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• Formulation of Effective Nonproliferation Policy, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, March 21, 23, 28, 30, 2000

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  From the opening statement of Richard G. Lurgar: "Today the committee begins a series of four hearings on United States and intelligence nonproliferation policy. No issue better illustrates the new challenges, complexities, and uncertainties faced by the United States and the world than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to stop proliferation are perhaps the most important foreign and national security policies we are implementing today. When the former Soviet Union collapsed just over 8 years ago, a new era in world history began. Many suggested the dangers of nuclear war have been dispelled by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Instead, we now face a world that is more turbulent, unpredictable, and in some respects more violent than the one we left in the early 1990's. Hopes for enduring peace have given way to the reality of disorder and conflict. The aspiring nuclear powers of today are not constrained by the patterns of Cold War competition. They do not need a Manhattan Project. The weapons programs of rogue nations and regional powers do not require high standards or a large number of weapons. These programs are harder to detect and to identify as nations are increasingly able to conceal their efforts and move ahead rapidly." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Richard G. Lurgar, Stephen A. Cambone, Joseph Cirincione, Robert G. Joseph, Sumit Ganguly, and Fred C. Ikle.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000-03
• S. Hrg. 106-599: 2000 Foreign Policy Overview and the President's Fiscal Year 2001 Foreign Affairs Budget Request: Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, February 8, 9, 10, 24, 25, 29, March 8, 23, and 2000

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  S. Hrg. 106-599: The purpose of this series of hearings is to review the President's foreign affairs budget for fiscal year 2001. At the first hearing, Secretary of State Albright reports on the state of the Nation's foreign affairs. The hearings address a broad range of topics, including: U.S. foreign policy priorities; U.S. Agency for International Development; the AIDS crisis in Africa; proposed emergency anti-drug assistance to Columbia; future of the International Monetary Fund and International Financial Institutions; administration of foreign affairs budget for FY2001; and the Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion and Anti-Corruption Act for FY2001. Statements, witnesses and submissions for the record include those of: Madeleine Albright, Jesse Helms, Richard Lugar, Russell Feingold, John Ashcroft, Joseph Biden, William Perry, James Woolsey, Robert Zoellick, Franklin Graham, Harvey Bale, Barbara Boxer, Angelo D'Agostino, Richard Durbin, Bill Frist, John Kerry, Peter Lurie, Benjamin Nelson, J. Perriens, Jeffrey Sachs, David Satcher, Gordon Smith, Sandra Thurman, Harold Varmus, R. Rand Beers, William Ledwith, Brian Sheridan, Michael Skol, Jose Miguel Vivanco, George Schultz, Lawrence Summers, Patrick Kennedy, Slade Gorton, William Roth, Chuck Hagel, Sam Brownback, Craig Thomas, Chafee, Biden, Paul Sarbanes, Christopher Dodd, Paul Wellstone, and Rod Grams

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000-02-08
• Strategic Mobility and the WMD Threat

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  "Our CONUS bases are not prepared to deal with the effects of WMD. This is especially true of forces in the pre-deployment phase of a strategic deployment. What conditions combined to create strategic deployment dilemma? This paper is written to identify and analyze these contributing conditions and offer potential solutions."

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Jones, Robert E.

  2000-02-08
• Testimony on Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, hearing before the United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, One Hundred and Sixth Congress, Second Session, February 3, 2000

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  This testimony compilation is from the February 3, 2000 hearing, "Testimony on Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States," U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services. From the statement of George Tenet: "Mr. Chairman, as we face a new century, we face a new world. A world where technology, especially information technology, develops and spreads at lightning speed--and becomes obsolete just as fast. A world of increasing economic integration, where a US company designs a product in Des Moines, makes it in Mumbai, and sells it in Sydney. A world where nation-states remain the most important and powerful players, but where multinational corporations, nongovernment organizations, and even individuals can have a dramatic impact. This new world harbors the residual effects of the Cold War--which had frozen many traditional ethnic hatreds and conflicts within the global competition between two superpowers. Over the past 10 years they began to thaw in Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, and we continue to see the results today. It is against this backdrop that I want to describe the realities of our national security environment in the first year of the 21st century: where technology has enabled, driven, or magnified the threat to us; where age-old resentments threaten to spill-over into open violence; and where a growing perception of our so-called 'hegemony' has become a lightning rod for the disaffected. Moreover, this environment of rapid change makes us even more vulnerable to sudden surprise." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: George J. Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency and Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

  United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services

  2000-02-03
• NIOSH-DOD-OSHA Sponsored Chemical and Biological Respiratory Protection Workshop Report

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  The workshop described in this report provided a forum for over 140 representatives from 63 different emergency responder, fire fighter, domestic preparedness, equipment manufacturing, federal research, and state and federal regulatory organizations. Participants openly discussed issues, exchanged information, and learned about current respiratory protection issues associated with incidents involving chemical and biological agents. Workshop objectives were to: 1) identify and understand the hazards associated with chemical and/or biological incidents, 2) identify the different responders and their respiratory protection needs, 3) determine which respirators and selection criteria are currently being utilized for response to these types of incidents, and 4) determine public health and medical community concerns which must be considered in developing a standard for chemical and/or biological respiratory protective devices.

  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

  Dower, John M.; Metzler, Richard W.; Palya, Frank M.

  2000-02
• Chemical and Biological Respiratory Protection Workshop Report

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  This Workshop provided a forum for over 140 subject-matter experts representing 63 different emergency responder, fire fighter, domestic preparedness, equipment manufacturing, federal research, and state and federal regulatory organizations. Participants openly discussed issues, exchanged information, and learned about current respiratory protection issues associated with incidents involving chemical and biological agents. The attendees were subject-matter experts, stakeholders, and partners with a common interest of assuring proper respiratory protection for emergency responders and other worker groups faced with the responsibility of responding to incidents involving chemical and/or biological threats.

  National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

  Dower, John M.; Metzler, Richard W.; Palya, Frank M.

  2000-02
• Policing on American Indian Reservations [2000]

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  "This study had two principal goals. The first was to take a broad look at policing in Indian Country in order to: (1) better understand the many arrangements for administering reservation police departments; (2) develop an initial assessment of the challenges facing Indian policing; and (3) identify policing approaches that might be successful in responding to the growing crime problem in Indian Country. The task was complex, especially because the research literature on policing in Indian Country is limited and the variety of policing arrangements and communities served is considerable. There are more than 200 departments, which serve an even large number of tribal communities. Most departments are administered by tribes, but some are administered by the federal government and some by state and local governments. They range in size from only two or three officers to more than 200 officers. The communities they serve are as small as the Grand Canyon-based Havasupai Tribe (with a population of only 430) and the Puyallup Tribe (whose 104-acre reservation is part of greater Tacoma, Washington) and as large as the Navajo Nation (with a population of more than a quarter million and a land area larger than the state of Connecticut). Our second goal was to evaluate the prospects for community policing in Indian Country. An obvious question was whether this strategy, which grew out of the experience of police departments in urban settings, could be usually applied to the strikingly different cultural, geographic, and demographic features typical of Indian reservations."

  National Institute of Justice (U.S.)

  Wakeling, Stewart; Jorgensen, Miriam; Michaelson, Susan

  2000-01-03
• Imposition of Martial Law in the United States

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  Imagine the following frightening scenario: Members of an American militia group enter a major metropolitan airport and attach small aerosol-like devices in several restrooms throughout the concourse. These devices release deadly amounts of smallpox bacteria into the air, infecting hundreds of Americans travelling through the airport. Within days, citizens around the country begin to display the horrific symptoms of smallpox. Soon public health workers determine the nature of the epidemic and release the information to the press. Widespread panic results. Civilian public health agencies attempt to educate the public on how to control the spread of the disease. But despite police efforts to control the populace by establishing quarantine areas, the civilian infrastructure is quickly overwhelmed. Chaos results. Finally, the President declares martial law in an attempt to restore order in the nation.

  Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (United States. Army)

  Davies, Kirk L.

  2000-01-03
• U.S. Plans and Policy Regarding National Missile Defense: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, June 28, 2000

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  From the opening statement of Floyd D. Spence: "Today, the Committee meets to examine the U.S. National Missile Defense Program and to review Administration policy toward missile defenses. [...]. This morning, the Committee will hear from the administration in more detail about its plans to develop for deployment a limited ground-based NMD system capable defending the United States against accidental, unauthorized or small-scale ballistic missile attacks from rogue states or, to use the latest terminology of the day, 'states of concern.' At the outset, I am compelled to reflect on how we arrived at this point. It is ironic that this administration, after years of opposing NMD, is now deciding whether to move forward with the deployment of just such a system. The past five years, the Congress has sought to move the Clinton Administration towards support for National Missile Defense deployment. Congress added funds to the Administration's NMD budget request each year since 1995. However, our efforts were met with administration resistance at every turn. In fact, in December of 1995, the President vetoed the National Defense Authorization Act, declaring that deploying a national missile defense would, and I quote, waste tens of billions of dollars, unquote, set United States policy, quote, on a collision course with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, unquote, and jeopardize further Russian strategic arms reductions." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ike Skelton, Floyd D. Spence, Stephen A. Cambone, Jacques S. Gansler, Robert G. Joseph.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services

  2000
• Domestic Preparedness in the Next Millennium: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Youth Violence and the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, April 20, 1999

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  On April 20, 1999, representatives met to discuss domestic preparedness in the next millennium. Testimony is designed to explain the administration's plan to train and equip first responders to the highest possible standards in preparation for possible chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks. Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Jeff Sessions, Dianee Feinstein, Jon Kyl, Barbara Y. Martinez, James M. Hughes, Charles L. Cragin, Andy Mitchell, Richard Dyer, Patrick J. Sullivan, Jr., Richard L. Alcorta, and Joseph F. Waeckerle.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000
• Defending America's Cyberspace: National Plan for Information: Systems Protection, Version 1.0: An Invitation to a Dialogue [Executive Summary]

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  The first version of the Plan largely focuses on the domestic efforts being undertaken by the Federal Government to protect the Nation's critical cyber-based infrastructures. Subsequent versions of the Plan will incorporate a broader range of concerns contemplated under PDD-63, including the specific role industry and state and local governments will play--on their own and in partnership with the Government--in protecting privately owned infrastructures; the need to protect physical, as well as cyber-based, infrastructures from deliberate attack; and the examination of the international aspects of critical infrastructure protection. Comments by industry, Congress, state and local governments, and the general public are sought for improvements that could be included in these subsequent versions.

  United States. White House Office

  2000
• PA Policy 9580: Job Aids and Fact Sheets

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  The purpose of this Public Assistance (PA) policy is to assist FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and partners in preparing, developing, and managing public assistance activities. This PA policy contains information on the following: "Public Assistance Program Administration and Appeals"; "Public Assistance Eligibility"; "General Work Eligibility"; "Emergency Work"; "Restoration of Damaged Facilities"; "Allowable Costs"; "Mitigation"; "Codes and Standards"; "Public Assistance Insurance Requirements"; "Fire Suppression Assistance"; "Compliance with Environmental, Historic Preservation, Cultural Initiatives, Other Laws"; "Standard Operating Procedures"; and "Job Aids and Fact Sheets".

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2000
• Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

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  "The specter of intermediate-range and short-range missile proliferation and their employment by rogue regimes to deliver weapons of mass destruction has troubled the international community for some time. The prospect of an 'irrational actor,' state or non-state, in possession of such a missile, coupled with current proliferation in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons opens up frightening scenarios for future U.S. and international community involvement in regional conflicts. Recent innovations in cruise missile technology pose a new and potentially greater problem than that posed by ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are far easier to obtain, maintain, weaponize, and employ than ballistic missiles. Given the greater ease of production of biological weapons compared to nuclear or chemical weapons, and the ease of acquisition of a cruise missile delivery system compared to ballistic missiles, several operational scenarios may prove inviting to states or nonstate actors intent on influencing the United States or attacking its forces. This paper reviews proliferation and ease of weaponization of biological agents, as well as the extent of proliferation of cruise missiles, along with their general capabilities. Finally, it reviews constraints that may be inhibiting the use of biological weapons, and poses plausible employment scenarios that could have a significant impact on U.S. decision makers as well as on USAF Air Expeditionary Forces. This paper seeks to raise the level of awareness of a threat, which is not "emerging" as much as it is already a clear and present danger to the United States and USAF expeditionary operations. Appendix A presents a table of past and present biological weapon programs by country. The table includes program status, possible bioagents involved, and whether the country is a sponsor of terrorism. Appendix B is a table of cruise missiles possessed by selected nations that includes type, launch method, range, payload, and status."

  USAF Counterproliferation Center

  Dickey, Michael E.

  2000
• Terrorism 2000/2001

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  "Since the mid-1980s, the FBI has published 'Terrorism in the United States', an unclassified annual report summarizing terrorist activities in this country. While this publication provided a good overview of the terrorist threat in the United States, its limited scope proved not conducive to conveying either the breadth and width of the terrorist threat facing U.S. interests or the scale of the FBI's response to international terrorism worldwide. To better reflect the nature of the threat and the scope of our response, the FBI is, therefore, expanding the focus of its annual terrorism report. Terrorism provides an overview of terrorist incidents and preventions taking place in the United Sates and its territories, just as 'Terrorism in the United States' did. In addition, however, 'Terrorism' discusses FBI investigations overseas, and thus provides a more comprehensive picture of the totality of the FBI's response to international terrorism. While this expanded focus is intended to provide a more complete overview of FBI terrorism investigations into acts involving U.S. interests around the world, 'Terrorism' is not intended as a comprehensive annual review of worldwide terrorist activity. For such a comprehensive overview of global terrorism issues, see the report 'Patterns of Global Terrorism', published annually by the U.S. Department of State. This inaugural issue of Terrorism provides annual overviews for the years 2000 and 2001. The FBI hopes you find 'Terrorism 2000/2001' to be a helpful resource, and thanks you for your interest in the FBI's Counterterrorism Program."

  United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation

  2000
• S. Hrg. 106-580: Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States: Hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, February 2, 2000

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  From the opening statement of Richard C. Shelby: "The witnesses have been asked to focus on those conditions throughout the world that have fostered, or will foster, threats and challenges to the security of the United States. We will be concentrating on conventional as well as unconventional threats, including threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and high-technology state-sponsored and nonstate terrorists. This hearing is intended to form the backdrop not only for the Committee's annual budget authorization process but also for a comprehensive review of the capabilities of the Intelligence Community and the adequacy of the resources being dedicated to this very important work. While this hearing is designed to address critical threats to our nation's security, another matter has come to the public's attention and is one that Director Tenet, I believe, should address in more detail. That matter is the conduct of Mr. Tenet's predecessor, John Deutch, and the conduct of senior CIA officials in investigating, failing to investigate, or possibly impeding the investigation of Mr. Deutch's handling or mishandling of classified information." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Richard H. Bryan, J. Stapleton Roy, George J. Tenet, and Thomas R. Wilson.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000
• S. Hrg. 106-352: Bioterrorism--Domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, Special Hearing [March 16, 1999]

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  In this hearing, the Senate approaches the subject of domestic weapons of mass destruction. They examine the line of present preparedness, and determine what needs to be done to raise that line to the appropriate level. This hearing was held in coordination with the work of the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction chaired by former CIA Director John Deutch to try to gain insights into what more needs happen, and how the organization should be structured when attempting to attack this very, very serious problem. Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Kenneth W. Kizer, Margaret A. Hamburg, Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Arlen Specter, Ben Nighthorse Campbell, John D. Rockefeller, IV, Dianne Feinstein, related GAO reports, responses to questions submitted to Dr. Hamburg by Senator Specter, and Donald A. Hederson.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000
• America's National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Plan: Can Compromise Win in an Uncompromising World?

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  "The United States' Constitution was generated with considerable difference of opinion as to how the U.S. government ought to be organized, and was the product of significant compromise. The Constitution established a federal government of separate institutions sharing powers--a system of checks and balances that throughout U.S. history, has fostered tension among these branches of government. Yet, in order to effect policy for U.S. national interests, this form of government has also required a mix of cooperation and compromise among the branches. The National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Plan is likewise the product of significant coordination and compromise among the branches of government, as well as numerous industry players and the American people. This paper is but one chapter in a larger effort to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S. government's policies on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). Using a practitioner's framework for decision making, I will describe the contextual elements, institutional equities, and spirit of compromise that led to Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) and the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan."

  National Defense University

  Werner, Stephen J.

  2000
• Florida Keys Area Contigency Plan: Annex 2000, Unified Command

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  "Historically, the success or failure of an oil spill response effort is often determined as much by the organization in place as by the availability of personnel and clean up equipment. One of the purposes of this plan is to ensure that all appropriate agencies in the Florida Keys are aware of, and involved in, the local 'oil spill response organization.' In this plan, the local oil spill response organization will be divided into two categories, planning and response. Both will be in place prior to an oil spill event and will be periodically exercised and/or evaluated. In events sufficiently significant to involve agencies other than the Coast Guard, oil spill response in the Sector Key West area will be based on the Unified Command System (figure 1). The Incident Management Handbook lists numerous key positions that should be filled during a 'significant' response. To ensure the best possible response, it is essential that the most qualified individuals fill these positions. Who fills the positions depends on the particular incident; however, it is highly unlikely that they will all be from the Coast Guard or any other individual agency. It is highly possible that some of the key individuals may be employees of the responsible party. This is particularly true when cleanup by chemical means (e.g. use of dispersants) is being considered."

  United States. Coast Guard

  2000
• China Debates the Future Security Environment

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  "The Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense, is attempting to understand the long-term consequences of the rise of China as a major world power. As part of that effort, it seeks to understand the views of the most important Chinese authors who have analyzed the future security environment. Some .Americans wrongly believe Chinese views reflect a mirror image of their own. This study suggests instead that the Chinese have their own unique perceptions, which may be difficult to appreciate. […]This study offers over 600 selected quotations from the writings of over 200 Chinese authors published from 1994 to 1999. Analysis and interpretation are kept to a minimum so that the Chinese may speak for themselves. Many Chinese scholars assisted with this study by providing hard-to-get books and articles unfamiliar to most Westerners. Half the authors were interviewed in China. They explained some of the viewpoints in recent debates about the future security, environment. Debates in China are generally concealed, and frequently authors pretend they do not exist. Conflicting views about the future nevertheless exist and merit attention if we are to understand the premises of China's national strategy and set a baseline from which to measure any future change in those premises."

  National Defense University Press

  Pillsbury, Michael

  2000
• International Narcotics Control Strategy Report - 1999 [Released March 1, 2000]

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  "The FAA requires a report on the extent to which each country or entity that received assistance under chapter 8 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act in the past two fiscal years has 'met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances' (the '1988 UN Drug Convention'). Although the Convention does not contain a list of goals and objectives, it does set forth a number of obligations that the parties agree to undertake. Generally speaking, it requires the parties to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering, to control chemicals that can be used to process illicit drugs, and to cooperate in international efforts to these ends. The statute lists action by foreign countries on the following issues as relevant to evaluating performance under the 1988 UN Drug Convention: illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and demand reduction.

  United States. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

  2000
• U.S.-Vietnam Trade Relations, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, June 18, 1998

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  This is the June 18, 1998 hearing on "U.S.-Vietnam Trade Relations," held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Douglas "Pete" Peterson, Thomas O'Dore, John F. Sommer, Jr., Greig Craft, Nguyen Dinh Thang, Burch, J. Thomas, Jr., Diem Hoang Do, Greig Craft, George C. Duggins, Virginia B. Foote, Ann Mills Griffiths, Bruce Harder, Joel D. Joseph, John F. Kerry, Bradley Lalonde, Filong Levan, Y Hin Nie, Rong Nay, John E. Moon, Lynn M. O'Shea, J. Thomas Burch, Jr., Dana Rohrabacher, and Christopher H. Smith.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000
• American Based Terrorism: What a Local Community Can Do to Prepare

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  "This paper will attempt to answer the following research questions in a fashion that will provide guidance and forethought to all that may be attempting to deal with this significant social drama. 1. What steps can a community as a whole take to evaluate its potential exposure and risk to an act of terrorism? 2. Who can a community expect to assist with mitigation activities should an act of terrorism occur within its jurisdictional confines? 3. What resources are available to assist a community to prepare for an act of terrorism? 4. How can a community develop a methodology for utilization and deployment of outside resources? 5. What is the relative importance of information flow to terrorism response and its effect on the disruption of essential government services? The research methodology used for this project was evaluative in nature and includes a literature review and a survey that was administered to 200 fire, rescue and Emergency Medical Service professionals from community based fire departments throughout the United States. The survey was designed to evaluate and sample communities and fire departments readiness to deal with potential terrorist acts. The survey included a series of questions developed to inquire about basic emergency management issues and more in-depth anti-terrorist activities and the organizations charged with supporting these endeavors. The main emphasis of the survey was to determine the respondents' general knowledge about their community and agencies general state of preparedness in relation to these destructive occurrences. All of these assessments were conducted within a six-month time period, necessary to complete this research project."

  National Fire Academy

  Siarnicki, Ronald J.

  2000-01
• Integration of the Army National Guard in Force Projection Operations A Concept for a New Millennium

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  In the summer of 1989, following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War, the Department of Defense announced plans to modify the structure and size of the armed forces based upon the changing security environment. Of particular interest to the Army was the appropriate balance and mix of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CS S) units between the Regular Army and the Reserve Components. The "BottomUp-Review" identified a critical Total Army shortfall in the number of CS/CSS units necessary to enable the United States to successfully conduct military operations in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, and determined that much of the National Guard's combat force structure was not necessary based on the contemporary security environment. Following Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the National Guard began the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS), to restructure its forces in order to make them more relevant to the needs of the Army, and the present global security situation. As a part of this initiative, the National Guard and the Regular Army created two integrated divisions by using Guard enhanced separate brigades as the subordinate ground maneuver units of two Regular Army division headquarters. The Guard also began the conversion of the ground maneuver brigades of two ofits eight combat divisions into combat support and combat service support units in an effort to reduce the critical shortfall identified in the "B oftomUp -Review. The remaining six National Guard divisions were teamed with Regular Army divisions in a mutually beneficial training, deployment, and operational support relationship. As a part of the emerging mission of homeland defense, the National Guard also began developing rapid assessment and initial detection teams in order to facilitate the consequence management of weapons of mass destruction incidents.

  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

  Taylor, James E.

  1999-12-15
• First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: I. Assessing the Threat

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  "Many government officials and concerned citizens believe that 'it is not a question of if, but when' an incident will occur that involves the use by a terrorist of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapon--a so-called 'weapon of mass destruction' (WMD)--that is designed, intended, or has the capability to cause 'mass destruction' or 'mass casualties.' In recent years, some have depicted terrorist incidents as causing catastrophic loss of life and extensive structural and environmental damage as not only possible but probable. Such depictions do not accurately portray the full range of terrorist threats. While such a devastating event is within the realm of possibility, the first annual report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the 'Panel') delves into a broad range of issues, chronicles actual terrorist attacks, considers potential terrorist incidents, and attempts to answer the fundamental questions of 'Who?,' 'What?,' and 'Why?;' and accordingly begins to consider what must be done to prepare for the 'When.'"

  Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (U.S.)

  1999-12-15
• Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959-1999 [Updated December 14, 1999]

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  "This chronology outlines major events in U.S.-Cuban relations from Fidel Castro's rise to power in 1959 through 1999. The chronology provides more detailed information on events since 1994, including U.S. legislative action and congressional hearings and significant economic and political events in Cuba."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sullivan, John P., 1959-

  1999-12-14
• National Security Strategy for a New Century [December 1999]

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  "The United States remains the world's most powerful force for peace, prosperity and the universal values of democracy and freedom. Our nation's central challenge-and our responsibility-is to sustain that role by seizing the opportunities of this new global era for the benefit of our own people and people around the world. To do that, we are pursuing a forward-looking national security strategy for the new century. This report, submitted in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, sets forth that strategy. […] The United States must have the tools necessary to carry out this strategy. We have worked to preserve and enhance the readiness of our armed forces while pursuing long-term modernization and providing quality of life improvements for our men and women in uniform. To better meet readiness challenges, I proposed, and Congress passed, a fiscal year 2000 defense budget that increased military pay and retirement benefits, and significantly increased funding for readiness and modernization. I have also proposed a $112 billion increase across fiscal years 2000 to 2005 for readiness, modernization, and other high priority defense requirements. This is the first long-term sustained increase in defense spending in over a decade."

  United States. White House Office

  1999-12
• Changing Face of Transportation

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  The Changing Face of Transportation provides a historical perspective for policymaking. It reviews the major policy milestones of the past quarter century and the social and economic context for those milestones. Secretary Slater provides a logical foundation for making future policy choices and challenges the transportation enterprise to aspire toward higher marks of excellence, moving beyond what we think is possible and also thinking globally. Some future policy choices are apparent already and, as with the choices envisioned by former Secretaries of Transportation, undoubtedly many more will emerge as the future unfolds. Today, we can look forward with confidence knowing that our transportation system reflects the remarkable achievements of the Clinton-Gore Administration in striving to meet our nation's transportation needs. Under their leadership, virtually every law governing major transportation programs has been renewed, including the Trucking Industry Deregulation Act of 1994, the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century of 1998 (TEA-21), and the Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21). These Acts provided record-level infrastructure investments, increased funding flexibility, expanded the proven strategies of public participation in the planning process, and affirmed this Administration's top transportation priority of improving safety and creating opportunities for all Americans. The ramification of this extraordinary era will positively shape transportation in the coming decades. Chapter 7 specifically deals with transportation and national security.

  United States. Department of Transportation

  2000
• United States Special Operations Forces: Posture Statement 2000

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  More recent history has caused the United States to maintain specialized forces capable of performing extremely difficult, complex, and politically sensitive missions on short notice, in peace and war, anywhere in the world. In 1987, Congress mandated the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) with the responsibility to prepare and maintain combat-ready special operations forces (SOF) to successfully conduct special operations, including civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP). The characteristics of SOF personnel are shaped by the requirements of their missions and include foreign language capabilities; regional orientation; specialized equipment, training, and tactics; flexible force structure; and an understanding of the political context of their mission. Today's SOF are the product of an evolutionary process. The lessons learned from past operations and events, as well as the requirements of current missions and operations, have brought about a unique force with distinctive characteristics, capabilities, and limitations.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2000
• Ruminations of a North Korean General Concerning the United States' National Military Strategy

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  This paper will support my firm belief that the United States National Military Strategy is misdirected and unfocused. More importantly, their strategy fails to adequately understand the motivation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK) and increases the risk of conflict.

  National War College (U.S.)

  Hayden, Dave

  2000
• America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21st Century

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  The objective of this report is to help the Coast Guard, the Departments of Transportation and Defense, other executive departments and agencies, the Congress, the Service's "partners" and "share-holders" - in state and local governments, U.S. and foreign industry, foreign governments, and private organizations in the United States and overseas - and the American public think broadly about future national security dynamics and trends. Important issues have been addressed - how these dynamics and trends will affect America's maritime security and hence the Coast Guard's current and future roles, missions, functions, and requirements. It discusses an expansive concept of U.S. maritime security interests, focusing on current and future threats to America's interests in its territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) as well as on the high seas. It provides an overview of the historical, strategic, policy, and operational contexts for the Coast Guard's maritime security roles, missions, functions, and tasks, and how the Service can most effectively and efficiently serve the United States in the 21st century. And it addresses the platforms and systems capabilities needed to satisfy current and future requirements. A key focus of this report is on the Coast Guard's "Deepwater" operating environment and enduring as well as emerging needs in this region. The Deepwater operational area has been defined by the Service as operations conducted 50 miles or more to sea, although clearly Deepwater assets protect U.S. maritime security in regions much closer to the shore. Many of the Coast Guard's Deepwater capital assets are approaching or are at the ends of their service lives in block obsolescence. To deal with the need to modernize and replace these assets, the Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater Systems (IDS) Capabilities Replacement Project has mapped out an innovative approach and program-plan to address all roles, missions, and functions and the subsystems, systems, and platforms needed to carry out the Service's multiple mandates. Thus, another important objective of this paper is to inform U.S. and possible foreign industry partners about the full spectrum of Coast Guard Deepwater requirements, operations, and programs for the future.

  United States. Coast Guard

  Stubbs, Bruce B.; Truver, Scott C.

  2000