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Engineering and Design -- Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Agents
This report provides information and guidance for the design of collective protection (CP) systems. Collective protection provides a toxic-be area (TFA) where personnel can function without individual protective equipment such as a mask and protective garments.
United States. Army. Corps of Engineers
1999-02-24
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Joint Publication 3-15: Joint Doctrine for Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare, 24 February 1999
"This publication provides barrier, obstacle, and mine warfare guidelines for the planning and execution of theater strategy, campaigns, and joint operations across the range of military operations. It focuses on national policy, international law, and operational and logistic considerations peculiar to the preparation and conduct of joint military operations involving barriers, obstacles, and mine warfare. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service […]."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1999-02-24
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Drug Control: Update on U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate
"I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the counternarcotics efforts of the United States and Mexico. My statement today will highlight the findings from our ongoing effort to update our June 1998 report, as requested by Senator Grassley and Congressman Hastert. I will discuss two broad issues: Mexico's efforts in addressing the drug threat and the status of U.S. counternarcotics assistance provided to Mexico. At last year's hearing on U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts, I stated that Mexico was the principal transit country for cocaine entering the United States. That has not changed. Mexico is one of the largest centers for narcotics-related business in the world. It is either a producer, refiner, or transit point for cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin, and is a major hub for the recycling of drug proceeds. U.S. law enforcement officials have told us that the Juarez drug trafficking organization is as powerful and dangerous as the Medellin and Cali cartels used to be. The porous 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border and the daunting volume of legitimate cross-border traffic-86 million cars and 4 million trucks and railcars entered the United States from Mexico in 1998-provide near limitless opportunities for the smuggling of illicit drugs and the proceeds from the sale of these drugs. The United States and Mexico face a formidable challenge in combating illicit drug-trafficking. Last year I testified that, with U.S. assistance, Mexico had taken steps to improve its capability to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. I also said that it was too early to determine the impact of these actions and that challenges to their full implementation remained. While some high-profile law enforcement actions were taken in 1998, major challenges remain."
United States. General Accounting Office
Nelson, Benjamin F.
1999-02-24
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Investigation Report: Refinery Fire Incident, Martinez, CA, February 23, 1999
"This investigation report examines the refinery fire incident that occurred on February 23, 1999, in the crude unit at the Tosco Corporation Avon refinery in Martinez, California. Four workers were killed, and one was critically injured. This report identifies the root and contributing causes of the incident and makes recommendations for control of hazardous non-routine maintenance, management oversight and accountability, management of change, and corrosion control." Key issues discussed include: control of hazardous non-routine maintenance, management oversight and accountability, management of change, and corrosion control.
United States. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
1999-02-23
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Serial No. 106-10: Oversight Hearing on Mining, the American Economy and National Security -- The Role of Public Lands in Maintaining a National Asset: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources of the Committee on Resources, U.S. House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress First Session, February 23, 1999
On February 23, 1999, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources of the Committee on Resources convenes to discuss and hear testimony regarding Oversight Hearing on Mining, the American Economy and National Security -- "the Role of Public Lands in Maintaining a National Asset". Testifying are Dr. Donald Brobst of the Society for Economic Geologists, Stephen d'Esposito of the Mineral Policy Center, Richard Lawsom of the National Mining Association, Michael McKinley of the US Geological Survey, Dr. David Menzie of the US Geological Survey, and Douglas Silver of Balfour Holdings, Inc. Additional material is supplied by John Dobra, Ph.D. of the Natural Resource Industry Institute, Leo Drozdoff of the Division of Environmental Protection, Michael Evans of Evans Group, Russell King of Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc., John Lutley of the Gold Institute, and George Milling-Stanley of the World Gold Council. Chairwoman Barbara Cubin explains that "today's hearing will address concerns the Subcommittee has regarding the domestic hardrock mining industry and the role of public lands in providing an exploration base for the discovery of new metal mines to replace dwindling reserves." She also complains that "the Clinton Administration's budget request includes provisions which, if enacted, would only harm, not help, our domestic miners in the fight to stay competitive globally." Ranking minority member Robert Underwood submits that "So it is of concern to learn, as those new to this issue do, that the individuals and corporations producing hard rock minerals located on and extracted from public lands do not pay a production fee or royalty to the United States."
United States. Government Printing Office
1999-02-23
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Year 2000 Issues Within the U.S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility - Hawaii Information Transfer System
"This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor DoD efforts to address the year 2000 computing challenge. The overall objective of this audit was to evaluate whether DoD adequately planned for and managed year 2000 risks to avoid disruptions to the U.S. Pacific Command mission. Specifically, the IG reviewed year 2000 risk assessments, contingency plans for mission critical systems, and continuity of operations plans to perform core mission requirements. The review included major DoD communications systems operating within the U.S. Pacific Command's area of responsibility. The Hawaii Information Transfer System (HITS) program managers, the Defense information System Agency, and the Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station-Pacific recognized the need for contract clauses and procedures to ensure Y2K compliance for the HITS program. The HITS contractor was required to ensure that all hardware and software assets were Y2K compliant and the contract specified that there could be no additional charges to the government for Y2K upgrades. Further, the implementation of HITS Y2K upgrades to existing systems was on schedule."
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General
1999-02-22
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Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOE's Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia's Unemployed Weapons Scientists
The risk that unemployed weapons scientists in the former Soviet Union will sell sensitive information to countries or terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction poses a national security threat to the United States. To reduce this threat, the Initiatives for Proliferation Program was established in 1994 to engage scientists in the former Soviet Union in peaceful commercial activities. In late 1998, the administrative launched a new complementary program -- the Nuclear Cities Initiative -- to create jobs for displaced weapons scientists in the 10 cities that form the core of Russia's nuclear weapons complex. This report reviews (1) the costs to implement the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program for fiscal years 1994-98, including the amount of money received by weapons scientists and institutes; (2) the extent to which the program's projects are meeting their nonproliferation and commercialization objectives; and (3) the Department of Energy's Nuclear Cities Initiative.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-02-19
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Afghanistan: Taliban Seem to Have Less Funds and Supplies This Year, But the Problem Does Not Appear to be that Acute, February 17, 1999
"Suffering under sanctions imposed in response to nuclear weapons testing in May 1998, Pakistan has reduced aid to the Taliban, although sources indicate Pakistan 'continued to write a check worth a million or so dollars every couple of months.' This decrease in support is not a political move by Pakistan, but appears to be a purely budgetary decision. Unlike certain other documents on Pakistan aid to the Taliban, this cable reports that there is little evidence of direct military aid from Pakistan to the Taliban, as Pakistan only admits to sending flour and fuel."
United States. Department of State
1999-02-17
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Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Preparation for Year 2000
"This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor DoD efforts in addressing the year 2000 computing problem...The overall audit objective determined whether the Project Manager for Chemical Stockpile Disposal at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility was adequately preparing information technology systems to resolve date-processing issues regarding the year 2000 computing problem. Specifically, the audit determined whether the Project Manager at the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility compiled with the DoD Year 2000 Management Plan."
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General
1999-02-16
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Joint Publication 3-07.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations, 12 February 1999
"This publication provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the planning and execution of peace operations. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
1999-02-12
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MSC Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Policy and Procedures
"The purpose of this notice is to establish Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) policy, procedures and responsibilities for complying with DoD Force Protection directives and instructions within Military Sealift Command (MSC). This notice applies to all USNS, RRF and chartered (6 months minimum) ships under the control of MSC. Reference (a) is the DoD standard for Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence. Reference (b) is the Secretary of the Navy/DoD instruction for AT/FP Program Standards. Reference (c) is the DoD Foreign Clearance Guide. Reference (d) is guidance on reporting AT/FP monthly status. Reference (e) is the Deputy Secretary of Defense interim policy for DoD contractors. Reference (f) is OPNAV instruction of Operation Risk Management (ORM). A large number of responsibilities are clarified for various positions. Also included is a MSC deployment checkoff list."
United States. Department of the Navy
1999-02-12
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Attorney's Fees for Legal Service Performed Prior to Federal Employment, Memorandum for the Director, Departmental Ethics Office [February 11, 1999]
"18 U.S.C. § 205 prohibits a Civil Division attorney from receiving attorney's fees for work in a case against the United States performed prior to federal employment when the right to payment depends on a finding of liability and award against the United States that takes place after the attorney's entry into federal employment."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1999-02-11
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Executive Order 13113: President's Information Technology Advisory Committee, Further Amendments to Executive Order 13035, as Amended
"By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (Public Law 102--194), as amended by the Next Generation Internet Research Act of 1998 (Public Law 105--305) ('Research Act'), and in order to extend the life of the President's Information Technology Advisory Committee so that it may carry out the additional responsibilities given to it by the Research Act, it is hereby ordered that Executive Order 13035, as amended ('Executive Order 13035'), is hereby further amended as follows:"
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
1999-02-10
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Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999
As directed by Congress, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. As stated, this report is submitted to Congress every six months.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1999-02-09
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Implementing Instruction for Information Operations (IO)
The purpose of this document is to "issue implementation guidance and organizational relationships for Information Operations (IO)". There are four references included in this release in addition to a list of IO Terminology. "Reference (a) issues new DoD policy on Information Warfare (IW) and directs each service to implement IW. Reference (b) issues Joint policy and acknowledges the importance of IO. It clarifies responsibilities for IO, chief among these are responsibilities for: joint coordination of IO evaluation and support; integration of IO into exercise and operation plans and orders; ensuring IO portions of plans are comprehensive. Reference (c) promulgates overall Navy policy concerning IO, assigns responsibilities within the Navy and directs implementation within its forces. Reference (d) establishes and promulgates the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANCOM) vision, strategies and objectives concerning IO."
United States. Department of the Navy
1999-02-08
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Cost Study Data Characterization Report
"This report assesses the data collected during the Land Mobile Radio Replacement Cost Study and reflects equipment and infrastructure trends in the responses of those who completed the cost survey. This study was completed in February 1999."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. SAFECOM
Booz, Allen & Hamilton
1999-02-08
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Military's Role in the Implementation of the National Security Policy on Counterdrugs
There are those throughout our country that say we are gaining positive headway toward the counterdrug effort and that our government should begin to focus its efforts elsewhere. Others take the alternative view; that drug abuse is still prevalent and is actually increasing. Those with this second opinion believe the federal government should do more to curb this nationwide problem that is effecting the well-being of our citizens. Specifically, advocates of this latter viewpoint believe the Department of Defense (DoD) could and should do more to keep our borders free from the flow of drugs into our nation. As the DoD continues to review and redefine the services' roles and missions, some ask that it commit more of its resources to the nations' counterdrug effort. Will the mission belong to the active component of each service, or to the National Guard or Reserve forces? Or, will there be a mixture of responsibility throughout the "Total Force?" This paper will provide a brief historical overview on the development of our nations' national counterdrug strategy, and review the basic components of that strategy through a discussion about the feasibility of its purported ends, ways, and means. The paper will then address the DoD involvement in the implementation of this strategy, and discuss alternatives and provide recommendations on how this author believes the military should structure itself to fight its piece of the nation's counterdrug effort.
Army War College (U.S.)
LaMar, Kevin T.
1999-02-08
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Space as an Area of Responsibility (AOR), Is it the Right Solution
United States Commander in Chief Space (USCINCSPACE) has advocated the need to designate space as an Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order for him to have the authority to fulfill his assigned responsibilities. However, upon examining the Unified Command Plan it becomes evident that designating space as an AOR provides USCINCSPACE no additional authority or ability to accomplish his assigned missions of space control, force protection, or conduct space operations. Designating space as an AOR would likely result in undesirable consequences. If space were designated an AOR it could be perceived by other countries as the U.S. intention of militarizing space, constituting a departure from decades old policy of using space for peaceful purposes. This action in turn could then instigate a space based weapons race or complicate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to space. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) can best ensure space control by non-space based weapons. Use of these types of weapons would ensure space protection and access for the U.S. and be capable of denying space access to enemies when needed, while avoiding the perception of militarizing space. To enhance USCINCSPACE's ability to meet his responsibilities, he needs the authority to better manage space personnel and space assets. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides an ideal model that USSPACECOM should implement to achieve this. If implemented, it would give USSPACECOM the unique authority to manage space orientated personnel careers. It would also give him the authority to execute his own budget, providing increased authority to shape space forces, insure interoperability and provide the best possible space support to the war fighters.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Cudnohufsky, Aaron L.
1999-02-05
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Real Cost of 'Engagement'
This paper analyzes the terrorist bombings in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996, and draws some universal lessons learned on how the Chain-of-command. Lessons learned include: (1) Tactical warning on where, when and how big a bomb was going strike was not available in either of the bombings. Given the complex nature of terrorist organizations a warning order this specific will most likely never be available; therefore, the chain- of-command must figure out how to protect their forces without it. (2) Particular attention must be paid to where forces are bedded-down initially. In both bombings United States forces were located in urban areas which are much more vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given the disruption to the mission and the cost of moving forces it is much wiser to place forces in more isolated locations that are less susceptible to standoff bombs even if the security environment at the time seems benign. (3) The chain-of-command must be ever vigilant if the security environment in their theatre declines because this is when their forces will be most vulnerable to terrorist attack. As the security situation declines, the chain-of-command must err on the side of asking for too much rather than too little. While it is the responsibility of the chain-of- command to ensure United States forces are protected while forward deployed, it simply is not possible to eliminate the terrorist threat. The military and civilian leadership in the United States must understand that its forward deployed forces will always face an asymmetric threats like terrorism and when these threats are acted upon, some will be successful, despite the best efforts of the chain-of-command.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Grosso, Gina M.
1999-02-05
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Shoring Up the Homeland Defense: The Joint Medical Task Force and Weapons of Mass Destruction
America is no longer safe within her borders. At any time, a determined group of foreign or domestic terrorists will target American citizens and institutions with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) composed primarily of lethal biological or chemical agents. Presently, many of our nation's military and civilian hospitals are not prepared to respond to WMD threats, as the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) is the only line of medical defense against these threats. A layered defensive strategy must be considered as a back-up capability to address gaps in the "WMD medical defense shield." This capability should be created from our armed forces' reserve medical personnel to form Joint Medical Task Forces (JMTF) to augment USPHS capabilities and to assist local community hospitals in the event of a WMD incident.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Feril, Benjamin G.
1999-02-05
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Emerging Infectious Diseases: Consensus on Needed Laboratory Capacity Could Strengthen Surveillance, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Public Health, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, U.S. Senate
The spread of infectious diseases is a public health problem once thought
to be largely under control. However, outbreaks over the last decade
illustrate that infectious diseases remain a serious public health threat. GAO recommends that the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lead an effort to help federal, state, and local public health officials create consensus on the core capabilities needed at each level of government.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-02-05
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Next Convoy War: The American Campaign Against Enemy Shipping in the Twenty-First Century
In the coming century, the United States may find herself at war with a determined and capable opponent. In this essay, the author predicts some of the attributes of the convoy war of the future. According to the author, a campaign against Orange commercial shipping will be a facet of the strategic warfare waged against this opponent. The Orange nation may attempt to protect her open-ocean trade routes by convoying her merchant vessels, but will find that American naval power in the age of Network Centric Warfare is too powerful to compete with outside the range of land-based support. The American forces will have great difficulty in shutting down the littoral trade routes, due partially to the limitations of weapons technology and partially to the shortage of delivery platforms capable of operation in the Orange denial area. Advanced weapons technology could help improve the success rate, as could a greater attention to offensive naval mining capability. To maximize the impact of the anti-shipping campaign, American forces should attack Orange ports directly. The Orange nation will respond to American successes by shifting her domestic transport mechanisms to air- or land-based vehicles where practical. This shifting will reduce the impact of the American anti-shipping efforts, unless the American forces also take steps to eliminate the alternate transport methods. If escalation concerns prevent strikes against the Orange homeland, the war against Orange domestic commerce may not be "winnable" at all.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Poyer, Jason M.
1999-02-05
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USAF Aerospace Expeditionary Force: Flying into the 21st Century
The DoD-wide drawdown over the last decade has eliminated or relocated two-thirds of forward-based USAF force structure back to the United States. During this time, however, the Air Force has been repeatedly called upon to respond to all levels of crises throughout the world. These sporadic, unpredictable, and demanding crises have taken a toll on Air Force personnel who have been overextended by the challenging OPTEMPO. To meet the needs of present and future military strategy and to provide personnel stability, the Air Force has developed the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF). The AEF is a force restructure providing tailorable, mobile, and responsive airpower to the combatant CINC within 48-72 hours. The AEF evolved from a small combat-oriented force package into a complete airpower package incorporating the full spectrum of combat and support assets. Two significant AEF shortfalls need to be remedied. Current Joint Chiefs of Staff Operational Plans (OPLANs) do not incorporate the AEF employment concepts, and AEF structure does not yet include strategic airlift or other "high demand, low density" assets. Failure to address these shortfalls could negate anticipated AEF benefits.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Reid, John R.
1999-02-05
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East Asia in Crisis: The Security Implications of the Collapse of Economic Institutions
"The financial crisis that began in Thailand in mid-1997 has now become a global one. It has consumed governments upset defense planning and the regional standing of major powers in Asia, and is forcing us to rethink Asia's entire past and future political trajectory. The security implications go beyond merely the crash of unsound financial systems. Governments have fallen across Asia and in Russia. Civil violence is currently taking place in Indonesia, a key Asian state. Defense research, development and procurement have been postponed in most Asian countries. The crisis and its reverberations have shaken financial markets and governments as far away as Brazil. In order to assess the dangers posed by this crisis to Asian and U.S. security interests, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) cosponsored a conference with the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Reserve Officers Association in Seattle, Washington on June 9- 10, 1998. This conference represented a unique opportunity to conduct such an assessment since it brought together participants from government the military, academia, international financial institutions, and Asia. This report presents a summary of the main points and ideas discussed at the conference."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Blank, Stephen, 1950-
1999-02-05
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Operational Design in Counterdrug Operations in the Caribbean: An Analysis
DoD is tasked to support the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDOP) by providing assets for Detection and Monitoring (D&M) operations worldwide. However, D&M efforts have been primarily focused on the Andean region and the Caribbean Basin. The services' force structure and interagency "turf battles" have always limited the scope of operations. Operational success has been elusive while military operating dollars, assets, and personnel bear the brunt of what is arguably a law enforcement action. New concepts of operations are being developed that should be analyzed from the operational art perspective to see if they flow from and can satisfy National Strategy. This Paper provides a summary of the origins of DoD involvement in the war on drugs and what the military's primary contribution is. From this background, the paper explores how counterdrug (CD) operational design builds on National-level guidance to combat the flow of drugs in the Transit and Source zones. The principal elements of operational design, discernible from open source literature, are analyzed with emphasis on maritime and air interdiction CD operations in the Transit Zone. The paper finishes by comparing the deduced operational scheme to the operational concept of Campaign STEEL WEB.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Ortiz-Marty, H. A.
1999-02-05
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Planning Factors for Non Lethal Weapons in Counter Narcotic Operations
The Coast Guard is investigating avenues to leverage technology to improve interdiction effectiveness. This is necessary since there is little likelihood for increased funding for additional interdiction resources to stem the flow of drugs via the maritime routes. One alternative, currently under development by the U.S. Marine Corps, is the deployment of non lethal weapons technology aboard Coast Guard helicopters and cutters to compel unwilling suspect vessels to stop. The introduction of non lethal weapons into the Coast Guard inventory will prompt the operational commander to plan for their use. The operational commander should become knowledgeable about non lethal weapons capabilities, limitations, and legal issues (including rules of engagement), will have to adjust operational command and control, and will probably redesign the task organization to improve effectiveness. This paper argues that using Non lethal weapons will safely improve interdiction rates by adding more alternatives for tactical units to stop vessels at sea without having to resort to deadly force.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Meese, W.R.
1999-02-05
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How Can Operational Maneuver be Used by the Naval or Joint Task Force Commander to Enhance Operational Protection in the Littoral
Operational maneuver provides operational protection to maritime forces when maneuver is used to expand the area, factor space, vulnerable to attack by the maritime force. Operational maneuver forces the enemy to respond to threats throughout its territory and littoral. The response will degrade the enemy's ability to concentrate forces against the maritime force. The enemy's ability to conduct and sustain offensive operations against the maritime force is reduced and the security of lines of operation and logistic sustainment is increased. This allows the maritime force to concentrate its forces against the enemy when conditions are favorable. The commander's ability to sustain the initiative and control the littoral provides the freedom of action to conduct follow on and support operations against the enemy. Through the utilization of maneuver and the resulting effects maneuver places on the enemy, operational protection is effectively provided to the maritime force.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Sullivan, Sean C.
1999-02-05
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Operational Effects of Mine Warfare
This paper demonstrates that naval mines are a threat to the operational commander and that there are actions one can take to reduce the operational effects of mine warfare. The first section demonstrates that mine warfare is a pertinent problem for the operational commander by examining three principle relationships. It examines the history of mine warfare from an operational perspective, warfare in the context of operational art and mine warfare in the context of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps service visions. The second part of the paper explores the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) concept of operations, the difficulties countering the mine problem with recommendations to minimize the operational effects and lastly, the future of mine warfare in the context of "Joint Vision 2010" and beyond. This paper shows that the operational commander can minimize the operational effects of mine warfare by preventing mining, maintaining surveillance, minimizing maneuver space requirements, requesting MCM forces early in crisis, using creative schemes of maneuver and exploiting the miner's resource and environmental limitations.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Morien, Steven B.
1999-02-05
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Precision Guided Munitions and The Asymmetric Threat
The Gulf War created the unrealistic expectation that precision guided munitions (PGMs) could win America's future wars. Since then U.S. civilian leaders have used them repeatedly while pursuing U.S. interests. Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) is the base document guiding U.S. military forces into the next century and its key concepts of precision engagement is focused on employing PGMs. JV 2010 envisions a high technology battlefield where PGMs will decisive. JV 2010 recognizes the emerging threat of "asymmetric warfare" but fails to see that this threat is not likely to be defeated with PGMs. PGMs are effective tactical weapons but using them to achieve strategic aims against asymmetric threats is failing. It is the responsibility of the operational commander to ensure the tactical weapons are part of an operational plan, not the whole plan. Additionally, a document as influential as JV 2010 is required to refocus military planning efforts for the 21st century.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Spratto, Timothy B.
1999-02-05
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Operational Fires on the Urban Battlefield: An Underdeveloped Concept
Now and into the future the U.S. military will be confronted in asymmetric warfare with adversaries who establish their power centers in urban terrain. Recent history has shown that U.S. forces can defeat adversaries on the conventional battlefield through overwhelming tactical and operational fires. Specifically, the employment of operational fires in conventional warfare has enabled the operational commander to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. However, when battles shift to urban terrain, the complexity of employing decisive operational fires goes up exponentially. The urban environment's characteristics of structured terrain and noncombatant inhabitants restrict the ability to employ lethal operational fires in the traditional fashion. As a result, Joint Doctrine generally views urban warfare as a tactical fight that should be tasked to the tactical commander to achieve operational objectives. The future operational commander needs a fully developed concept to employ operational fires. This study will examine the challenges facing the operational commander in the urban battle space. Furthermore, an analysis of the evolving Joint MOUT concept will identify the limited integration and considerations for operational fires. This study concludes with recommendations for integrating a full scale employment of operational fires into the conceptual framework of Joint MOUT.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Langley, Michael E.
1999-02-05
