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Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks
Executive Order 13045 establishes a Task Force on Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks to Children. The Order also mandates that each Federal agency shall make it a high priority to identify and assess environmental health risks and safety risks that may disproportionately affect children; and shall ensure that its policies, programs, activities, and standards address disproportionate risks to children that result from environmental health risks or safety risks.
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
1997-04-21
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Review of the FBI's Performance in Uncovering the Espionage Activities of Aldrich Hazen Ames (April, 1997)
"In this report, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) examines the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in uncovering the espionage activities of former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Operations officer Aldrich Hazen Ames. Because Presidential Executive Order 12333 gives the FBI primary responsibility for combatting espionage conducted within United States borders, Ames' espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union, and later Russia, fell within the FBI's jurisdiction. [...] After his arrest, Ames disclosed that he had engaged in espionage for nine years -- from the spring of 1985 until his arrest in February 1994. During that time, Ames provided a wealth of classified information to his handlers. In particular, Ames provided information to the KGB that led to the compromise and execution of at least ten CIA and FBI intelligence sources. Assessments following Ames' arrest have indicated that Ames' betrayal will continue to have a negative effect on this nation's intelligence efforts for years to come. After Ames' arrest, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) recommended that the CIA Inspector General investigate the CIA's performance in connection with Ames. In September 1994, the CIA Inspector General issued a report detailing deficiencies in the CIA's counterintelligence effort and management of personnel. After reviewing various issues relating to the Ames matter, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) issued a report recommending an examination of the FBI's performance in connection with Ames. We initiated our review in response to that recommendation."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
1997-04-21
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Are Current Psychological Operations Procedures Adequate in Information Warfare?
"This monograph discusses the ability of Psychological Operations forces to conduct information operations. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U S Army has struggled to adapt to an increasingly volatile series of missions. Many believe the likely conventional or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) threat will involve Information Warfare (IW) as part of the conflict. As a consequence, the army has begun to develop capabilities that allow it to fight more effectively in an information intensive environment. While some aspects of information warfare are conducted domestically, many are executed on foreign soil and involve extensive interaction with other governments, their population, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. Each of these entities constitutes a potential target audience for psychological operations while executing information warfare. The importance of information warfare grows proportionally as the level of technological sophistication increases around the world. The U S Army is compelled to rely upon psychological operations forces to fill vital support roles in the conduct of information warfare. In this monograph, psychological operations capabilities will be measured using Operation Desert Shield/Storm as a case study and to a lesser extent, recent OOTW operations. Based on the successes and failures found in these examinations, the monograph will draw conclusions as to the abilities of the psychological operations force to conduct information warfare."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Duff, Murray J.
1997-04-18
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Future Roles of US Military Power and their Implications
"Examining the larger issue of the future roles of U.S. military power first requires establishing the appropriate context. To this end, this monograph first briefly examines the probable U.S. role in the emerging international security environment. With that context established, the report addresses the future roles of U.S. military power and explores the potential implications at the national strategy and national military strategy level, and for the Army. The study closes with conclusions."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Johnsen, William Thomas, 1952-
1997-04-18
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Personal Satisfaction of Immigration and Nationality Act Oath Requirement: Letter Opinion for the General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service [April 18, 1997]
"You have requested advice concerning whether section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994), requires some sort of accommodation for persons who are unable to form the mental intent necessary to take the naturalization oath of allegiance prescribed by section 337 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ('INA'), 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1994). Memorandum for Dawn Johnsen, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from David A. Martin, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Feb. 10, 1997). More specifically, your memorandum of February 10 asks us to consider the question whether, in the case of a person who cannot form the requisite intent, the oath requirement might be fulfilled by a guardian or other legal proxy. Id. As we recently advised you, it is our conclusion that the oath requirement of section 337 may not be satisfied by a guardian or legal proxy. This letter briefly sets forth the reasoning underlying that conclusion."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1997-04-18
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Biological Agent Detection Since Desert Storm: From Theory To Practice?
"Proliferation of WMD, especially biological warfare (BW) weapons, continues apace in today's world, both by nation states and terrorist groups. BW weapons may provide these players a capability which is as potentially devastating as a nuclear weapon at a much lower cost. They will continue to threaten regional stability and may be the primary strategic, as well as terrorist, threat against the United States in the future. An effective and credible biological defense program will minimize the impact of biological weapons in the conduct of U.S. military operations. This goal will be achieved only when our forces have real time detection and identification of BW attack. This paper details the progress made in BW agent detection in the six years since the Gulf War. With two new systems, we have the technology to provide the combatant commander with a credible bio-detection array. What we have failed to do in the near term is to supply the requisite force structure in the Active Component to make the technology work for the commander."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Shockley, Linda J.
1997-04-16
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How Much for a Pound of Communication?
"Thesis: Did historical advances in communication technology drive changes in the Command, Control and Communication architecture in use by the Ground Force components of Marine Corps forces? How should today's communication technology affect existing communication architecture doctrine? Discussion: How much is a pound of communication worth to a warfighter? No communication is disastrous; as would be a budget containing only communication purchases. Where is the balance between proper coordination and "all talk, no fight?" Understanding communication equipment use requires the understanding of the strategy of its employment. This paper evaluates the evolution of military communication architectures for the last fifty years. Through this analysis a methodology for implementing communication technology advances should be evident. Conclusions: The Ground Component of Marine Corps forces, at the regiment and below, uses the same communication architecture as in World War II. However one fundamental principle (analog) used by all military radios did not change. Today we face a revolution in communication technology, digital communication. Digital communication techniques may replace fifty years of analog improvements. Consider how digital compact disks virtually eliminated the analog phonograph record industry. Recommendations: Use commercial, digital, satellite communication equipment along with existing military equipment. Implementing the fruits of the commercial market advances can provide both an edge and a gap filler for military communication."
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (U.S.)
Ruud, Paul E.
1997-04-16
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Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies, Report to Congressional Requesters
The GAO examined how the U.S. government is organized to develop technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics. This report discusses (1) the roles, responsibilities, and authority of agencies that establish policy, provide funds or oversee funding requests, and develop explosives and narcotics detection technologies; (2) mechanisms used to coordinate the joint development of technologies; and (3) efforts to strengthen detection technology development. The FAA, Office of National Drug Control Policy, U.S. Customs Service, and DoD all play a part in the development of these detection technologies, however, the GAO found that these organization have yet to agree on standards for explosives detection systems, profiling and targeting systems, and deploying canine teams at airports. In addition, they have not agreed on how to resolve issues related to a joint-use strategy and liability. Moreover, key decisionmakers are not receiving periodic reports on efforts by the various government entities to develop and field explosives and narcotics detection technologies.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-04-15
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Joint Task Force Headquaters Master Training Guide
"In December 1993, the US Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (USCINCACOM) proposed to the Joint Staff that a Joint Task Force (JTF) training document be developed to link the Universal Joint Task List to joint doctrine/joint tactics, techniques and procedures (JTTP). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided funding for this project through the CINC Initiative Fund (CIF) and designated USACOM as the lead agent for its development. The intent is that this publication - named the Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (JTF HQ MTG) - will be the first of a series of joint training documents that support the training and operations of all Joint Task Forces. An explanation of this series of publications is provided in Chapter 1. The purpose of the JTF HQ MTG is to provide a descriptive, performance-oriented training guide to assist leaders in training their units. It also serves as a guide for the JTF Headquarters in actual operations. This publication is not intended to include information on all types of joint units - just the JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS. It should be viewed as a single source for information, in outline form, to guide training of the JTF HQ."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1997-04-15
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Criminal Activity: The Future Threat to our Nation's Security
"The Cold War saw the threat of superpower conflagration end, and with it, the notion of traditional warfare. America now faces an entirely different enemy. An enemy who operates within and outside its borders. He uses the inner cities as his battleground and conducts warfare through criminal activity. His multi-ethnic numbers are growing, fed by the disparate have-nots. His organization mirrors the C3 structure and global reach of the most successful international business enterprises. He readily uses the latest technological innovations to sustain his livelihood. The new world order allows him to carry on his activities relatively unencumbered. His future appears bright because he does not have an adversary who can counter him. Traditional means of coping with his criminal activity will likely be overwhelmed. This enemy has the ability of becoming our nation's primary security challenge. Sweeping changes in the way we conduct jurisdictional law enforcement must be made. A multilateral effort, cutting across law enforcement jurisdictions, both nationally and internationally, to include the use of federal armed forces is required. A separate Unified Crime Control Agency should be created that integrates the various local, state, federal and Department of Defense agencies, which is linked to the U.N."
Army War College (U.S.)
Raggio, Paul A.
1997-04-15
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Information Operations, Information Warfare: Policy Perspectives and Implications for the Force
Information Operations and Information Warfare are hot topics today and as a result, there is a tremendous amount of intellectual capital invested in the debate over what impact of new information technologies will have in two areas. These areas parallel two of our three components of the national security strategy; first is enhancing our security and the second is promoting prosperity. In many regards, the interests involved are somewhat mutually exclusive, which presents a challenging environment for issue identification and policy development. This paper identifies a few of the many scenarios in which information operations/warfare are a component; reviews some of the directions provided to the government as a whole and the military in particular; discusses why our nation is now more vulnerable to asymmetric attack; and then provides a few historical precedents. Finally, several of the many issue areas are analyzed, followed by the derivative implications for our military forces. The basic philosophical underpinning in this analysis is that solutions to these emerging issues must be consistent with our historical identity and values; failing this, we expose our long-term interests to unacceptable and probably fatal risk.
Army War College (U.S.)
Stewart, Michael J.
1997-04-15
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Freedom's Greatest Threat, the Metaterrorist
"The end of the Cold War ushered on to the world scene a new hybrid of terrorist. This new breed of criminal is called the metaterrorist, because his art of instilling terror goes beyond anything we have ever seen in the past. As the only remaining super power in the world, the United States is in the vanguard of freedom and must be prepared to deal with this new emerging threat. This study examines this new phenomena, discusses the potential effects of the metaterrorist and provides recommendations to combat this new threat to freedom. It provides a think piece in the form of a metaterrorist scenario, which effects America's center of gravity and, if not examined, may portend this nation's 21st century Pearl Harbor."
Army War College (U.S.)
Jones, Gary M.
1997-04-15
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Tao of War: Balance in the National Military Strategy
From the thesis abstract: "Esoteric wisdom is not restricted to tradition and religion. Modem subnuclear physics, organizational systems theories and even teachings in 'critical thinking' lead to the same truth: cooperation forms the very foundation of life. This document illustrates how individuals and nations can be guided by esoteric wisdom. The depicted trends for the future support the expressed idealistic views. The reality of perpetually conflicting interests between people and nations is not denied, however. Idealism and realism should be balanced, although the current military documents emphasize warfighting. The concept of Preventive Defense should be more explicitly expressed in the U.S. National Military Strategy, the military doctrine and the Joint Vision 2010. The armed forces need to be able to fight the nation's wars, if necessary and preferably in coalition with other nations. However, the structure, concepts, leadership and training of the forces should show the flexibility to accept a more diplomatic role of the military, that can prevent the need for use of other military power. To preserve the peace, one should not only prepare for war, but foremost invest in alliances and mutual understanding."
Army War College (U.S.)
Bek, Willem
1997-04-15
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Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses [April 11, 1997]
"In 1990 and 1991, approximately 697,000 U.S. troops were deployed in the Persian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The United States suffered relatively few casualties during the brief air and ground war against Iraq. Since returning home, however, many veterans have developed illnesses that appear to be related to their military service in the Gulf. Researchers caution that it may be impossible to identify the causes of these illnesses because of the absence of baseline data on the health of military personnel and the lack of reliable exposure data. This report provides concise answers to a series of questions concerning Gulf War veterans' illnesses, based on currently available scientific information."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Redhead, C. Stephen
1997-04-11
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Understanding Non-Western Cultures: A Strategic Intelligence Perspective
"With the containment of the Soviet threat, there has been a resurgence of ethnic consciousness and cultural values throughout the non-Western world. Given that non-Western societies comprise two-thirds of the world's population, their cultural perspectives will define conflict and instability in the Twenty-First Century. In the new world order, culture divergence promises to be the major challenge to United States intelligence. Therefore, the Intelligence Community must reassess its Cold War paradigm relative to a multi-polar world of smaller, but no less lethal threats. The effectiveness of technology-based collection systems, designed for the conventional battlespace, will be challenged by adversaries from different cultures with irregular and asymmetrical views of conflict. At the same time, a more transparent cultural divide between the West and non-West will require a greater emphasis on analyzing potential adversaries' actions and intentions. Therefore, a new culturally-based intelligence paradigm will be required. This paper examines the nature of this change and suggests an approach to defining a new intelligence paradigm."
Army War College (U.S.)
Browning, Susan A.
1997-04-09
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Organized Crime in Russia: A Threat to the National Security Interests of the United States
Organized crime in Russia has a direct, negative impact on the national security interests of the United States. The U.S. national security interests in Russia include regional stability, development of a free market based economy and control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These interests are best served by a viable, democratic government in Russia. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia began a movement toward democracy. However, the powerful forces of organized crime within Russia and its grip on the domestic economy, is impeding its progress. International solutions to this challenge include greater cooperation among western nations to stem the flow of illegal money and material out of Russia. For its part the United States is developing closer law enforcement ties with the Russian Ministry of Interior. The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an office in Moscow. Future efforts must be focused on the mutual development of criminal intelligence in order to identify, arrest, and successfully prosecute Russian organized crime figures. In addition the products, goods, and services which Russian organized crime provides to the Russian people must be produced and delivered through the legal Russian market.
Army War College (U.S.)
Clifford, James T.
1997-04-09
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Marine Corps Intelligence Doctrine: Does It Know The Information Age Has Arrived?
The author summarizes his paper: "For eight years the ASD (C3I) has published numerous policies directing the services to create and function in an open systems computing environment. The concept is to simply free DOD of vendor reliance when using high capability computers…The U.S. Navy, with some foresight, created the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS), which for the most part, operates on the open systems architecture models…The Navy's position as front runner in the COE adoption was leveraged by the Marine Corps to create a C2 system supporting the operating forces. By adopting the Navy's system, the Marine Corps avoided huge development costs. Moreover, the Navy already possessed the supporting infrastructure to continue systems development. Additionally, the Marine Corps was able to capitalize on twenty years of Navy culture and learning in using computers as a component of its C2 doctrine. Marine Corps C2 doctrine, embodied in MCDP 6, beautifully translates DOD policies, and the Navy's JMCIS into an operational precept that makes the DOD COE a combat multiplier. MCDP 6 establishes the culture and principles for Marine Corps C2. MCDP 2, is to embody the principles of Marine Corps intelligence doctrine. Dissemination, arguably is the most important part of the intelligence cycle. If intelligence is not disseminated, it cannot be used. Neither MCDP 2, nor MCWP 2-1, incorporates the principles of MCDP 6. The only comments on computers reflects a look backward" The author's recommendation is to "Incorporate MCDP 6 principles into MCDP 2 and all other intelligence doctrinal, or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, manuals."
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (U.S.)
Sillman, Bradley J.
1997-04-09
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Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts, Statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Military Research and Development and Military Procurement, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives
"According to DOD [Department of Defense], its objective in acquiring UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] is to provide unmanned systems that will complement its mix of manned and national reconnaissance assets. However, its UAV acquisition efforts to date have been disappointing. Since Aquila began in 1979, of eight UAV programs, three have been terminated (Aquila, Hunter, Medium Range), three remain in development (Outrider, Global Hawk, DarkStar), and one is now transitioning to low rate production (Predator). Only one of the eight, Pioneer, has been fielded as an operational system. We estimate DOD has spent more than $2 billion for development and/or procurement on these eight UAV programs over the past 18 years."
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-04-09
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Maritime Chokepoints: Key Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and Strategy
"Does U.S. military strategy adequately address maritime chokepoints or is there an oversight awaiting an untimely catastrophic event? The importance of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), especially chokepoints, have been constant throughout history. When geopolitical issues associated with SLOCs have been misunderstood or overlooked, the consequences have been severe. The United States needs to ensure that current strategy and resources properly address modem and future SLOC issues. This paper examines SLOC issues and whether or not the United States is properly addressing such issues accordingly."
Army War College (U.S.)
Peele, Reynolds B.
1997-04-07
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National Security Strategy for Information Assurance
"Information age technologies have profoundly altered American society. Information itself has become a strategic national asset and the maintenance and protection of our information systems has become a vital national interest of the United States. Our dependence upon information technologies and the global connectivity of today's information systems result in a new strategic threat aimed at those information systems that control key aspects of our military, economic, and political power. Yet, our National Security Strategy fails to adequately address this emerging threat to this vital national interest and our way of life. Our nation must develop a comprehensive National Security Strategy to assure the security and integrity of our information systems. This strategy must outline the ends, ways, and means required to guarantee Information Assurance in the Information Age."
Army War College (U.S.)
Farrell, Peter T.
1997-04-07
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XXI Century: Veiled Threats towards the National Security Strategy
"The scope of this paper is to focus on long term, slowly developing internal threats to national security. The aim is to identify dormant social threats showing how they can undermine national interests. It will also seek to explain the role of information age technologies as powerful social value multipliers, setting, for better or for worse, new worldwide social standards. Finally, this analysis will postulate possible ways to find a new strategic model to avert the future noxious social paradigm."
Army War College (U.S.)
de Amo, Julio, Jr.
1997-04-07
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Defensive Information Warfare in Today's Joint Operations: What's the Real Threat?
"Information warfare (IW) is an emerging concept that affects the use of automated systems and reflects the growing realization that information technology can be used to gain an advantage over other users. Since the Gulf War, the incidents of information systems attacks have increased, especially in the civilian environment. Attacks against military systems have gone as far as penetrating sensitive, previously secure systems. As this threat against information- or computer-based systems becomes more blatant, it raises the question of how vulnerable to attack are our automated military systems. Emerging technologies promise greater speed, accuracy and reliability for military operations while simultaneously producing greater lethality and situation awareness. However, as the Armed Forces depend more and more on these systems to perform routine and specialized operations, the risk of penetration, disruption, or even compromise becomes apparent. While information warfare has great potential as a valid offensive tool, this paper explores the threat to unified and joint military operations from a defensive information warfare perspective. We must first identify what the threat entails and design defensive procedures because this is where the greatest vulnerabilities lie. Research and development of IW as an offensive weapon can be pursued and funded along with other conventional weapons programs. What is critical is identifying weaknesses and correcting them before we become victims of information warfare itself."
Army War College (U.S.)
Ashman, Bruce W.
1997-04-07
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National Security Strategy and Information Warfare
"This paper examines how the National Security Strategy (NSS) and its new subcomponent, the National Security Science and Technology Strategy (NSS&TS) address Information Warfare. The Executive Branch has put the Department of Defense (DOD) on the front lines of the national effort to define and build a National Information Infrastructure (NII). The Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) is described in its relationship to the NII. Two Information systems of the DoD are then examined. They are: Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (ECEDI) and the Defense Message System (DMS). They are described non-technically to press home three points. First, Information is a national strategic asset and that using it and protecting it should be national priorities. Second, the world and the United States are becoming extremely interconnected and interdependent during this Information Age. This represents a new dimension of warfare and national security across all levels of conflict and all locations of the battlespace. The NSS and the NSS&TS should explicitly recognize Information Warfare, probably under a different diplomatically acceptable name. Third, the Administration recognizes these trends and has accounted for them in the NSS even if not explicitly recognized."
Army War College (U.S.)
Klinefelter, Stephen
1997-04-07
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National Military Strategy: Information Warfare
"The U. S. Government has realized that new technologies will have a significant impact not only on everyday life but also on national security and the conduct of future warfare. While evaluating the powerful potential of information, policymakers are also attempting to understand a variety of problems surrounding it. This paper analyzes IW, specifically the protection of information, as a component of the 1995 National Military Strategy (NMS). It reviews the ends, ways, and means of our IW strategy. It focuses on the actions of the U. S. Government, the Department of Defense (DoD), and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), especially on the U. S. Army's role. It examines the Army's IW strategy and provides some recommendations for what it needs to do to further support national policy."
Army War College (U.S.)
Hall, Larry P.
1997-04-07
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Cryptography, Information Operations and the Industrial Base: A Policy Dilemma
"The information age is in full swing and it is changing the face of national security. The explosive force of information technology places the Global Information Infrastructure, the worldwide industrial base and the various world governments in both mutually supporting and somewhat adversarial positions. The information infrastructure is rapidly becoming the lifeblood for the world's industry and a critical part of the national infrastructure around the world. Consequently, the emerging operational regime of information operations is playing a critical role in the protection of U.S. national security interests and exploitation of adversary systems associated with information systems. Cryptography, long a traditional government area of interest, is taking on increased importance in industry, not only for protection of sensitive data but as a worldwide product market itself. The U.S. government cryptography policy must balance the need for continued U.S. dominance in information technology and the government's legitimate need to access data. U.S. dominance requires increased access to world markets for U.S. cryptography technology. Solution to this policy dilemma requires a team approach by U.S. government and industry to provide the best answer."
Army War College (U.S.)
Horner, Stephen C.
1997-04-07
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Allowing Access to the Selected Reserve for Domestic Disaster Relief Operations
When major natural disasters strike the United States, the nation's active military forces are frequently called upon to augment the relief efforts of the affected states' National Guard units. Currently, Title 10, United States Code, prohibits the President from ordering the activation of Selected Reserve units or personnel for participation in domestic disaster relief operations. Reductions in the overall active strength, along with changes in the force structure of active forces and Reserve Components, increase the potential that the types of active forces most needed in domestic disaster relief may not be available when a major disaster strikes. This study analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of enabling the President to access the Selected Reserves for participation in domestic disaster relief operations. The study concludes that the best course of action for the Secretary of Defense is to recommend that the President pursue legislation to amend Title 10 to permit involuntary activation of Selected Reserve units and individuals under a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up for domestic disaster relief operations.
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Freund, Lee W.
1997-04-07
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Poor Man's Air Force: Implications of the Evolving Cruise Missile Threat
For several years, the United States has expended considerable resources on countering the theater ballistic missile threat. During this time, we have relatively ignored a growing land attack cruise missile threat. Land attack cruise missiles have the potential to be even more deadly than ballistic missiles, able to deliver similar payloads over similar distances with much greater accuracy. Advanced cruise missiles can penetrate existing air defenses, giving potential regional adversaries a significant ability to conduct strategic attack and interdiction against our military forces, a poor man's air force. Additionally, cruise missiles, synchronized with employment of ballistic missiles and manned aircraft, can have a synergistic effect. This paper examines implications of the growing threat by discussing the proliferation of cruise missiles, the features that make cruise missiles the growing weapon of choice in the Third World, Western defensive capabilities against the threat, and the effect that synchronized and synergistic use of cruise missiles can have on our air operations.
Army War College (U.S.)
Bowen, John T.
1997-04-07
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Role of U.S. Special Operations Forces in Counter-Drug Activities
U.S. Special Operations Command invests a great deal of time, manpower and equipment to train Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies in conducting counterdrug operations and to assist foreign governments in their efforts to combat the production and distribution of illegal drugs. SOF also conducts detection, monitoring and interdiction along the U.S. southwestern land border and throughout the Caribbean basin. This paper examines the drug problem within the U.S., defines the national and military counterdrug strategy and assesses the value of this mission to SOF and their contribution to the national effort of countering illegal drugs in the U.S.
Army War College (U.S.)
Ryan, Thomas M.
1997-04-07
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Implications Related to Eastward Enlargement
"NATO enlargement is a key issue both within NATO and in the context of alternative future security alignments in Europe involving NATO, the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU). This paper examines the most crucial implications of the ongoing enlargement process and what has to be done prior to the very important summer summit in Madrid this year, 50 years after President Truman's Marshall Plan. The study concludes that the main issue as far as Western security is concerned is not a hasty enlargement of NATO but rather how to guarantee peaceful relations between Russia and NATO. The West must understand that the costs of Russia's being forced to move away from the West could far exceed any advantages gained through NATO enlargement. And finally, US leadership as a super-power within NATO, has never been more important than it is today to avoid polarization of European Security policy. Without broad-based, active US involvement the European security architecture will be less effective and will lose credibility. The US has the unique role as the leading security partner of the world's principal democracies and with unparalleled military assets to display influence as an international leader."
Army War College (U.S.)
Vaagland, John
1997-04-07
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Beyond NATO Enlargement: Security Frameworks for Central and Eastern Europe
"NATO enlargement will most likely occur following the general outline established by the NATO ministers in 1994. Likewise, NATO will initiate and successfully conclude a security arrangement with Russia. Enlargement without strong complementary programs inadequately addresses the stability and security needs of Central and Eastern Europe. Since our stated vital interests are to maintain a stable Europe and to stabilize and democratize Russia it is imperative that we conceptualize and execute the complementing policies and programs necessary to achieve our stated interests. This study analyzes these complementing programs to determine what the framework for security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe should be. It assesses the current state of the elements of that framework. United States interests are compared to that framework. The expected outcomes of the initial phases of NATO enlargement are compared to our interests and desired outcomes of the strategy to determine potential shortfalls. Policy recommendations and adjustments complete the review."
Army War College (U.S.)
Wynarsky, Andrew E.
1997-04-07
