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• Strategy for Protecting and Preparing the Homeland Against Threats of Electromagnetic Pulse and Geomagnetic Disturbances

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  "Extreme electromagnetic incidents caused by an intentional electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack or a naturally occurring geomagnetic disturbance (GMD, also referred to as 'space weather') could damage significant portions of the Nation's critical infrastructure, including the electrical grid, communications equipment, water and wastewater systems, and transportation modes. The impacts are likely to cascade, initially compromising one or more critical infrastructure sectors, spilling over into additional sectors, and expanding beyond the initial geographic regions. EMPs are associated with intentional attacks using high-altitude nuclear detonations, specialized conventional munitions, or non-nuclear directed energy devices. Effects vary in scale from highly local to regional to continental, depending upon the specific characteristics of the weapon and the attack profile. High-altitude electromagnetic pulse attacks (HEMP) using nuclear weapons are of most concern because they may permanently damage or disable large sections of the national electric grid and other critical infrastructure control systems. [...] For these reasons, the potential severity of both the direct and indirect impacts of an EMP or GMD incident compels our national attention. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been actively analyzing the risk of the EMP-GMD problem set since its inception. The Strategy for Protecting and Preparing the Homeland Against Threats of Electromagnetic Pulse and Geomagnetic Disturbances (hereafter referred to as the 'DHS Strategy') represents the Department's first articulation of a holistic, long-term, partnership-based approach to confronting this challenge."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2018-10-09
• Securing the Modern Electric Grid from Physical and Cyber Attacks, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, July 21, 2009

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  From the opening statement of Yvette D. Clark: "The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on securing the modern electric grid from physical and cyber attacks. [...] Our national health care delivery system, just like all of our critical infrastructure systems, requires secure and reliable electric system. That is what this committee has been investigating for years, and what we will discuss today. [...] There are two significant threats that will be discussed at today's hearing. One is the threat of a cyber attack. [...] The other significant threat to the grid is the threat of a physical event; that could come in the form of a natural or man-made electromagnetic pulse, known as EMP. [...] Our goal is to determine whether appropriate protections are in place that would mitigate catastrophic incidents on the grid." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Yvette D. Clark, Daniel E. Lungren, Bennie G. Thompson, William R. Graham, Mark Fabro, Michael J. Assante, Steven T. Naumann, Joseph H. McClelland, Patricia A. Hoffman, Sean P. McGurk, Cita M. Furlani, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, William Radasky, John Kappenman, Emprimus LLC, EMP Commission, Applied Control Solutions, LLC, Advanced Fusion Systems, LLC, Canadian Electricity Association, Industrial Defender, Inc., and Southern California Edison.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2009
• S. Rept. 114-250: Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, to Accompany S. 1846

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  From the Purpose and Summary: "The purpose of S. 1846, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2015 (CIPA), is to require the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS, or the Department) to develop, regularly update, and submit to Congress a strategy to protect critical infrastructure against threats of geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and, to the extent practicable, to perform research and development and incident response planning to mitigate the consequences of threats of EMP and GMD."

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2016-05-09
• Infrared Radiation Transmittance and Pilot Vision through Civilian Aircraft Windscreens

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  From the abstract: "INTRODUCTION: In support of a Department of Homeland Security project, the Federal Aviation Administration's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute measured the optical transmittance properties of aircraft windscreens. This paper focuses on windscreen transmittance in the infrared (IR) spectral region (780 -- 4000 nm) of the electromagnetic spectrum. METHOD: Transmission measurements were performed on eight aircraft windscreens. Three windscreens were from large commercial jets (MD 88, Airbus A320, and Boeing 727/737); two from commercial, propeller-driven passenger planes (Fokker 27 and the ATR 42); one from a small private jet (Raytheon Aircraft Corporation Hawker Horizon); and two from small general aviation (GA), single-engine, propeller-driven planes (Beech Bonanza and Cessna 182). The two GA aircraft windscreens were plastic (polycarbonate); the others were multilayer (laminated) composite glass. RESULTS: The average transmittance for both glass laminate and plastic windscreens in the IR-A region (780 -- 1400 nm) varied considerably (47.5% ± 11.7%), with glass windscreens consistently attenuating more IR than plastic windscreens. The average difference in transmittance between the two materials fluctuated (27.3% ± 15.9%) throughout the first half of the IR-B spectrum (1400 -- 3000 nm) up to approximately 2200 nm when transmittance dropped below 7%. The average transmittance for glass and plastic windscreens became negligible beyond 2800 nm. CONCLUSION: Aircraft windscreens provide a level of protection from potential ocular and skin hazards due to prolonged or intense exposure to IR radiation. The amount of protection is dependent on the type of windscreen material, the wavelength of the radiation, and angle of incidence. On average, laminated glass windscreens attenuate more IR than plastic. Additional research is recommended to confirm that the measured transmittance values for this sample of windscreens are typical of all aircraft windscreens currently in service and to evaluate the potential threat posed by new applications, such as IR lasers, in navigable airspace."

  United States. Office of Aerospace Medicine

  Nakagawara, Van B.; Montgomery, Ronald W.; Marshall, Wesley J.

  2008-06
• Cyber Defense Review (Spring 2018)

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  This Spring 2018 issue of the Cyber Defense Review contains the following articles: "Tactical Considerations for a Commander to Fight and Win in the Electromagnetic Spectrum" by Patricia Frost, Clifton McClung, and Christopher Walls"; "Preparing for Cyber Incidents with Physical Effects" by Joseph W. Pfeifer; "An Airman's View of Deterrence and Cyberspace" by Jay Raymond; "Smart Bases, Smart Decisions" by Harold J. Arata III and Brian L. Hale; "There IS No Cyber Defense" by Bryson Bort; "Strategic Blind-Spots on Cyber Threats, Vectors, and Campaigns" by Cathy Downes; "Countering the Cyber Threat" by Shawn Henry and Aaron F. Brantly; and "The Role of Commercial End-to-End Secure Mobile Voice in Cyberspace" by Elad Yoran and Edward Amoroso.

  Army Cyber Institute, West Point

  2018
• Combating WMD Journal [Issue 5 Spring/Summer 2010]

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  This issue of the Combating WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] Journal contains the following articles: "Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction"; "The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accident & Incident Program in Europe"; "Making Foreign Consequence Management Harder"; "Pandemics of the Past: A Learning Opportunity"; "Nuclear Medical Science Officers: Army Health Physicists Proudly Serving and Defending Their Country around the Globe"; "The Need to Redefine Electromagnetic (EM) Protection: 'A Think Piece'"; "Nuclear Power Plants on Military Installations: "A Think Piece'"; "USANCA Launches Army CWMD Information Portal (ACIP)"; "The Mission that Drove World History"; "Historical Development of the Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures"; "Sea Power - Deterrence from the Sea."

  United States. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

  Gomes, Stephen A.

  2010
• Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations

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  "This instruction is in accordance with Enclosure B, reference a, issue policy and guidance for planning, coordinating, and controlling electromagnetic spectrum use in joint military operations. Its purpose is to develop and implement joint doctrinal concepts and associated operational procedures to achieve interoperability of IT and NSS capabilities employed by US military forces and, where required, with joint, combined, and coalition forces and other USG departments and agencies. References a through are provided for further reading."

  United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

  2002-09-30
• Identify Potential Impacts of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack on Fire and EMS Delivery Services for the Walpole Fire Department

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  "The problem was that the Walpole Fire Department did not know the potential impacts of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on both fire and emergency medical delivery services. The purpose of this research was to identify potential impacts of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on both fire and EMS [emergency medical services] delivery services for the Walpole Fire Department, to decide whether the Walpole Fire Department was vulnerable to such an attack, and to determine whether we needed to develop a plan for EMP awareness and recognition."

  National Fire Academy

  Laracy, Michael K., Sr.

  2012-02?
• Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks, but Opportunities Exist to Further Assess Risks and Strengthen Collaboration, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  "Electromagnetic risks caused by a man-made EMP or a naturally occurring solar weather event could have a significant impact on the nation's electric grid as well as other infrastructure sectors that depend on electricity, such as communications. These risks could lead to power outages over broad geographic areas for extended durations. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid. This report examines (1) the extent to which key federal agencies have taken action to address electromagnetic risks and how these actions align with the 2008 EMP Commission report recommendations, and (2) what additional opportunities exist to enhance federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid. GAO reviewed the EMP Commission report and federal program documents, and interviewed DHS, DOE [Department of Energy], and FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission] officials and relevant stakeholders who provided insights on key actions taken. GAO recommends that DHS identify internal roles to address electromagnetic risks, and collect additional risk inputs to further inform assessment efforts; that DHS and DOE collaborate to ensure critical electrical infrastructure assets are identified; and engage with industry stakeholders to identify and prioritize risk-management activities, such as research and development efforts, to address EMP risks to the grid. DHS and DOE concurred with our recommendations and identified planned actions to address the recommendations."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2016-03
• Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR)

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  This instructions purpose is to provide policy and guidance for reporting, identifying, evaluating, and controlling electromagnetic interference to achieve a goal of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) between joint Service and combatant command operations and space systems. This document also provides supplementary information (see DOD Directive C-3222.5 for further information) regarding the reporting and resolution of suspected hostile electronic attacks against DOD systems. Electronic Attacks are divided into three categories: Meaconing, Intrusion, and Jamming.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1999-12-01
• Joint Doctrine Note 3-16: Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations

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  From the Introduction:"This joint doctrine note (JDN) describes how to manage and execute joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO). The rapid advances in electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) technologies over the last few decades have led to an exponential increase in commercial and military EMS-enabled/dependent capabilities. This proliferation, coupled with the US military's heavy reliance on the EMS and the low entry costs for adversaries, poses significant military challenges to the joint force commander (JFC). Integrated electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) are required to achieve EMS superiority, which is an essential and potentially decisive aspect of all joint operations."

  United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff

  2016-10-20
• FM 3-38 Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

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  This Field Manual, number 3-38, "provides overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA). This manual describes the importance of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to Army forces and provides the tactics and procedures commanders and staffs use in planning, integrating, and synchronizing CEMA. This manual provides the information necessary for Army forces to conduct CEMA that enable them to shape their operational environment and conduct unified land operations. It provides enough guidance for commanders and their staffs to develop innovative approaches to seize, retain, and exploit advantages throughout an operational environment. CEMA enable the Army to achieve desired effects in support of the commander's objectives and intent. The principal audience for FM 3-38 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should see applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO). Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual."

  United States. Department of the Army

  2014-02-12
• Joint Publication 6-01: Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations [March 23, 2012]

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  "Military operations are complicated by increasingly complex demands on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). All modern forces depend on the EMS. The EMS is a physical medium through which joint forces conduct operations. The importance of the EMS and its relationship to the operational capabilities is the key focus of joint electromagnetic spectrum management operations (JEMSMO). The EMS is a highly regulated and saturated natural resource. The EMS includes the full range of all possible frequencies of electromagnetic radiation. Joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO) include all activities in military operations to successfully plan and execute joint or multinational operations in order to control the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). JEMSO is comprised of electronic warfare (EW) and JEMSMO and aims to exploit, attack, protect, and manage resources within the EMOE and resolve electromagnetic interference (EMI) in order to achieve the commander's objectives."

  United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff

  2012-03-23
• Electromagnetic Pulse - A Catastrophic Threat to the Homeland

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  From the thesis abstract: "The detonation of a single nuclear weapon at a high altitude above the United States, or a major solar geomagnetic storm, would create electromagnetic pulses which have the potential to catastrophically impact the survivability of the United States. The electrical power grid is fragile, and is extremely vulnerable to an electromagnetic pulse. Its failure would result in the loss of almost all logistical functions necessary to support our modern society. This paper will examine the causes, threats, probable effects, and what measures can be taken to mitigate the potential impact to the Homeland."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Oreskovic, Robert

  2011-03-24
• Say Again? Lessons from Hurrican Katrina in Spectrum Management and Communications Interoperability

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  "The concepts of electromagnetic spectrum management and communications interoperability are nothing new or revolutionary. They are core functions that enable successful command and control for the Joint Force Commander throughout the range of military operations. The importance of these functions cannot be stressed enough. When properly planned for and executed, electromagnetic spectrum management and communications interoperability ensure issues such as interference, duplication of effort and friction are eliminated. In the particular case of disaster relief, they become even more imperative since the destruction of the communications infrastructure within a disaster area is very likely. Hurricane Katrina provided perhaps the greatest illustration of this fact. Without question, the relief operation following Hurricane Katrina was a monumental task and performed admirably by all those involved. However, the operation was not a smooth success. The issues of interference, duplication of effort and friction were all realized due to the inability of the JTF-Katrina Commander's staff to effectively manage the electromagnetic spectrum and resolve communications interoperability issues. Furthermore, the JTF-Katrina Commander's ability to exercise command and control and maintain situational awareness was nearly non-existent leading to coordination issues and delays in the relief efforts. Fortunately, these issues can be resolved and lessons can be derived for future disaster relief operations."

  Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department

  Canfield, Justin M.

  2010-03-05
• Oversight of Federal Efforts to Address Electromagnetic Risks, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, May 17, 2016

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  This testimony compilation is from the May 17, 2016, hearing, "Oversight of Federal Efforts to Address Electromagnetic Risks" before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Scott Perry: " America's energy infrastructure is the heart that pumps the American economy. Long term power outages resulting from an attack on our critical infrastructure could cripple our nation's economy and put Americans' health and safety in jeopardy. Because the nation's critical infrastructure is so vital to Americans' way of life, the Federal government has recognized the necessity of securing our infrastructure from an array of risks, including the threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. The most serious EMP risk would come in the form of an EMP resulting from a nuclear detonation at high altitude. Such an attack could cause long-term damage to the power grid. While many believe the likelihood of such an attack is low, the damage and economic aftershocks that would follow demand that we address these risks. We cannot discount that other nation-states, such as North Korea, or sophisticated terror groups might want to utilize an EMP to wreak havoc on our economy. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Scott Perry, Chris P. Currie, Brandon Wales, Joseph McClelland, and Judson Freed.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security

  2016-05-17
• Critical Infrastructure Protection: Preliminary Observations on DHS Efforts to Address Electromagnetic Threats to the Electric Grid, Statement of Christopher P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

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  "The threat posed by an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or solar weather event could have a debilitating impact on the nation's critical electrical infrastructure, as well as other key assets that depend on electricity. These events could lead to power outages over broad geographic areas for extended durations. Addressing these risks requires collaboration among multiple government and industry stakeholders; with DHS in the lead role for overall infrastructure protection efforts, working in coordination with DOE [Department of Energy]. The EMP Commission, established by statute and comprised of subject matter experts, issued recommendations in 2008 addressing the preparation, protection and recovery of critical infrastructures against a possible EMP attack. The majority of these recommendations were made to DHS and DOE. This testimony is based on preliminary observations from GAO's [Government Accountability Office] ongoing review of DHS's efforts to address electromagnetic threats. Specifically, this testimony addresses the extent to which DHS has: (1) taken action to address recommendations from the 2008 EMP Commission Report and (2) coordinated with other principal federal agencies, such as DOE and industry stakeholders to mitigate risks to the electric grid from electromagnetic threats. GAO reviewed EMP Commission recommendations and DHS program documents, and interviewed relevant stakeholders who provided insights on key issues and coordination activities with the federal government to address these threats."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-07-22
• Subject Bibliography: Advanced Weapons

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  This is an FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Library subject bibliography on "Advanced Weapons." Additional information about each source can be found in the abstracts beneath the citations.

  FBI Academy

  Bunker, Robert J.; Begert, Matt

  2007-09
• EMR-ISAC: InfoGram 33-11 [August 18, 2011]

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  This document from the Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center is "distributed weekly to provide members of the Emergency Services Sector with information concerning the protection of their critical infrastructures." Sections include: "Dumpster Fire Precautions"; "EMP [electromagnetic pulse] Attack Awareness"; "Chemical Emergencies Website"; and "Public Health Emergency Response Guide".

  Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (U.S.)

  2011-08-18
• FMI 6-02.70: Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations

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  "This manual provides an overview of electromagnetic spectrum management operations, hereafter referred to as spectrum management, for the Army at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This manual also provides direction, guidance, and techniques necessary to meet the needs of Army spectrum management in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. In addition, this guide describes the roles and functions of international, national, host nation, and military organizations. It provides a comprehensive look at installation frequency coordination. The target audience for this manual is the spectrum manager, but it is also useful for signal leaders and supervisors to gain an understanding of spectrum management."

  United States. Department of the Army

  2006-09
• Overview of New Surveillance Technologies

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  Stanley E. Borek of the Air Force Research Laboratory gives this presentation which provides an overview of new surveillance technologies.

  Air Force Research Laboratory (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio). Information Directorate

  Borek, Stanley E.

  2005-11-02
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3320.02D: Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution, June 3, 2013

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  "This manual standardizes techniques and procedures for spectrum interference resolution throughout the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). It provides detailed guidance to the DoD regarding standard electromagnetic interference (EMI) detection, characterization, reporting, identification, geo-location, and resolution procedures for space and terrestrial systems."

  United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

  2013-06-03
• Critical Infrastructure Protection: Electricity Suppliers Have Taken Actions to Address Electromagnetic Risks, and Additional Research is Ongoing, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  "GAO [Government Accountability Office] examined government and industry studies and interviewed federal and industry officials about potential GMD [geomagnetic disturbance] and HEMP [high-altitude electromagnetic pulse] effects on grid infrastructure; reviewed regulatory standards, monitoring processes, and NERC [North American Electric Reliability Corporation] compliance audit data from April 2015 through August 2017; reviewed federal regulations and interviewed state regulators on cost recovery issues; and interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 13 U.S. and Canada electricity suppliers, selected based on factors such as GMD experience and preparation for GMD and HEMP events."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2018-02
• Implementing Instruction for Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare (IW/C2W)

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  "The purpose of this instruction is to issue implementation guidance and organizational relationships for IW/C2W. Information Warfare is the action taken in support of national security strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage by attacking an adversary's information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and influence, while protecting friendly information systems. C2W is the action taken by the military commander to realize the practical effects of IW on the battlefield. It involves both offensive and defensive aspects. It encompasses actions that deny adversary Command and Control (counter-C2), while protecting friendly Command and Control (C2- protection). As defined, C2W integrates physical destruction of enemy C2 targets, Electronic Warfare (EW), military deception, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Operations Security (OPSEC). Navy C2W encompasses these disciplines and uses surveillance, intelligence, communications, computers, and database management to ensure effective C2W execution."

  United States. Department of the Navy

  1995-01-18
• Threat of Radio Frequency Weapons to Critical Infrastructure Facilities

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  "Critical infrastructure facilities include electric power facilities, oil refineries, water treatment plants, banking systems, pipelines, transportation systems, and communications facilities. Most critical infrastructure facilities depend on electrical and electronic systems to function. These systems can be susceptible to a little-known, yet significant and growing threat called radio frequency weapons (RFWs)."

  Naval Surface Warfare Center (U.S.). Dahlgren Division

  United States. Technical Support Working Group

  2005-08
• Nuclear High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse - Implications for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense

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  "The detonation of a nuclear weapon at an altitude of approximately 500 kilometers over the United States will generate a near-continental scale high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP). The effects of such an attack may instantaneously destroy or disrupt substantial portions of the electrical and electronic systems that operate the critical infrastructure of the United States as well as portions of Canada and Mexico. Those interested in the efforts to ensure an effective homeland defense and homeland security effort should understand the implications of a successful HEMP attack on the United States the factors that influence the probability of an attack and continuously seek innovative ways to prevent such an attack from ever occurring and simultaneously to prepare for it if preventative efforts should fail. This paper describes what an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is and how a nuclear weapon creates a HEMP. Next a brief description of the effect of a HEMP attack on electrical and electronic systems is followed by an overview of the implications of the failure of these systems on the nation's critical infrastructure and elements of national power. A discussion of the risks of such an attack caused by nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation will be followed by an overview of the on-going contributions of the existing National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Homeland Security to prevent and prepare for a HEMP attack. This paper will conclude with some broad recommendations to strengthen the United States capabilities to prevent and simultaneously prepare to mitigate and recover from the effects of this ultimate form of asymmetric attack."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Riddle, Thomas C.

  2004-03-19
• Joint Publication 3-13.1: Electronic Warfare

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  This publication provides joint doctrine for electronic warfare planning, preparation, execution, and assessment in support of joint operations across the range of military operations. As the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum gets more crowded with broadcasts from devices of every kind, from sensors to video feeds on unmanned aerial vehicles, computers to radios to wireless devices, all in support of network centric operations, the risks to military forces from EM disruption grow significantly. This publication lays out the scope of electronic warfare and addresses the organizational responsibilities for protecting spectrum use and disrupting enemy forces' spectrum use.

  United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff

  2007-01-25
• Preempting the Storm: Mitigating America's National Security Vulnerability to Disruptive Magnetic Events

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  From the student thesis: "This paper will examine the United States national infrastructures vulnerability to disruptive magnetic events. While other sources could pose similar challenges to the components of infrastructure, this paper will focus on electromagnetic threats from hostile state or terrorist actors as well as geomagnetic disruption caused by natural phenomena, specifically geomagnetic storms. This research offers an overview of the nature of the infrastructure threat from disruptive magnetic current events and considers the relative probability of an event occurring. The paper explores the continuum of consequences an event would have on the nations electrical grid, transportation and communication systems in their current state."

  Air University (U.S.). Air War College

  Twiford, James R.

  2011-02-16
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3320.02F: Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution, March 8, 2013

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  The purpose of this instruction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to "provide policy, reporting guidance, and program description; identify the roles and responsibilities of DoD agencies; and provide security classification guidance for the Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) program."

  United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

  2013-03-08
• Effect of an Electromagnetic Pulse Strike on the Transportation Infrastructure of Kansas City

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  From the Abstract: "In the twenty-first century many non-state actors and third-rate countries aspire to become relevant in a world moving forward. The development of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) used as a weapon poses a significant threat to an electrically driven world. An EMP strike is an extremely desirable way to affect a given population of any nation. Due to the indirect nature of an EMP strike, its employment has minimal signature further concealing its origin or motivated actor. An aspiring third-rate country could harness or employ this weapon to quickly ensure its relevancy in the world, while a world super-power could use it to upset the balance of power without bringing attention to its self. As the U.S. and specifically a mid-sized city such as Kansas City adjust for tighter homeland security, they also look to combat potential future threats. Kansas City is at the epicenter of U.S. transportation acting as a major mid-continent hub for multi-mode transport, where everything is executed just in time. This study examines how an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) strike targeting Kansas City will affect its road, rail, and distribution infrastructure."

  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

  Reardon Jr., Patrick J.

  2014-01