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National Security Directive 44: Organizing to Manage On-Site Verification of Nuclear Testing
From the Document: "This directive defines organizational structure and responsibilities to implement the on-site monitoring and inspection provisions of the protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and defines the policy structure for making compliance judgements. This directive complements National Security Directive 41 which expanded the mission of the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)."
United States. White House Office
1990-07-18
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National Security Directive 43: FY 1990-1995 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan National Security Directive
National Security Directive (NSD) 43 made various authorizations to the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for the period of fiscal years 1990-1995. In general, authorizations dealt with Department of Energy's (DoE) ability to increase or reduce the stockpile, make parts transfers to the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as coordinate with DoD on changes to the production or retirement of warheads. NSD 43 stipulated that DoE should maintain a reserve of weapon-grade plutonium and enriched uranium metal to support the equivalent of one year of weapons production. In consideration of the uncertainties brought on by impending treaties and disarmament actions, the directive required the undertaking of various studies to prepare for the possible impact of these potential changes. Enclosure I of the directive is the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Note, this document was previously classified at the SECRET level. Portions of this declassified edition have been blackened out.
United States. White House Office
1990-07-12
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FM 10-52: Water Supply in Theaters of Operations: NBC Operations
This manual is a guide for commanders, staff officers, and other persons concerned with planning, organizing, and operating an Army water supply system in a TO. Concepts and doctrine are presented to enable the planner to design a water purification, storage, and distribution system that will ensure units can provide necessary water support to US forces. Chapter 6 of this manual deals specifically with the water supply in the theater of operation after being exposed to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons. Personnel, who purify, store, distribute, and issue water supplies must know NBC operations. Operators and supervisors must be alert to avoid NBC contamination. They must know NBC requirements related to field water supply.
United States. Department of the Army
1990-07-11
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Airborne Surveillance of Hijacked Aircraft
This regulation defines how North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) forces carry out airborne surveillance of hijacked aircraft and aircraft used without authorization within the NORAD system. It applies to HQ NORAD, regions, sectors and the commanders of all other units under the operational control of the Commander in Chief NORAD (CINCNORAD). Other commands and agencies having air defense responsibilities to CINCNORAD use this regulation for guidance. NORAD region commanders are authorized to supplement this regulation to establish specific responsibilities and operating procedures for their area of responsibility. For the purpose of clarity and conciseness in this regulation, the term "hijack" will cover situations in which aircraft control is seized in order to go somewhere other than the scheduled destination and when an aircraft is stolen or used without permission of the owner and or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Transport Canada (TC) authorities. The term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission.
North American Aerospace Defense Command
1990-07-06
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National Security Directive 42: National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems
National Security Directive (NSD) 44 established a mechanism to protect the government's national security telecommunications and information systems against attacks. The directive laid out "initial objectives, policies and an organizational structure to guide the conduct of activities," established "a mechanism for policy development and dissemination" and assigned responsibilities for their implementation. Some of the organizational changes addressed by the directive was the establishment of the National Security Council / Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems and of the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee. The Secretary of Defense and the director of National Security Agency are named the Executive Agent of the Government and the National Manager, respectively, for the National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee.
United States. White House Office
1990-07-05
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Evaluating Defense Department Research
Congress must vote funding for-- and sometimes choose among--an extremely complex assortment of highly technical proposals for supporting the defense technology base. Any type of systematic approach that could make this task more tractable, rational, and transparent would be attractive. One approach that seems, at first examination, to hold much promise is some sort of "decision-support system" or, as it is sometimes called, "risk analysis" often used by commercial research groups. Closer examination reveals that such approaches are too limited in scope to apply across the whole range of projects that Congress must consider, although the approach can still be applied to specific cases. One limitation of using a decision-support system is that the method requires a quantitative measure of "benefit," which is very difficult to produce when dealing with questions of national security. This is not to say that members of Congress do not have clear ideas of national security objectives, just that these ideas typically are not readily quantifiable.
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1990-07
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Coastal Management Solutions to Natural Hazards
"The problem of coastal hazards is more pressing now than ever before. Americans continue to demand more opportunities for coastal recreation, leading to intense pressures to develop resort areas and single family vacation houses along the beach. The consequences of this development is increased exposure to storms and the potential for loss of life and property, a potential realized in South Carolina when Hurricane Hugo made landfall last year. Less dramatic, but of equally great concern, is the interference intensive development causes in natural shoreline processes. [...] State coastal zone management agencies are at the forefront of efforts to mitigate coastal hazards through restrictions on development, mapping and monitoring erosion rates, participating in beach renourishment projects, educating the public and other efforts.
United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
1990-07
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Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and Nationless States
"This paper does not presume to offer policy solutions, but to provide the first step in their formulation--a context in which the political landscape of the Arab-Islamic world can be understood. That Islam has been 'reinvented' by political activists as a vehicle of rejection, sometimes violent, is not surprising. This phenomenon has occurred frequently over the centuries. More perplexing, why and how have Islam and Arabism become so profoundly entrenched in the broad spectrum of modern political expression? Often interdependent, why do they occasionally function as mutually antagonistic, distinct political paradigms? Why has no other claimant in the ideological marketplace--including democracy, Marxism, socialism, and, in particular, state nationalism--been capable of sustaining itself as a viable competitor without the garb of either Arabism, or Islam, or both? Why have some Islamic activists been able to attract a wider more committed audience, including adherents to Arab nationalist movements who had been avowedly secular and had formerly opposed them? What role does foreign influence play? How do factors unique to this century contribute? How do these underlying tensions affect intra-Arab relationships; and relations with non-Arab Muslims, such as Turks and Iranian Shi'a, and non-Muslim Western states, among which is included Israel? Finally, will the 'state' be able to assert its territorial integrity and the 'legitimacy' of its representative authority?"
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Helms, Christine Moss.
1990-07
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When All Else Fails! Enforcement of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act: A Self Help Manual for Local Emergency Planning Committees
"Does your emergency plan address the key preparedness problems in your area? Do your first responders know what chemical hazards they face when arriving at the scene of an emergency? Has missing information limited your emergency preparedness? Have all affected facilities reported? What steps are you planning to take in the future to improve emergency preparedness? What can you do to ensure that facilities are complying with the law? During the next few years, many Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) will look to improve the quality of their communities' chemical emergency response plans and to reduce chemical risks. One of the most significant ways to improve overall planning is to ensure that all the , - facilities have reported and, where appropriate, are participating in the emergency planning process. Only then can the local community completely understand and prepare for potential chemical accidents. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act ..... (EPCRA or SARA Title III) grants specific state and local authority to request information from facilities and to take enforcement actions in those situations where voluntary compliance has not occurred. This pamphlet contains information on these authorities and provides tips to help LEPCs ensure that facilities covered by SARA Title III are complying with the law. The material presented outlines the enforcement authorities granted to citizens, local governments, States, and EPA."
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1990-07
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American Naval Strategy and Forces to the Year 2000
"The breakup of the Warsaw Pact, perhaps of the Soviet Union itself, has wrought such great changes upon the geopolitical environment that all previous political and military strategies have been called to question. Not the least of these is that most useful, but now somewhat outmoded Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. Decreasing force levels in the United States Navy are being driven by economic and domestic political forces with little regard for strategic considerations. The resulting quandary is: Will the United States' naval components be able to execute the Bush administration's 'National Security Strategy' with the forces that Congress is willing to fund? This paper examines in detail the tools likely to be available to the U.S. Navy by the year 2000, and the alterations to strategy that will be required if Soviet naval forces continue to be modernized at current rates of production. It also deals with the U.S. Navy's role and capabilities in advancing the United States' interests, goals and objectives throughout the world. Whereas the U.S. Navy has been the dominant naval power for nearly 50 years, there are naval forces building which may be strong enough to challenge American naval supremacy on a regional basis. Finally, the paper concludes with comments on prospects for naval arms control between the two superpowers."
Naval War College (U.S.). Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Lynch, Hugh F.
1990-06-30
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DoD Management of Threat Simulators
"This audit report concludes that the Deputy Director significantly improved management of the Threat Simulator Program (the Program) in recent years, but that more effective centralized control is needed to provide a coordinated, joint-Service approach to threat simulator development and acquisition. The Program evolved from a single Service concept to a tri-Service and OSD effort with $1.5 billion programmed for threat simulator development, acquisition, and upgrade during FY 1990 through FY 1994. Threat simulator is a term for equipment having characteristics of actual threat weapon systems. Threat simulation is achieved by using mathematical computer models, combining hardware with computer models, and building hardware replicas of radars and missile seekers. Simulators are used in laboratories, indoor test facilities (chambers), and open-air test ranges to test the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. weapon systems and to train military personnel."
United States. Department of Defense
1990-06-27
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Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1982-1989 [June 19, 1990]
"The general decline in the value of new arms transfer agreements with the Third World seen in recent years continued in 1989. The value of all arms transfer agreements with the Third World in 1989 ($29.3 billion) was the lowest total for any year during the period from 1982-1989 (in constant 1989 dollars). The Soviet Union and the United States have clearly dominated the Third World arms market as the top two suppliers from 1982-1989. Collectively, the two superpowers accounted for 60% of all arms transfer agreements with, and arms deliveries to, the Third World during these years. In real terms, the value of United States arms transfer agreements with the Third World decreased from the 1988 total of $9.3 billion to $7.7 billion in 1989, a 26% share of all such agreements in 1989. The total value of the Soviet Union's agreements fell from $14.7 billion in 1988 to $11.2 billion in 1989, a 38.4% share of all Third World arms transfer agreements in 1989."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Grimmett, Richard F.
1990-06-19
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Amphibious Operations: The Operational Response to a Third World Crisis
From the thesis abstract: "With the current changes in world structure, alliances and the reduction in the size of the armed forces of the U.S., operational art and AirLand Battle become increasingly important as concepts. FM 100-5, Operations, published in 1986, establishes what operational art is, yet this concept is usually associated with a European scenario and mature theater of war. With the current changes taking place in the world, it becomes increasingly possible that future crises and commitment of forces will be in the Third World region. Even with this change in focus, an understanding of the operational level of war is important. The purpose of this study is to determine if amphibious operations could be utilized in the Third World to exercise operational art and execute the operational level of war. Given that the majority of conflicts in the Third World will be in an immature theater, this suggests conditions that will require flexibility, self-sustainment, and a force capable to meet multiple threats. The study draws on the main concepts of operational art from FM 100-5, historical examples of amphibious operations as operational art, and how these operations may be utilized in the future in conjunction with the military options available to the NCA [National Command Authority]. The conclusions show that amphibious forces and amphibious operations offer a potent operational response in a Third World theater of operations. However, this type of response may not be the total answer. Force ratios, time-distance relationships, and response time are key issues that must always be considered."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Driest, Charles W.
1990-06-07
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Eye Spy: The Utility of Strategic Satellite Reconnaissance
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph discusses the utility of strategic satellite reconnaissance in terms of its capability to satisfy our intelligence requirements in Europe. Although the context is present day Europe, it is not tied to ongoing Conventional Forces Europe discussions. This paper will argue that although the satellite has great capability to provide intelligence, it has faults. The monograph examines the historical development of the reconnaissance satellite. The primary historical emphasis begins immediately after World War II and extends to the present day. It traces our aerial intelligence collection efforts targeted against the Soviets. Current satellite capabilities are then addressed. The purpose is to develop a common understanding so that the discussion of future trends is more meaningful. Next, reconnaissance satellites are analyzed in terms of vulnerabilities and limitations. This analysis provides a determination of the utility of strategic satellite reconnaissance in a European setting today and answers the research question. The future direction of satellite technology will then be reviewed. This discussion will provide insight into what strategic intelligence collection capabilities will be available on future battlefields. The monograph concludes that reconnaissance satellites can satisfy many but not all of our intelligence needs. Its use must be balanced with other intelligence collection resources."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Day, Lowell L.
1990-06-07
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Screening of Materiel Available in the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service
"The objective of this audit was to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the DOD wholesale inventory management activities' screening and requisitioning of materiel in the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) during the FES and FAS processes. It also evaluated internal controls used to ensure that DoD Components were enforcing applicable policies. The audit concluded that internal controls were not adequate because procedures, criteria, and managerial controls did not ensure that wholesale inventory management activities would screen and order materiel available for re utilization in DRMS."
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General
1990-06-06
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Report on the Audit of Screening of Material Available in the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service
"This is the final report on the Audit of Screening of Material Available in the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) for your information and use. Comments on a draft of this report were considered in preparing the final report. We performed the audit from October 1988 through June 1989. The audit objectives were to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the DoD wholesale inventory management activities' screening and requisitioning of material in the DRMS during the Front End Screening (FES) and Final Asset Screening (FAS) processes. We also reviewed the internal controls used to ensure that applicable policies were enforced. The DRMS offered material valued at $839 million for FES and $677 million for FAS in fiscal year 1988."
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General
1990-06-06
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Tri-State Hurricane Loss and Contingency Planning Study Phase II: Executive Summary and Technical Data Report for Alabama, Florida, Mississippi
"This report presents the results of the second phase of a two-phase program. The main objective of the phase II report is to compile a list of appropriate and potentially effective mitigation measures that communities can adopt to lessen the property damages that may result from a hurricane striking the area [Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama]."
United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Army. Corps of Engineers
1990-06
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Effects of Protracted Ionizing Radiation Dosage on Humans and Animals: A Brief Review of Selected Investigations
"A review of selected investigations of animal irradiation studies, radiation therapy experience, and radiation accident accounts is presented, and some acute effects of protected ionizing radiation exposure on animals and humans are discussed. Various guidelines and models, which account for biological recovery when radiation exposure is protracted over time, are compared. Biological response modifying effects of dose rate and protraction period in humans are discussed in terms of prodromal symptoms. Radiation injury and recovery in a variety of animals, based on the LD(50) endpoint, are reviewed and summarized for low and high dose rates ranging from 0.5 to about 700 R/h. Biological recovery models and guidelines are empirical and are primarily based on radiation injury accumulation is animals and gauged by the LD(50) endpoint. Further development of appropriate protracted dose models is relevant and necessary for military operations and emergency civil defense planning."
United States. Defense Nuclear Agency
Anno, George H.; Baum, Siegmund J.
1990-06-01
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Physical Vulnerability of Electric Systems to Natural Disasters and Sabotage
"Electric utilities normally plan for the possibility of one, or occasionally two, independent failures of major equipment without their customers suffering any significant outage. If the system can be better protected, or made sufficiently resilient to withstand greater levels of damage, then the risk of a major, long-term blackout will be reduced. However, any such measures will cost money. Utilities are taking some steps, but apparently, generally consider the risk to be too low to warrant large expenditures […]. However, the consequences of a major, long-term blackout are so great that there is a clear national interest involved. Steps that may not be worthwhile for individual utilities could make sense from the national perspective. The purpose of this report is to explore the options for reducing vulnerability and place them in context. It first reviews the threat from both natural disasters and sabotage to determine what damage might occur. However, an analysis of the probability of any of these threats materializing is beyond the-scope of this study. Chapter 3 reviews the impact of major blackouts that have occurred, in order to help understand the costs of an even greater one that might be experienced eventually. Chapter 4 estimates the effect on the system when various critical components are damaged, and how the system can be restored. Chapters 5 and 6 describe present and potential efforts to reduce vulnerability. Finally, chapter 7 suggests how Congress could act, depending on how seriously the problem is viewed."
United States. Government Printing Office
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1990-06
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Geographic Information System: Forest Service Not Ready to Acquire Nationwide System, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
"While a GIS [Geographic Information System] holds the promise to significantly enhance the ability of the Forest Service to manage and preserve natural resources, the agency is not ready to procure a $1.2-billion nationwide GIS system. The Service did not analyze a full range of alternatives or adequately analyze alternatives for integrating a nationwide GIS into its operations. The Service made assumptions that limited the alternatives it considered and did not analyze the organizational impact of the alternatives in its feasibility study. Further, it did not estimate the dollar value of specific benefits it expected to achieve from the planned GIS, but instead used what we believe is an invalid representation of future benefits in its cost/benefit analysis. Finally, the Service did not adequately define its information and system performance needs, thereby failing to comply with Department of Agriculture regulations governing functional requirements analyses. As a result, an increased and unnecessary risk exists that the proposed GIS will not result in an effective and cost-beneficial system to support the agency's management and protection of the public lands and natural resources entrusted to it."
United States. General Accounting Office
1990-06
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Guide for Evaluating the Performance of Chemical Protective Clothing (CPC)
"In industrial environments where dermal exposure to hazardous chemicals can occur, engineering, administrative, and work practice controls can minimize the worker's contact with chemicals. Where these controls are inadequate, the use of chemical protective clothing (CPC) can minimize the risk of exposure and provide a last line of defense. This guide describes a method for an industrial hygienist or equivalent safety professional to select appropriate CPC. The steps in the selection process are (I) evaluating the workplace, (2) obtaining samples of candidate CPC, (3) testing the samples under the conditions in which they will be used, (4) select the best candidate CPC, and (5) monitoring the use of the CPC in the workplace. The decontamination and reuse of chemical protective clothing are discussed, and an example is given for using the selection process."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
1990-06
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Security Assistance: Observations on the International Military Education and Training Program, Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters
"As you requested, we reviewed the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program in selected countries. Specifically, we determined whether the Departments of State and Defense had (1) complied with program policies and procedures and (2) met the U.S. foreign policy objective of exposing IMET trainees to U.S. values, including human rights. We also obtained U.S. and foreign officials' views on the program's benefits and the desirability and feasibility of expanding nation-building training in the program, for example, in the fields of medicine, engineering, and logistics. We obtained information on training programs in Austria, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, South Korea, and Span; the U.S. Unified Commands; and the Departments of Defense and State. This report summarizes the information we provided to your offices in a briefing on May 23, 1990."
United States. General Accounting Office
1990-06
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EPA Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Advisory Ammonia
"This advisory recommends ways Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and chemical facilities can minimize risks posed by the presence of ammonia in their communities. Ammonia is toxic if swallowed or inhaled and can irritate or burn the skin, eyes, nose or throat through inhalation or direct contact. Careless storage or mixing of ammonia with other chemicals can cause the release of toxic ammonia vapors, as well as fires and high-pressure releases, and result in injuries or death to unprotected community members. Its toxicity and high production volume prompted EPA to list ammonia as an extremely hazardous substance (EHS) under Section 302 of the Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-Know Act (commonly known as SARA Title III). In addition, OSHA regulations require that facility employees who could potentially be exposed to ammonia in any form be trained in the safe use and potential hazards posed by this chemical. EPA stresses that although mishandling of ammonia can cause harm, there is no cause for undue alarm about its presence in the community. Ammonia is typically handled safely and without incident. More than 70% of all ammonia produced today in the U.S. is used either in direct application as a fertilizer or to manufacture other fertilizers. Anhydrous ammonia is commonly applied directly to soils to bolster the strength of plant roots, improve nutrient uptake, and stimulate growth. Ammonia is also used to purify municipal and industrial water supplies, as an oxygen scavenger in treating boiler feed water, and as a refrigerant gas in commercial installations. Reducing the use of chlorofluorocarbons as refrigerants, in efforts to protect the ozone layer, will likely increase reliance on ammonia for refrigeration, which may result in even greater production and storage volumes of ammonia at a greater number of facilities."
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1990-06
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EPA Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Advisory Swimming Pool Chemicals: Chlorine
"This advisory to Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) [advises] special attention to swimming pool chemicals this summer." This advisory outlines how pool chemicals work, steps for LEPCs, and steps for facilities. […] "Many chemicals used at swimming pools may release chlorine - an extremely hazardous substance (EHS). Careless storing, wetting, mixing, or the contamination of any of these chemicals or the systems used to feed them can cause fires, explosions, burns, and possibly the release of gaseous chlorine, resulting in injuries or death. Facilities should train all employees, including summer employees, on the safe use and potential hazards of these chemicals."
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1990-06
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Comparison of Password Techniques for Multilevel Authentication Mechanisms
"Various mechanisms for authenticating users of computer-based information systems have been proposed. These include traditional, user-selected passwords, system-generated passwords, passphrases, cognitive passwords and associative passwords. While the mechanisms employed in primary passwords are determined by the operating systems' manufacturers, system designers can select any password mechanism for secondary passwords, to further protect sensitive applications and data files. This paper reports on the results of an empirically based study of passwords characteristics. It provides a comparative evaluation on the memorability and users' subjective preferences of the various passwords mechanisms, and suggest that cognitive passwords and associative passwords seem the most appropriate for secondary passwords."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Zviran, Moshe; Haga, William James
1990-06
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National Security Directive 41: Organizing to Manage On-site Inspection for Arms Control
National Security Directive (NSD) 41 expanded the On-Site Inspection Agency's (OSIA) mission to include planning for manpower, operational, logistic, and administrative requirements ensuing from responsibilities brought about through various arms control agreements: START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), Chemical Weapons (CW), and Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT). OSIA had originally been established within the Department of Defense as a coordinating body for on-site inspections and escort activities ensuing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.
United States. White House Office
1990-05-29
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U.S. Maritime Strategy in a Post-Cold War World
"This monograph examines the impact of future U.S. military force reductions in Europe upon the Maritime Component of U.S. National Military Strategy. A chain reaction of historic events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has dramatically altered the strategic paradigm of East-West relationships. If the Cold War is over, as many pundits and policymakers would argue, then a major strategic reassessment is in order. This research attempts to define those key tenets of America's current maritime strategy which will have continuing relevance in a changing geopolitical environment. The monograph lays the theoretical and historical foundations of U.S. maritime strategy as currently written. It also discusses the forces of change which are driving troop reductions in Europe. The U.S. maritime strategy is one element of a national security strategy based on deterrence, forward defense and alliance solidarity. American defense policy has been focused toward the Soviet Union for over 40 years, and logically the Maritime Component of U.S. National Military Strategy has evolved to meet this threat."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Hendricks, Douglas O.
1990-05-16
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Findings and Recommendations of the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
This document summarizes the final report of the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which consisted of Frank Lautenberg, Alfonse D'Amato, James Oberstar, John Paul Hammerschmidt, Edward Hidalgo, Thomas C. Richards, and Ann McLaughlin and was formed to investigate the bombing of Pan Am flight 103. The document addresses background of the incident, formation of the Commission, and a summary of the major findings, which include an inadequate aviation security system. It concludes with a brief recounting of the recommendations of the Commission and an overview of how the recommendations can be implemented.
United States. Congress. Senate
1990-05-15
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Command, Communications, Control and Intelligence: The Role of the Joint Task Force in the War on Drugs
The issue of fighting drug abuse has come to the forefront of our list of national security priorities. A major part of this war is an attempt to stop the flow of drugs into the United States from the source countries. As the Federal government focused more attention to and national assets on this effort the need for better coordination among the numerous agencies involved became immediately apparent. A unified Command, Communications, Control and Intelligence (C3I) network was paramount to effectively employing the myriad personnel and equipment dedicated to Drug Surveillance and Interdiction, and hopefully conducting a successful campaign. The goal is to interdict and confiscate inbound shipments of drugs, or prevent their successful transhipment through deterrence. In response to this need for unified C3I, the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act designated the Department of Defense as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring program targeted against the aerial and maritime traffic attempting to bring drugs into the United States. Commander Joint Task Force FOUR (CJTF-4) in Key West, FL, Commander, Joint Task Force FIVE in Alameda, CA and Commander, Joint Task Force SIX in El Paso, TX were established to direct the anti-drug surveillance efforts in the Atlantic/ Caribbean, Pacific, and Mexico border areas respectively. The Joint Task Forces have been operating with assigned and supporting assets since October, 1989. After almost nine months of operations, two questions need to be answered: How well are they working? And, how effective have the Joint Task Forces been?
Naval War College (U.S.)
Miskill, Donald K., Jr
1990-05-14
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National Security Directive 40: Decisions on START Issues
National Security Directive (NSD) 40 laid out the administration's best faith effort to resolve various issues in the upcoming START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] summit. Included are decisions on air launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), the verification of non-deployed mobile missile production, limits on heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and limits on mobile ICBMs and mobile ICBM reentry vehicles (ICBM RV).
United States. White House Office
1990-05-14
