Advanced search Help
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Sharing the Knowledge: Government Sector Partnerships to Enhance Information Security
The U.S. military has become increasingly dependent upon the nation's information and communications infrastructures. Concurrently, threats to and vulnerabilities in these infrastructures are expanding, in large part due to structural factors not likely to disappear in the future. To prevail against the increasing threat, the military--and, more broadly, the government--needs to adopt a risk reduction and management program. A crucial element of this risk management program is information sharing with the private sector. However, substantial barriers threaten to block information exchanges between the government and private sector. These barriers include concerns over release of sensitive material under Freedom of Information Act requests, antitrust actions, protection of business confidential and other private material, possible liability due to shared information, disclosure of classified information, and burdens entailed with cooperating with law enforcement agencies. There is good cause to believe that the government and private sector can overcome these barriers, guided by lessons learned from numerous successful government-private sector information-sharing mechanisms. This analysis concludes with actions the government should undertake to develop an information-sharing mechanism with the private sector. Key among them are actively engaging the private sector from the onset, determining information requirements, and fostering a partnership based on trust.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Rinaldi, Steven M.
2000-05
-
Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for U.S. Security Interests
This paper analyzes the history of Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation. The "special" Moscow-New Delhi relationship during the Cold War, it concludes, was based upon Indian needs, American ambivalence, and Soviet opportunism. In the post-Cold War era this relationship has persisted due to continued American ambivalence, short-term Indian military needs, and Russian economic needs. This bond, therefore, may be fractured by an eventual improvement in Indian military self-reliance or a deepening in Indo-American military cooperation. India's strategic culture, rooted in Indian history, geography and political culture, has created an Indian strategic mindset impervious to American nonproliferation efforts. The paper finds, moreover, that there are no short-term "silver bullets" to cure the current Indo-American rift, which flows from causes in addition to India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998. While short-term measures can be taken to improve the bilateral relationship, the historical rift that has emerged between the two states cannot be easily mended. The United States, therefore, must strive to ensure that Indian nuclear expansion is conducted in a controlled, safe and limited manner.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Conley, Jerome M.
2000-02
-
Interpreting Shadows: Arms Control and Defense Planning in a Rapidly Changing Multi-Polar World
The focus of arms control is changing. It now deals with issues affecting all nations and not just the super powers. The policy options available to counter proliferation span responsibilities in different American agencies. A cohesive arms control effort will require greater interagency cooperation, because it will involve both inherently political and military issues. In reviewing current policy options some key findings emerge. First, the United States needs to develop closer relationships with countries that will have an impact on key regions. Key considerations in building these relationships are that the country has a similar government, an open economy, a professional military, and adequate infrastructure to support joint military exercises. Second, deterrence is still required, but nuclear deterrence by the United States is no longer credible and can be counterproductive to non-proliferation. The result is that conventional deterrence as the primary method of deterrence needs to be developed and demonstrated. Additionally, because of their quick deployment and long-range precision-strike capabilities, the role of the Air Force will probably increase in scenarios with regional powers possessing weapons of mass destruction. Third, economic sanctions are ineffective and hurt the population and not the leaders they are targeted against. There may be situations where multilateral sanctions would be appropriate; however, the United States should discontinue implementing unilateral economic sanctions. Fourth, export controls have been used to limit proliferation and support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, more can be done to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons through unilateral and multilateral export controls. Fifth, military assistance, when provided, needs to focus more on infrastructure development and deal less with weapon system sales. Building a nation's infrastructure has the dual purpose of aiding their economy and facilitating joint military exercises. Finally, confidence-building measures need to be pursued with more than lip service, because for confidence-building measures to succeed takes as much work as other options discussed.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
King, David R.
1999-06
-
Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience
The primary focus of the paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful development and subsequent rollback of South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the important milestones in the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability. It also relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa's nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests. The conclusions drawn from this effort are the South African nuclear program was an extreme response to its own "identity crisis." Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long-term end of a closer affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation--and receive guarantees of its security--rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western support to counter a feared "total onslaught" by Communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved economic and political integration with the West. Several recommendations are offered for critical review of the above issues to include the need for greater international dialogue and constructive engagement with threshold nations such as India and Pakistan. Nonproliferation regimes can be used to promote mutual verification, transparency, and the resolution of mutual security concerns. More than anything, policymakers must be prepared to assist threshold nuclear states in resolving their core regional security concerns if they wish to encourage states to pursue nuclear rollback.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Horton, Roy E.
1999-08
-
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture, Report to Congressional Requesters
Never has a results-oriented focus been more critical than today, when the security of America's citizens depends on the outcomes of many federal programs. In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) that created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and made it responsible for transportation security. ATSA requires TSA to implement specific practices that are intended to make it a results oriented organization. GAO makes specific recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation and the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security to continue and augment TSA's progress in implementing ATSA's results-oriented practices. The adjacent table shows selected recommended next steps for TSA. We provided drafts of this report to officials from the Department of Transportation (DOT), including TSA, for their review and comment. TSA's Director of Strategic Management and Analysis provided oral comments on behalf of DOT and TSA generally agreeing with the contents, findings, and recommendations of the draft report.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-01-17
-
Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction
The purpose of Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction is to integrate the key insights of previous Air Force vision statements with the findings of the 1998 Long-Range Air Power Panel and address one of the most demanding practical issues that will impact America's next first battle. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) changes the context and conduct of future warfare. For starters, America's military strategy, operations concepts, and doctrine for the early 21st century should be based on the very real possibility that the armed forces will be pitted against adversaries armed with biological and chemical weapons and the ballistic and cruise missiles needed to deliver them accurately across great distances. The single most distinguishing feature of counterforce operations against WMD, as compared with existing missions of battlefield area interdiction, offensive counterair, and deep interdiction, lies in the targets themselves: chemical and biological weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles. These targets may already be earmarked for attack under an existing mission area but counterforce operations against WMD should be considered a specialized subset of these other missions and whose neutralization or destruction is of immense importance to the success of the overall campaign. Many of the WMD targets should be destroyed early in a conflict to prevent their use against friendly populations and forces. Locating these targets can be difficult, including, for example, the specific site of WMD facilities within the confines of a larger fixed target. Some targets may be relocatable; they may be vulnerable to attack for a short period of time (hours) at the outset of conflict. Mobile targets, such as missile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), present an especially difficult bombing task due to an enemy's use of ruses, decoys, rapid shoot-and-scoot operations, and other tactics. Another consideration is the depth of the target from political borders. Generally speaking, the deeper the target location, the more onerous is the counterforce strike operation. Finally, linking sensors-to-shooters can help significantly in striking the WMD target within the enemy's decision-making cycle.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Chandler, Robert W.
1998-09
-
Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations: New Answers and New Issues in the Arena of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy and Posture Entering the Twenty-First Century
"This publication represents the INSS vision. It emphasizes both the product of research, the papers produced, and the process of national security education and expertise development. Each of the authors presented here is a 'military-academic,' more traditionally a 'soldier-scholar,' and most are associated with the faculties of either the United States Air Force Academy or of its parent United States Military Academy. The results of their research are distributed by INSS to reach an audience that includes the military policy community. But of equal importance, these same results find their way into the classroom, educating the next generation of military leaders. The messages of these researchers and their enthusiasm for their subjects also reach the military faculties, particularly the junior faculty that many of these authors mentor in both career and academic pursuits. In short, these papers and authors combine the product and the process goals of INSS, thus magnifying the significance of their research efforts. Therefore, INSS presents the following four papers on post-Cold War deterrence and strategic defense, nuclear strategy, and regional considerations both for their content (product) and in furtherance of education and inquiry (process) in this critical arena of high-end national security policy."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Smith, James M.
2001-02
-
Searching for National Security in an NBC World: Four Papers on Changing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats and US Government Policy in the Post-Cold War International Security Environment
"The four papers that follow are not a set, but a sampling of research being undertaken about the future role of nuclear weapons. No one of them is complete in addressing one or more of the questions--in fact these papers were written to address related but separate research questions. Either together or alone, neither are they necessarily definitive on each selected topic, but instead they represent developmental efforts by researchers still growing expertise in these fields. And both in spite of and because of researcher evolution and learning, they take on the added importance of being written by military and military-related civilians associated with the three Department of Defense service academies--faculty and staff members at institutions devoted to the undergraduate education and career preparation of future generations of practitioners of United States national security at all stages of the military spectrum."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Smith, James M.
2000-07
-
Test Results of Level A Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Summary Report
In 1996, Congress passed Public Law 104-201, directing the Department of Defense (DoD) to assist other federal, state and local agencies in enhancing preparedness for terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction. DoD responded by forming the Domestic Preparedness Program that same year. One of the objectives of the Domestic Preparedness Program is to enhance emergency and hazardous material response to Nuclear, Biological and chemical (NBC) terrorism incidents. As part of an effective response, people who are responding to an incident will use personal protective equipment to protect them from exposure to chemical agents or biological agents. The specific personal protective equipment that will be used depends upon the situation that they encounter and what they have on hand. In some cases, Level A protective suits are required to enter a contaminated area. Level A suits are totally encapsulated suits that protect the wearer from liquid, vapor and gaseous chemical and particulates. Air is supplied by self-contained breathing apparatuses or supplied air lines. Appendix A has a list of the Level A suits that are testing in this program.
Edgewood Research, Development, & Engineering Center (U.S.)
Belmonte, Richard B.
1998-06
-
Test Results of Phase 2 Level A Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Summary Report
Swatches from six commercially-available Level A protective suites were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each suit for the purposes of comparison. In addition, intact suits were challenged with corn-oil aerosol to stimulate biological and chemical aerosols. Protection factors were determined for each suit.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.; Pappas, Alex G.
2001-02
-
Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Gloves to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
Swatches from eleven commercially available chemical protective gloves were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each glove/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-02
-
Swatch Test Results of Phase 2 Commercial Chemical Protective Gloves to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
Swatches for four commercially available chemical protective gloves were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time and the results for all swatches were used to determine an average cumulative mass for each glove. From these data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each glove/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Procell, Suzanne A.; Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-01
-
Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Boots to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
Swatches from nine commercially available chemical protective boots were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each boot. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each boot/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-02
-
Tests of Level A Suits: Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Executive Summary
Twelve Level A protective suits were tested for GB and HD permeation swatch testing using modified procedures of TOP 8-2-501. Agent break-through times were calculated for each suit. Vapor and aerosol agent simulant tests of suit matters were conducted to measure overall protection factors of the suits.
Edgewood Research, Development, & Engineering Center (U.S.)
Belmonte, Richard B.
1998-06
-
Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Gloves to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Executive Summary
Swatches from eleven commercially available chemical protective gloves were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each glove/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-02
-
Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Boots to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Executive Summary
Swatches from nine commercially available chemical protective boots were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each boot. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each boot/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-02
-
Swatch Test Results of Phase 2 Commercial Chemical Protective Gloves to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Executive Summary
Swatches from four commercially available chemical protective gloves were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time and the results for all swatches were used to determine an average cumulative mass for each glove. From these data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each glove/agent combination for purposes of comparisons.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-06
-
Radiation Safety Manual
These radiation safety requirements were prepared and approved by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) Radiation Safety Committee with the guidance of the CDC Radiation Safety Officer for
CDC laboratory scientists and technical staff who use radioactive material licensed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Applicable regulations are incorporated in this manual, along with procedures for
handling radioactive material. The manual is a practical reference, but users must also have technical
knowledge of radiation and some experience in handling radioactive materials. The safety requirements provided in this manual form the basic program. The Office of Health and Safety provides radioisotope users with required safety procedures on the use of radioactive materials in the laboratory setting and on general laboratory practices. The Radiation Safety Manual is one chapter of the CDC/ATSDR Occupational Health and Safety Manual.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
1999-08
-
Animal Studies of Residual Hematopoietic and Immune System Injury From Low Dose/Low Dose Rate Radiation and Heavy Metals
It is clear that there is an adaptive response to low dose rate exposures. However, as the authors of this report describe, recovery of marrow precursor cells after a second exposure may be incomplete. This could be due to any combination of factors such as persistent deficiency of stem cells, accelerated cell cycling of marrow precursors leading to increased ratios of S-phase populations among stem cells, shortened lifespans of immature erythroid and myeloid cells, and others. Part of the problem in studying the effects of damage repair after low dose exposures is that the damage is minimal, and detection of changes accordingly is difficult. More research needs to be carried out in this field. One unique feature of this report is the combination of radiation effects with those from the heavy metals cadmium and lead. These metals, both marrow-toxic and immunotoxic in their own right, affect the outcomes of radiation exposures even at low doses and low dose rates. Particularly in situations involving radiation contamination from occupational accidents or environmental releases, one may expect to seldom encounter victims adversely affected by radiation alone. A host of other physicochemical agents, ranging from metals such as these to solvents and other substances, are likely to be present. The authors' findings regarding the additive and/or synergistic effects of simultaneous or nearly simultaneous exposure to radiation and toxic metals are important for this reason. We trust that readers of this work will find their approach and findings stimulating and useful for their own understanding and efforts.
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (U.S.)
Yagunov, A.S.; Tokalov, S.V.; Chukhlovin, A.B. . . .
1998-09
-
Chemical Protection Against X-Ray, Gamma, and Neutron Radiation
Experiments in mice showed that intraperitoneal (i.p.) injection of unithiol (sodium salt of 2,3-
dimercapto-l-propanesulfonic acid) diminished toxicity of several aminothiol radioprotectors, increasing
the LD50 of cystamine by 40% and aminoethanisothiuronium bromide hydrobromide (AET) by 64%. The optimum ratio for the doses is 0.5 molar equivalent of unithiol per radioprotective thiol. A new radioprotector (mixed disulfide of cysteamine and unithiol--MDCU) has a weak toxicity: the LD50 is 750 mg/kg i.p. The use of unithiol makes it possible to increase the dose of the SH-radioprotectors, enhancing the dose reduction factor (DRF) of cystamine and AET by 30% for x-ray irradiation. A somewhat lesser effect is observed with fission neutron
irradiation. The DRF of MDCU is equal to 1.6 for x-ray irradiation and is 1.1 for neutron irradiation. The mechanism of antitoxic action of unithiol could not be detected in Chinese hamster fibroblasts. It may be caused by the competition of unithiol and the SH-radioprotectors for certain, as yet undetermined,
biochemical structures in brain neurons. It is also possible that unithiol may decrease penetration
of SH-radioprotectors into the brain.
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (U.S.)
Grachev, Sergeĭ (Sergeĭ Anatolʹevich)
1997-12
-
Justice Department: Better Management Oversight and Internal Controls Needed to Ensure Accuracy of Terrorism-Related Statistics, Report to the Honorable Dan Burton, House of Representatives
In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provides the Congress and the public with an annual performance report. These reports serve as an important measure of DOJ's progress related to its strategic goals and objectives, including statistics on its efforts to investigate and prosecute terrorist acts. A December 2001 news article alleged that DOJ had inflated terrorism statistics in its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report. We were asked to review the accuracy of DOJ's terrorism-related conviction statistics. Among other objectives, in this report we (1) identify how DOJ develops its terrorism-related conviction statistics and (2) assess whether DOJ has sufficient management oversight and internal controls in place to ensure the accuracy of terrorism-related statistics included in its annual performance reports. To improve the accuracy and reliability of terrorism-related conviction statistics in DOJ's annual performance reports, we recommend that the Attorney General, in accordance with federal internal control standards, implement a formal system to oversee and validate the accuracy of case classification and conviction data entered in EOUSA's case tracking system. DOJ agreed to implement this recommendation.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-01-17
-
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Fact Sheet
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is charged with reducing the present threat to the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and preventing future threats. DTRA is creating the intellectual infrastructure for a new
approach to deter and counter the worldwide proliferation of WMD. DTRA reviews licenses for the export of U.S. technologies that could be used to support the production and delivery of WMD or conventional weapons to ensure that the transfers are consistent with U.S. national security interests. It implements the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which assists former Soviet Union countries in reducing their WMD infrastructure and provides verifiable safeguards against WMD
proliferation. DTRA conducts force protection vulnerability assessments designed to protect military and civilian personnel and their families from terrorist acts. The Agency
leads DoD efforts to support operational forces and develop field systems to counter WMD proliferation.
United States. Department of Defense
2000
-
Northeast Asia Regional Security and the United States Military: Context, Presence, and Roles
The combined set of papers covers a broad and relevant swath of territory, both geographic and conceptual. The first paper, by Jay Parker, addresses the regional security context with special
emphasis on that strategic landscape as viewed from the perspective
of Japanese security and the United States roles both in Japanese
security and within the broader region. Sue Bryant then fits the
Korean peninsula into that regional security context, adding special
emphasis on the Korean road toward unification and on the continuing United States military presence in Korea--both for peninsular and regional security reasons. Finally, Russ Howard and Al Wilner add China to the mix and also add the third level of analysis--their focus is on post September 11, 2001 issues and
opportunities, and the specific military-to-military dimension of
United States overall military presence and policy. Together, then,
the papers cover the region as well as policy recommendations from
macro United States security and military policy, to force presence,
to the significant roles of individual service members.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Bryant, Susan F.; Howard, Russell D. (Russell D'Vere), 1946-; Parker, Jay M. . . .
2002-11
-
View from the East: Arab Perceptions of United States Presence and Policy
The papers included address in detail some of the implications of those perceptions for US military presence and policy in the region. Brent Talbot focuses his analysis on the key segment of the region's population that stands between the totally dispossessed and deprived radical base and some entrenched,
corrupt regimes. This Arab majority, he argues, can reshape the
region's states into culturally compatible and accountable (if not
purely democratic by western standards) revisionist Arab and
Islamic political and economic states that are much more
compatible with United States values and presence. This is a
significant message in terms of the longer-term strategic postscript
to the current US-Iraq conflict. Mike Meyer focuses his analysis at
the more operational level of US military personnel on the ground
in the region, but comes to complementary conclusions as to United States public diplomacy and presence. He argues that American
military personnel and programs must purposefully shape the
relationships--and through them perceptions and attitudes--with
the emerging military and political leaders in this region of
transition. This approach also provides a key element to the statebuilding exercise that will likely soon present itself. Together the two papers suggest a wisdom of experience--academic and practical--that is essential to the high-stakes endgame that lies before us.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Talbot, Brent J.; Meyer, Michael B.
2003-02
-
X-LAM: Roots of Terror and the Battle Ahead
The United States is conducting a war against terror. All nation states have responsibilities to their societies and more so, certain lead or core nations have greater responsibilities to the rest of the civilized world. Each state has a role in countering global terror. This paper is framed in the context of understanding who the enemy is, why he acts the way he does, and what leadership role the United States must play.
Army War College (U.S.)
Nelson, James P.
2002-04-09
-
'Squaring the Circle': Cooperative Security and Military Operations
This is considered to be an important paper for at least three reasons. First, it provides a pointed overview of conventional arms controls. So much of the
focus in arms control literature is exclusively on strategic agreements that this important arena is overlooked. Second, this paper addresses the interaction effects of multiple arms control agreements. These second order consequences--often unforeseen and potentially negative--raise a warning flag for future multilateral and theater arms control and cooperative security efforts. Third, and closely related, the paper highlights the potential for the
"offensive" use of arms control provisions by the full range of state parties to arms control agreements. Agreements are negotiated with a particular target state or group of states in mind and toward the bounding or control of specific behaviors and capabilities. Seldom do we really consider the second and subsequent order potential in compliance and verification monitoring that are highlighted here. Such indirect consequences clearly must be anticipated today and factored into a whole range of national security planning.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
McCausland, Jeffrey D.
2002-07
-
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology
This paper is a capstone document on two levels. First, it is a linked follow-on to Steve Lambert's (with Dave Miller) Russia's Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control (INSS Occasional Paper 12, April 1997). That paper was derived from their Naval Postgraduate School thesis, and it was selected for the award of the INSS Linhard Outstanding Researcher Award. Second, this current paper also caps a remarkable series of closely related research by the team of John Cappello, Gwen Hall, and Steve Lambert. They previously wrote A Post-Cold War Nuclear Strategy Model (INSS Occasional Paper 20, July 1998--also a Linhard Award winner); "US Counter-proliferation Strategy for a New Century" (in Searching for National Security in an NBC World, INSS July 2000); and "Triad 2025: The Evolution of a New Strategic Force Posture" (in Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations, February 2001; a version was also published under that same title in National Security Studies Quarterly, Spring 2001). This paper brings both tracks full circle back to "tactical" nuclear weapons. While this topic is addressed in much more exhausting detail in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, eds. Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities (INSS, July 2001), this paper offers a concise summary of many of the difficult issues presented in addressing this category of weapons within nuclear policy and posture, and particularly within the arms control arena. Its four direct findings are worthy of full consideration and debate as we rethink the place and role of tactical nuclear weapons.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Lambert, Stephen P.; Cappello, John T.; Hall, Gwendolyn M.
2002-08
-
Final Report of the Biological Warfare Improved Response Program (BW-IRP): NDPO/DoD Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Workshop, January 19-21, 2000: to U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
This report is divided into three primary sections. The first section discusses the process used to arrive at the conclusions in this report. The second section briefly discusses the core issues that drove the discussions among the respective panelists. The final section contains the panelists' conclusions and suggestions to facilitate improved coordination between the law
enforcement and the medical/public health communities. The conclusion addresses four key areas: WHAT - What information is necessary for each investigation?; WHO/WHEN - Who gets this information? When should the individual or group get the information?; HOW - Understanding that there are barriers to free exchange of some information,
how can the law enforcement and medical/public health communities work to improve the exchange?; DECISIONS - What are the critical decision points in each investigation?. The effective use of all resources during a mass casualty incident will be critical to an efficient and appropriate response. The use of biological agents in a terrorist attack is likely to stretch a jurisdiction's resources to the limit. Both law enforcement and medical/public health communities will be tasked with a variety of duties, including their respective investigations. Accordingly, it is important to maximize the use of all available resources. The Workshop
participants were asked to develop a list of the types of information or questions that each group could obtain for the other while conducting their respective investigations. Medical/public health personnel could obtain and provide information from their epidemiological investigation
to benefit a criminal investigation. Conversely, the law enforcement community could provide data that would benefit an epidemiological investigation. The identified information may be data that is currently collected or may be additional information that must be collected.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
2000-12
-
Report of the Biological Weapon Improved Response Program (BW-IRP): Updated BW Response Decision Tree and BW Response Template to U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
The purpose of this report is to update the original BW-IRP Decision Tree and the BW-IRP Response Template, published in April 1999, with information obtained from workshops, exercises and seminars conducted subsequent to its initial development. The BW Response Template was validated by a series of workshops at various cities to determine the applicability and scalability to different locations and demographics. Additional workshops were focused on other areas of the project. The Revised Decision Tree incorporates changes and modification derived from the workshops conducted under the BW-IRP. As part of the modification process, several additional decision trees were generated that go into more detail than the basic Decision Tree. This level of detail may prove to helpful to jurisdictions as they plan for their response to a BW incident. The key decisions during a BW response are: Has an unexplained event occurred?; Is a major public health event occurring?; Is the probable cause and population at risk known?; Decide on medical prophylaxis and treatment measures; Decide on appropriate activation of emergency medical support and other appropriate responses functions. The result is that the BW Decision Tree and BW Response Template, when taken together, provide a picture of what is likely to be required to successfully respond to a BW incident. The BW Decision Tree and its subordinate decision trees may serve also as an aid in identifying and tracking the difficult but necessary decisions that must be made during an ongoing large-scale medical emergency. The template provides a structured response strategy and includes examples of response activities.
United States. Department of Defense
Kussman, Richard L.
2001-05
-
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001
As directed by Congress, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. As stated, this report is submitted to Congress every six months.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2002-01-30
