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U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command: Comparison of Decontamination Technologies for Biological Agent on Selected Commercial Surface Materials
The BW-IRP is a multi-year program designed to identify, evaluate, and demonstrate the best practical approaches to improve BW domestic preparedness. Through the use of multiagency workshops on bioterrorism response the BW-IRP developed a response template that could function as a model for cities to use when developing their own bio terrorism response plan. Along with the medical response template, 28 gaps in biological warfare response were
identified. One response gap identified was how do you decontaminate a public building after a bio terrorism attack. This test and associated report address the gap of how to decontaminate a building that has been contaminated with a biological agent. This study evaluates available technologies (mostly research-scale) on the basis of to what level these technologies reduce the spore contamination on panels of different materials,
which represent office environments. The testing platform consisted of six vertical surfaces, each made of a different material which could be commonly found in a typical civilian office environment. These test surfaces were uniformly contaminated with the bacterial agent simulant,
bacillus globigii, BG and then sampled to determine the concentration level of the contamination at time zero (t=0). The test participants decontaminated the panels using their technology and
procedure. The following day, the test panels were sampled again by swabbing to check for surviving BG spores. Performing best in the overall rankings were University of Michigan (U.Mich.), Sandia
National Laboratories (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLNL). The data suggest that the material surfaces most receptive to decontamination of agent simulant BG are Painted Metal, Painted Wallboard and Panel Fabric. The decontamination technologies were less effective on the porous surfaces. No technology was able to fully-decontaminate all surfaces in this test.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
O'Connor, Laurel E.
2001-04
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000
As directed by Congress, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. As stated, this report is submitted to Congress every six months.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2001-02-22
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999
As directed by Congress, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. As stated, this report is submitted to Congress every six months.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1999-02-09
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 1999
As directed by Congress, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. As stated, this report is submitted to Congress every six months.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2000-02-02
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Training Circular 3-10: Commander's Tactical NBC Handbook
Training Circular 3-10 provides commanders of battalion and brigade-sized units with the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to train and operate under nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) conditions. Ultimately, the focus of this manual is to take the mystery and fear out of NBC defense. Leaders and soldiers must develop confidence in their equipment and in their own ability to both survive and operate effectively while wearing MOPP gear.
United States. Department of Defense
1994-09-29
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Army Field Manual: Chemical Accident Contamination Control
This manual provides guidance for training, equipping, and utilizing
teams for contamination control during accidents/incidents involving
chemical surety material. Specific guidance is provided for nuclear,
biological, chemical (NBC) teams and decontamination teams, but the
general principles presented apply to all special teams and personnel concerned with chemical accident/incident control (CAIC).
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit operations for CAIC are specified in FM 9-15. This manual covers procedures and techniques for reducing chemical hazards from accidents and incidents. It describes procedures for detecting, identifying, controlling and decontaminating chemical contamination. This manual is designed primarily for peacetime
operations but is applicable in wartime operations.
United States. Department of Defense
1978-02-23
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Human Behavior and WMD Crisis / Risk Communication Workshop: Final Report, March 2001
Results of a workshop that sought to investigate: methods of reducing public panic/fear in the event of an WMD attack, persuading the public to take appropriate actions, and finally, identifying and preventing adverse psychological and psychosocial effects experienced by the public and first responders. Report also includes lessons learned from past experiences, and presents prioritized recommendations for future research and analysis.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-03
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President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee: Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force Report
At the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) XXIV meeting, Mr. Richard Clarke, then National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, requested the NSTAC's continued assistance in
assessing and responding to cyber attacks, particularly distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which could impact national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications in the converged network environment. Responding to Mr.
Clarke's request, the NSTAC subsequently tasked the Network Security and Vulnerability Assessments Task Force (NS/VATF) to assess the policy and technical
issues related to the evolving public network (PN) supporting NS/EP communications for (1) Network disruptions, particularly DDoS attacks; (2) Security and vulnerability of the converged network control space, including wireless, network Simulation and testing, standards and consequence management issues; (3) Needed countermeasures (e.g., functional requirements) to address 1 and 2 above.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2002-03
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Operations Support Group Report (1997)
The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC) Operations Support Group (OSG) was established in April 1997 to evaluate the overall progress and direction of NS/EP operational activities. Among its specific taskings, the OSG was
instructed to assist the Government in development of a future concept of operations for the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), and to explore the need for and feasibility of a National Coordinating Mechanism (NCM) across infrastructures. Two OSG
subgroups, the NCC Vision Subgroup and the NCM Subgroup, addressed these actions. This report presents the charge, approach, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the OSG and its two subgroups.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1997-12
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President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee: Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force Report
An important facet of the Nation's strategy to protect critical infrastructures from cyber attacks is the development of mechanisms to facilitate public and private sector information sharing about actual threats and vulnerabilities. To address this concern, the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC) Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) formed the Information Sharing/Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force (ISCIPTF) in September 1999 to focus on various informationsharing
issues associated with critical infrastructure protection.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2001-06
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President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee: the NSTACs Reponse to the National Plan
The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC)[1]Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force developed this document, The NSTAC's Response to the National Plan, to highlight the NSTAC's work in several issue areas that are important to the main objectives of
Version 1.0 of the National Plan for Information Systems Protection (National Plan). The issue areas are discussed in the context of summaries of previous NSTAC reports presented in the Appendix: Summaries of Previous NSTAC Reports. This document is organized around the three broad objectives listed in the National Plan, which are essential for critical infrastructure protection
(CIP)--Prepare and Prevent, Detect and Respond, and Build Strong Foundations.
In addition, it is proposed that a new broad objective--International
Considerations--be included in Version 2.0 of the National Plan.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2001-04
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Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risks and How to Address Them
"Thirty years from now, if our successors were to deem our stewardship of American national security at the end of the 20th century as poor, why would that be so? Suppose through a time warp our computers receive the first paragraph of a review written in 2029, then imagine that preview were critical of our national security policies and investments at the end of the 20th century. Perhaps it said we had failed to focus adequately on what proved to be our most important national security problems. What would the missing
text most likely report as our failures? There are many candidates for answers to this question, all should be subject to debate. This essay outlines the answers by describing three risks that should be of greater concern to us over
the next decades: Renewed competition with a major military adversary; Traumatic attacks, particularly from nonexplosive warfare (NEW) weapons; and, Erosion of support." This book reviews each of these risks and the immediate actions that hold promise of reducing our vulnerability.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Danzig, Richard
1999
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History of Chemical and Biological Detectors, Alarms, and Warning Systems
"The history of chemical agent analysis can be traced to the 17th century. The development of U.S. Army detectors, alarms, and warning systems dates back to World War I when chemical warfare was first introduced on a large scale. The next generation detectors, alarms, and warning systems will be revolutionary advancements in chemical and biological agent detection technology. This brief history will cover some of the highlights of the long history of chemical and biological agent detection technology."
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Smart, Jeffrey K.
2000
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Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2000: Electronics
As the 21st century begins, the electronics industry continues its strong growth worldwide. Semiconductors are emerging from a 3-year decline as new applications for their use emerge on the market. Increases in wireless communications, Internet storage capacity, and personal computing devices underpin the ongoing boom. Current challenges are in part a consequence of government policy. Immigration quotas, for example, have contributed to a critical shortage of skilled workers, and export licensing policies relative to high-speed processing capability have hampered U.S. industry exploitation of global markets. Moreover, the short life cycles of today's electronic products translate to difficulty in obtaining replacement parts, and the growing dependence of some domestic market sectors on foreign suppliers tends to jeopardize U.S. market share. The U.S. electronics industry continues to outperform other industrial sectors, however, due to its propensity for innovation, firm commitment to strong capital investment, and substantial funding for research and development.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
2000
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Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2000: Bio Technology
The rapidly emerging biotechnology industry is a critical element of national power. Advances in biotechnology are resulting in novel biomedical and pharmaceutical products and processes that are relieving human suffering, improving health, and increasing the quality of life for the world's citizens. Biotechnology is transforming agriculture, improving the productivity, quality, safety, affordability, and environmental compatibility of food and fiber production around the world. The application of biotechnology to fields as diverse as bioremediation, forensics, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology is similarly providing widespread benefits to humans and exciting new economic opportunities for entrepreneurs. As the preeminent global leader in this new industry, the United States is well positioned to maintain its competitive advantage in the future. Even so, there remain many challenges to this dominance, including a variety of ethical concerns and a growing public unease about genetically altered food.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
2000
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Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2000: Advanced Manufacturing
Advanced manufacturing is the making of a better product suitable for more immediate use at a cheaper cost. It is a critical aspect of many industrial sectors and an essential component of U.S. national defense. Manufacturers must cope with rapid changes in markets--including workforce, process, and technology changes--while operating in a dynamic, competitive, and global environment. They deal with this environment by selectively focusing their resources and efforts to sustain competitive advantage. They also pursue partnerships for research and development, for workforce enhancements, and for supply and production functions that they cannot efficiently accomplish themselves. These relationships create dependencies that can impede defense mobilization, however. The government can play a meaningful role in dealing with potential mobilization shortfalls and other major challenges facing the nation's domestic manufacturing sector.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
2000
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Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2000: Education
The performance of the education industry is vital to the national security and economic prosperity of the United States. The advent of the Information Age has significantly increased both the opportunities and the challenges presented to policymakers and educators. An examination of the education industry leads to three principal conclusions. First, high academic standards and effective assessments are vital to promote achievement and measure progress. Second, efforts to recruit, train, and retain high-quality teachers and administrators require special priority. Third, the United States should continue to implement policies that promote equal access and opportunity for all U.S. citizens. The overall assessment of the U.S. education industry at present produces mixed results. Primary and post-secondary schools are above average compared with those of international competitors; middle schools are average; and secondary schools are below average. The performance of the transitional sector (noncollegiate adult education) is marginal, and that of the workplace sector is satisfactory.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
2000
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Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2000: Construction
The U.S. construction industry is vibrant, healthy, and growing. United States firms dominate the domestic market and maintain a competitive advantage in the growing overseas market. However, the shortage of skilled workers, the impact of information technology, changes in the way projects are financed and executed, and the privatization of public infrastructure--especially overseas--have altered the construction landscape, forcing the industry to reevaluate the way it does business. The process of adapting to these changes in the conservative, risk-averse U.S. construction industry has been slow but steady.
The government has an important role to play in this transition, especially in light of the industry's vital contribution to U.S. economic strength, military power, and ultimately its national security. Coherent and consistent polices that create a favorable environment for industry growth at home and abroad should help nurture and extend the industry's competitive advantage and help maintain its "world-class" stature.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
2000
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Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2000: Agribusiness
Agriculture and the related agribusiness industry remain the foundation of U.S. commerce and society. Agribusiness plays a dominant role in both trade and foreign affairs in the United States. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the evolution of agriculture is the globalization of the industry. The United States is finding that it must address agribusiness issues in consonance with other nations. In fact, the nation has a vested interest in helping other countries deal with agribusiness problems and a responsibility to provide leadership in pressing for farming reforms, education, and the introduction of new technologies in growing, harvesting, and processing food. The national security posture of the United States is inextricably linked to global agribusiness. Understanding and appreciating the nuances of that linkage are essential tasks for U.S. national security planners and decision-makers.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
2000
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Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2000: Aircraft
The U.S. aircraft industry has long been a critical enabler of U.S. political and military power and remains one of the most pervasive industries within the U.S. economy. However, continued U.S. dominance in the global aircraft market is uncertain. After a decade of mergers and downsizing, the industry's four main sectors--commercial fixed-wing aircraft, military fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, and jet engines--are entering a head-to-head competition with Europe from a strategically weakened position. To ensure profitability and maintain market dominance, aerospace manufacturing companies are striving to improve profit margins by streamlining production processes, reducing overhead costs, and entering into strategic partnerships to stimulate revenue-generating opportunities. Many of these innovations are indeed yielding new profit centers. Nevertheless, U.S. dominance of the global aircraft market has eroded to the point that vigorous action is required by industry and government to preserve this vital element of national power.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
2000
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Research and Special Programs Administration: Guidelines for Transporting Anthrax and Anthrax-Contaminated Objects and Materials
This report describes regulations for transporting anthrax and anthrax-contaminated objects and materials. Included are transportation requirements, training requirements, transporting powder or other material forms of anthrax, transporting diagnostic specimens, anthrax-contaminated regulated medical waste, and transporting anthrax-contaminated mail. Additional information may be obtained from the following agencies: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC; http://www.cdc.gov), 42 CFR Part 72 Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents; Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA; http://www.osha.gov), 29 CFR 1910.1030 Bloodborne Pathogens; and the US Postal Service (USPS; http://www.usps.gov), Hazardous, Restricted, and Perishable Mail.
United States. Department of Transportation
2001-12
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Strategy Essay Competition (2002)
Reflection involves not only reading, thinking
about, and discussing ideas with colleagues, but also communicating through the process of writing. Through the discipline of writing, one can examine and develop themes, concepts, and arguments in much greater detail.Writing is no easy feat--to which all who submitted papers in this year's essay competition can attest--but the rewards are substantial.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
2002
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Strategy Essay Competition (2001)
The winners of this 20th annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition join an impressive line of gifted men
and women who have made significant academic contributions to U.S. national security. Each year the competition challenges students attending professional military education institutions to analyze key elements
of defense strategy and recommend areas in which changes or improvements are needed. As in past years, the winning essays are remarkable for
their insight and wisdom. Each author provides fresh ideas and thoughtprovoking suggestions that will stimulate the ongoing debate over defense strategy and priorities during this year of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
2001
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Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam
"Identified as a member of the 'axis of evil' by President George W. Bush, Saddam Hussein's Iraq continues to pose a major threat to the region and to Western society. Saddam has doggedly pursued the development of weapons of mass destruction, despite U.N. sanctions imposed at the conclusion of the Gulf crisis. To deal effectively with Saddam Hussein requires a clear understanding of his motivations, perceptions, and decision-making. To provide a framework for this complex political leader, a comprehensive political psychology profile has been developed, and his actions since the crisis analyzed in the context of this political psychology assessment."
USAF Counterproliferation Center
Post, Jerrold M.; Baram, Amatzia, 1938-
2002-11
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Gathering Biological Warfare Storm -- Chapter 3: Surveillance and Detection: A Public Health Response to Bioterrorism
Chapter 3 of "The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm" addresses surveillance and detection in the case of a bioterrist attack: "Perhaps the most frightening apparition of our times is the possibility that a biological agent (bacterium, virus, or toxin) will be used to attack our unprotected civilian population and inflict mass casualties. Until the Fall of 2001, anthrax attacks delivered through the mail to various U.S. senators, to the Governor of New York, and to various media offices, the previously expected use of a weapon of mass destruction against the United States has been a nuclear device that explodes or a chemical cloud that is set adrift. However, today, of all the weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), the biological weapons are the most feared by many defense experts but these are the ones that our country is least prepared to deal with. Like the concept of a 'nuclear winter,' the potential destructiveness of a biological attack can come in many forms and is presently very hard to detect and control, and its results could be catastrophic. The unleashing of biological agents against an unprotected civilian population also, in some cases, constitutes the ultimate medical disaster with the capability to completely overwhelm the present health care system. Patients might go to health facilities in unprecedented numbers, and demands for intensive care could well exceed available medical resources. Discerning the threat of bioweapons and appropriate responses to them are critical if we are to prevent the devastating effects of bioterrorism."
USAF Counterproliferation Center
Bullock, Barbara F.
2002-04
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Smallpox: A Primer
Smallpox, is a virus that plagued humanity for millennia. It was the
first and only disease ever intentionally eradicated from the face of this
planet, a scourge defeated in a remarkable, never-before-attempted
campaign of generosity and cooperation by the nations of the world. Its
eradication was a triumphant symbol of science and dogged persistence
winning over nature. Moreover, its eradication was a gift of man to all
mankind.
Yet, is it possible that the same hand of man, that once rid the scourge
of smallpox from the world, will be used to unleash this terror again on its
unprotected citizens? This paper, by providing a thorough review of the
history, epidemiology, and current risks associated with this dreaded
disease, addresses that question and its implications for the American
public.
USAF Counterproliferation Center
McEleney, Brenda J.
2000-10
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Network Group Intrusion Detection Subgroup Report: Report on the NS/EP Implications of Intrusion Detection Technology Research and Development (1997)
The Intrusion Detection Subgroup (IDSG) conducted a study of intrusion detection technology R&D that included: (1) an examination of the role of intrusion detection in the
context of indications, assessment, and warning; (2) an overview of existing and planned intrusion
detection technology R&D initiatives; and (3) a high-level review of those attributes end users value in their intrusion detection systems. In addition, the subgroup analyzed
intrusion detection technology R&D in terms of meeting national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) requirements. This report focuses on the three areas requiring attention identified by the subgroup.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1997-12
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Research and Development Exchange Proceedings: Transparent Security in a Converged and Distributed Network Environment
On September 28-29, 2000, the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), co-sponsored with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), held its fourth Research and Development Exchange, in conjunction with the Telecommunications and Information Security Workshop at the
University of Tulsa. The purpose of the Exchange was to stimulate an exchange of ideas among representatives from industry, Government and academia on the challenges faced by the convergence of the traditional public switched network (PSN) and the Internet
into a Next Generation Network (NGN). During the dynamic dialogues, participants expressed a number of concerns to include: the shortage of qualified information technology professionals, increased litigation, new types of threats, increased
vulnerabilities arising from convergence and the need to enhance R&D efforts.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2000-09
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President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee: Convergence Task Force Report
The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) Convergence Task Force (CTF) examined potential national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) implications of this indeterminate, developing public network infrastructure. The resulting information, provided in the CTF Convergence Report, is designed to enable the President and NS/EP entities to make informed recommendations to address the ability of the evolving public network (PN) to reliably support NS/EP
communications requirements. Specifically, the report addresses:
(1)Potential security vulnerabilities of converged networks including those of the control space;(2) The realistic possibility of widespread outages of converged networks (resulting from focused failures) and the associated implications; (3)Ongoing standards development efforts in support of NS/EP priority requirements in the converged network.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2001-06
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'Last Mile' Bandwidth Availability Task Force Report
The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee explores the factors surrounding the procurement and provisioning of high-bandwidth services at the local level, referred to as the "last mile," and offers recommendations for reducing the periods for obtaining such services. In November 2000, the President's National Security telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC) Industry Executive Subcommittee formed the "Last Mile" Bandwidth Availability Scoping Group, and later the "Last Mile" Bandwidth Availability Task Force, to undertake the following activities: (1)Examine how the provisioning process is affected by economic and technological factors;(2)Recommend how Government might work with industry to reduce provisioning times or to otherwise mitigate the effects of extended provisioning periods; (3) Examine what policy-based solutions can be applied to the provisioning of high bandwidth circuits for national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) services.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2002-03
