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Transnational Crime: Legal and Policy Implications of Direct U.S. Military Action Against Non-State Actors
Transnational crime, to include terrorism, drug trafficking, alien smuggling, etc., constitutes one of the most serious threats to U.S. security interests at home and abroad. To a great extent, transnational crimes are committed by non-state actors. The U.S. response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 has included direct action by military forces against the non-state actors believed to be responsible for the attacks. The President has stated that once we have dealt with those directly responsible for the 11 September attacks, our "war" on terrorism will continue against other terrorist organizations with a global reach. This paper will examine the legal aspects of U.S. military action conducted outside the U.S. against non-state actors involved in transnational crime. It will analyze the international law framework to determine the authority for, and limitations of, U.S. military action in this context and then assess the implications for U.S. national security strategy.
Army War College (U.S.)
Katkow, Mark J.
2002-04-09
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Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information, Report to Congressional Requesters
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government's need to locate aliens in the United States was considerably heightened. Without reliable alien address information, the government is impeded in its ability to find aliens who represent a national security threat or who could help with the nation's anti-terrorism efforts. Requesters from both the Senate and House asked GAO to review the reliability of INS's alien address information and identify the ways it could be improved. Recent events have shown that INS's alien address information could not be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were of interest to the United States. For example, the Department of Justice sought to locate and interview 4,112 aliens who were believed to be in the country and who might have knowledge that would assist the nation in its anti-terrorism efforts. However, as shown below, almost half of these aliens could not be located and interviewed because INS lacked reliable address information. The reliability of INS's alien address information is contingent, in part, on aliens' compliance with the requirement that they notify INS of any change of address. However, lack of publicity about the requirement that aliens should file change of address notifications, no enforcement of penalties for noncompliance, and inadequate processing procedures for changes of address also contribute to INS's alien address information being unreliable. Because INS does not publicize the change of address requirement, some aliens may not be aware of it and may not comply with it. Alternatively, some aliens who are aware of the requirement may not comply because they do not wish to be located. These aliens have little incentive to comply given that INS does not enforce the penalties for noncompliance. On the basis of our review of available data, INS does not appear to have enforced the removal penalty for noncompliance since the early 1970s. When aliens do comply with the requirement, INS lacks adequate processing procedures and controls to ensure that the alien address information it receives is recorded in all automated databases. Addressing these problems should help improve the reliability of INS's alien address information but would not necessarily result in a system that would allow INS to reliably locate all aliens, because some aliens will not likely comply. INS has recognized the need to increase the reliability of its alien address information and is taking some steps to improve it.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-21
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Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies: By the Comptroller General of the United States
The early years of the 21st century are proving to be a period of profound transition for our world, our country, and our government. The federal government needs to engage in a comprehensive review, reassessment, re-prioritization, and as appropriate, re-engineering of what the government does, how it does business, and in some cases, who does the government's business. Leading public and private organizations in the United States and abroad have found that for organizations to successfully transform themselves they must often fundamentally change their culture. On September 24, 2001, GAO convened a forum to identify and discuss useful practices and lessons learned from major private and public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations that federal agencies could implement to successfully transform their cultures and a new Department of Homeland Security could use to merge its various originating components into a unified department. The invited participants have experience managing or studying large-scale organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. There are a number of key practices that have consistently been found at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations and can serve as a basis for subsequent consideration as federal agencies seek to transform their cultures in response to governance challenges. These practices to (1) ensure top leadership drives the transformation, (2) establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, (3) focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation, (4) set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one, (5) dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process, (6) use the performance management system to define responsibility and assure accountability for change, (7) establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress, (8) involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation, and (9) build a world-class organization.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-14
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Homeland Security: CDC's Oversight of the Select Agent Program
In the wake of anthrax incidents and mounting concerns about the potential for another bioterrorism attack, we assessed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) oversight of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Laboratory Registration/ Select Agent Transfer Program. We brought program weaknesses we identified to the immediate attention of CDC and HHS officials, who agreed that improvements were warranted. The purpose of this report is to summarize our findings. As the agency responsible for identifying and controlling biological agents that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, CDC can improve its management of the Select Agent Program to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access to biological agents. During the course of our review, we identified and brought to the immediate attention of CDC and HHS officials areas in which program oversight could be strengthened, including inspection and approval of facilities and monitoring of the transfer and shipment of select agents. To better position CDC to reasonably ensure that appropriate security and safety protections are in place for select agents, we made recommendations aimed at establishing proper internal control in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 over the Select Agent Program.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-22
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Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, 42 executive branch positions at 31 executive branch agencies--including all 14 Cabinet secretaries, four deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly heads of agencies)--had security protection. Personnel from 27 different agencies protected them: 36 officials by their own agencies or departments and six from other agencies or departments, such as the Secret Service and the Marshals Service. Protective personnel increased 73 percent from fiscal year 1997 through 1999. Funding rose from $19.1 million in 1997 to $28.5 million in 1999, largely due to increased travel. Only the Secret Service and State Department have specific statutory authority to protect executive branch officials. Agencies reported that their officials received different levels and frequency of protection and that protection was needed to respond to possible and actual threats. Most agencies favored establishing a repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information about their officials. Also, agencies reported that their protective personnel received different amounts of protection training and from different sources. Field staff received less training than did the agencies' full-time personnel based in Washington. Most agencies favored establishing a standardized protection training program. Most agencies opposed centralizing security protection under one agency. No single agency or official is responsible for handling issues relating to routine protection of executive branch officials. This fragmentation has serious implications because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat assessments documenting the level of protection needed makes it difficult to determine the basis for and reasonableness of protection being given. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials by Bernard L. Ungar, Director of Government Business Operations and Robert H. Hast, Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177, July 27 (10 pages).
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-11
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Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials, Statement of Bernard L. Ungar, Director, Government Business Operations Issues, General Government Division and Robert H. Hast, Acting Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, 42 executive branch positions at 31 executive branch agencies--including all 14 Cabinet secretaries, four deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly heads of agencies)--had security protection. Personnel from 27 different agencies protected them: 36 officials by their own agencies or departments and six from other agencies or departments, such as the Secret Service and the Marshals Service. Most agencies favored establishing a repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information about their officials. Also, agencies reported that their protective personnel received different amounts of protection training and from different sources. Most agencies opposed centralizing security protection under one agency. No single agency or official is responsible for handling issues relating to routine protection of executive branch officials. This fragmentation has serious implications because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat assessments documenting the level of protection needed makes it difficult to determine the basis for and reasonableness of protection being given. This testimony summarizes the July 2000 report, GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-27
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Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes
Multilateral export control regimes are consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. GAO found weaknesses that impede the ability of the multilateral export control regimes to achieve their nonproliferation goals. The regimes cannot effectively limit or monitor efforts by countries of concern to acquire sensitive technology without more complete and timely reporting of licensing information and without information on when and how members adopt and implement agreed-upon export controls. The United
States seeks to improve the effectiveness of these regimes. GAO was asked to (1) assess weaknesses of the four regimes and (2) identify obstacles faced in
trying to strengthen them.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-10-25
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Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
The September 11th attacks affected the scope of activities of many federal agencies, including the Coast Guard. Homeland security, a long-standing but
relatively small part of the Coast Guard's duties, took center stage. Still, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions, such as helping stem the flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing
grounds, and responding to marine pollution. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's current efforts and future plans for balancing resource levels among its
many missions.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-12
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Chemical Weapons: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Needs Comprehensive Plan to Correct Budgeting Weaknesses. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is responsible for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the use of chemical weapons and requires their elimination. In this report, GAO assessed the accuracy of the organization's budget and the impact of budget shortfalls on program activities. GAO also reviewed efforts to improve the organization's budget planning. Since its establishment in 1997, the ability of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to carry out key inspection functions has been hindered by inaccurate budget projections and, more recently, budget deficits. Its budgets have recorded as income nearly $1 million in unpaid assessments owed by 30 member states. The budgets have also overestimated reimbursement payments for inspections conducted in member states with chemical weapons-related facilities. Weak budgeting practices and budget deficits have affected the organization's ability to perform inspection activities as mandated by the Chemical Weapons Convention. The organization had to reduce the number of inspections it conducted in 2001 and plans to reduce the number it conducts in 2002. Although the organization and the State Department have taken some steps to address the budget problems, the organization has not developed a comprehensive plan to overcome its inherent budgeting weaknesses. Unless the organization improves its planning, GAO believes budget shortfalls will continue to affect its ability to conduct inspections. Furthermore, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of State should: (1) work with the organization to develop a comprehensive plan to improve budget projections and income collection, and (2) report annually to Congress on the organization's progress in correcting its budgeting weaknesses.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-10-24
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Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations, Report to the Chairman, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, domestic military installations increased their antiterrorism measures to their highest levels. These measures were reduced in the weeks following the attacks, but because of the persistent nature of the threat, the antiterrorism posture at domestic installations remains at a higher than normal level more than 1 year later. The Department of Defense's (DOD) budget request for fiscal year 2003 includes more than $10 billion for combating terrorism activities, which includes a substantial increase in funding for antiterrorism measures to safeguard personnel and strategic issues. The commands do not always require documentation of the assessments, and they do not periodically evaluate the assessment methodology used at each installation to determine the thoroughness of the analysis or the consistency with required assessment methodology.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-01
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Homeland Security: Department of Justice's Response to Its Congressional Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry Vulnerabilities
Congress passed the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act after a number of testimonies expressing concerns about the vulnerability of chemical facilities to criminal and terrorist attacks. According to the Attorney General's interim report, chemical facilities visited generally had safety and emergency response measures that could mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack. The interim report also contains nine preliminary findings that cumulatively address the other required reporting elements--the vulnerability of facilities to criminal and terrorist activity, current industry site security practices, and the security of chemicals being transported. These findings address the extent to which 11 facilities conducted facility security assessments, had the capability to respond to armed attacks, conducted emergency response exercises, conducted routine pre-employment background investigations, had secure process control systems, had secure chemical transportation containers, had adequate security measures over transportation of hazardous chemicals, received meaningful threat information, and had effective facility security systems.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-10-10
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Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, Report to Congressional Committees
As concerns about terrorism have grown, Executive Branch responsibilities and authorities have received greater attention, which led to the 1998 appointment of a national coordinator in the National Security Council. The President recently requested that the Vice President oversee a coordinated national effort to improve national preparedness, including efforts to combat terrorism.
Federal efforts to develop a national strategy to combat terrorism and related guidance have progressed, but key efforts remain incomplete. The first step toward developing a national strategy is to conduct a national threat and risk assessment. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have collaborated on such an assessment, but they have not formally coordinated with other departments and agencies on this task. Under current policy, the federal government also has improved its capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are tasked with leading federal efforts in their respective roles for managing a terrorist crisis and the consequences of an incident. Federal assistance to state and local governments to prepare for terrorist incidents has resulted in training for thousands of first responders--those state and local officials who would first respond at the scene of an incident. To protect computer systems and the critical operations and infrastructures they support, various efforts have been undertaken to implement a national strategy outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 63. Specifically, federal agencies have taken initial steps to develop critical infrastructure protection plans, but independent audits continue to identify persistent, significant information security weaknesses that place federal operations at high risk of tampering and disruption.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-20
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Protecting Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning Capabilities, Statement of Joel C. Willemssen, Managing Director, Information Technology Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that continue to put critical operations and assets at risk. New information security provisions introduced by Congress will be a major catalyst for federal agencies to improve their security program management. To help maintain the momentum that the new information security reform provisions have generated, federal agencies must act quickly to implement strong security program management. A key element of the strategy outlined in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 was establishing the National Infrastructure Protection Center as "a national focal point" for gathering information on threats and facilitating the federal government's response to computer-based incidents. The center has begun critical infrastructure protection efforts to establish a foundation for future governmentwide efforts. However, the analytical and information-sharing capabilities that PDD 63 asserts are needed to protect the nation's critical infrastructures have not yet been achieved.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-12
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Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, Report to Congressional Requesters
U.S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year in both passenger planes and all-cargo planes. Typically, about one-half of the hull of each passenger aircraft is filled with cargo. As a result, any vulnerabilities in the air cargo security system potentially threaten the entire air transport system. GAO agreed to determine the security vulnerabilities that have been identified in the air cargo system, the status of key recommendations that have been made since 1990 to improve air cargo security, and ways in which air cargo security can be improved in the near-and long-term.
Numerous government and industry studies have identified vulnerabilities in the air cargo system. These vulnerabilities occur in the security procedures of some air carriers and freight forwarders and in possible tampering with freight at various handoffs that occur from the point when cargo leaves a shipper to the point when it is loaded onto an aircraft. As a result, any weaknesses in this program could create security risks. FAA or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which now has responsibility for ensuring air cargo security, has implemented a number of key recommendations and mandates to improve air cargo security made since 1990 by numerous government organizations. For example, FAA and the air cargo industry developed security training guides for air carriers and ground personnel who handle air cargo. However, a few recommendations by those groups, such as conducting research and operational tests of technology to screen cargo for explosives, are ongoing and not yet completed by TSA, or have not been implemented. Federal reports, industry groups, and security experts have identified operational and technological measures that have the potential to improve air cargo security in the near-term. Examples of the measures include checking the identity of individuals making cargo deliveries and implementing a computerized cargo profiling system. In addition, long-term improvements, such as developing a comprehensive cargo-security plan, have been recommended by the above sources, but not implemented by TSA. Each potential improvement measure, however, needs to be weighed against other issues, such as costs and the effects on the flow of cargo. Without a comprehensive plan that incorporates a risk management approach and sets deadlines and performance targets, TSA and other federal decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible in implementing measures to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-12-20
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Information Security: Code Red, Code Red II, and SirCam Attacks Highlight Need for Proactive Measures, Statement of Keith A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Organizations and individuals have recently had to contend with particularly vexing computer attacks. The most notable is Code Red, but potentially more damaging are Code Red II and SirCam. Together, these attacks have infected millions of computer users, shut down websites, slowed Internet service, and disrupted businesses and government operations. They have already caused billions of dollars of damage, and their full effects have yet to be completely assessed. Code Red and Code Red II are both "worms," which are attacks that propagate themselves through networks without any user intervention or interaction. Both take advantage of a flaw in a component of versions 4.0 and 5.0 of Microsoft's Internet Information Services Web server software. SirCam is a malicious computer virus that spreads primarily through E-mail. Once activated on an infected computer, the virus searches through a select folder and mails user files acting as a "Trojan horse" to E-mail addresses in the user's address book. In addition to spreading, the virus can delete a victim's hard drive or fill the remaining free space on the hard drive, making it impossible to save files or print. On July 19, 2001, the Code Red worm infected more than 250,000 systems in just nine hours, causing more than $2.4 billion in economic losses. SirCam is allegedly responsible for the leaking of secret documents from the Ukrainian government. U.S. government agencies do not have an effective information security program to prevent and respond to these attacks and often lack effective access controls to their computer resources and consequently cannot protect these assets against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure. However, several agencies have taken significant steps to redesign and strengthen their information security programs. Also, Congress recently enacted legislation to provide a comprehensive framework for establishing and ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over information resources that support federal operations and assets.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-08-29
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Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
The United States now faces increasingly diverse threats that put great destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and individuals. These threats range from cyber attacks on critical infrastructure to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction or infectious diseases. Efforts to combat this threat will involve federal agencies as well as state and local governments, the private sector, and private citizens. GAO believes that the federal government must address three fundamental needs. First, the government needs clearly defined and effective leadership with a clear vision carry out and implement a homeland security strategy and the ability to marshal the necessary resources to get the job done. Second, a national homeland security strategy should be based on a comprehensive assessment of national threats and risks. Third, the many organizations that will be involved in homeland security must have clearly articulated roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms. Any strategy for homeland security must reduce risk where possible, assess the nation's vulnerabilities, and identify the critical infrastructure most in need of protection. To be comprehensive, the strategy should include steps to use intelligence assets or other means to identify attackers and prevent attacks before they occur, harden potential targets to minimize the damage from an attack, and effectively manage the consequences of an incident.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-21
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Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation's Airports, Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and myriad programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the horrendous events on September 11, 2001, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined. As reported last year, GAO's review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own security requirements. Specifically, FAA had not ensured that ATC buildings and facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were protected, and that the contractors who access these systems had undergone background checks. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. GAO's special agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk unescorted to aircraft departure gates. Tests of screeners revealed significant weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage. Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--countries whose systems GAO has examined--differ from this country's in some significant ways. Their screening operations require more extensive qualifications and training for screeners, include higher pay and better benefits, and often include different screening techniques, such as "pat-downs" of some passengers.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-20
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Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning Screening Responsibilities, Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and a myriad of programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system. Some key security issues include airport access controls, passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and alternatives to current screening practices, including practices in selected other countries. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. In May of 2000, special agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates. In June 2000, testing of screeners showed that significant, long-standing weaknesses--measured by the screeners' abilities to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage--continue to exist.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-21
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Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics, Report to Congressional Requesters
Aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex and costly mix of intelligence, procedures, and technologies. Since 1978, federal agencies have spent about $246 million for research and development on explosives detection technologies and nearly $100 million on narcotics detection technologies. Most of this spending has taken place since 1990, in response to congressional directives, and have been for technologies to screen checked baggage, trucks, and containers. Difficult trade-offs must be made when considering whether to use detection technologies for a given application--chief among them the extent to which intelligence-gathering and procedures can substitute for expensive technology. Some technologies are very effective and could be deployed today, but they are expensive, slow the flow of commerce, and raise issues of worker safety. Other technologies are more widely used but are less reliable, while still others are in the development stage and may not be available for years. Some countries have already deployed advanced explosive and narcotics detection equipment, and the United States may be able to learn from their experiences. The Federal Aviation Administration estimates that use of the best available procedures and technologies to beef up aviation security could cost as much as $6 billion during the next 10 years--the equivalent of a $1.30 surcharge on a one-way ticket.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-09-04
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Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director Defense Information and Financial Management Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Computer attacks at the Defense Department (DoD) pose increasing risks of access to highly sensitive information. Recent data suggest that DoD may have experienced as many as 250,000 attacks last year. These attacks are often successful, and the number of attacks is doubling each year as Internet use increases and hackers become more sophisticated. At a minimum, these attacks are a multimillion dollar nuisance to the Pentagon. At worst, they pose a serious threat to national security. Attackers have seized control of entire DoD systems, some of which control critical functions, such as weapons system research and development, logistics, and finance. Attackers have also stolen, modified, and destroyed data and software. The potential for catastrophic damage is great. The DoD is taking steps to address this growing problem but faces major challenges in controlling unauthorized access to its computer systems. Moreover, the DoD is now trying to react to successful attacks as it learns of them, but it has no uniform policy for assessing risks, protecting its systems, responding to incidents, or assessing damage. Training of users and system and network administrators is haphazard and constrained by limited resources. Technical solutions, such as firewalls, smart cards, and network monitoring systems, should help, but their success depends on whether DoD implements them in tandem with better policy and personnel measures.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-05-22
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Chemical and Biological Defense: DoD Needs to Clarify Expectations in Medical Readiness, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Public assessments by Department of Defense (DoD) officials have emphasized the seriousness of the military threat from chemical and biological (CB) weapons. However, neither DoD nor the services have systematically examined the adequacy of the current specialty mix of medical personnel for CB defense. Although some of the services have begun to review the adequacy of staffing of deployable medical units that would manage the consequences of chemical warfare scenarios, they have not done so for biological warfare scenarios. Joint protocols for treating CB casualties have recently been completed, but the services have not yet agreed on which health care providers should provide treatment. Relatively few military health care providers are trained to a standard of proficiency in providing care to CB casualties. The service surgeons general have begun integrating chemical and a few biological scenarios into their medical exercises, but no realistic field exercise of medical support for CB warfare had been concluded. DOD and the services have not fully addressed weaknesses and gaps in modeling, planning, training, tracking, or proficiency testing for the treatment of CB casualties. The resulting medical structure has not been rigorously tested for its capacity to deliver the required medical support. As a result, medical readiness for CB scenarios cannot be ensured.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-19
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Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and Long-Term National Needs, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives
The United States now confronts a range of diffuse threats that put increased destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and individuals. These threats include terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure and computer systems, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of infectious diseases. Addressing these challenges will require leadership to develop and implement a homeland security strategy in coordination with all relevant partners, and to marshal and direct the necessary resources. The recent establishment of the Office of Homeland Security is a good first step, but questions remain about how this office will be structured, what authority its Director will have, and how this effort can be institutionalized and sustained over time. Although homeland security is an urgent and vital national priority, the United States still must address short-term and long-term fiscal challenges that were present before September 11.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-07
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Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical and Biological Preparedness: Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Since the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the terrorist threat has risen to the top of the national agenda. Preparing for all possible contingencies is impractical, so a risk management approach should be used. This would include a threat assessment to determine which chemical or biological agents are of greatest concern. The federal government has various programs to prepare for and respond to chemical and biological terrorism, including response teams, support laboratories, training and equipment programs, and research efforts. Evaluations of chemical and biological preparedness have identified several problems and their solutions. Congress faces competing demands for spending as it seeks to invest resources to better prepare our nation for chemical and biological terrorism. Given the uncertainty of the chemical and biological threat, Congress may want to initially invest resources in efforts with broad applicability rather than in those that are applicable to a specific type of chemical or biological attack.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-17
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Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA's Role in Strengthening Federal Preparedness, Statement of Cynthia A. Bascetta Director, Health Care--Veterans' Health and Benefits Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House of Representatives
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) aims to provide backup medical resources to the military health system and local communities. VA supports federal agencies that provide lead responsibilities for responding to disasters, including terrorism. The areas of responsibility also include disaster simulation exercises and maintaining medical stockpiles. VA's efforts in these areas have enhanced national emergency preparedness by improving medical response procedures and by strengthening the security of federal pharmaceutical stockpiles to ensure rapid response to local authorities. VA has resources that could play a role in future federal homeland security efforts. Its assets include the bricks, mortar, and human capital components of its health care system; graduate medical education programs; and expertise involving emergency backup and support activities. In managing large-scale medical emergencies arising from terrorist attacks, VA's emergency response capabilities have strengths and weaknesses. Determining how VA can best contribute to homeland security is especially timely given the extraordinary level of federal activity underway to manage large-scale disasters.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-15
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Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director Defense Capabilities and Management, Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform
Risk management is a systematic and analytical process that weighs the likelihood that a threat will endanger an asset, individual, or function and identifies actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack. A good risk management approach includes the following three assessments: a threat, a vulnerability, and a criticality. After these assessments have been completed and evaluated, key steps can be taken to better prepare the United States against potential terrorist attacks. Threat assessments alone are insufficient to support the key judgments and decisions that must be made. However, along with vulnerability and criticality assessments, leaders and managers will make better decisions using this risk management approach. If the federal government were to apply this approach universally and if similar approaches were adopted by other segments of society, the United States could more effectively and efficiently prepare in-depth defenses against terrorist acts.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-12
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Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues: Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives
This Government Accounting Office (GAO) report addresses the foreign and domestic terrorism threat in the United States, and U.S. policy principles and strategies to combat terrorism. The United States, for example, spends billions of dollars each year to combat terrorism, with few guarantees that federal funds are being channeled to the right programs or in the right amounts. Threat and risk assessments could help better target these funds, set priorities, and avoid duplication of effort. The government needs improved coordination among federal, state, and local agencies. Disagreement exists in the intelligence and scientific communities over the nature of the terrorist threat, particularly the potential for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Although conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the weapons of choice for terrorists, the likelihood that they may use chemical and biological weapons may increase during the coming decade, according to intelligence agencies.
United States. General Accounting Office
Davis, Richard A., 1942-
1998-04-23
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Weaponry: .50 Caliber Rifle Crime
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how .50 caliber semiautomatic rifles have been used in domestic and international criminal activity.
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's investigation revealed that .50 caliber semiautomatic rifles have been linked to domestic and international criminal activity; (2) GAO has established a nexus to terrorist groups, outlaw motorcycle gangs, international drug cartels, domestic drug dealers, religious cults, militia groups, potential assassins, and violent criminals; (3) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) routinely conducts gun traces for law enforcement agencies; (4) the fact that a trace has been conducted does not necessarily mean that the firearm was involved in criminal activity; (5) ATF provided GAO with a list of 30 firearm trace requests generated between November 1992 and March 1999 concerning .50 caliber rifles; (6) however, 2 of the requests were duplicates, leaving 28 separate weapons on which traces were conducted; (7) all of the traces involved Barrett .50 caliber rifles, of which 27 were the semiautomatic model 82A1; (8) one trace request appeared to involve a Barrett model 90, but efforts to develop additional information on this trace were unsuccessful; (9) of the 27 traces involving Barrett semiautomatic model 82A1 rifles, GAO found that 18 were associated with criminal activity and 3 were not associated with criminal activity; (10) no determination could be made regarding 6 traces; (11) in some cases, GAO found that although the criminal activity involved more than one .50 caliber semiautomatic rifle, the law enforcement agency had initiated a trace on only one firearm; (12) GAO also developed information on two criminal cases involving .50 caliber semiautomatic rifles not reported in the ATF tracing information; and (13) the Barrett model 82A1 was the weapon identified in both cases.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-08-04
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Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities, Report to Congressional Committees
The following Federal departments and agencies have been identified as responders to the public health and medical consequences of a bioterrorist attack on the civilian population: the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice (DOJ), Transportation (DOT), the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA); the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Preparedness activities, for example, include (1) increasing federal, state, and local response capabilities; (2) developing response teams; (3) increasing the availability of medical treatments; (4) participating in and sponsoring exercises; (5) aiding victims; and (6) providing support at special events, such as presidential inaugurations and Olympic games. The coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs, however remain fragmented, which raises concern about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. In addition, issues include insufficient state and local planning and a lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-28
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Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs: Statement of Janet Heinrich Director, Health Care--Public Health Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
Research is currently being done to enable the rapid identification of
biological agents in a variety of settings; develop new or improved
vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals to improve treatment and vaccination
for infectious diseases caused by biological agents; and develop and test
emergency response equipment such as respiratory and other personal
protective equipment. Federal agencies are developing interagency response plans, participating in various interagency work groups, and entering into formal agreements with each other to share resources and capabilities. The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), however, found that coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs is fragmented, which raises concerns about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Issues include poor state and local planning and the lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning. This report summarizes the September 2001 report (GAO-01-915).
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-10
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Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness, Statement of Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care--Public Health Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Public Health, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, United States Senate
Twenty Federal departments and agencies have been identified as playing a role in responding to (and preparing for) the public health and medical consequences of a bioterrorist attack. The agencies have engaged in a number of efforts to coordinate activities, such as interagency work groups, on a formal and informal basis. Preparedness activities include (1) increasing federal, state, and local response capabilities; (2) developing response teams; (3) increasing the availability of medical treatments; (4) participating in and sponsoring exercises; (5) aiding victims; and (6) providing support at special events, such as presidential inaugurations and Olympic games. The US General Accounting Office (GAO) has found, however, that the coordination of Federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs is fragmented, which raises concern about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Issues include poor state and local planning and the lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning. This report summarizes the September 2001 report (GAO-01-915).
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-09
