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Serial No. 112-122: WMD Terrorism: Assessing the Continued Homeland Threat, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, November 15, 2012
This is the November 15, 2012 hearing, "WMD Terrorism: Assessing the Continued Homeland Threat" before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. From the opening statement of Patrick Meehan: "The Aspen Institute's WMD Working Group has assessed that WMD terrorism is a continuing and serious threat to the U.S. Homeland. At today's hearing, we will hear from the Institute on where we are and where we need to go. This report reminds us that some of the building blocks for weapons of mass destruction are appropriately and legitimately used in the U.S. for medical and other peaceful purposes. So we must also ensure that certain biological, radiological, nuclear, and chemical materials never fall into the hands of domestic terrorists or others who would do us harm. [...] The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has also played a large role on ramping up the preparedness apparatus and since 2004 has spent at least $70 million developing more than 20 CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear] risk assessments. In March of this year, this Committee marked up legislation I proposed in order to establish weapons of mass destruction intelligence and information sharing functions of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at DHS and to require dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security. This is a threat that I take very seriously, as the results of a successful CBRN attack on the homeland would be catastrophic." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Patrick Meehan, Brian Higgins, Leonard A. Cole, and Randall J. Larsen.
United States. Government Printing Office
2013
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United States' Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror: A Military Revolution?
From the Thesis Abstract: "In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against symbolic icons of the United States' economic and military power, then President George W. Bush launched a series of military, political and diplomatic efforts that became widely known as the Global War on Terror. Rebranded as the "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror" by President Barack Obama in 2009, these efforts have had a profound impact both domestically and globally. The resultant political, economic and societal effects give rise to the possibility that these operations collectively constitute a Military Revolution. The absence of a universally-agreed upon definition for a Military Revolution provides an exciting opportunity to consider various authors' theories and provide a fresh look at this intriguing concept. Subsequent analysis seeks to compare the U.S. post-9/11 response to terrorism with historical examples and consider the evidence to determine how these events have affected the United States politically, economically and socially."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
O'Leary, David R.
2014-01
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Agroterrorism - Why We're Not Ready: A Look at the Role of Law Enforcement
"Terrorists trying to damage the U.S. economy need look no further than the country's heartland for 'soft' targets. Farms, ranches, and feedlots are open and generally unprotected. The majority of State and local law enforcement agencies are financially and strategically unprepared to respond to agroterrorism. Public health officials may seem like the logical leaders for responding to an attack on the food supplies. However, the laws of many States require that agroterrorism be handled as a crime investigation, giving law enforcement primary responsibility. […] Agroterrorism experts are especially concerned about the introduction of foot-and-mouth disease into the food supply. Twenty times more infectious than smallpox, the disease causes painful blisters on the tongues, hooves, and teats of cloven-hoofed animals-cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, deer-rendering them unable to walk, give milk, eat, and drink. Although people generally cannot contract the disease, they can carry the virus in their lungs up to 48 hours and transmit it to animals. The animal-to-animal airborne transmission range is 50 miles. With millions of farms, open fields, and feedlots in the United States, the introduction of foot-and-mouth disease would require the mass slaughter and disposal of infected animals. An outbreak could halt the domestic and international sale of meat and meat products for years. Foot-and-mouth disease in 2001 in the United Kingdom affected 9,000 farms and required the destruction of more than 4,000,000 cows. Researchers believe that a similar outbreak n the United States would cost taxpayers up to $60 billion."
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
Schmitt, Glenn R.
2007-06
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Serial No. 106-15: E-Commerce: the Benefits and Pitfalls of Conducting Business over the Internet: Hearing before the Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, May 26, 1999
From the opening statement of Christopher Shays: "Earlier today we heard testimony in closed session from those familiar with very specific and very sensitive aspects of the threats posed by terrorists to U.S. citizens and property at home and abroad. That information provided some depth and clarity to the subcommittee's ongoing oversight of government wide terrorism issues. But terrorism also has a very public face. Using fear and panic as weapons, terrorists seek to amplify and transform crimes against humanity into acts of war. The growing and changing threat of terrorism requires an ongoing public discussion of the appropriate strategy, priorities and resources to protect public health and national security. That discussion brings us here this afternoon. As this point in the evolution of our post cold war response to the new realities of a dangerous world, we should have a dynamic, integrated assessment of the threat posed by foreign and domestic-origin terrorism. We should have a truly national strategy to counter the threat. And to implement that strategy, we should have a clear set of priorities to guide Federal programs and funding decisions." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel O. Hill, Harris N. Miller, Andrew B. Whinston, Alan W. Anderson, and Brian Hanson.
United States. Government Printing Office
1999
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Bioterrorism: Threat to the U.S. Food System - Biological Agents of Concern [brochure]
"Food bioterrorism is an intentional attack targeted against the food system using a disease-causing biological agent. The U.S. food supply is susceptible to intentional contamination by terrorists, where food could be used as a vehicle for introducing harmful disease pathogens into the United States. The U.S. food system is far reaching, encompassing the full range of domestically produced foods (fish, fruits, grains, meats, nuts, poultry, vegetables), a large variety of processed food products (deli meat, juices, milk, snack foods, etc.), as well as those foods and food products imported into the United States. Most common food-borne illnesses are caused by a handful of bacterial species, most notably Escherichia coli O157:H7, Listeria monocytogenes, Salmonella, and Shigella. Terrorists could intentionally add these commonly found food pathogens or other bioterrorism threat agents to legally or illegally imported foods, or contaminate a facility where foods are being produced, packaged, and distributed."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2010-08-31?
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Bioterrorism: Threat to the U.S. Food System - Concerns for Food and the Food Distribution Infrastructure
"Food bioterrorism is an intentional attack targeted against the food system using a disease-causing biological agent. The U.S. food supply is susceptible to intentional contamination by terrorists, where food could be used as a vehicle for introducing harmful disease pathogens into the United States. The U.S. food system is far reaching, encompassing the full range of domestically produced foods (fish, fruits, grains, meats, nuts, poultry, vegetables), a large variety of processed food products (deli meat, juices, milk, snack foods, etc.), as well as those foods and food products imported into the United States. Potential targets of a bioterrorism attack can be found all along the food production and supply chain, including production, processing, and packaging facilities, transportation vehicles, ports of entry, distribution and warehouse centers, and retail outlets"
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2010-09-01?
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Joint/Interagency/Interconnected: Maritime Security and Defense in the Global War on Terror
"In order for the U.S. to be successful in the maritime global war on terror, the Coast Guard should assist the Navy in conducting major operations against terrorists and their support in the international littorals. Conversely, the Navy should assist the Coast Guard in conducting major operations in the offshore U.S. environment in defense of the United States. In other words, the Navy and Coast Guard should closely integrate through coordination and cooperation on a proverbial 'war' footing, ultimately leveraging their distinct strengths directly and indirectly to the terrorism problem in the other's assigned areas of responsibility. The Navy and Coast Guard must be joined on a wartime footing similar to that of World War II, but at a much more sophisticated level suitable for the complex nature of war and the asymmetric nature of the threat in the 21st century. The Navy and Coast Guard team should practice their operational art in a joint, flexible, and interconnected manner in both domestic and international maritime theaters. They must employ military and law enforcement power appropriately in time, space, and force to reach the four goals of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, to Defeat, Deny, Diminish, and Defend against terrorism."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Brown, Eric P.
2004-05-24
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Domestic Threat Intelligence: Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, One Hundred and Twelfth Congress, First Session, October 6, 2011
This testimony compilation is from the October 6, 2011 hearing, "Domestic Threat Intelligence," hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. From the opening statement of Mike Rogers: "Today the Committee welcomes FBI Director Robert Mueller and National Counterterrorism Center Director Matt Olsen to discuss the state of the terrorism threat against the United States and how the Intelligence Community has changed in the decade since 9/11 to address this threat. In the wake of the takedown of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula leader Anwar al-Aulaqi, who former NCTC Director Mike Leiter called the single greatest terrorism threat to the homeland, we convene to discuss the future of the al-Qa'ida threat against the United States." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mike Rogers; C.A. Ruppersberger; Robert S. Mueller; and Matthew G. Olsen.
United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
2011-10-06
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Federal Support for Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers, Majority and Minority Staff Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, United States Senate
This Majority and Minority Staff Report was issued by Senators Carl Levin and Tom Coburn of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. From the Executive Summary:"Sharing terrorism-related information between state, local and federal officials is crucial to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack. Achieving this objective was the motivation for Congress and the White House to invest hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars over the last nine years in support of dozens of state and local fusion centers across the United States. The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the fusion centers forwarded 'intelligence' of uneven quality -- oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens' civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism. Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead this initiative. A bipartisan investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found, however, that DHS' work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful intelligence to support federal counterterrorism efforts. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS officials' public claims about fusion centers were not always accurate. For instance, DHS officials asserted that some fusion centers existed when they did not. At times, DHS officials overstated fusion centers' 'success stories.' At other times, DHS officials failed to disclose or acknowledge non-public evaluations highlighting a host of problems at fusion centers and in DHS' own operations. Since 2003, over 70 state and local fusion centers, supported in part with federal funds, have been created or expanded in part to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly to detect, disrupt, and respond to domestic terrorist activities. DHS' support for and involvement with these state and local fusion centers has, from the beginning, centered on their professed ability to strengthen federal counterterrorism efforts."
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
2012-10-03
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Intelligence-sharing Continuum: Next Generation Requirements for U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts
From the thesis abstract: "The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a major catalyst for intelligence reform in the United States. Since this date, most government agencies have strived to evolve and advance in this capacity. One such way has been through the development of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary intelligence centers, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, and the 72 state and major urban area fusion centers established throughout the nation. However, despite the changes that have occurred throughout the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities, significant issues still remain that are impeding the creation and flow of actionable intelligence to support domestic counterterrorism efforts. This has been identified from research conducted on numerous sources. Several policy, technological, cultural and political challenges exist, all contributing to the less-than-perfect nature of the United States' existing counterterrorism framework. This thesis aims to identify potential solutions that leverage existing intelligence operations to promote an intelligence-sharing continuum across all tiers of U.S. government. The author provides an analysis of specific, priority issues that require fixing within our nation's counterterrorism system, and provides evidence-based recommendations to improve the capability and value of existing intelligence support structures and further-develop the desired intelligence-sharing continuum."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security; Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Carabin, David
2011-09
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Ignoring the Obvious: The Influence of Islamism in America
From the thesis abstract: "This thesis proposes that the United States Government (USG) acknowledges and acts to mitigate the potential domestic threat of Islamism to national security. Radical influences are permeating throughout the United States via interaction with Muslim youth and through a misconstrued and misguided interpretation of Islam inside United States Prisons. These two mechanisms for spreading radicalism in the US are similar to those that are active in Europe. There are fundamental differences in the origins and effects of the radicalization in US and Europe. Europe's largest failure may have been its 'westernized' misconception of Islam as a religion and failure to aggressively address initial problematic indicators: such as segmentation, ideology and criminal related activities used in spreading Islamism. The USG cannot repeat these failures. The combination of radical organizations, public apathy, appeasement and radicalization of prisoners threaten to facilitate the formation of a fifth column similar to the one that Europe deals with now. This thesis reviews the European challenges and examines certain indicators of radicalism within two affected demographics. The thesis proposes a domestic strategy combating the threat similar to that of the USG's commitment to the Global War of Terror."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Bryant, Reginald E.
2008-08-12
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German Foreign and Security Policy [Updated January 31, 2008]
"German Chancellor Angela Merkel took office in November 2005 promising a foreign policy anchored in a revitalized transatlantic partnership. Most observers agree that since reaching a low-point in the lead-up to the Iraq war in 2003, relations between the United States and Germany have improved. With recent leadership changes in the United Kingdom and France, and a fragile coalition government in Italy, U.S. officials view Germany under Chancellor Merkel as a key U.S. ally in Europe. Despite continuing areas of divergence, President Bush and many Members of Congress have welcomed German leadership in Europe and have voiced expectations for increased U.S.-German cooperation on the international stage[...] Under Merkel's leadership, Germany has sought to boost transatlantic cooperation in areas ranging from economic and trade relations, climate change policy, and global counterterrorism and non-proliferation policy, to peacekeeping, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans. Merkel has enjoyed relatively strong domestic support for her transatlantically-oriented foreign policy agenda. However, as her term progresses, and domestic political tensions mount, she may be more hard-pressed to justify her Atlanticist foreign policy to a public which appears increasingly skeptical of U.S. influence in the world. This report may be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Belkin, Paul
2008-01-31
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Persian Gulf States: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2006 [Updated August 21, 2006]
This CRS report focuses on "threat perceptions and U.S.-Gulf Security Cooperation," domestic stability in the Gulf, and counter-terrorism cooperation. "The U.S.-led war to overthrow Saddam Hussein virtually ended Iraq's ability to militarily threaten the region, but it has produced new and un-anticipated security challenges for the Persian Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). The Gulf states, which are all led by Sunni Muslim regimes, fear that Shiite Iran is unchecked now that Iraq is strategically weak. The Gulf states strongly resent that pro-Iranian Shiite Muslim groups and their Kurdish allies (who are not Arabs) have obtained preponderant power within Iraq. This has led most of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to provide only halting support to the fledgling government in Baghdad and to revive the focus on U.S. -Gulf defense cooperation that characterized U.S.-Gulf relations during the 1990s. […] Domestically, all of the Gulf states are undertaking substantial but gradual economic and political liberalization to deflect popular pressure and satisfy U.S. calls for reform. However, the reforms undertaken or planned do not aim to fundamentally restructure power in any of these states. The Bush Administration advocates more rapid and sweeping political and economic liberalization as key to long-term Gulf stability and to reducing support in the Gulf states for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Administration is funding civil society programs in the Gulf states - funding that is not necessarily welcomed by the Gulf leaderships - but is also promoting the bilateral free trade agreements that most of the Gulf leaders seek. The Bush Administration is also working to improve post-September 11 cooperation with the Gulf states against Al Qaeda. Some Gulf states allegedly tolerated the presence of Al Qaeda activists and their funding mechanisms prior to the September 11 attacks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
2006-09-21
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Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism Via Post-Detonation Attribution: Is the United States on Target?
From the thesis abstract: "As nuclear terrorism is a risk of low probability and high consequences, the United States is right to address it as a significant--but not the utmost--national security priority. The science of nuclear forensics makes possible the characterization of nuclear materials used in a nuclear attack, and, as such, provides the backbone of an attribution program. Nuclear forensics-based attribution serves the dual purpose of helping to prevent nuclear terrorism by enabling deterrence, as well as guiding and enabling post-attack response options in the event of deterrence failure. The deterrence that an attribution capability alone enables is fairly narrow in its effective scope, though this deterrence does cover what would otherwise be a critical gap in U.S. strategy for preventing nuclear terrorism. The U.S. attribution capability is currently lacking in several important regards, the most significant of which is a future dearth of highly qualified personnel. Since an attribution capability is a critical enabler, the United States must do more to efficiently develop its attribution program. This can be done most cost-effectively in the short term by focusing on unilateral program needs while building an enduring domestic political will to improve and then maintain the nation's attribution capability."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Geelhood, Philip
2009-12
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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs [powerpoint]
This presentation outlines the state of Homeland Defense in the United States: the security environment, Department of Defense roles and definitions, DoD education and training in the past and present, DoD personnel needs, and interagency education. In the current security environment, nation-state threats will continue, and transnational threats will be the most pressing, as terrorists will seek to: attack Americans at home and abroad, attack multiple targets simultaneously, and inflict mass casualties or cause mass panic. Improved intelligence will help mitigate uncertainty about the form and timing of attacks. Other security environment hazards include: geological, water, climatic, fire, and health and disease. Homeland security is a concerted National effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks. In defining roles, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for the homeland security of the United States. DHS also has responsibilities beyond the prevention of terrorism, including leading the U.S. Government response to mitigation and recovery of natural disasters, WMD attacks, and other emergencies. Other federal agencies, such as the FBI, also have critical roles in combating terrorism (e.g., FBI is responsible for terrorist crisis management in the U.S.) Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, & critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense will supervise Homeland Defense activities of the Department of Defense, develop policy and force employment guidance. He or she is the principle DoD representative on homeland matters to DHS and the Homeland Security Council staff. He or she also assists the Secretary of Defense to fulfill the DoD's role in homeland defense and civil support. Prior to 1986, DoD education and training remained service-specific/service-focused. Operation Desert Storm was the first major test to put the education lessons into operation. Victory demonstrated that the services and joint community were accomplishing the joint educational missions. The DoD needs educated professionals who: understand the competencies of the national security/homeland security/homeland defense communities; know how to think strategically about national security/homeland security/homeland defense and the interagency process in an ever-changing global landscape; and understand how to develop effective plans and carry them to fruition in an interagency process.
United States. Department of Defense
Verga, Peter F.
2007-02-28
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Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security: Goldwater-Nichols and Network-Centric Warfare
This report is part of chapter two of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "Since the attacks of 9/11, the United States has sought to strengthen its ability to prevent terrorist attacks and respond to high-consequence events affecting the U.S. homeland. Washington's tactic of choice to improve counterterrorism and homeland security has been to reorganize the federal government. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 to rationalize assets and centralize activities related to borders, domestic asset protection, preparedness and response, information integration and dissemination, and science and technology. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created to better coordinate the fragmented intelligence community Washington's decision to turn to far-reaching reorganization in response to new national security challenges has significant historical precedent. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help the United States meet the security challenges it faced after World War II. It took another decade, however, to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), deterrence and various other critical institutions and concepts to fight the Cold War effectively. For every step in the right direction, there were missteps, trial and error. It took another 39 years before Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to foster 'jointness' among the military services, something that Dwight Eisenhower had lobbied for both as a general and as President. U.S. efforts to address homeland security and counterterrorism represent the most significant federal reorganization since 1947. But the 'big bang' creation of both the DHS and DNI are not sufficient. Reorganization is only a step in refashioning government and society to meet the challenges of global terrorism and homeland security."
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
Prieto, Daniel B.
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Combatting the Terrorist Threat Through Agility, Persistence, and Resilience, Statement of Russell Travers, Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, October 10, 2018
"In the years since 9/11, the U.S. counterterrorism (CT) community and its many foreign and domestic partners have continued to achieve significant successes against terrorist groups around the world through enhanced information sharing, aggressive intelligence collection, targeted military action, and terrorism prevention programs. Most notably, coalition operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria are now depriving the group of its last territorial holdings in the so-called caliphate. In addition, ongoing CT efforts across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia continue to diminish the ranks of al-Qa'ida, removing dozens of experienced leaders and operatives. Interagency efforts to enhance our defenses and vigilance at home, including strengthened aviation security measures and border control initiatives, have resulted insubstantial progress in safeguarding the Homeland from terrorist attacks. Despite these considerable achievements, the United States faces an increasingly dynamic terrorist threat from a more diverse range of groups who continue to explore methods to defeat our defenses and strike the West. Terrorists are responding to recent setbacks by adapting their tactics, seeking out alternate safe havens, and using new technologies to recruit and train the next generation of terrorists. Such trends make for a more dispersed, fluid, and unpredictable terrorist threat that requires a persistent and agile U.S. response to mitigate. Given the challenging national security landscape that confronts the United States today, the relative priority attributed to the terrorist threat is being reevaluated. Nevertheless we will need to ensure that we maintain the many improvements made across the government in countering terrorism since 9/11."
National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.)
Travers, Russ
2018-10-10
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Reconsidering CVE: The Unintended Consequences of Countering Violent Extremism Efforts in America
From the thesis abstract: "The problem of violent extremism in the United States is complex and, now more than ever, it is politically charged. This thesis critically analyzes countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts in the United States since 2011 to reveal a number of adverse, unintended consequences stemming from policy and programming. Using open-source research, the thesis also establishes a dataset to describe federal CVE efforts, which is evaluated through a sociopsychological lens to determine the impact of the efforts on communities, organizations, and individuals. While many adverse consequences are identified, they culminate in one troublesome conclusion: that current U.S. CVE programming is contributing to greater national insecurity. This research provides recommendations designed to mitigate the damaging impacts of CVE efforts that have already taken root--such as institutionalized racism and insufficient attention on domestic terrorism--and offers data-driven suggestions for policymakers. The findings of this research call for a fundamental restructuring of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy; rather than interdicting violence, the strategy must focus on preventing violence. Preventing terrorism, as shown through this research, begins with countering the susceptibility of vulnerable individuals to violent radicalization and recruitment tactics."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Barbari, Nabeela
2018-12
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European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism [July 24, 2006]
From the Document: "The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent attacks on European countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain have prompted both sides of the Atlantic to reinvigorate their respective efforts to ensure homeland security and combat terrorism. However, U.S. and European approaches to these issues differ. While the United States has embarked on a wholesale reorganization of its domestic security and border protection institutions, European countries have largely preferred to work within their existing institutional architectures to combat terrorism and respond to other security challenges and disasters, both natural and man-made. This report examines homeland security and counterterrorist measures in six selected European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. None of these European countries currently has a single ministry or department equivalent to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In most of these countries, responsibility for different aspects of homeland security and counterterrorism is scattered across several ministries or different levels of government."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Archick, Kristin
2006-07-24
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Terrorism in Southeast Asia [September 11, 2007]
"Since September 2001, the United States has increased focus on radical Islamist and terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Southeast Asia is a base for past, current, and possibly future terrorist operations. Al Qaeda penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been particularly vulnerable to penetration by anti-American Islamic terrorist groups. […] The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics. In general, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia, whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to their citizens. Many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with ambivalence because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. The Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand has escalated in recent years as has terrorist activity in southern areas of the Philippines. The report will begin with an overview of the rise of Islamist militancy and a discussion of the JI network before proceeding to discuss terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore and will conclude with a section on options and implications for U.S. policy. Counterterrorism strategies include placing greater emphasis on attacking the institutions that support terrorism, building up regional governments' institutional capacities for combating terrorist groups, and reducing the sense of alienation among Muslim citizens."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manyin, Mark E.; Vaughn, Bruce, 1963-; Chanlett-Avery, Emma
2007-09-11
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Domestic Wiretapping in the War on Terror: A Briefing Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights Held in Washington, DC, Briefing Report
"On March 9, 2007, a panel of three experts attended a briefing on domestic wiretapping in the war on terror at the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Gregory T. Nojeim, Assistant Director and Chief Legislative Counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union, Washington Legislative Office; Dr. John Eastman, Professor at Chapman University School of Law and Director of the Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence; and Kareem W. Shora, National Executive Director of the American-Arab Anti Discrimination Committee presented their insights on the constitutional implications of wiretapping in the war on terror, the role of the President and Congress in national security policy-making and program authorization, and the impact of surveillance programs on Arab Americans and other groups. The briefing was held in Room 540 at 624 Ninth Street, Northwest, Washington, DC. The briefing was originally scheduled in response to Bush administration policies generally described as the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). In general terms, the dispute focused on the fact that, in 2002, President George W. Bush secretly authorized the National Security Agency to conduct warrantless phone-taps of domestic targets reasonably believed to be in communication with a member or agent of al Qaeda, or an affiliated terrorist organization. Supporters of this program argued that the President has the constitutional and statutory authority to conduct such warrantless phone taps. Critics, on the other hand, argued that the program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which permits warrantless taps of 72 hours, but otherwise requires an order from a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Critics also argued that these taps did not comport with the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures."
United States Commission on Civil Rights
2010-01
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Serial No. 113-40: Eyes in the Sky: The Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, May 17, 2013
This is the May 17, 2013 hearing, "Eyes in the Sky: The Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems" held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations. From the statement of Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.: "Welcome to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations' hearing, ''Eyes in the Sky: the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems.'' Today we will explore the use of unmanned aircraft within the United States. We will discuss the possible uses and capabilities of such unmanned aircraft, and we will learn about the effect such use may have on the privacy of Americans. We will also discuss the constitutional issues that may arise when the government uses unmanned aircraft for law enforcement and public safety purposes." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Bob Goodlatte, John Villasenor, Gregory S. McNeal, Tracey Maclin, Chris Calabrese, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. and Robert C. Scott.
United States. Government Printing Office
2013
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Domestic Terrorism: The Sovereign Citizen Movement
"Domestic terrorism--Americans attacking Americans because of U.S.-based extremist ideologies--comes in many forms in our post 9/11 world. To help educate the public, we've previously outlined two separate domestic terror threats--ecoterrorists/ animal rights extremists and lone offenders. Today, we look at a third threat--the 'sovereign citizen' extremist movement. Sovereign citizens are anti-government extremists who believe that even though they physically reside in this country, they are separate or 'sovereign' from the United States. As a result, they believe they don't have to answer to any government authority, including courts, taxing entities, motor vehicle departments, or law enforcement. This causes all kinds of problems--and crimes. For example, many sovereign citizens don't pay their taxes. They hold illegal courts that issue warrants for judges and police officers. They clog up the court system with frivolous lawsuits and liens against public officials to harass them. And they use fake money orders, personal checks, and the like at government agencies, banks, and businesses."
United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation
2010-04-13
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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat [September 20, 2010]
"This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. 'Homegrown' and 'domestic' are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term 'jihadist' describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term 'violent jihadist' characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism, describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Randol, Mark A.; Bjelopera, Jerome P.
2010-09-20
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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat [November 15, 2011]
"This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. 'Homegrown' and 'domestic' are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term 'jihadist' describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term 'violent jihadist' characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress. There is an 'executive summary' at the beginning that summarizes the report's findings, observations, and policy considerations for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bjelopera, Jerome P.
2011-11-15
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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat [December 7, 2010]
"This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. 'Homegrown' and 'domestic' are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term 'jihadist' describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term 'violent jihadist' characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism, describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bjelopera, Jerome P.; Randol, Mark A.
2010-12-07
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US Military Presence in Latin America: Making the Manta Forward Operating Location work
"The US military's regional concerns in the 1990s focused on the drug war, improving interoperability, and carrying out regional engagement. In the new millennium, military activities have expanded to encompass a growing concern with Colombia's drug problem and the 'war on terrorism.' After the closure of Howard Air Force Base, Panama, the US established forward operating locations (FOLs) as tools for the realization of its goals in the region. This thesis examines both the international and domestic politics involved when establishing FOLs in Latin America and its implications for future efforts in the region. It focuses on the Manta FOL because it is essential for US strategy in Colombia and best illustrates the challenges of dealing with local opposition to a US military presence. This thesis concludes that Manta is viable because it is more cost-effective, improves military-to-military relations, and demonstrates the existence of external influence upon actors of domestic politics, which can be used as a bargaining asset to sustain its military presence. It is important to understand why the Manta FOL was a success, in order to create a model when establishing future FOL agreements in the region."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
De La Cruz, Maria Zosa S.
2003-09
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Inadequacy of Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations for Winning the Peace and Securing the Homeland
"United States participation in conflicts requiring extensive civil-military operations (CMO) for "winning the peace" after the conflict is concluded has become more and more commonplace for the U.S. military. As the conflict in Iraq winds down, the post-conflict actions to win and sustain the peace are ramping up on almost a daily basis. Most if not all U.S. military conflicts since Operation URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983) have been characterized by relatively short periods for planning not just for the military operations, but for the post-conflict CMO as well. Since future operations similar to recent operations (e.g., Haiti, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) are probable, is current CMO doctrine sufficient to accomplish the myriad of tasks that fall into the CMO realm and confront the operational-level commander on the ground? With the Global War on Terrorism having a domestic component, does CMO doctrine adequately address requirements for the United States Northern Command regarding homeland security?
Joint CMO doctrine has been improved significantly over the past three years with the issuance of Joint Publications 3-57 and 3-57.1. These two documents draw upon the many lessons learned from the numerous domestic and combat operations in which the United States engaged during the 1990s. However, there are still shortfalls in CMO doctrine to be addressed, consolidation of publications that could be made, and additional efforts required to provide the complete and comprehensive doctrine needed for today's environment."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Grubbs, Robert K.
2003-05-16
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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Issues for Congress [Updated March 16, 2005]
"Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel frequently shipped in large tankers from overseas to U.S. ports. LNG is also manufactured domestically and is often stored near population centers. Because LNG infrastructure is highly visible and easily identified, it can be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. LNG industry and federal agencies have put new measures in place to protect LNG infrastructure and respond to the possibility of terrorism. Nonetheless, public concerns about LNG risks continue to raise questions about LNG security. While LNG has historically made up a small part of U.S. natural gas supplies, rising gas prices and the possibility of domestic shortages are sharply increasing LNG demand. Faced with this growth in demand and public concerns, Congress is examining the adequacy of federal LNG security initiatives. Proposed legislation, including S. 684 and H.R. 173, would increase regulation of LNG security. LNG infrastructure consists primarily of tankers, import terminals, and inland storage plants. There are seven active U.S. terminals and proposals for numerous others. Potentially catastrophic events could arise from a serious accident or attack on such facilities, such as pool or vapor cloud fires. But LNG has a record of relative safety for the last 40 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists. The likelihood and possible impacts from LNG attacks continue to be debated among experts."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Parfomak, Paul W.
2005-03-16
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations [April 22, 2016]
"The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, ruled by the Al Saud family since its founding in 1932, wields significant global influence through its administration of the birthplace of the Islamic faith and by virtue of its large oil reserves. Close U.S.-Saudi official relations have survived a series of challenges since the 1940s. In recent years, shared concerns over Sunni Islamist extremist terrorism and Iranian government policies have provided a renewed logic for continued strategic cooperation. Political upheaval and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa appear to have strained bilateral ties, but the full effect has yet to be determined. [...] Current U.S. policy seeks to coordinate with Saudi leaders on regional issues and help them respond to domestic economic and security challenges. Time will tell whether U.S. initiatives and, more importantly, Saudi leaders' decisions will ensure stability. Shared security challenges have long defined U.S.-Saudi relations, and questions about Saudi domestic and foreign policy may become more pertinent as leadership changes occur in the kingdom and as conflicts and competition continue in the Middle East region."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.
2016-04-22
