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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Set to Expire in 2009 [March 16, 2009]
From the Document: "Several recent amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will sunset on December 31, 2009. H.R. 1467, introduced in the 111th Congress, would extend these three provisions until December 31, 2019. Section 6001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (IRTPA), also known as the 'lone wolf' provision, changed the rules regarding the types of individuals that could be targets of FISA-authorized searches. It permits surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism, without requiring evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization. Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT ACT amended FISA to permit multipoint, or 'roving,' wiretaps by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility subject to electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT enlarged the scope of documents that could be sought under FISA, and lowered the standard required before issuance of a court order compelling the production of documents. While these provisions will cease to be prospectively effective on December 31, 2009, a grandfather clause permits them to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the sunset date."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Liu, Edward C.
2009-03-16
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Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Set to Expire May 27, 2011
"Three amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) are set to expire (sunset) on May 27, 2011. The three sunsetting amendments expanded the scope of federal intelligencegathering authority following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Two amendments were enacted as part of the USA PATRIOT Act. Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to permit multipoint, or 'roving,' wiretaps by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility subject to electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified. Section 215 enlarged the scope of materials that could be sought under FISA to include 'any tangible thing.' It also lowered the standard required before a court order may be issued to compel their production. The third amendment was enacted in 2004, as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). Section 6001(a) of the IRTPA changed the rules regarding the types of individuals who may be targets of FISA-authorized searches. Also known as the 'lone wolf' provision, it permits surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism without requiring evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Liu, Edward C.
2011-05-20
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Proposed Change to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) under S.113 [Updated August 9, 2004]
"In order to facilitate the surveillance of possible 'lone wolf' terrorists, whose links to an international terrorist organization may be difficult to ascertain, several bills have been introduced to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ('FISA'). The Senate passed S. 113, a bill to extend the coverage of FISA to non-U.S. persons who engage in international terrorism or activities in preparation for terrorist acts, without a showing of membership in or affiliation with an international terrorist group. While the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) does not call for such a measure, the Bush Administration has indicated its support. FISA provides the government authority to conduct electronic surveillance (wiretap) and other searches with respect to a foreign power or its agents to obtain intelligence related to espionage, terrorism, or other matters involving national security. Related proposals include H.R. 3179, 304 of S. 2386, H.R. 3552, and S. 123."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elsea, Jennifer
2004-08-09
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NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for Congress [July 2, 2013]
"Recent media stories about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance address unauthorized disclosures of two different intelligence collection programs. These programs arise from provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, they rely on separate authorities, collect different types of information, and raise different policy questions. As such, where possible, the information contained in this report distinguishes between the two. For both programs, there is a tension between the speed and convenience with which the government can access data of possible intelligence value and the mechanisms intended to safeguard civil liberties. The first program collects and stores in bulk domestic phone records that some argue could be gathered to equal effect through more focused records requests. The second program targets the electronic communications of non-U.S. citizens but may incidentally collect information about Americans. The following sections address (1) what information is being collected; (2) the legal basis for the collection; (3) existing oversight mechanisms; and (4) arguments for and against the two programs. The last section of this report discusses legislation that has been proposed in response to information disclosed about NSA surveillance. Because documents leaked to the news media may be classified, CRS [Congressional Research Service] is precluded from providing a detailed analysis of the content of those documents. The information in this report is based largely on public comments from intelligence officials and Members of Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis; Liu, Edward C.
2013-07-02
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): An Overview [March 10, 2020]
From the Introduction: "Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978. FISA provides a statutory framework for government agencies to obtain authorization to gather foreign intelligence by means of (1) electronic surveillance, (2) physical searches, (3) pen registers and trap and trace devices (which record or decode dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information), or (4) the production of business records and other tangible things. Agencies typically request authorization for such activities from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a specialized court created by FISA to act as a neutral arbiter of agency requests for FISA orders."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Lobert, Joshua T.
2020-03-10
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ITL Bulletin: Making Email Trustworthy (October 2016)
"Email is a core application of computer networking and has been since the early days of Internet development. In those early days, networking was a collegial, research-oriented enterprise. Security was not a consideration. The past forty years have seen diversity in applications deployed on the Internet, and worldwide adoption of email by research organizations, governments, militaries, businesses, and individuals. At the same time, there has been an associated increase in Internet-based criminal and nuisance threats. The Internet's underlying core email protocol, Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP), was adopted in 1982 and is still deployed and operated today. However, this protocol is susceptible to a wide range of attacks, including man-in-the-middle content modification and content surveillance. The basic standards have been modified and augmented over the years with adaptations that mitigate some of these threats. With spoofing protection, integrity protection, encryption and authentication, properly implemented email systems can be regarded as sufficiently secure for government, financial, and medical communications. […] The major goal of the document is to provide guidelines on how to combat possible threats before a user opens an email. This guidance applies to federal IT [information technology] systems and will also be useful for other organizations, including small and medium-sized businesses."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.); Information Technology Laboratory (National Institute of Standards and Technology). Computer Security Division
Rose, Scott; Feldman, Larry; Witte, Greg
2016-10
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Maintaining the Information Flow: Signal Corps Manpower and Personnel Requirements for the Battlefield
From the Abstract: "Army transformation depends heavily upon superior Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to provide a force multiplier. C4ISR requirements also bring electronic systems and technologies to the battlefield in quantities never before used by the Army. In order to function and serve the soldiers, these systems require support personnel predominantly from the unit's Signal Company. To determine if identified signal manpower levels would adequately support a C4ISR function for the new Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), an assessment of signal support was conducted. The assessment methodologies were (1) a comparison of the Stryker signal personnel with signal personnel of current units, (2) a comparison of electronic equipment per repairer levels in the SBCT and current units, (3) an analysis of the C4ISR maintenance backlog during an operational exercise, and (4) an analysis of signal personnel questionnaires. Results indicated that the signal personnel assigned to the SBCT may not be sufficient. Manpower for some of the Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) needs to be increased, specifically the information systems personnel (MOS 74B) and various electronics repair personnel. If the C4ISR is not sufficiently maintained, it will degrade and not provide the expected force multiplier needed by the warfighter."
Command and Control Research Program (U.S.)
Anderson, B. Wayne; Garfinkel, Gerald S.
2004
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Maintaining the Information Flow: Signal Corps Manpower and Personnel Requirements for the Battlefield [Presentation]
This presentation supplements a paper addressing signal corps manpower and personnel requirements for the battlefield. "Army transformation depends heavily upon superior Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to provide a force multiplier. C4ISR requirements also bring electronic systems and technologies to the battlefield in quantities never before used by the Army. In order to function and serve the soldiers, these systems require support personnel predominantly from the unit's Signal Company. To determine if identified signal manpower levels would adequately support a C4ISR function for the new Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), an assessment of signal support was conducted. The assessment methodologies were (1) a comparison of the Stryker signal personnel with signal personnel of current units, (2) a comparison of electronic equipment per repairer levels in the SBCT and current units, (3) an analysis of the C4ISR maintenance backlog during an operational exercise, and (4) an analysis of signal personnel questionnaires. Results indicated that the signal personnel assigned to the SBCT may not be sufficient. Manpower for some of the Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) needs to be increased, specifically the information systems personnel (MOS 74B) and various electronics repair personnel. If the C4ISR is not sufficiently maintained, it will degrade and not provide the expected force multiplier needed by the warfighter."
Command and Control Research Program (U.S.)
Anderson, B. Wayne; Garfinkel, Gerald S.
2004
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ECPA Part 1: Lawful Access to Stored Content: Hearing Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, March 19, 2013
This testimony compilation is from the March 19, 2013 hearing, "ECPA Part 1: Lawful Access to Stored Content," before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations. From the opening statement of Bob Goodlatte: "The dawn of the digital age and the explosive development of communication methods has brought with it faster ways to compile, transmit and store information. These developments have produced faster and more efficient ways to do everything from conducting commerce to connecting with friends. Unfortunately, criminals have found ways to convert the benefits offered by new technology into new ways to commit crimes. At the intersection of these activities are the privacy rights of the public, society's interest in encouraging and expanding commerce, the investigative needs of law enforcement professionals, and the demands of the Constitution. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was designed to provide rules for government surveillance in the modern age. The technology of 1986 now seems ancient in comparison to today's. The interactive nature of the Internet, now including elements such as home banking and telecommuting, has produced an environment in which many people may spend hours each day 'on-line.' In this context, a person's electronic communications encompass much more today than they did in 1986. Indeed in 2013, a person's electronic communications encompass much more than they did in 2000, when Congress acknowledged that much had changed since the original ECPA of 1986. ECPA reform must be undertaken so that despite the evolution of technology and its use in the world, the constitutional protections reinforced by ECPA will endure." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Bob Goodlatte, Elana Tyrangiel, Richard Littlehale, Orin Kerr, and Richard P. Salgado.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary
2013-03-19
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Use of Automated Ambulatory-Care Encounter Records for Detection of Acute Illness Clusters, Including Potential Bioterrorism Events
The advent of domestic bioterrorism has emphasized the need for enhanced detection of clusters of acute illness. We describe a monitoring system operational in eastern Massachusetts, based on diagnoses obtained from electronic records of ambulatory-care encounters. Within 24 hours, ambulatory and telephone encounters recording patients with diagnoses of interest are identified and merged into major syndrome groups. Counts of new episodes of illness, rates calculated from health insurance records, and estimates of the probability of observing at least this number of new episodes are reported for syndrome surveillance. Census tracts with unusually large counts are identified by comparing observed with expected syndrome frequencies. During 1996-1999, weekly counts of new cases of lower respiratory syndrome were highly correlated with weekly hospital admissions. This system complements emergency room- and hospital-based surveillance by adding the capacity to rapidly identify clusters of illness, including potential bioterrorism events.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Lazarus, Ross
2002-08
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Before and After the USA PATRIOT Act
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, left an indelible mark upon America and an overshadowing feeling of vulnerability. They also created a determination to respond to the new national security threats they represented. Congress reacted to these threats by passing laws providing new tools to fight terrorism. Perhaps, the most controversial recent act of Congress is the United and Strengthening of America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 20011 (USA PATRIOT Act) and its impact upon the use of electronic surveillance and physical searches authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)2 to combat foreign threats. Some Americans fear the actions taken by Congress may infringe upon basic American liberties. Benjamin Franklin warned that " those who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety."3 The government must use its new tools in a way that preserves the rights and freedoms guaranteed by America's democracy, but, at the same time, ensure that the fight against terrorism is vigorous and effective. No American should be forced to seek safety over liberty. This article briefly examines FISA and the impact of the USA PATRIOT Act upon it.
United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Bulzomi, Michael J.
2003-06
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 113: A Bill to Amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to Cover Individuals, other than United States Persons, Who Engage in International Terrorism without Affiliation with an International Terrorist Group
"CBO estimates that implementing S. 113 would not result in any significant cost to the federal government. Enacting S. 113 could affect direct spending and receipts, but CBO estimates that any such effects would not be significant. S. 113 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. S. 113 would amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to expand the definition of "agent of a foreign power." Under the bill, this designation would include persons (other than U.S. persons) who engage in or prepare for international terrorist acts on their own. This would enable the Attorney General to use electronic surveillance to acquire information on such individuals. CBO expects that any increase in costs for law enforcement, court proceedings, or prison operations would not be significant because of the small number of cases likely to be affected. Any such additional costs would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Because those prosecuted and convicted under S. 113 could be subject to criminal fines, the federal government might collect additional fines if the bill is enacted. Collections of such fines are recorded in the budget as governmental receipts (revenues), which are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. CBO expects that any additional receipts and direct spending would be negligible because of the small number of cases involved."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2003-03-14
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Serial No. 109-20: Implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act: Sections 201, 202, 223, of the Act that Address Criminal Wiretaps, and Section 213 of the Act that Addresses Delayed Notice: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, May 3, 2005
From the opening statement of Howard Coble: "Today the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security will hold a hearing on criminal authorities for surveillance and search warrants. We are examining three sections of the PATRIOT Act that are sunsetting, and one section that is not, but has become controversial. Sections 201 and 202 of the PATRIOT Act create new wiretap predicates. Wiretap predicates are serious crimes enumerated in the Federal Criminal Code, but fall under one of the limited circumstances for which Congress authorized the use of a wiretap or electric surveillance. Sections 201 and 202 in no way change the strict limitations on when wiretaps may be used, as Congress dictated in title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act outlines what is and what is not permissible with regard to wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. Title III restrictions go beyond fourth amendment constitutional protections and include a statutory suppression rule to exclude evidence that was collected in violation of title III. Section 223 of the PATRIOT Act added additional safeguards against abuse by amending the Federal Criminal Code to provide for administrative discipline of Federal officers or employees, as well as for similar actions to be brought against the United States for damages by a person aggrieved by such illegal disclosures." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Howard Coble, Robert C. Scott, Michael J. Sullivan, Chuck Rosenberg, Heather Mac Donald, Bob Barr, and William E. Moschella.
United States. Government Printing Office
2005-05-03
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Public Law 95-511: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
"An Act [t]o authorize electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the 'Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978'."
United States. Government Printing Office
1978-10-25
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): An Overview
"The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted in 1978. This legislation was the Congressional response to the exposure during multiple Committee hearings of previous abuses of U.S. persons' privacy rights by certain components of the United States government. Those abuses had occurred, according to the government, as part of its efforts to counter purported threats to national security. Unquestionably, such threats existed in and before 1978; beyond peradventure, however, they pale in comparison to the threats to national security that the United States currently faces. Those threats bear the face of terrorism, primarily foreign but domestic as well. Though FISA is not a legally usable tool for combating domestic terrorism, its electronic surveillance and physical search authority are legal and very effective methods for monitoring the activities of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers while they operate within the United States. Increasingly, indeed, overwhelmingly, the current objective of such operational activities is to thwart terrorist acts. [...] In the face of the foregoing, it is no wonder then that our Congress has recently enhanced the ability of counter terrorism agents to use FISA in the effort to discover and thereby thwart acts of terrorism aimed at our country. The following is offered as an historical context in which to view FISA as well as a summary of how FISA has evolved over the past quarter century of its existence as a tool not just to thwart terrorism but more generally as an effective means to gather foreign intelligence."
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
McAdams, James G.
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S. Hrg. 113-326; Serial No. J-113-18: Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, June 19, 2013
This is the June 19, 2013 hearing on "Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation," before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. From the opening statement of Patrick Leahy: "Today, the Judiciary Committee welcomes Robert Mueller for what is likely to be his final appearance before this panel as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). […] As the FBI now prepares for its first change in leadership since the 9/11 attacks, we must continue to review closely the broad intelligence-gathering powers that Congress granted to the FBI in order to combat terrorist threats. The FBI has faced daunting national security challenges, but we must also ensure that they do not violate the privacy rights and civil liberties of law-abiding Americans. I have long said that protecting national security and protecting Americans' fundamental rights are not mutually exclusive. We can and must do both. The recent public revelations about two classified data collection programs illustrate the need for close scrutiny by Congress of the Government's surveillance activities. For years, I have been troubled by the expansive nature of the USA PATRIOT Act. These powerful law enforcement tools, including Section 215 orders, require careful monitoring and close oversight. That is why I authored legislation in 2009 that would have improved and reformed the PATRIOT Act, while increasing public accountability and transparency. My bill was reported by this Committee on a bipartisan basis in 2009 and 2011, and would help protect the privacy rights of innocent Americans, and strengthen oversight by the courts and Congress. I intend to re-introduce that bill tomorrow, and hope that Senators from both parties will join me in this effort to improve the PATRIOT Act and further protect the civil liberties of everyday citizens. The American people deserve to know how broad investigative laws like the PATRIOT Act are being interpreted and used to conduct electronic surveillance, particularly when it involves the collection of data on innocent Americans. The American people also deserve to know whether these programs have proven sufficiently effective to justify their breadth. Right now, I remain skeptical." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Robert S. Mueller.
United States. Government Printing Office
2014
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Applications Made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court During Calendar Year 2014
"This report is submitted pursuant to sections 107 and 502 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 19878 (the 'Act'), as amended, 50 U.S.C. section 1801 et seq., and section 118 of USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177 (2006). In accordance with those provisions, this report provides information regarding all applications made by the Government during calendar year 2014 for authority to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act, all applications made by the Government during calendar year 2014 for access to certain business records (including the production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes, and certain requests made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to national security letter authorities. In addition, while not required to do so by statute, the Government is providing information concerning the number of applications made during calendar year 2014 for authority to conduct physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legislative Affairs
2015-04-20
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Data Management Issues for Emerging Diseases and New Tools for Managing Surveillance and Laboratory Data
"Two primary data management functions can satisfy the laboratory data demands with multiple requirements in each function. The first function, internal laboratory data management, consists of entering test results and tracking specimens. The second, surveillance, includes gathering data and moving data beyond the electronic files of the laboratory to appropriate sites for analysis. A data management system should be able to perform these functions not only during an outbreak but throughout the period of surveillance as well."
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Martin, Stanley M.; Bean, Nancy H.
1995-10
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MMWR: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, April 22, 2005
The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Series is prepared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).[It] is the agency's primary vehicle for scientific publication of timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and useful public health information and recommendations.This issue of MMWR contains the following: "Homicide and Suicide Rates -- National Violent Death Reporting System, Six States, 2003"; "Assessing the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System - Cooperative Adverse Drug Event Surveillance Project -- Six Sites, United States, January 1-June 15, 2004"; "Congenital Malaria -- Nassau County, New York, 2004"; "QuickStats: Percentage of Persons Aged
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2005-04-22
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Syndromic Surveillance For Bioterrorism Following Attacks on World Trade Center -- New York City, 2001
Immediately after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC), the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYCDOHMH) was concerned about the possibility of a secondary attack with a biologic agent. Because NYCDOHMH lost communications as a result of the attacks, concern arose that this disruption would affect the ability to recognize a bioterrorist event. To address this concern, NYCDOHMH quickly implemented a syndromic surveillance system in hospital emergency departments (EDs) to identify a large-scale bioterrorist event and other health conditions related to the WTC attacks. This report describes the operational and maintenance aspects of conducting syndromic surveillance for bioterrorism (BT) and demonstrates the limitations of drop-in systems that rely on manual data collection. Health departments that are establishing early warning systems for BT should consider seeking routinely collected electronic data.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Ackelsberg, Joel
2002-09-11
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HIV/AIDS: Haiti Pre-Decision Brief for Public Health Action
"Haiti has the highest HIV prevalence rate in the hemisphere (2.2%); more than 120,000 persons are estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) in Haiti. Approximately 31,132 were receiving antiretroviral treatment at the end of September, 2009. (there were a total of 48 treatment sites providing ARV treatment in the country; 36 PEFPAR sites and 17 Global Fund Sites (GFS). HIV sentinel surveillance carried out in pregnant women in 2006/7 at 17 sites found a median prevalence of 4.4% (range 0.8-11.8%; urban 5.9%, rural 2.7%). A reported four (4) HIV-infected infants are born each day, among the 8,000 HIV- infected women who become pregnant each year. Rates of infection are higher in commercial sex workers (CSW) and men who have sex with other men (MSM) (~5%). HIV is highly stigmatized in Haiti. An active electronic HIV/AIDS reporting system, in place before the earthquake, is currently the backbone of public health surveillance in Haiti. The National Public Health Laboratory (LNSP) supported HIV diagnosis and early infant diagnosis in the country. HIV diagnostic capacity was generally available at all 131 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) services sites, but may be limited due to constraints posed by an increased number of patients needing post-earthquake care. Existing testing algorithms for HIV diagnosis can be used without modification; all 131 PEPFAR service sites have continued operating and offering services, despite the earthquake. CD4 testing is available at most 36 PEPFAR treatment sites."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2010-02
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Authority of the Deputy Attorney General Under Executive Order 12333, Memorandum Opinion for the Associate Deputy Attorney General [November 5, 2001]
This memorandum from the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel deals with the powers that the Deputy Attorney General possesses. "You have asked for our opinion whether the Deputy Attorney General has the authority to grant approvals under section 2.5 of Exec. Order No.12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981 Comp.). We believe that he does. Executive Order No. 12333 addresses the conduct of intelligence activities. Section 2.5 provides: The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such technique shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ['FISA'], shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order. Under the Department's regulations, the Deputy Attorney General 'is authorized to exercise all the power and authority of the Attorney General, unless any such power or authority is required by law to be exercised by the Attorney General personally.' 28 C.F.R. § 0.15(a) (2000). That regulation rests on the Attorney General's statutory authority to 'make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney General.' 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1994). Consequently, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise the Attorney General's power under section 2.5 of the Executive Order, unless by law the Attorney General must exercise that power personally."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
Yoo, John
2001-11-05
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Surveillance for Foodborne Disease Outbreaks - United States, 1998-2002
"The Foodborne Disease Outbreak [FBDO] Surveillance System reviews data on FBDOs, defined as the occurrence of two or more cases of a similar illness resulting from the ingestion of a common food. State and local public health departments have primary responsibility for identifying and investigating FBDOs. State, local, and territorial health departments use a standard form to report these outbreaks to CDC [Center for Disease Control and Prevention]. In 1998, CDC implemented enhanced surveillance for FBDOs by increasing communication with state, local, and territorial health departments and revising the outbreak report form. Since 2001, reports of FBDOs are submitted through a web application on the Internet called the electronic Foodborne Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS)."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Braden, Christopher; Woodruff, Rachel; Painter, John . . .
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2007 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Report
"Pursuant to Sections 1807 and 1862 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the 'Act'), as amended, this report provides information regarding applications made by the Government during calendar year 2007 for authority to conduct electronic surveillance and physical search for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act and applications made by the Goverrunent during calendar year 2007 for access to certain business records (including the production of tangible things) for foreign intelligence purposes under the Act."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legislative Affairs
2008-04-30
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Wiretap Report 2007
"The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report to Congress the number and nature of federal and state applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The statute requires that specific information be provided to the AO, including the offense(s) under investigation, the location of the intercept, the cost of the surveillance, and the number of arrests, trials, and convictions that directly result from the surveillance. This report covers intercepts concluded between January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2007, and provides supplementary information on arrests and convictions resulting from intercepts concluded in prior years. A total of 2,208 intercepts authorized by federal and state courts were completed in 2007, an increase of 20 percent compared to the number terminated in 2006. The number of applications for orders by federal authorities fell less than 1 percent to 457. The number of applications reported by state prosecuting officials grew 27 percent to 1,751, with 24 states providing reports, 1 more than in 2006. Installed wiretaps were in operation an average of 44 days per wiretap in 2007, compared to 40 days in 2006. The average number of persons whose communications were intercepted decreased from 122 per wiretap order in 2006 to 94 per wiretap order in 2007. The average percentage of intercepted communications that were incriminating was 30 percent in 2007, compared to 20 percent in 2006."
United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts
2008-04
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Wiretap Report 2000
"The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report to Congress the number and nature of federal and state applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The statute requires that specific information be provided to the AO, including the offense(s) under investigation, the location of the intercept, the cost of the surveillance, and the number of arrests, trials, and convictions that directly result from the surveillance. This report covers intercepts concluded between January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2000, and provides supplementary information on arrests and convictions resulting from intercepts concluded in prior years. A total of 1,190 intercepts authorized by federal and state courts were completed in 2000, a decrease of 5 percent compared to the number terminated in 1999. In 2000, wiretaps installed were in operation on average 15 percent fewer days per wiretap than in 1999, and the number of intercepts per order was 8 percent lower, but the average number of incriminating communications intercepted per wiretap increased 3 percent."
United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts
2001-04
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Wiretap Report 2001
"The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report to Congress the number and nature of federal and state applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The statute requires that specific information be provided to the AO, including the offense(s) under investigation, the location of the intercept, the cost of the surveillance, and the number of arrests, trials, and convictions that directly result from the surveillance. This report covers intercepts concluded between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2001, and provides supplementary information on arrests and convictions resulting from intercepts concluded in prior years. A total of 1,491 intercepts authorized by federal and state courts were completed in 2001, an increase of 25 percent compared to the number terminated in 2000. In 2001, wiretaps installed were in operation on average 9 percent fewer days per wiretap than in 2000, and the number of intercepts per order was 12 percent lower. The average number of persons whose communications were intercepted declined 56 percent, from 196 per wiretap order in 2000 to 86 per order in 2001."
United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts
2002-04
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Wiretap Report 2003
"The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report to Congress the number and nature of federal and state applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The statute requires that specific information be provided to the AO, including the offense(s) under investigation, the location of the intercept, the cost of the surveillance, and the number of arrests, trials, and convictions that directly result from the surveillance. This report covers intercepts concluded between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2003, and provides supplementary information on arrests and convictions resulting from intercepts concluded in prior years. A total of 1,442 intercepts authorized by federal and state courts were completed in 2003, an increase of 6 percent compared to the number terminated in 2002. The number of applications for orders by federal authorities rose 16 percent to 578. The number of applications reported by state prosecuting officials remained stable (up 0.3 percent), with 23 state jurisdictions providing reports, 4 more than in 2002. Wiretaps installed were in operation an average of 44 days per wiretap in 2003 compared to 39 days in 2002. The average number of persons whose communications were intercepted increased from 92 per wiretap order in 2002 to 116 per order in 2003. The average percentage of intercepted communications that were incriminating rose from 24 percent in 2002 to 33 percent in 2003."
United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts
2004-04
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Wiretap Report 2002
"The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report to Congress the number and nature of federal and state applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The statute requires that specific information be provided to the AO, including the offense(s) under investigation, the location of the intercept, the cost of the surveillance, and the number of arrests, trials, and convictions that directly result from the surveillance. This report covers intercepts concluded between January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2002, and provides supplementary information on arrests and convictions resulting from intercepts concluded in prior years. A total of 1,358 intercepts authorized by federal and state courts were completed in 2002, a drop of 9 percent compared to the number terminated in 2001. The number of applications for orders by federal authorities rose 2 percent to 497. Following an increase of 41 percent in 2001, the number of applications reported by state prosecuting officials dropped 14 percent in 2002. The average number of persons whose communications were intercepted increased 7 percent. The number of communications intercepted per order was 9 percent higher, and the number of incriminating communications reported per wiretap was 21 percent higher."
United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts
2003-04
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Wiretap Report 2004
"The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report to Congress the number and nature of federal and state applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The statute requires that specific information be provided to the AO, including the offense(s) under investigation, the location of the intercept, the cost of the surveillance, and the number of arrests, trials, and convictions that directly result from the surveillance. This report covers intercepts concluded between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2004, and provides supplementary information on arrests and convictions resulting from intercepts concluded in prior years. A total of 1,710 intercepts authorized by federal and state courts were completed in 2004, an increase of 19 percent compared to the number terminated in 2003. The number of applications for orders by federal authorities rose 26 percent to 730. The number of applications reported by state prosecuting officials grew 13 percent to 980, with 19 state jurisdictions providing reports, four fewer than in 2003, but equal to the number for 2002. Wiretaps installed were in operation an average of 43 days per wiretap in 2004 compared to 44 days in 2003. The average number of persons whose communications were intercepted increased from 116 per wiretap order in 2003 to 126 per order in 2004. The average percentage of intercepted communications that were incriminating was 21 percent in 2004, compared to 33 percent in 2003."
United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts
2005-04
