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Joint Economic Committee Hearing: Radio Frequency Weapons and Proliferation: Potential Impact on the Economy: Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, February 25, 1998
On June 17, 1997, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) held a hearing called, "Economic Espionage, Technology Transfers and National Security," in which it heard testimony from Lt. Gen. Robert Schweitzer about a new class of weapons, radio frequency weapons (RF), and the impact of these new weapons on the civilian and military electronic infrastructure of the United States. Since the General talked about a terrorist threat and a proliferation threat, the JEC has continued to investigate these potential threats. Opening statement for this hearing prepared by Jim Saxton. Witnesses include: James O'Bryon, David Schriner, Dr. Ira Merritt, and Dr. Alan Kehs.
United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee
1998-02-25
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Statement of Mr. David Schriner before the Joint Economic Committee United States Congress; The Design and Fabrication of a Damage Inflicting RF Weapon by Back Yard' Methods
For many years research activities in different countries have focused on the use of radio frequency (RF) waves as a weapon. Most of this work has been titled or described under the title of High Powered Microwave (HPM). One primary point of this paper is that as these technologies mature they also become affordable and usable by criminals and terrorists. Most military programs are classified and the general public knows little concerning their nature but as the technology becomes available to criminals and terrorists, it may be directly applied to the infrastructure elements of our society. This paper addresses the question concerning the possibility of certain types of this technology being used against the society. The primary focus of this paper will be on a different and new form of HPM called Transient Electromagnetic Devices (TED) that could, in the hands of enemies, criminals, pranksters, or terrorists pose a significant threat to much of the United States infrastructure components that are based on micro-circuits and computer or micro-processor control. Millions of dollars have been spent on the conventional HPM, systems and it is the type that DOD managers and their funding offices are well acquainted with. This paper will briefly speak to these but the main focus of it will be on the very different type, the TED systems, which is less well known and may be the RF weapon of choice to the modern cyber or infrastructure RF warrior.
United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee
Schriner, David
1998-02-25
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Executive Order 13076: Ordering the Selected Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty
Executive Order 13076 determines that it is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for the effective conduct of operations in and around Southwest Asia, and authorizes the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty any units, and any individual members not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Selected Reserve.
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
1998-02-24
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Sendero Luminoso: A Failed Revolution in Peru?
"The study examines the impact of a rural-based revolutionary movement on a democracy using Peru as the case study. The thesis of the research is that the Sendero Luminoso has been strategically defeated in Peru despite the fact the conditions for insurgency remain. Peru has been the battleground for a bloody and violent internal revolution for the past two decades. With Peru's history of military dominance and coup d' etat, widespread poverty, and an ethnically divided population, a breeding ground was ripe for revolution. One revolutionary movement has continuously fought the ruling democratic governments in Lima since 1980. The Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui - Communist Party of Peru in the Shining Path of Mariategui is a rural-based guerrilla movement seeking to overthrow the ruling government in Lima. The United States Department of State has classified the Sendero as the most violent, vindictive, and elusive terrorist organization in the Western Hemisphere."
Army War College (U.S.)
Vevon, Gerald N., Jr
1998-02-24
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Evaluating the Need of a Specialized Disaster Preparedness Plan for Bonita Fire Department: Executive Analysis of Fire Services Operations in Emergency Management
The Bonita Fire Department has never had a disaster preparedness plan specifically unique for the community it serves. The County of San Diego has a disaster preparedness plan for 3 million plus residents, and Bonita Fire Department had adopted this as its disaster preparedness plan. The problem to be researched was to evaluate if the current disaster plan overlooked any potential risks unique for the community of Bonita. The purpose of this project was to provide a unique disaster preparedness manual specifically for Bonita Fire Department after comparing the existing emergency disaster plan of Bonita with other emergency service organizations. The evaluative research method was used for this applied research project and the questions answered were: 1.) What potential disaster risks should be assessed and planned for in the jurisdiction covered by Bonita Fire Department? 2.) Does the present disaster preparedness plan for Bonita Fire Department overlook any anticipated needs recommended by Standard 1600 Disaster Management, from the National Fire Protection Association? 3.) Should Bonita Fire Department have a specialized, unique-for-the-community, disaster preparedness plan? 4. Should the community of Bonita have citizens trained for disasters to assist Bonita Fire Department and what programs are available for citizen disaster training? Risk assessment evaluations were made for Bonita, disaster potentials identified, and based on the probability of occurrence, several risks were identified. The County of San Diego Preparedness plan was studied, researched, and compared with disaster manuals received from other agencies with similar risks. Most of these manuals thoroughly addressed potential disaster risks and included those that Bonita Fire Department could encounter. Nevertheless, when reviewed and compared to others, the disaster preparedness manual used by Bonita Fire Department was far superior in the 4 areas recommended by NFPA 1600.
National Fire Academy
French, Bob
1998-02-24
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Executive Order 13075: Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents
Executive Order 13075 establishes and outlines the functions for a Special Oversight Board for Department of Defense Investigations of Gulf War Chemical and Biological Incidents to provide advice and recommendations based on its review of Department of Defense investigations into possible detections of, and exposures to, chemical or biological weapons
agents and environmental and other factors that may have contributed to
Gulf War illnesses.
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
1998-02-19
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Joint Counterdrug Operations
"This publication is designed to consolidate some of the existing information on counterdrug (CD) operations, but it is not intended as an all encompassing, single-source CD document. Other publications provide information for implementing the guidance provided in this publication in the areas of detailed planning, organizing, and employing forces for Department of Defense CD operations. References to these publications are made throughout this document. This document provides general background on joint counterdrug operations; discusses the general threat; covers counterdrug organizations; focuses on Department of Defense (DoD) counterdrug operations; covers planning counterdrug operations; and discusses the execution of counterdrug operations."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1998-02-17
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Applicability of 18 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 to Limited Partnership Interests in Government Leases Under Proposed Transaction: Memorandum for the General Counsel, General Services Administration [February 17, 1998]
"This memorandum responds to your request for our opinion on the applicability of 18 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994) to the interests of two Members of Congress in contracts involving government leases under a proposed transaction. Those provisions generally prohibit Members of Congress from entering into or holding contracts with federal agencies and render such contracts void. Specifically, you have asked: (1) whether the interests of the Members under the proposed transaction fall within the scope of 18 U.S.C. §§ 431 and 432; (2) whether the 'incorporated company' exception of 18 U.S.C. § 433 is applicable; and (3) whether any or all of four alternatives to the proposed transactions would violate §§ 431 and 432. We conclude: (1) that the interests of the Members under the proposed transaction would fall within the prohibition of § 431; (2) that the 'incorporated company' exception does not apply; and (3) that one of the alternatives would not violate § 431."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1998-02-17
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Iraqi Chemical & Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities [February 17, 1998]
The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) has destroyed large amounts
of CB weapons and materials in Iraq since 1991. UNSCOM has reported no firm
evidence that Iraq still retains weapons or materiel, but the Iraqi government has not
provided adequate evidence to support its claim all its CBW arsenal has been destroyed,
nor has it accounted for CBW production materials known to have been in its
possession. These factors, coupled with Iraqi obstruction of UNSCOM inspections has
led to strong suspicions. U.S. and British intelligence agencies believe that Iraq still
may possess tons of chemical warfare agents and the necessary materials to produce
thousands of liters of biological agents. In addition, UNSCOM and U.S. intelligence
believe Iraq may still have hidden from 2-10 warheads designed to deliver chemical or
biological agents. UNSCOM and U.S. intelligence differ in their estimates of the
number of missiles that may still be in Iraq. The Iraqi chemical warfare arsenal has
included nerve agents (Sarin and VX), blister agents ("mustard gas"), and psychoactive
agents (so-called Agent 15). Biological/toxin warfare agents produced by Iraq include
anthrax, botulinum, aflotoxins, ebola virus, bubonic and pneumonic plague, ricin, and
clostrdium perfringens. Reconstitution of militarily significant production capability
using materials unaccounted for to UNSCOM could take only a matter of weeks.
During the week of February 23, the Senate is scheduled to consider S.Con.Res. 71,
calling on the President to take all necessary and appropriate actions in response to the
threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its lethal weapons program.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowman, Steve
1998-02-17
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Environmental Engagement: Using the Physical Environment to Shape the Strategic Environment
From the thesis abstract: "In today's international arena, the U.S. cannot be content to let environmental factors take their own course and then react to the costly crises. The U.S. should actively shape the strategic environment, advancing U.S. national interests, through a coordinated interagency strategy of diplomatic and military environmental engagement. The linkage between environmental factors and security is now codified as a tenant of United States security policy. Often this linkage is a complex interaction with other political, economic, social and cultural factors which contribute to instability and conflict. Environmental factors will dominate in the complex national security calculus of the next century. A holistic military and diplomatic shaping strategy is required to reduce the threat of environment induced conflict and exploit opportunities for improved regional stability based on environmental cooperation. This shaping strategy must be the product of synergistic interagency planning, coordination and execution. The interagency community has made significant progress in initiating this process. However, if these initial efforts are to have a significant impact in advancing U.S. national security interests additional steps must be taken. This study provides specific recommendations for implementation by the National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community."
Army War College (U.S.)
Slockbower, Robert E.
1998-02-15
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Emergence of Iranian Sea Power
This paper examines the intent of Iran's sea power strategy, and finds that it is a definitive component of a coherent national security strategy of strategic deterrence designed to protect its strategic center of gravity--its oil. Furthermore, as the operative component of its national security strategy, Iran's national military strategy focuses on deterrent regime of weapons of mass destruction, and a credible deterrent sea denial capability to threaten the Gulf shipping. Iran's sea denial capability stems from the six components of its sea power force structure: submarines, mines, coastal-based antiship cruise missiles, missile armed corvettes, naval special warfare forces and maritime strike Air Force. While not in its interest to actually carry out, Iran's potential threat to Gulf shipping is the source of its freedom to maneuver. Iran's sea power strategy has contributed to its reemergence as the dominant power in the Gulf and the reassertion of its perceived role as a Pan-Islamic leader in the region. Of significance, Iran conceives the United States policy of "dual containment" as a major threat.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Laquinta, Philip G.
1998-02-13
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Role of the Plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence (POMI) officer on the Component and Unified-level Staff
Unprecedented threats in global disease endemicity, frightening advancements in weapons technology, and the horrific specter of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can and will have an enormous impact on the health and welfare of the American Military without proper intelligence and planning considerations. The plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence (POMI) Officer provides the theater-level commander with vital information on the health service support (HSS) requirements, based on theater medical intelligence estimates and an assessment of the potential public health impact on the conduct of operations, in that commander's area of responsibility (AOR). This paper will focus on the roles and functions of the Plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence Officer, and will assess the importance of this function on major theater staffs.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Marghella, Pietro D.
1998-02-13
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U.S. Military Role in Countering the Biological and Chemical Warfare Threat: Attacking the Enemy's Will
One of the greatest challenges facing the U.S. military today in the post-Cold War Era is countering the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons (BCW). These weapons of mass destruction (WMD) not only pose a significant threat to our military forces but to global security as well. Known adversaries of the United States currently possess such weapons and will most likely employ them in future conflicts based on the perceived attractiveness associated with BCW. The U.S. military can and must play an active role in deterring the proliferation and potential employment of these horrific weapons. Attacking the adversary's will to possess or employ them is the singular, long lasting solution to a growing global crisis. The U.S. military's principal means of attacking this will is to negate the attractiveness of obtaining or already possessing a biological and chemical warfare capability. This can and must be accomplished in order to ensure global security and the protection of our forces today and into the future. Focusing our efforts otherwise is a recipe for disaster.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Kraft, James E., Jr
1998-02-13
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Impact of the JFACC and AADC on the Joint Force Commander's Flexibility in Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
As a growing area of warfare, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense (JTAMD) presents an environment that challenges the U.S. military to achieve unprecedented levels of force integration. As the ballistic and cruise missile threat continues to expand and include weapons of mass destruction, the Joint Force Commander must employ a force package capable of succeeding in any theater, regardless of its maturity level. Joint doctrine, and the roles and missions of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC), play an integral part in his ability to execute JTAMD effectively and efficiently. The JFACC and AADC currently inhibit force effectiveness through disparities and overlap of missions, as well as frequent dual and triple hatting functional and service component commands. Resultant problems include inappropriate apportionment of resources, lack of focus on the objective, and inadequate staffing at the functional component command. All of these problems degrade force integration and reduce both effectiveness and efficiency. Solving these problems, primarily through more specific joint doctrine that provides distinct roles for the JFACC and AADC, will produce defense in depth, unity of effort and economy of force.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Williams, Charles F.
1998-02-13
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Terrorist Threat To United States Military Bases - Are We On The Verge Of Another Pearl Harbor?
Each year the list of terrorist activities worldwide grows at a frightening rate. Not only are these terrorist acts occurring in countries which have traditionally been plagued by such activity, but they have begun filtering into our own borders. Although the number of terrorist attacks has actually declined slightly in recent years, the number of deaths and injuries has steadily increased. This is largely due to the increased severity of terrorist attacks. The United States military is certainly not immune to these cowardly acts. The Beirut Bombing and khobar Towers Bombing, two well-known terrorist attacks on U.S. forces, have claimed the lives of hundreds of our military men and women. Even with these events etched into our collective memory, we continue to believe that terrorist acts are not likely to happen on our military bases stateside. This unhealthy lack of concern over a real terrorist threat creates a weakness in security that could be exploited by international as well as domestic terrorists. This paper seeks to raise the level of consciousness among all military and civilian personnel who serve and work on bases within our nation's borders. It also offers recommendations to be incorporated into the Department of Defense structure to ensure that not only personnel awareness of the terrorist threat is increased but that our capabilities to combat terrorism is developed to a higher level of security.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Carter, John F.
1998-02-13
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Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: Considerations for the Commander
The information age, and an accompanying revolution in military affairs, has the potential to provide U.S. forces with dominant battlespace knowledge resulting from information superiority. While the benefits to the commander would be significant, the development of relative superiority in situational awareness will not go unnoticed by the enemy. While it may provide advantageous deterrent and coercive capabilities, dominant battlespace knowledge will not necessarily prevent hostilities. Commanders should expect the enemy to pursue asymmetric strategies including insurgencies, terrorism, and the use of weapons of mass destruction to overcome the technological advantage of the United States. At the same time the enemy may introduce technology into his own forces to improve his situation awareness and precision engagement capabilities. The end result of technological advances of both sides may be increased weapons lethality, and increased involvement in prolonged conflicts and military operations other than war. Dominant battlespace knowledge will also create challenges to conventional military leadership. The goal of dominant battlespace knowledge is to lift the fog of war. While the commander's understanding of the battle situation may improve, the existence of dominant battlespace knowledge will create new and complex challenges.
Naval War College (U.S.)
McMurry, Robert D.
1998-02-13
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Applying Operational Art to Asymmetrical Threats Within United States
The United States position of military dominance has continually evolved since World War 2. While many factors are responsible for this elite status, perhaps the most important is the careful consideration given to jointness and operational effectiveness. Given the Unites States' seemingly overwhelming conventional military strength relative to foreseeable potential adversaries, it is likely that future foes will attempt to attack the United States in a more indirect manner by using asymmetrical warfare. Asymmetrical warfare focuses on defeating the superior with the inferior. Examples include terrorism, informational warfare, and the use of chemical, biological and nuclear (CBR) weapons. Potential asymmetrical attacks to the continental United States pose substantial challenges to the current operational structure from which so much of our military strength is derived. Examined are the elements that effect our preparedness in responding to a domestic asymmetrical attack: The complexities asymmetrical threats present in operational planning; unified command structuring; interagency coordination; and legal jurisdiction. A hypothetical scenario employing Red China's current asymmetrical warfare capabilities is depicted to reinforce the pertinence of the topic. This paper examines the current operational system, issues that inhibit the operational process and offers for consideration areas of potential improvement.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Sweet, Jon M.
1998-02-13
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Critical Factors Analysis Applied to the Drug War
"In 1997 we have entered into a renewed commitment to the war on drugs, and seek to develop relevant, effective course of action to implement the National Drug Control Strategy (1997). Critical Factors Analysis--deriving courses of actions by examining the critical strengths, critical weaknesses, critical vulnerabilities, and center(s) of gravity of a potential enemy--is a highly valuable analytical tool that has applicability in planning actions for the war on drugs. The enemy in the drug war is the illegal drug industry, which by its nature as an industry has the typical functions for a transnational industry, except for its illegality. Courses of action in the drug war should be designed to defeat this enemy's center(s) of gravity by exploiting its critical vulnerabilities. After examining all primary functions', of the illegal drug industry, there are several critical vulnerabilities: illicit crops, specific precursor chemicals, demand at the street dealing level, and money laundering at the point just before cash loads enter the legitimate banking system. Centers of gravity are the drugs profitability as a product, the productive capacity of drug producers, and accumulated wealth to recapitalize any temporary setbacks. Courses of action derived from this analysis support the National Drug Control Strategy, while giving added relevancy because they are designed to ultimately defeat the adversary, the illegal drug industry, by employing this operational art concept of critical factors analysis."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Gabrielsen, Karl J.
1998-02-13
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Double Edged Sword: Information Superiority or Information Vulnerability of 'Joint Vision 2010'
"'Joint Vision 2010' emphasizes the criticality of achieving Information Superiority in future military operations. With the global explosion of 'Information Age' technology, the
United States seeks a strategic and operational advantage through information while simultaneously denying an enemy any advantage. With no peer competitor to challenge the United States, adversarial nations may attempt to leverage the low cost, compared to high advantage, that information warfare has to offer. As the United States becomes increasingly reliant on the rapid flow of information, will the underlying infrastructure and deterrence effort provide sufficient security to ward off potentially devastating information warfare attacks? Operational Risk Management (ORM) is a methodology to identify hazard severity and probability from which to draw reasonable measures to reduce risk. (ORM) techniques can be adopted to assess information warfare (defense) hazards and assist in developing controls to minimize risks. Recommendations highlight the importance of educating personnel in information warfare, incorporating information warfare (defense) in war games, studying information infrastructure issues and applying ORM principles to reduce vulnerabilities."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Tanner, Nancy L.
1998-02-13
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Report of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure Measures of Progress Workshop
"This workshop was convened by the FGDC to consider the question "How do we know how we are doing at building the NSDI?" Participants represented diverse perspectives on GIS and NSDI. The NSDI was understood as a broad-based effort to improve data sharing and use. The purpose of NSDI is to get usable geospatial data into the hands of citizens and decision makers. Participants in the engaging, productive workshop clarified the benefits of using GIS and NSDI and examined critical issues relevant to measurement, promotion, and spread of NSDI. Based on their own experience, they identified the indicators of success implicit in actual data-sharing practice. They then developed those indicators into drafts of three approaches to measuring progress in building the NSDI."
United States. Federal Geographic Data Committee
1998-02-13
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Joint Vision 2010: Can We Get There From Here?
As one of the principal means of delivering equipment and logistics in support of the current national military strategy of the United States, sealift impacts the ability to conduct sustained operations and may influence the outcome of the operation being conducted. To the extent that sealift limits deployment of forces or logistics support, geographic combatant (CINCs) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) are constrained in the strategic, operational and tactical options that they might choose and the forces they can employ. The flexible, assured sealift support initiatives proposed by Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) are intended to permit regional CINC's and JFCs to expand the strategic, operational, and tactical options available. Where will the sealift of the future come from? Can we look to JV 2010 for answers? The size of the U.S. Merchant Fleet - vessels and mariners - is at an all time low and getting smaller. Our reliance on the commercial shipping industry and foreign commercial shipping for our sealift needs is becoming more and more prevalent. We have learned many lessons from the Gulf War... or have we? The Maritime Security Program and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, which propose reliable and secure U.S.-flag commercial sealift, will support JV 2010. Despite their best efforts, the regional CINC has the potential to find himself at the mercy of the accepted commercial practices of the shipping industry, and subjected to the risks associated with the reliance upon foreign commercial shipping. If the operational commander is to successfully develop and execute contingency plans utilizing the best available options for the situation, he must fully understand the limitations and impact that reliance on these sealift assets may have on the mission and then act accordingly.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Graves, Roy D.
1998-02-13
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Full-Dimensional Protection: Safety Begins at Home
Full-Dimensional protection is designed to ensure the safety and security of our armed forces, and to assure that they retain freedom of action across the entire range of military operations. Extending beyond the traditional idea of force protection, full-dimensional protection must be applied within the borders of the continental United States. The increasing likelihood of an asymmetric attack direct against our armed forces, within our own borders requires careful examination. Failure to adequately assess and counter these threats will result in a military that is unprepared for the war of the 21st century.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Stanton, Patrick W.
1998-02-13
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Nonlethal Weapons: Impact and Utility Concerns for Operational Commanders in Future Conflicts
"The role of today's military in future conflict is far from certain. Rapid changes and instability in the world's political arena may thrust our military into a wide spectrum of conflicts at a moments notice. In order to meet this ever-present challenge, the United States military must constantly be prepared for any crisis. From peace operations to war, the U.S. armed forces represent the instrument of power that must never lose. The coalition military success in The Gulf War set the standard for future conflicts. The media portrayed a high-tech military capable of decisively defeating an able opponent in record time with few casualties. Unfortunately, the next conflict may not be so accommodating and the carnage of war could once again return to American living rooms. One avenue to avoid this, to attempt victory without fighting, is nonlethal weapons. The role of nonlethal weapons in future conflicts is likely to increase on a continuous basis. Political and moral benefits, limited destruction, and the American public desire to avoid war casualties, will force increased development and employment of weapons that avoid killing. These weapons will offer the operational commander-in-chief(CINC) additional flexibility, thereby enhancing military effectiveness, in both war and operationS other than war. The ultimate goal is to achieve victory, impose our will, or maintain the peace with as few American casualties as possible. Nonlethal weapons cannot, however, be considered a panacea to cure the destruction caused by war. Many problems exist in the international community concerning their use. Current laws and treaties, possible negative impact on operational effectiveness, and ethical issues prohibit the employment of many non-lethal weapons. Additionally, some so-called non-lethal weapons may still result in death or permanent disability to their victims if used indiscriminately or incorrectly."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Garland, Kyle E.
1998-02-13
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Joint Vision 2010: A Unilateral Vision for a Multilateral Future
"Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) is the operational template guiding the services toward achieving new joint force capabilities. These capabilities, applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict, are based on four new operational concepts that are enabled by technology and information superiority. Applying JV 2010 across the entire spectrum of conflict without understanding the fundamental differences between war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) assumes risk. MOOTW will continue to be prevalent, and its' fundamental nature precludes relying on information superiority and the four new concepts as touchstones for future conflict. An appreciation of asymmetrical threats exists in current joint doctrine but is not translated to the JV 2010 operational blueprint. The time is now to accurately reflect future U.S. capabilities to the National Command Authority (NCA). JV 2010 should be the operational linchpin connecting the strategic decision-makers with the proper application of military force into a challenging and demanding future. Effective strategy cannot be developed based on inaccurate operational capabilities. Assuming JV 2010 is applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict is the first step in a flawed process."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Stiles, Craig J.
1998-02-13
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Caspian Sea Region: A Look at Future U.S. and Allied Military Missions
"The Caspian Sea is rapidly becoming a region of increased attention to both U.S. civilian and military policymakers and planners. The region's large amounts of oil and gas reserves will allow the U.S. and its allies to diversify their sources of oil imports, and therefore, reduce the dependence on Middle Eastern oil. However, the Caspian is an inland sea and the export of the resources to markets is of critical concern. The pipelines, required to transport the oil and gas, will need to traverse a region complete with internal and external ethnic animosities, border disputes, and regional powers competing with each other for influence and control over the Caspian and its resources. Given this background, the U.S. and its allies may have to conduct military operations to secure their investments of capital and influence in the region as well as to resolve or prevent disputes among the Caspian nations and the other regional powers as the Caspian oil reaches full production in the next 10 to 15 years. The missions of peace operations, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and others possibly await U.S. and NATO forces in the twenty-first century."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Chicky, Jon E.
1998-02-13
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Impact of Military-Media Relations on the Operational Commander
"Technological advances have greatly improved reporting from the scene of battle and conflict, and therefore have radically increased the media's potential to influence and impact the outcome of future military operations. The overriding issues of contention between the military and the media revolve around three critical factors: access, censorship, and timely reporting from the field. Operational commanders' foremost concerns center on operational security, mission accomplishment and troop safety. Their two disparate yet complementary objectives must be reconciled. Military commanders control sanctioned access to the military area of operations; the situation is thus rife with potential for conflict between the two. Various methods of information control have been employed through history. Censorship, ground rules, denial of access and media pools (the most widely used) each has its pros and cons. The unique attributes of military operations other than war have further complicated the issue for operational commanders. Information provided by the mass media can be a force multiplier for the astute commander; he must adopt a proactive approach toward media relations in order to realize the media's potential for improving his chances for mission accomplishment. His approach must include personal involvement, organizational reform and force-wide education and training as he seeks to balance the legitimate and worthy objectives of both the military operation and the media covering the story."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Gradel, Robert S.
1998-02-13
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Truth and Deceit: Media Relations and Military Deception
"The Joint Force Commander (JFC) can conduct, 'good faith' media relations in operations that involve operational deception by directing early coordination between Command and Control Warfare (C2W) and the Public Affairs Officer (PAO). PAOs must ensure that the legitimate professional interests of news media are addressed as well as the operational needs of the JFC in operational planning. To plan for future operations, military leaders must understand evolving DOD policy on media relations, recognize the changing role of PAOs, and update joint doctrine to provide guidance on PAO/C2W coordination."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Ross, Robert Todd
1998-02-13
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Operation Peace for Galilee: An Operational Analysis with Relevance Today
"The uncertain nature of future threats to U.S. forces presents interesting challenges to military planners. As the emphasis on the littoral environment and urban warfare continues, valuable lessons can be learned from Israel's swift and successful drive into Lebanon in 1982. Operation Peace for Galilee was epitomized by expert planning and operational excellence, as the IDF achieved its stated aim of establishing a PLO-free 40 kilometer buffer zone north of its border within 40 hours. Yet, as defense minister Ariel Sharon manipulated its conduct, the operation grew beyond the scope of IDF capabilities. By incorrectly identifying the PLO center of gravity as its military 'fighters', the Israelis expanded their aims and found themselves in a two month siege of Beirut that resulted in mounting casualties and rising domestic dissatisfaction. The IDF was caught unprepared for urban warfare. Its heavy armor forces were more suited to the desert terrain of its previous wars, rather than the mountainous and urban terrain of Lebanon, which favored the defender. A planned 72 hour operation lasted 3 months and resulted in a 3 year occupation of Lebanon. While full of operational excellence at its outset, the operation protracted and ended in strategic failure and erosion of domestic support, resulting in the resignations of both the president and defense minister."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Thomas, Wilbert E.
1998-02-13
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Theater Missile Defense: Does the Quadrennial Defense Review Go Far Enough in Support of the Operational Commander?
"In May of 1997, the Secretary of Defense released the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) establishing the Department of Defense's force structure and modernization program requirements designed to meet the challenges of the 21st century while ensuring current readiness. Included in this report were the continuation of numerous programs designed to provide a theater missile defense (TMD) system. The Gulf War demonstrated the difficulties of preventing and defending against the use of ballistic missiles launched at U.S. and allied deployed forces. Further, the continued proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the associated delivery technologies are an increasing threat to deployed operations. These threats could effectively deter U.S. foreign policy and out of area operations in regions considered vital to national security. This paper will examine the approach of the QDR with respect to TMD programs, and ask the question, does the QDR go far enough in support of the Operational Commander? Specific recommendations are offered to demonstrate how the QDR could have more fully committed to TMD, countering the threat of WMD in regional conflicts."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Baker, Charles E., III
1998-02-13
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Ultimate Brinkmanship: Iraq's Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction to Raise the Stakes
"This paper discusses the ability of regional powers, such as Iraq, to challenge the United States militarily within their specific region using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It looks at the U.S.'s readiness to counter proliferation of these weapons and our adversaries desire to have them to tip the balance of influence with the threat of use or actual use of WMD. This paper also looks at the reasons for the potential use by regional powers due to the erosion of traditional restraints in the international community."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Self, Jackson D.
1998-02-12
