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• Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: 'Lone Wolf' Amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

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  "Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, amended the definition of 'agent of a foreign power' in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1), to add a new category of covered individuals. Under the new 'lone wolf' provision, a non-United States person who engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation for international terrorism is deemed to be an 'agent of a foreign power' under FISA. The new provision does not change the procedures to be used to apply for a court order authorizing electronic surveillance or a physical search under FISA. If an order is sought under this definition of an 'agent of a foreign power,' however, the applicant is not required to demonstrate a connection between the target of the electronic surveillance or the physical search and a foreign nation, foreign group, or international terrorist group. Nor does the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), in approving such an order, have to find probable cause to believe that such a connection existed. Rather, if the court authorizes such a surveillance or physical search using this new definition of 'agent of a foreign power,' the FISC judge has to find, in pertinent part, that, based upon the information provided by the applicant for the order, the target had engaged in or was engaging in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2004-12-29
• Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: 'Lone Wolf' Amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act [Updated December 19, 2006]

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  "Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, amended the definition of 'agent of a foreign power' in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1), to add a new category of covered individuals. Under this 'lone wolf' provision, a non-United States person who engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation for international terrorism is deemed to be an 'agent of a foreign power' under FISA. This provision does not change the procedures to be used to apply for a court order authorizing electronic surveillance or a physical search under FISA. If an order is sought under this definition of an 'agent of a foreign power,' however, the applicant is not required to demonstrate a connection between the target of the electronic surveillance or the physical search and a foreign nation, foreign group, or international terrorist group. Nor does the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), in approving such an order, have to find probable cause to believe that such a connection existed. Rather, if the court authorizes such a surveillance or physical search using this definition of 'agent of a foreign power,' the FISC judge has to find, in pertinent part, which, based upon the information provided by the applicant for the order, the target had engaged in or was engaging in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore. By operation of the sunset provision in Section 103 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act, P.L. 109-177, the amendment to the definition of 'agent of a foreign power' in FISA will cease to have effect on December 31, 2009."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.; Yeh, Brian T.

  2006-12-19
• Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act [October 9, 2012]

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  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It also appends citations to state law in the area and the text of ECPA. It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2012-10-09
• Privacy: An Abridged Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act [October 9, 2012]

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  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2012-10-09
• Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act [March 30, 2011]

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  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It also appends citations to state law in the area and the text of ECPA. It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); in civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; in disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and in suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2011-03-30
• Electronic Investigative Techniques

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  This issue of the Bulletin focus on the working relationships among the United States Attorneys' offices, The Criminal Division's Office of Enforcement Operations (OEO) and Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section, and the Assistant Attorney General or Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the area of Title III, and other electronic surveillance techniques. We have included articles, checklists, and interviews covering the approval process for, and use of, Title III intercepts and related electronic surveillance methods in the investigation and prosecution of a variety of criminal cases. The interview of OEO Director Frederick D. Hess is terrific. He provides us with insight into the history of OEO, its inner workings, and the need to have OEO lawyers review applications to allow us to use these effective and powerful investigative tools. Through the collective efforts of several OEO lawyers, we have a great article on the "nuts and bolts" of OEO's Title III approval process and highlights of several major Title III cases. You'll also find that the articles submitted by Michael R. Sklaire of the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section are invaluable references when faced with "what do we need to do to get . . . [electronic surveillance order]" questions. AUSA Jeffrey W. Johnson has written a very common sense article regrding his approach to wiretaps. We also included an interview with DEA Special Agent Mark Styron regarding his perspective on working relationships between AUSAs and Agents in wiretap cases. AUSAs Melissa J. Annis, Monica Bachner, and Patricia Diaz share their experiences with wiretap investigations, including some of the obstacles AUSAs face when supervising wiretaps. Each author offers terrific suggestions and "things to think about."

  Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

  1997-09
• Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act [Updated August 3, 2005]

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  "The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, P.L. 103- 414, 47 USC 1001-1010), enacted October 25, 1994, is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently despite the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities, and services, wherever reasonably achievable, to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance actions. The modifications, originally planned to be completed by 1998, have been delayed due to disagreements among the telecommunications industry, law enforcement agencies, and privacy rights groups, over equipment standards, and other technical issues. Disagreements over amount of federal funds to be provided to the telecommunications carriers for CALEA implementation, which carriers are eligible to receive those funds, and privacy concerns, have also impeded implementation. After receiving petitions from the industry and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) over the dispute, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1999 ruled in favor of most of the FBI's requests. This decision resulted in lawsuits being filed by industry and privacy rights groups. In August 2000, a federal appeals court upheld parts of the FCC's decision, but remanded most of it for reconsideration. Since that time, the FCC established June 30, 2002, as the final CALEA compliance date, but it has granted numerous waivers and full CALEA implementation remains incomplete."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Figliola, Patricia Moloney

  2005-08-03
• Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act [Updated May 3, 2005]

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  "The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, P.L. 103- 414, 47 USC 1001-1010), enacted October 25, 1994, is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently despite the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities, and services, wherever reasonably achievable, to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance actions. The modifications, originally planned to be completed by 1998, have been delayed due to disagreements among the telecommunications industry, law enforcement agencies, and privacy rights groups, over equipment standards, and other technical issues. Disagreements over amount of federal funds to be provided to the telecommunications carriers for CALEA implementation, which carriers are eligible to receive those funds, and privacy concerns, have also impeded implementation. After receiving petitions from the industry and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) over the dispute, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1999 ruled in favor of most of the FBI's requests. This decision resulted in lawsuits being filed by industry and privacy rights groups. In August 2000, a federal appeals court upheld parts of the FCC's decision, but remanded most of it for reconsideration. Since that time, the FCC established June 30, 2002, as the final CALEA compliance date, but it has granted numerous waivers and full CALEA implementation remains incomplete."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Figliola, Patricia Moloney

  2005-05-03
• Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act [Updated December 29, 2004]

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  "The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, P.L. 103- 414, 47 USC 1001-1010), enacted October 25, 1994, is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently despite the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities, and services, wherever reasonably achievable, to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance actions. The FBI and other law enforcement agencies, the FCC, and Congress are all actively addressing CALEA-related concerns. On March 10, 2004, the FBI, the Department of Justice and the Drug Enforcement Administration petitioned the FCC to identify additional telecommunications services not identified specifically within CALEA that should be subject to it. In response to the petition and after considering the comments and replies from interested parties, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and declaratory ruling on August 4, 2004. In the NPRM, the FCC drew a number of tentative conclusions regarding CALEA applicability; addressed compliance issues; and developed a proposal for implementation costs and time frame. Comments and replies to the NPRM were due November 8 and December 7, 2004, respectively. Accompanying the NPRM was a declaratory ruling in which the FCC clarifies that commercial wireless 'push-to-talk' services are subject to CALEA, regardless of the technologies that wireless providers choose to apply in offering them."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Figliola, Patricia Moloney

  2004-12-29
• Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act [June 8, 2007]

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  "The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, P.L. 103- 414, 47 U.S.C. 1001-1010), enacted October 25, 1994, is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently despite the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities, and services, wherever reasonably achievable, to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance actions. Since 2004, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been considering a number of questions as to how to apply CALEA to new technologies, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). In August 2005, in response to a March 2004 petition by a group of law enforcement agencies, the FCC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Declaratory Ruling which required providers of certain broadband and interconnected VoIP services to accommodate law enforcement wiretaps. The FCC found that these services could be considered replacements for conventional telecommunications services already subject to wiretap rules, including circuit-switched voice service and dial-up Internet access. The Order is limited to facilities-based broadband Internet access service providers and VoIP providers that offer services that use the public switched telephone network ('interconnected VoIP providers)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Figliola, Patricia Moloney

  2007-06-08
• Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act [Updated January 29, 2008]

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  "The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act […], enacted October 25, 1994, is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently despite the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities, and services, wherever reasonably achievable, to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance actions. Since 2004, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has been considering a number of questions as to how to apply CALEA to new technologies, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). […]. In May 2006, the FCC addressed several outstanding issues regarding CALEA implementation. Among other clarifications, the FCC (1) affirmed its May 14, 2007 compliance deadline for facilities-based broadband Internet access and interconnected VoIP services, and clarified that the date applied to all such providers; (2) explained that the FCC does not plan to intervene in the standards-setting process in this matter; (3) permitted telecommunications carriers the option of using Trusted Third Parties to assist in meeting their CALEA obligations; (4) restricted the availability of compliance extensions to equipment, facilities, and services deployed prior to October 25, 1998; (5) found that the FCC may enforce action under section 229(a) of the Communications Act against carriers that fail to comply with CALEA; and (6) concluded that carriers are responsible for CALEA development and implementation costs for post-January 1, 1995, equipment and facilities […]."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Figliola, Patricia Moloney

  2008-01-29
• Digital Surveillance: The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act [Updated May 10, 2006]

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  "The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA, P.L. 103- 414, 47 USC 1001-1010), enacted October 25, 1994, is intended to preserve the ability of law enforcement officials to conduct electronic surveillance effectively and efficiently despite the deployment of new digital technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to modify their equipment, facilities, and services, wherever reasonably achievable, to ensure that they are able to comply with authorized electronic surveillance actions...Among other clarifications, the FCC (1) affirmed that the CALEA compliance deadline for facilities-based broadband Internet access and interconnected VoIP services will be May 14, 2007, and clarified that the date will apply to all such providers; (2) explained that the FCC does not plan to intervene in the standards setting process in this matter; (3) permitted telecommunications carriers the option of using Trusted Third Parties to assist in meeting their CALEA obligations; (4) restricted the availability of compliance extensions to equipment, facilities, and services deployed prior to October 25, 1998; (5) found that the FCC may enforce action under section 229(a) of the Communications Act against carriers that fail to comply with CALEA; and (6) concluded that carriers are responsible for CALEA development and implementation costs for post-January 1, 1995, equipment and facilities, and declined to adopt a national surcharge to recover CALEA costs."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Figliola, Patricia Moloney

  2006-05-10
• Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 2248: FISA Amendments Act of 2007

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  "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2007 would make several modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and repeal several sections added to FISA by the Protect America Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-55). The bill would grant authority to the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to authorize surveillance of individuals or groups outside the United States. Such authorizations would permit the incidental acquisition of communications of individuals located within the United States so long as procedures are in place to minimize such acquisitions and to ensure that surveillance is targeted at individuals outside the United States. Under the bill, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) would be authorized to review those procedures and to order the government to modify them if the court finds they are inadequate or violate the Constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure. Section 101 of the bill would restrict the ability of the government to target U.S. persons located outside of the United States pursuant to authorizations by the Attorney General and DNI. Under the bill, if the government targets a U.S. person overseas but intends to acquire that individual's communications in the United States, the government must follow the traditional FISA warrant process for electronic surveillance."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2007-12-07
• Impeccable Timing: The Political Efficiency of PRC-U.S. Surveillance Confrontations

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  From the thesis abstract: "This thesis investigates several potential drivers of surveillance confrontations involving United States' assets on the People's Republic of China's [PRC] maritime periphery, by exploring encounters such as the April 2001 EP-3 [Electronic Patrol] and the March 2009 USNS [United States Naval Ship] Impeccable (T-AGOS-23) incidents. The evidence herein suggests that the 2001 and 2009 confrontations were most likely driven by issue elevation, in which the PRC's maritime forces were given the charge to opportunistically challenge U.S. maritime surveillance operations during periods of enhanced political efficiency. These encounters were likely part of broad efforts to elevate maritime sovereignty and surveillance issues during periods in which U.S. surveillance norms were perceived to be most vulnerable to political challenge. Potential secondary drivers of the PRC's behavior are also woven through this assessment. From this conclusion, future vulnerability periods may reappear, in which there is an increased probability that a similar broad pattern of surveillance confrontations will resurface. This work concludes by assessing current PRC-U.S. maritime trends and providing recommendations in support of a comprehensive plan that spans the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This adaptive effort may mitigate future surveillance confrontations, their escalation, and conflict, to protect U.S. military, diplomatic, and national interests."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  Harbaugh, Jon D.

  2014-06
• Essence II and the Framework for Evaluating Syndromic Surveillance Systems

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  "In response to the threat of biologic terrorism and the resurgence of virulent forms of infectious diseases, technologic advances are being applied to disease surveillance. Syndromic surveillance systems have emerged to capture and analyze health-indicator data to identify abnormal health conditions and enable early detection of outbreaks. Given the limited public health experience with biologic terrorism and the variety of possible terrorism scenarios, the research community is exploring the application of advanced detection technology to prediagnostic syndromic data. In 2003, CDC issued a draft framework for evaluating syndromic surveillance systems, which was later revised and published in MMWR. The CDC framework is designed for evaluation of relatively mature, fully operational syndromic surveillance systems. The technology to support syndromic surveillance is just maturing, with current operational experience gained from test-bed use. This paper applies the framework to the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE), a series of prototype systems developed by Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) and the Division of Preventive Medicine at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  Lombardo, Joseph S.; Burkom, Howard S.; Pavlin, Julie A.

  2004-09-24?
• Viral Hepatitis Surveillance - United States, 2014

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  "As part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), viral hepatitis case-reports are received electronically from U.S. state and territorial health departments via CDC's National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS), a computerized public health surveillance system that provides CDC with data on a weekly basis. Although the surveillance infrastructure was in place for states to report both acute and chronic infections, case-reports of chronic hepatitis B virus (HBV) and past or present hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections, which account for the greatest burden of disease, were not submitted by all states; in 2014, 40 states submitted reports of chronic HBV infection and 37 states submitted reports of chronic HCV infection. The NNDSS data in this report should be interpreted with the understanding that 'reported cases' of viral hepatitis represent persons who were tested for and diagnosed with viral hepatitis infection based on a relatively stringent case definition. Because most infections with viral hepatitis are asymptomatic, all cases are not identified or reported. As a result, this Summary is most useful in detecting trends over time for newly reported cases of hepatitis A virus (HAV), HB V, and HCV infections."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  2014
• Viral Hepatitis Surveillance - United States, 2015

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  "The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS) receives viral hepatitis case reports electronically each week from state and territorial health departments in the United States (U.S.) via CDC's National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS), a computerized public health surveillance system. The surveillance system accepts case reports of acute and chronic infections from all states and the District of Columbia, though not all jurisdictions report their data. In 2015, a total of 48 states submitted reports of acute hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection, 40 submitted reports of acute hepatitis C virus (HCV) infection, 40 submitted reports of chronic HBV infection, and 40 submitted reports of chronic HCV infection. Most persons infected with viral hepatitis are asymptomatic and so are not identified or reported. In 2011, CDC developed a statistical method to account for cases that were neither diagnosed nor reported in estimating the actual number of new (acute) cases of hepatitis A virus (HAV), HBV, and HCV infections from the number of cases reported for each disease; estimates in this report were derived using this method. Since estimates before 2011 were obtained using a different, unpublished method, they cannot be compared with those since 2011. This Summary describes estimated trends during 2011- 2015 and reported cases of acute HAV, HBV, and HCV infections in 2015."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  2015
• USA PATRIOT Act Sunset: A Sketch [Updated June 29, 2005]

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  "Several sections of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act (the act) and one section of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, each relating to enhanced foreign intelligence and law enforcement surveillance authority, expire on December 31, 2005, unless they are extended. Thereafter, the authority remains in effect only as it relates to foreign intelligence investigations begun before sunset or to offenses or potential offenses begun or occurring before that date. The temporary provisions are: sections 201 (wiretapping in terrorism cases), 202 (wiretapping in computer fraud and abuse felony cases), 203(b) (sharing wiretap information), 203(d) (sharing foreign intelligence information), 204 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen register/trap & trace exceptions), 206 (roving FISA wiretaps), 207 (duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who are agents of a foreign power), 209 (seizure of voicemail messages pursuant to warrants), 212 (emergency disclosure of electronic surveillance), 214 (FISA pen register/ trap and trace authority), 215 (FISA access to tangible items), 217 (interception of computer trespasser communications), 218 (purpose for FISA orders), 220 (nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence), 223 (civil liability and discipline for privacy violations), and 225 (provider immunity for FISA wiretap assistance). This report is an abridged version--without footnotes or chart--of CRS Report RL32186, 'USA PATRIOT Act Sunset: Provisions That Expire on December 31, 2005."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2005-06-29
• USA PATRIOT Act Sunset: A Sketch [January 7, 2004]

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  "Several sections of Title II of the USA PATRIOT Act (the Act) relating to enhanced foreign intelligence and law enforcement surveillance authority expire on December 31, 2005. Thereafter, the authority remains in effect only as it relates to foreign intelligence investigations begun before sunset or to offenses or potential offenses begun or occurring before that date. The temporary provisions are: sections 201 (wiretapping in terrorism cases), 202 (wiretapping in computer fraud and abuse felony cases), 203(b) (sharing wiretap information), 203(d) (sharing foreign intelligence information), 204 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen register/trap & trace exceptions), 206 (roving FISA wiretaps), 207 (duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who are agents of a foreign power), 209 (seizure of voicemail messages pursuant to warrants), 212 (emergency disclosure of electronic surveillance), 214 (FISA pen register/ trap and trace authority), 215 (FISA access to tangible items), 217 (interception of computer trespasser communications), 218 (purpose for FISA orders), 220 (nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence), 223 (civil liability and discipline for privacy violations), and 225 (provider immunity for FISA wiretap assistance). The sunset provision suggests two types of interpretative challenges: (1) what is a potential offense? (2) what is the impact of amendments enacted after the Act?"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2004-01-07
• Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping [October 9, 2012]

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  "This report provides an overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). ECPA consists of three parts. The first, often referred to as Title III, outlaws wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, except as otherwise provided. The second, the Stored Communications Act, governs the privacy of, and government access to, the content of electronic communications and to related records. The third outlaws the use and installation of pen registers and of trap and trace devices, unless judicially approved for law enforcement or intelligence gathering purposes. FISA consists of seven parts. The first, reminiscent of Title III, authorizes electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence investigations. The second authorizes physical searches in foreign intelligence cases. The third permits the use and installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices in the context of a foreign intelligence investigation. The fourth affords intelligence officials access to business records and other tangible items. The fifth directs the Attorney General to report to Congress on the specifics of the exercise of FISA authority. The sixth, scheduled to expire on December 30, 2012, permits the acquisition of the communications of targeted overseas individuals and entities. The seventh creates a safe harbor from civil liability for those who assist or have assisted in the collection of information relating to the activities of foreign powers and their agents."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Stevens, Gina Marie; Doyle, Charles

  2012-10-09
• Privacy: An Abbreviated Outline of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping [October 9, 2012]

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  "This report provides an overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). ECPA consists of three parts. The first, often referred to as Title III, outlaws wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, except as otherwise provided. The second, the Stored Communications Act, governs the privacy of, and government access to, the content of electronic communications and to related records. The third outlaws the use and installation of pen registers and of trap and trace devices, unless judicially approved for law enforcement or intelligence gathering purposes. FISA consists of seven parts. The first, reminiscent of Title III, authorizes electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence investigations. The second authorizes physical searches in foreign intelligence cases. The third permits the use and installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices in the context of a foreign intelligence investigation. The fourth affords intelligence officials access to business records and other tangible items. The fifth directs the Attorney General to report to Congress on the specifics of the exercise of FISA authority. The sixth, scheduled to expire on December 30, 2012, permits the acquisition of the communications of targeted overseas individuals and entities. The seventh creates a safe harbor from civil liability for those who assist or have assisted in the collection of information relating to the activities of foreign powers and their agents."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles; Stevens, Gina Marie

  2012-10-09
• Strengthening FISA: Does the Protect America Act Protect Americans' Civil Liberties and Enhance Security? Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, September 25, 2007

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  From the opening statement of Patrick J. Leahy: "The Protect America Act provides no meaningful check by the FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] Court, or by the Congress, for that matter. It does not even require the Government to have its own internal procedures for protecting the privacy of these Americans. As I said, it may be a spouse calling from here to a husband or a wife who is overseas protecting America. They may be talking about the children's grades. They may be talking about a difficulty a child may be having with the separation. Now, the alternative bill would have required at least internal procedures and an Inspector General audit, and I would like to know why Director McConnell rejected that idea. In addition, the Protect America Act contains language that appears to go far beyond what the administration said it needed. It redefines ''electronic surveillance'' in a way that has expansive implications, but was not necessary to accomplish the administration's stated objectives. It has language in many places that, at the very least, is inscrutable and could be read to allow much broader surveillance than the administration has acknowledged or, for that matter, I hope intends. And if this was unintentional, well, then, we can fix it. That is one of the things the sunset requires us to do, is look at it. If it was not, then we need to evaluate what was really intended and why. I know the skilled and dedicated employees of our intelligence agencies want to protect our country, as every one of us does. But if our history has taught us anything, it is that the Government cannot and should not be left to police itself when it comes to the secret surveillance of Americans. The Founders knew it. The Congress that passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act knew it. So I hope this hearing will help us institute the proper protections to safeguard our security and our valued freedoms." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Russell D. Feingold; Chuck Grassley; Patrick J. Leahy; Arlen Specter; James A. Baker; Bryan Cunningham; James. X. Dempsey; J. Michael McConnell; Suzanne E. Spaulding; and Michael A. Sussmann.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2009
• S. Rept. 111-6: Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Covering the Period January 4, 2007 to January 2, 2009, March 9, 2009

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  The Select Committee on Intelligence submitted to the Senate this report on its activities from January 4, 2007 to January 2, 2009. This report includes the briefing of the CIA detainees who were transferred to Guantanamo in September 2006 and information about the CIA's detention program, which had previously been restricted to the Chairman and Vice Chairman. "In January 2007, during the first month covered by this report, President Bush nominated J. Michael McConnell to be the second Director of National Intelligence (DNI), replacing the first DNI, John D. Negroponte, who was nominated to be the Deputy Secretary of State. Also in January 2007, Attorney General Gonzales informed the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees that, as a result of a recent Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ruling, electronic surveillance that had been conducted under the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) would now be conducted under court authorization. Then, in March 2007, Chairman Rockefeller and Vice Chairman Bond commenced efforts with the Attorney General and DNI McConnell, whom the Senate had confirmed in February, to consider amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The Committee's expanded knowledge of the CIA's detention program, and evolving circumstances concerning foreign intelligence surveillance matters, combined with priorities of the new DNI, and ever present and challenging intelligence issues relating to Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iraq, all served as the basis of important undertakings of the Committee during the 110th Congress."

  United States. Government Printing Office. Federal Security Agency

  2009-03-09
• DoD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System, Annual Report Fiscal Year 2002, Partnering in the Fight Against Emerging Infections

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  "The emergence in China of SARS in late 2002 not only highlighted a new and serious threat in its own right but also reinforced that emerging infections that may emerge in one part of the world can rapidly cause devastating problems elsewhere. These events have all shown as prophetic those experts and government leaders who called for the establishment of DoD-GEIS in the early 1990s. Fiscal year 2002 was DoD-GEIS's sixth year of funded operations. […] This was leveraged through an extensive network of partnerships within the DoD, with other US government agencies, and with many foreign governments and international agencies. These partnerships supported both domestic and foreign programs of surveillance, response, capacity building, and training. Many of these programs provided direct benefits to the global war on terrorism. A particular leadership role played by DoD-GEIS in the global war on terrorism has been the fostering of two automated syndromic surveillance systems, ESSENCE (Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics) and EWORS (Early Warning Outbreak Recognition System). […] New automated approaches to antibiotic resistance surveillance were successfully established at several DoD medical treatment facilities through a partnership with Focus Technologies, Inc. The rapid expansion of West Nile virus infection across the US in 2002 was another startling example of the potential of emerging infections to invade the US. […] DoD-GEIS is contributing to active surveillance for new strains of influenza in the Far East, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. […]DoD-GEIS is a leader in a new and evolving national security construct. Pioneering innovations and broad outreach within the military health system and in the international setting have been central to success during its first five-year plan."

  United States. Department of Defense. Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System

  2003
• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions [Updated April 21, 2005]

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  "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., (FISA) as passed in 1978, provided a statutory framework for the use of electronic surveillance in the context of foreign intelligence gathering. In so doing, the Congress sought to strike a delicate balance between national security interests and personal privacy rights. Subsequent legislation expanded federal laws dealing with foreign intelligence gathering to address physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices, and access to certain business records. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, made significant changes to some of these provisions. Further amendments were included in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-108, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296. In addressing international terrorism or espionage, the same factual situation may be the focus of both criminal investigations and foreign intelligence collection efforts. The changes in FISA under these public laws facilitate information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence elements. In its Final Report , the 9/11 Commission noted that the removal of the pre-9/11 'wall' between intelligence and law enforcement 'has opened up new opportunities for cooperative action within the FBI.'... This report will examine the detailed statutory structure provided by FISA and related provisions of E.O. 12333. In addition, it will discuss the decisions of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Bills from the 108th Congress relating to FISA are addressed in CRS Report RL32608, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Selected Legislation from the 108th Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2005-04-21
• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions [Updated September 22, 2004]

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  "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., (FISA) as passed in 1978, provided a statutory framework for the use of electronic surveillance in the context of foreign intelligence gathering. In so doing, the Congress sought to strike a delicate balance between national security interests and personal privacy rights. Subsequent legislation expanded federal laws dealing with foreign intelligence gathering to address physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices, and access to certain business records. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, made significant changes to some of these provisions. Further amendments were included in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-108, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296. In addressing international terrorism or espionage, the same factual situation may be the focus of both criminal investigations and foreign intelligence collection efforts. The changes in FISA under these public laws facilitate information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence elements. In its Final Report, the 9/11 Commission noted that the removal of the pre-9/11 'wall' between intelligence and law enforcement 'has opened up new opportunities for cooperative action within the FBI.'... This report will examine the detailed statutory structure provided by FISA and related provisions of E.O. 12333. In addition, it will discuss the decisions of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Bills from the 108th Congress relating to FISA are addressed in CRS Report RL32608, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Selected Legislation from the 108th Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2004-09-22
• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions [Updated February 15, 2007]

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  "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., (FISA) as passed in 1978, provided a statutory framework for the use of electronic surveillance in the context of foreign intelligence gathering. In so doing, the Congress sought to strike a delicate balance between national security interests and personal privacy rights. Subsequent legislation expanded federal laws dealing with foreign intelligence gathering to address physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices, and access to certain business records. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, P.L. 107-56, made significant changes to some of these provisions. Further amendments were included in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, P.L. 107-108, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, P.L. 108-458, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, P.L. 109-177, and the USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, P.L. 109- 178. In addressing international terrorism or espionage, the same factual situation may be the focus of both criminal investigations and foreign intelligence collection efforts. The changes in FISA under these public laws facilitate information sharing between law enforcement and intelligence elements. In its Final Report , the 9/11 Commission noted that the removal of the pre-9/11 'wall' between intelligence and law enforcement 'has opened up new opportunities for cooperative action within the FBI.'... This report will examine the detailed statutory structure provided by FISA and related provisions of E.O. 12333. In addition, it will discuss the decisions of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. Bills from the 108th Congress relating to FISA are addressed in CRS Report RL32608, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Selected Legislation from the 108th Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2007-02-15
• S. Hrg. 109-840: Department of Justice Oversight: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, July 18, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Arlen Specter: "So far, the Administration has been unwilling to confirm or deny the existence of that program, and I will be pursuing the conversations which I have already had with Attorney General Gonzales on the question of what court clearance there was on such a program, with the Attorney General having said that the only program which does not have judicial authorization is the electronic surveillance program. So it raises the inference that if there is an administration program to get telephone records, there has been judicial clearance. And that is a question, I think, of importance, and from a practical point of view, it has been so widely publicized there seems to be hardly any point in not discussing it if, in fact, it does exist. We will be discussing with the Attorney General the issue about the electronic surveillance program and what factors are operative to determine whether or not the President has Article II powers. There is a great deal of discussion about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but the administration has, in effect, declared that Act inoperative." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Charles E. Grassley, Edward M. Kennedy, Patrick J. Leahy, Arlen Specter, Alberto R. Gonzales, and Charles Savage.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• USA Patriot Act Sunset: Provisions that Expire on December 31, 2005 [Updated January 27, 2005]

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  "The consequences of sunset are not the same for every expiring section. In some instances the temporary provision has been replaced with a permanent one; in some, other provisions have been made temporary by attachment to an expiring section; in still others, the apparent impact of termination has been mitigated by related provisions either in the act or elsewhere. The temporary provisions are: sections 201 (wiretapping in terrorism cases), 202 (wiretapping in computer fraud and abuse felony cases), 203(b) (sharing wiretap information), 203(d) (sharing foreign intelligence information), 204 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen register/trap & trace exceptions), 206 (roving FISA wiretaps), 207 (duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons who are agents of a foreign power), 209 (seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants), 212 (emergency disclosure of electronic surveillance), 214 (FISA pen register/ trap and trace authority), 215 (FISA access to tangible items), 217 (interception of computer trespasser communications), 218 (purpose for FISA orders), 220 (nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence), 223 (civil liability and discipline for privacy violations), and 225 (provider immunity for FISA wiretap assistance); and in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, section 6001 ("lone wolf" FISA orders)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2005-01-27
• Encryption and Evolving Technology: Implications for U.S. Law Enforcement Investigations [September 8, 2015]

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  "Because modern-day criminals are constantly developing new tools and techniques to facilitate their illicit activities, law enforcement is challenged with leveraging its tools and authorities to keep pace. For instance, interconnectivity and technological innovation have not only fostered international business and communication, they have also helped criminals carry out their operations. At times, these same technological advances have presented unique hurdles for law enforcement and officials charged with combating malicious actors. Technology as a barrier for law enforcement is by no means a new issue in U.S. policing. In the 1990s, for instance, there were concerns about digital and wireless communications potentially hampering law enforcement in carrying out court-authorized surveillance. To help combat these challenges, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA; P.L. 103-414), which among other things, required telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement in executing authorized electronic surveillance. The technology boundary has received renewed attention as companies have implemented advanced security for their products--particularly their mobile devices. In some cases, enhanced encryption measures have been put in place resulting in the fact that companies such as Apple and Google cannot unlock devices for anyone under any circumstances, not even law enforcement. Law enforcement has concerns over certain technological changes, and there are fears that officials may be unable to keep pace with technological advances and conduct electronic surveillance if they cannot access certain information."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Finklea, Kristin M.

  2015-09-08