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Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness: Statement of Janet Heinrich Director, Health Care--Public Health Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has found that federal agencies are participating in research and preparedness activities, from improving the detection of biological agents to developing a national stockpile of pharmaceuticals to treat victims of disasters. Federal agencies coordinate these activities on a formal and informal basis; for example, interagency work groups facilitate the process. Despite the efforts, however, coordination between agencies remain fragmented. In addition, the GAO has found emerging concerns about the preparedness of state and local jurisdictions, including insufficient state and local planning for response to terrorist events, inadequate public health infrastructure, a lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning, insufficient capabilities for treating mass casualties, and the timely availability of medical teams and resources in an emergency. This testimony summarizes the September 2001 report (GAO-01-915).
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-05
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Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies, Report to Congressional Requesters
The GAO examined how the U.S. government is organized to develop technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics. This report discusses (1) the roles, responsibilities, and authority of agencies that establish policy, provide funds or oversee funding requests, and develop explosives and narcotics detection technologies; (2) mechanisms used to coordinate the joint development of technologies; and (3) efforts to strengthen detection technology development. The FAA, Office of National Drug Control Policy, U.S. Customs Service, and DoD all play a part in the development of these detection technologies, however, the GAO found that these organization have yet to agree on standards for explosives detection systems, profiling and targeting systems, and deploying canine teams at airports. In addition, they have not agreed on how to resolve issues related to a joint-use strategy and liability. Moreover, key decisionmakers are not receiving periodic reports on efforts by the various government entities to develop and field explosives and narcotics detection technologies.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-04-15
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State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud, Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony Before the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, House of Representatives
At the time GAO issued its report in May 1996 (GAO/NSIAD-96-99), the State Department was attempting to make its visa-issuing process more efficient and less vulnerable to fraud by (1) issuing visas that were machine readable, (2) expanding automated name-check capability to all posts, (3) forming "lookout" committees to identify suspected terrorists and others ineligible for visas, and (4) strengthening compliance with management controls. Since then, the State Department's efforts to combat visa fraud at diplomatic posts by introducing a machine-readable visa system have been hampered by technical problems, a lack of cooperation from other government agencies, and weak management controls at many U.S. embassies.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-05-20
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Obstacles to U.S. Ability To Control and Track Weapons-Grade Uranium Supplied Abroad
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the ability of the United States to control and account for highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium supplied abroad. This report focuses on U.S. administrative controls, physical security reviews, international safeguards and the U.S. ability to keep track of exports of highly enriched uranium. Also addressed were U.S. efforts to develop a non-weapons-grade uranium fuel to be used as a substitute for highly enriched uranium.
The central computer system currently used by the Department of Energy (DOE) to track all U.S. highly enriched uranium exports to foreign countries is incomplete and inaccurate. Although DOE has been working to improve the information in the system, it has not used some readily available internal data. GAO believes that efforts to streamline and consolidate needed information are warranted. The United States attempts to regulate the exports of highly enriched uranium fuels with: (1) agreements for cooperation, (2) export licenses, and (3) subsequent arrangements made with other countries. To minimize the risks of having weapons-grade material accumulate abroad, DOE has the authority to accept returns of spent highly enriched uranium of U.S. origin from other nations. However, several factors relating to charges and shipping costs may be discouraging some nations from returning such fuel. The U.S. Government has become increasingly concerned with the physical security of highly enriched uranium due to the increase in terrorism. Current methods of conducting physical security reviews within nations receiving U.S. highly enriched uranium are inadequate due to the limitations placed on such reviews by foreign governments. However, officials stated that there is a growing effort to establish some universal safety standards. Nonproliferation efforts have centered around minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium by using a lower grade. GAO stated that a number of obstacles will have to be overcome if such a conversion is to occur.
United States. General Accounting Office
1982-08-02
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Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation Issues: Report to the Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison, U.S. Senate
The aviation industry and business traveler groups have proposed the registered traveler concept as a way to reduce long waits in airport security lines caused by heightened security screening measures implemented after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of November 2001 allows the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to consider developing a registered traveler program as a way to address these two issues. GAO completed this review to inform Congress and TSA of policy and implementation issues related to the concept of a registered traveler program. Under a variety of approaches related to the concept of a registered traveler program proposed by industry stakeholders, individuals who voluntarily provide personal background information and who clear background checks would be enrolled as registered travelers. Because these individuals would have been pre-screened through the program enrollment process, they would be entitled to expedited security screening procedures at the airport. Through a detailed literature review and interviews with stakeholders, GAO found that a registered traveler program is intended to reduce the inconvenience many travelers have experienced since September 11 and improve the quality and efficiency of airport security screening. Although GAO found support for this program among many stakeholders, GAO also found concerns that such a program could create new aviation security vulnerabilities.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-22
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Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs 1995-98), Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Committee on othe Judiciary, U.S. Senate
"The findings by the General Accounting Office (GAO) indicate that the amount of funds allocated and obligated by the FBI for counterterrorism-related activities more than doubled from fiscal years 1995 through 1998--from $256 million to $581 million. During this period, Congress directed or provided guidance to the FBI on the use of about one quarter of these funds, and the FBI has generally followed this direction in obligating the money. Although neither the (GAO) nor the FBI could precisely determine the amount of overall funds allocated and obligated by the FBI to carry out its counterterrorism mission, the FBI and the Justice Department have several efforts under way to better identify resources used by the FBI for counterterrorism-related activities. These include efforts (1) to specifically track certain counterterrorism funds; (2) to calculate the overall amount of funds associated with counterterrorism-related activities, including shared costs; and (3) to link the allocation of budget resources to annual and strategic plans, including specific counterterrorism-related performance measures. In addition, the FBI and the Justice Department plan to develop a methodology for reporting the full cost of program activities in compliance with established managerial cost-accounting standards."
United States. General Accounting Office
1998-11-20
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Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges: Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
"Since September 11, the safety and security of the nation's civil aviation system have taken on greater urgency. The General Accounting Office (GAO) found that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has assumed responsibility for aviation security and has focused on meeting congressionally mandated deadlines for strengthening aviation security: TSA has developed plans and implemented procedures for using federal employees to conduct security screening at more than 400 commercial airports, hired and begun to train nearly 4,000 key security personnel and has undertaken more rigorous background checks of workers with access to secure areas at airports. Overall, TSA faces immediate challenges in assuming responsibility for security in other modes of transportation, improving the performance of screeners, and addressing aviation security issues not covered by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act's current-year deadlines. TSA also faces long-term organizational challenges, including strategically managing its workforce, controlling costs, and sharing threat information."
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-25
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Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has Affected Some Development Projects: Report to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
The events of September 11, 2001 created several new challenges for the aviation industry in ensuring the safety and security of the national airport system. Chief among them is deciding to what extent Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grant funds should be used to finance the new security requirements at the nation's airports. Although many in the aviation industry believe that funding security projects has become even more important in the aftermath of September 11, they also recognize the need to continue funding other airport development projects, such as those designed to enhance capacity in the national airport system. During fiscal year 2002, the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) awarded a total of $561 million, 17 percent of the $3.3 billion available for grants, in AIP grant funds to airports for security projects related to the events of September 11, 2001. This amount is the largest amount awarded to airports for security projects in a single year since the program began in 1982. Based on data provided by FAA, all of the security projects funded with AIP grants since the events of September 11, 2001, met the legislative and program eligibility requirements.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-10-15
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Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat
Fears of anthrax, smallpox, and plague pervade the American consciousness, fueled by reports that some of the plane hijackers involved in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks had specific interest in crop duster aircraft that could be used to disseminate aerosols of pathogens. Because of this, the Nation is stepping up its defenses against bio-terrorism. Nevertheless, little attention has been given to agricultural bio-warfare and bio-terrorism or to the roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors in deterring and responding to potential attacks. This point is exemplified in a General Accounting Office (GAO) report on combating terrorism released 9 days after the attacks of September 11. The report did not address threats to American agriculture, nor did it involve participation by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). This paper examines the threat of agricultural bio-terrorism and outlines a plan to counter this threat.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Parker, Henry S.
2002-03
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Maritime Access: Do Defenders Hold All the Cards?
National security strategy depends on sustaining access to world markets for American commerce in peacetime and for the Armed Forces to various parts of the globe in times of crisis or war. Potential nation-state adversaries understand the importance of this access and are devising strategies and investing in systems to delay, discredit, or deny U.S. entry to those regions of vital interest where they wish to become the dominant power. Most of these regions are adjacent to international waters where American naval forces freely operate today. Naval forces provide a valuable degree of sovereign and secure access in a strategic environment in which overseas land bases are becoming increasingly restricted politically and vulnerable militarily. The mobility and layered defensive capabilities of American warships, particularly those operating in carrier battle groups, make them the hardest of all tactical forces for an adversary to find, target, and effectively strike with anti-access systems, such as cruise or ballistic missiles. Mobility also keeps ships from being vulnerable to ballistic missiles and makes accurate, long-range targeting of anti-ship cruise missiles a great operational challenge. Moreover, the latest generation of weapon systems for defense against submarines and cruise missiles is extremely effective against the current and projected systems of potential adversaries. These defensive systems are fielded on many, but not all, U.S. ships because of budget constraints and past estimates that likely adversaries had minimal naval capabilities. As national strategy changes to one that accounts for more demanding anti-access threats, the technology and operational skill will become available to sustain assured access for American naval forces.
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Barber, III, Arthur H.; Gilmore, Delwyn L.
2001-10
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Building Security: Interagency Security Committee Has Had Limited Success in Fulfilling its Responsibilities, Report to Congressional Requesters
GAO reviewed efforts by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) to protect critical federal infrastructure since the committee was created in 1995. ISC is chaired by the General Services Administration (GSA) and comprises 14 department-level agencies and other executive agencies and officials. ISC's primary responsibilities are to (1) establish policies for security in and protection of federal facilities; (2) develop and evaluate security standards for federal facilities, develop a strategy for ensuring compliance with such standards, and oversee the implementation of appropriate security measures in federal facilities; and (3) take the steps necessary to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security and protection of federal facilities. ISC has made little or no progress in developing and establishing policies for security in and protection of federal facilities, developing a strategy for ensuring compliance with security standards, overseeing the implementation of appropriate security in federal facilities, and developing a centralized security database of all federal facilities. Several factors have limited ISC's progress, including (1) the lack of consistent and aggressive leadership by GSA, (2) inadequate staff support and funding for ISC, and (3) ISC's difficulty in making decisions. The creation of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would have significant implications for ISC and its responsibilities.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-09-17
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Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism Abroad, Report to Congressional Requesters
This report is intended to assist Congressional committees in overseeing the State Department's leadership of U.S. programs to combat terrorism abroad.
Specifically, this report identifies the State Department's programs and
activities intended to (1) prevent terrorist attacks, (2) disrupt and destroy
terrorist organizations, (3) respond to terrorist incidents, and (4)
coordinate efforts to combat terrorism. Footnotes to this report identify
programs and activities managed by the U.S. Agency for International
Development that complement the State Department's efforts to combat
terrorism abroad.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-09-06
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Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, Statement of Peter Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate
In considering the federal government's role in funding
transit safety and security initiatives, several issues will need to be
addressed, including (1) developing federal funding criteria, (2)
determining the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, and (3)
selecting the appropriate federal policy instruments to deliver assistance
that may be deemed necessary by policymakers (e.g., grants, tax
incentives, etc.).
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-09-18
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Diffuse Security Threats: USPS Air Filtration Systems Need More Testing and Cost Benefit Analysis Before Implementation, Report to Congressional Committees
Following the anthrax attacks of October 2001, the United States Postal Service (USPS) has started to look at various technologies that could be implemented in the event of another bioterror attack. The high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration system is being used as a prototype at two facilities and is planned for implementation throughout the country. HEPA filtering technology is the state-of-the-art technology for the removal of particulate biohazards and other particles of micron-sized range. USPS has not adequately tested the HEPA filtration system to confirm that it will meet its intended purpose of trapping anthrax spores and its secondary purpose of cleaning the mail processing equipment. USPS's testing has not shown conclusively (1) the HEPA filtration system's ability to trap released hazards and other contaminants, and (2) what level of hazards or contaminants could be released into the mail processing environment as a result of the air filtration system's design. Furthermore, USPS has not verified through testing that the air filtration system will not interfere with the air sampling and detection equipment. Even though HEPA filtration systems could reduce the risk of exposure to biohazards, they may negate the benefits of other technologies being considered by USPS to protect its employees and customers in the event of another anthrax attack. Finally, the design and installation of the HEPA filtration system requires custom modification to USPS equipment nationwide and will likely cost more than USPS projected in its Emergency Preparedness Plan.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-08-22
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Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further Improvement, Report to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
This report updates the status of corrective measures taken by federal agencies to address internal control weaknesses that could affect the United States' ability to effectively respond to chemical or biological terrorist attacks. GAO, which cited these weaknesses in 1999, found that the agencies have significantly improved accountability over the medical supplies needed to treat victims of chemical or biological terrorism. However, ensuring that supplies are current, accounted for, and readily available depends in large part on successful collaboration with other entities. Until the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Office for Emergency Preparedness (OEP) formalize ad hoc arrangements with other entities covering the storage, management, stock rotation, and transporting of supplies, they run the risk that, in the event of a chemical or biological attack, the appropriate supplies will be unavailable. Also, unless the agencies' inventory requirements lists are up-to-date and reflect their own identified needs, the agencies cannot guarantee that they have the supplies on hand to fulfill their mission.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-03-30
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Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating Preparedness and Response, Report to Congressional Requesters
GAO reviewed the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) actions to improve its capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents based on its response to lessons learned from the Oklahoma City bombing, requirements in Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62, and its own guidance. Specifically, GAO determined the extent to which FEMA has (1) incorporated the lessons learned from the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, (2) ensured the preparedness of states and federal agencies to respond to terrorist incidents, and (3) ensured that states' plans are tested through exercises. GAO found that FEMA (1) has made across the board improvements in those areas identified as needing action after the Oklahoma City bombing, (2) updated the Federal Response Plan to address how federal agencies, states, and localities would work together to respond to an act of terrorism, and (3) assessed states' capabilities for consequence management in 1995 and set up a system to continue monitoring those capabilities.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-03-20
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Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response, Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
This testimony discusses three bills that would change the overall leadership and management of programs to combat terrorism. The three bills--H.R. 525, H.R. 1158, and H.R. 1292--vary in scope. H.R. 525 focuses on federal programs to prepare state and local governments for domestic terrorist attacks. Both H.R. 1158 and H.R. 1292 focus on the larger issue of homeland security, which includes terrorism and additional threats such as military attacks. The bills are similar in that they all advocate a single focal point for programs to combat terrorism. However, some bills place the focal point in the Executive Office of the President and others place it with a lead executive agency. In addition, the three bills provide the focal point with different, but often similar, duties to improve the management of federal programs. To the extent that these three bills--or some hybrid of them--address these problem areas, GAO believes that federal programs to combat terrorism will be improved. It will be important to
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-04-24
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Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
This testimony discusses the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 (H.R. 525). To improve federal efforts to help state and local personnel prepare for domestic terrorist attacks, H.R. 525 would create a single focal point for policy and coordination--the President's Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness--within the White House. The new council would include the President, several cabinet secretaries, and other selected high-level officials. H.R. 525 would (1) create an executive director position with a staff that would collaborate with other executive agencies to assess threats, (2) require the new council to develop a national strategy, (3) require the new council to analyze and review budgets, and (4) require the new council to oversee implementation among the different federal agencies. Other proposals before Congress would also create a single focal point for terrorism. Some of these proposals place the focal point in the Executive Office of the President and others place it in a lead executive agency. Both locations have advantages and disadvantages.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-05-09
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Leaders as Targets
Targeting of threat leaders by military strikes is increasingly being touted as an option for crisis resolution. Operational and strategic level commanders face greater pressure than ever to employ this option. A survey of the legitimacy, capability, and efficacy of targeting enemy leaders shows that commanders may have the right and ability to target threat leaders. However, the lack of positive effects for such targeting, both in theory and in practice, argues that commanders should not pursue this approach. Today, the United States is using all elements of national power to wage war on terrorism. Polls indicate that the American public supports this war. Moreover, these polls also suggest that the public looks favorably on possible efforts to target and kill the terrorist Al Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden. This is not an unusual attitude for the American people, who also have responded positively in questions about possible use of military force against Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to remove him from power. This attitude also draws attention to the notion of leadership targeting as an option for operational and strategic-level military commanders, when they plan the use of military power in crisis resolution. Belligerents in modern history have generally balked at specific military targeting of threat leaders, but polls suggest that, at least in the United States, a military strike against a threat leader could be an approved solution to crisis resolution.
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.)
Chakwin, Mark B.; Voelkel, Dieter; Enright, Scott
2002-09-06
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Homeland Defense [bibliography]
This bibliography, compiled by the Joint Staff College Library, contains a list of books and documents, periodicals, doctrine and directives, laws, and electronic resources related to homeland defense. Call numbers are provided for books and documents, and links are provided for online access when available.
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.)
2002-01
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How the Bush Doctrine of Preemptive Strike Meets the Test of the Powell Doctrine
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 drastically changed American perceptions of national defense. With the possible exception of the communist states' developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems, no other event has so fundamentally challenged the American sense of security since the United States emerged from World War II as a superpower. As the Bush Administration grapples with the related issues of transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it has turned its focus on the state of Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein. Although there appears to be only tenuous evidence linking Hussein to the events of September 11, the administration's concern is that the Iraqi WMD program, in particular its nuclear weapons program, will be used to covertly arm terrorist organizations for attack against the United States or its allies. As the public debate continues on how to pursue the Global War on Terrorism and what role, if any, Iraq will play in that war, the President has concluded that the United States cannot afford to wait for its enemies to develop and proliferate weapons of mass destruction before acting.
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.)
Brown, Herb, 1931-; Bowlin, Mark L.; Sheltz, Scott C.
2002-09-06
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Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63 [White Paper]
"This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration's policy on critical infrastructure protection. It is intended for dissemination to all interested parties in both the private and public sectors. It will also be used in U.S. Government professional education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on interagency practices and procedures. Wide dissemination of this unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all agencies of the U.S. Government."
United States. National Domestic Preparedness Office
1998-05-22
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Review and Assessment of United States Strategy to Combat Terrorism
The striking difference between the terrorism on September 11, 2001 (9/11), and previous terrorist events was the magnitude and success of these attacks in a society where it never happened before. In response, the Bush administration is leading a worldwide campaign against terrorism. Using unclassified sources, this research project reviews and assesses United States strategy to combat terrorism. The strength in evolving U.S. strategy to combat terrorism lies in its dependence on all elements of national power ranging from diplomacy, international cooperation and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement and military force. These initiatives should be continued. This paper will discuss the strengths and deficiencies of selected elements in U.S. counter-terrorism policy and recommend changes to increase effectiveness of U.S. strategy to combat terrorism. Overall, the U.S. strategy appears to be effective. However, specific elements in U.S. strategy - organizations to combat terrorism, diplomatic policy to strike at roots of terrorism anti-Americanism, intelligence collection, allied and coalition involvement in counter-terrorism, use of the military, border controls, the media, and WMD nonproliferation - must be improved in order to make it more effective.
Army War College (U.S.)
Rainer, Richard A., Jr.
2002-04-09
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Strategic Level Center of Gravity Analysis on the Global War on Terrorism
The key to any successful strategic campaign begins with an analysis of both the friendly and threat strategic center of gravity. This analysis drives the development of the campaign plan by familiarizing planners with an understanding of how both belligerents organize, fight, and make decisions. Consequently, the improper identification or miscalculation of the center of gravity will lead to the misapplication of the elements of national power and ultimately to a campaign plan that will not meet the stated strategic objectives. The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, to determine a workable definition of terrorism and how this definition applies to the new religiously based terrorism the world witnessed on 11 September; second, to conduct a comprehensive strategic level center of gravity analysis that will identify the relative strength and weaknesses of the U.S. led coalition and the al Qaeda terrorist network and; third, to present potential friendly and enemy response strategies.
Army War College (U.S.)
Reilly, James E.
2002-04-09
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Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management
"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) serves as the federal government's principal agency for responding to and investigating terrorism. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI have elevated counterterrorism and the prevention of future attacks against U.S. interests as the paramount mission of the Department of Justice (Department) and, specifically, the FBI. As a result, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated an audit to review certain aspects of the FBI's management of its counterterrorism resources. Our audit focused specifically on: (1) the FBI's progress toward developing a national-level risk assessment of the terrorist threat to the United States; (2) whether the FBI's strategic planning process provides a sound basis to identify counterterrorism requirements; and (3) the amount of resources dedicated to the FBI's counterterrorism program from 1995 to April 2002. In addition, the audit assessed the FBI's management of its training and after-action reporting as they relate to counterterrorism operations. This audit does not assess all aspects of the FBI's counterterrorism program or how the FBI or other law enforcement and intelligence agencies handled information that may have been related to terrorist activities that resulted in the September 11 attacks."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2002-09
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 1796: Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act
"S. 1796 would enable victims of Iranian terrorism who have won judgments against Iran in U.S. courts to collect monetary damages from that country--primarily by obtaining certain funds currently held by the U.S. government. Although the bill would pertain to victims of other nations that sponsor terrorism, CBO does not expect that any budgetary effects would result from judgments against other nations. Enactment of S. 1796 could result in savings in later years if future disbursements that would otherwise have to be made under current law were reduced because of the payments made in 2001. CBO has no basis for estimating these effects--if any--because they would depend on future decisions of the international Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the responses of the United States and Iran to these decisions."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2000-05-03
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3448: Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
"H.R. 3448, enacted as Public Law 107-188, provides the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Agriculture with new authorities to regulate the possession, use, and transfer of certain biological agents and toxins. The act includes assessments of civil penalties of up to $500,000 for violations of the regulations. In addition, the act creates criminal penalties for unlawful possession and unauthorized transfers of certain biological
agents and toxins. Violators can be fined or imprisoned for up to five years, or both. The new criminal penalties will be deposited as revenues into the Crime Victims Fund and spent in subsequent years as direct spending. CBO estimates that the increase in civil and criminal penalties will not be significant in any year."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2002-07-08
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Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 10th Anniversary Issue
Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 1997, published by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DS/DSS/ITA), is intended to provide a comprehensive picture of the broad spectrum of political violence that American citizens and interests have encountered abroad during 1997. In addition to examining terrorism-related acts, this study also includes other instances of violence affecting Americans. This chronology is designed to encompass major anti-U.S. incidents that occurred in 1997.
United States. Department of State
1997
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Global Threats and Challenges
Statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency regarding the Post-September 11 Security Environment.
United States. Department of Defense
2002-02-06
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Defense Security Service Survival Handbook: The Basic Security Procedures Necessary for Keeping You Out of Trouble
As we are well aware, there are a multitude of security practices and procedures that must be followed in
order to protect classified materials. The sheer volume of procedures can be intimidating to anyone. This pamphlet describes the basic security procedures that we should know to keep us out of trouble when handling classified materials on a daily basis. Be sure to contact your local security office for more detailed
information on these and other pertinent security procedures.
United States. Defense Security Service
1997-03
