Homeland Security Digital Library

SEARCH THE HSDL

Results 129391 - 129420 (of 140,647) sorted by relevance sort by date

Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).

Food Insecurity in a Low-Income, Predominantly African American Cohort Following the COVID-19 Pandemic

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Document: "The disease burden of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] has disproportionately fallen on racial/ ethnic minority groups and marginalized populations in the United States. Food insecurity--a lack of consistent access to enough food for an active, healthy life-- is a fundamental social determinant of health linked to poor nutrition, obesity, and chronic disease. Food insecurity is projected to grow across the United States and globally in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and is likely to exacerbate existing racial inequities, as African Americans experienced disproportionate rates of food insecurity even before the pandemic. Structural racism has been identified as an upstream determinant of these inequities as well as a critical determinant of population health. To date, no longitudinal investigations of which we are aware have assessed changes in food insecurity in response to COVID-19 in at-risk, low-income communities. We examined the impact of COVID-19 and shutdowns on food insecurity in a cohort of low-income, primarily African American residents of 2 food deserts (neighborhoods without access to healthy, fresh foods) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. We assessed longitudinal trends in food insecurity over 9 years, before and during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, in this sample relative to the US population."

American journal of public health (New York, N.Y. : 1971)

Dubowitz, Tamara; Ghosh-Dastidar, Bonnie; Troxel, Wendy M. . . .

2021-03
How an Outbreak Became a Pandemic: The Defining Moments of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Document: "This report is a companion to the main report, 'COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]: Make it the Last Pandemic,' of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response. It is an evidence-based narrative, providing in-depth analysis of 13 defining moments of the evolution and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic."

Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

2021-05?
International Health Law in Perspective

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Summary: "Any reset of the international system will require reform to existing international governance for pandemic preparedness and response. This includes adopting new international legal instruments and/or reforming existing international instruments. Reform using legal instruments is an opportunity to address gaps identified in the international response and clarify responsibilities between States and international organizations, establish and reinforce legal obligations and norms, and institute new governance structures (such as a global health security taskforce and mechanisms for financing, research and development, technology transfer, and capacity building). This background paper sets out the range of options available. However, a Framework Convention - Protocol approach has the potential to capitalize on political will and facilitate the necessary governance reforms. This can be done in coherence with the broader international legal system, including under, or separate to, the auspices of the World Health Organization and with, or without, reforms to existing global health law, such as the International Health Regulations (2005)."

Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

Phelan, Alexandra L.; Pillai, Priya

2021-05
World Health Organization: An Institutional Review

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Summary: "WHO [World Health Organization] 'is at the center of the international system' for prevention, preparedness, and response to a global health emergency. The work of WHO during the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has been at a substantively different scale and level compared to the initial time of the EVD [Ebola Virus Disease] outbreak in West Africa 2014. WHO's capacity and competence as it responds to one of the largest health crises in modern time is laudable. But there is always room for improvement and there are aspects of WHO's performance that render reflection and change. In analyzing WHO's performance, the Independent Panel considered what its leadership role entails, what kind of a coordinating mandate WHO should have, how operational the organization should be and what authority it holds to ensure transparency of information and decision-making. The analysis has been based in a series of interviews with experts within and outside WHO, roundtable discussion and literature reviews."

Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

2021-05
COVID-19: The Authoritative Chronology, December 2019-March 2020

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
This document provides a chronology of the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic, which includes key events along side national and international responses.

Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

2021-05
Management Report: Improvements Needed in FDIC's Internal Control Over Contract-Payment Review Processes

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Document: "On February 18, 2021, we issued our report on the results of our audits of the 2020 and 2019 financial statements of the two funds the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) administers: the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund (FRF). Our report states we identified deficiencies in FDIC's controls over contract-payment review processes. These deficiencies collectively represent a significant deficiency in FDIC's internal control over financial reporting that merits attention by those charged with FDIC governance. Although it did not affect our opinion on the 2020 financial statements of the DIF and the FRF, because of this significant deficiency, misstatements may have occurred in unaudited financial information FDIC reported internally and externally. The purpose of this report is to present the deficiencies we identified during our audit testing of FDIC's 2020 non-payroll operating expenses internal controls, and our recommendations related to these deficiencies. GAO [Government Accountability Office] had no prior recommendations to FDIC related to the financial statement audit or internal controls over financial reporting. This report is intended for FDIC management use."

United States. Government Accountability Office

Dalkin, James R.; Hansen, Michael D.; Galvan-Treviño, Lisa M. . . .

2021-05-13
Federal Highway Administration: Administrative Expenses Funded from the Highway Trust Fund

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Document: "In December 2015, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act authorized funds for fiscal years 2016 through 2020 from the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) for the administrative expenses of the Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). The FAST Act includes a provision for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to submit a report describing the FHWA administrative expenses funded from the HTF every 5 years following an initial report. Our initial report was issued in June 2016 and covered fiscal years 2013 through 2015. Our objectives were to describe (1) the types and amounts of administrative expenses funded by HTF for the FHWA programs and offices during the 5 most recent fiscal years (2016 through 2020); (2) the extent to which FHWA adequately designed tracking and monitoring internal controls over its administrative expenses as of September 30, 2020; and (3) the extent to which FHWA has the flexibility, under existing laws and regulations, to reallocate administrative monies funded from the HTF between general operating expenses and other functions. This report transmits briefing slides regarding the final results of our work in response to the provision in the FAST Act."

United States. Government Accountability Office

Towler, LaDonna; Bhojwani, Tulsi; Burrows, Troy . . .

2021-05-13
Pipeline Security Guidelines [Updated April 2021]

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Introduction: "The 2010 Pipeline Security Guidelines were developed with the assistance of industry and government members of the Pipeline Sector and Government Coordinating Councils, industry association representatives, and other interested parties. This document was soon revised resulting in the 2011 Pipeline Security Guidelines. The advancement of security practices to meet the ever changing threat environment in both the physical and cyber security realms required that the guidelines be updated again. Utilizing a similar industry and government collaborative approach, TSA developed this document, which supersedes the 2011 version of the Pipeline Security Guidelines. [...] These guidelines are applicable to operational natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission pipeline systems, natural gas distribution pipeline systems, and liquefied natural gas facility operators. Additionally, they apply to operational pipeline systems that transport materials categorized as toxic inhalation hazards (TIH). TIH materials are gases or liquids that are known or presumed on the basis of tests to be so toxic to humans as to pose a health hazard in the event of a release during transportation."

United States. Transportation Security Administration

2021-04
Senate Committee Print 116-56: The Cost of Trump's Foreign Policy: Damage and Consequences for U.S. And Global Security, October 21, 2020

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Executive Summary: "This report takes stock of the damage President Trump's foreign policy has inflicted on U.S. and global security, as well as the immediate and long-term consequences for the safety and security of the American people. It finds that the state of the United States in the world hangs in a tenuous balance. Our allies are weary and alienated; our own diplomats struggle to uphold the values we have promoted to the world for decades; and a U.S. president's eschewing of democracy has helped to fuel autocratic trends abroad. The report is based in large part on interviews and discussions with former U.S. and foreign government officials and foreign policy experts who shared their candid assessments about foreign policy under President Trump. For over a year, Committee Democratic staff conducted more than 80 interviews, including dozens of interviews with U.S. officials who served in the Trump administration. Committee staff sought a wide range of viewpoints and regional perspectives, speaking with officials and experts from nearly 20 countries."

United States. Government Publishing Office

2021
2020 Biennial National Strategy for Transportation Security, Report to Congress

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Executive Summary: "The 2020 National Strategy for Transportation Security addresses the security of 'transportation assets in the United States that… must be protected from attack or disruption by terrorist or other hostile forces….' The strategy presents a forward-looking, risk-based plan to provide for the security and freedom of movement of people and goods while preserving privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. It identifies objectives to enhance the security of transportation infrastructure, conveyances, workers, travelers, cargo, and operations. The strategy consists of a base plan and four security plans, including aviation, maritime, surface, and intermodal systems. The Surface strategies (National Strategy for Public Transportation Security [NSPTS] and the National Strategy for Railroad Transportation Security [NSRTS]) that were previously annexed to the 2018 NSTS are now incorporated into the Surface modal plans. Specifically, the NSPTS was merged into the mass transit and passenger rail modal plans, and the NSRTS was merged into the freight and passenger rail modal plans."

United States. Transportation Security Administration

2020-05-29
Update: COVID-19-Related Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Introduction: "The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] outbreak an international pandemic in March 2020. Since then, the pandemic has had an unprecedented impact on peoples' lives around the world. Countries have responded by imposing a variety of public health measures, and implementing stimulus programmes to help protect individuals and companies. These measures have evolved over the last six months, in response to the changing situation in different countries. Changes in behaviour as a result of the pandemic - whether the behaviour of individuals, companies or governments - have in turn presented criminals with new opportunities to commit crimes and launder the proceeds. The FATF [Financial Action Task Force] has been monitoring these changes in criminal activity, their impact on anti-money-laundering/counter-terrorist-financing (AML/CFT) regimes, and the measures that governments have implemented to respond to the different types of challenges presented. This has included the publication of a paper in May on COVID-19 risks and policy responses, supplemented by a series of webinars with participants from both the public and private sectors. Since May, the FATF has continued to collect and assess relevant information on the impact of the pandemic. [...] The purpose of this paper is to provide reporting entities, other private sector entities, and other stakeholders with additional information on COVID19 related money laundering and terrorist financing risks. This paper addresses both changes in predicate offences and changes in money laundering and terrorist financing activity."

Financial Action Task Force

2020
Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment Guidance

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Executive Summary: "Terrorists regularly adapt how and where they raise and move funds and other assets in order to circumvent safeguards that jurisdictions have put in place to detect and disrupt this activity. Identifying, assessing and understanding terrorist financing (TF) risk is an essential part of dismantling and disrupting terrorist networks. An understanding of TF risk should also inform national counter terrorist financing (CFT) strategies and assists in the effective implementation of a risk-based approach (RBA) towards CFT measures. [...] [T]his report provides good approaches, relevant information sources and practical examples for practitioners to consider when assessing TF risk at the jurisdiction level. This report draws on inputs from over 35 jurisdictions from across the FATF [Financial Action Task Force] Global Network on their extensive experience and lessons learnt in assessing TF risk. [...] This report covers: key considerations when determining the relevant scope and governance of a TF risk assessment, and practical examples to overcome information sharing challenges related to TF and terrorism information. [...] While a risk assessment presents a snapshot in time, 'this report highlights the importance of establishing regular mechanisms to monitor TF risk on an ongoing basis, taking into account current terrorism and TF threats and developments.'"

Financial Action Task Force

2019
H. Doc. 117-29: Declaration of a National Emergency with Respect to the Russian Federation, April 15, 2021

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Document: "Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. [United States Code] 1701 'et seq.') (IEEPA), I hereby report that I have issued an Executive Order declaring a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation. I have determined that specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation--in particular, efforts to undermine the conduct of free and fair democratic elections and democratic institutions in the United States and its allies and partners; to engage in and facilitate malicious cyber-enabled activities against the United States and its allies and partners; to foster and use transnational corruption to influence foreign governments; to pursue extraterritorial activities targeting dissidents or journalists; to undermine security in countries and regions important to United States national security; and to violate well-established principles of international law, including respect for the territorial integrity of states--constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States."

United States. Government Publishing Office

2021-04-15
Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Executive Summary: "Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has evolved significantly since 9/11. The greatest terrorism threat to the Homeland we face today is posed by lone offenders, often radicalized online, who look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of socio-political goals and personal grievances against their targets. With this report, we are providing our strategic intelligence assessments on DT [domestic terrorism], a detailed discussion of our procedures and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and our investigations."

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Office of Homeland Security

2021-05
Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Executive Summary: "Since Central Asian states gained independence in 1991, new regional military and security alliances have been created (some of which are Russian-led), new military partnerships with non-NATO countries have been established, a number of joint military exercises have been conducted, dozenz [sic] of high-profile incidents of violence and civil unrest have taken place, and military installations have been used by foreign militaries. While this activity gained attention, it has not been collectively compiled. A compilation of this activity can serve as a guide for current and future military and security involvement in Central Asia. The first section of the compendium is organized alphabetically and includes entries on Central Asian military facilities and installations (bases, air fields, etc.), and military and security organizations past and present. The second section is also organized alphabetically and includes joint exercises of regional militaries and security forces. [...] The third section is a list of Central Asian military and security structures and other (non-joint exercises) security cooperation activity organized by country. The fourth section is a list of major incidents of violence and civil unrest in Central Asia organized by country and then chronologically."

Foreign Military Studies Office (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.)

Stein, Matthew

2021-01-20
Trusted Traveler Programs [May 5, 2021]

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Summary: "Trusted traveler programs expedite the inspection of preapproved, low-risk travelers to the United States. Trusted traveler programs help the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) achieve their goals of facilitating the lawful flow of people and goods while preventing the entry of unauthorized individuals, criminals, terrorists, and contraband. Trusted traveler programs operate at various combinations of air, land, and sea ports of entry. They all screen individuals arriving at a U.S. port of entry, and some programs screen those departing the United States, those traveling within the United States, or those embarking on U.S.-bound travel (i.e., at international preclearance locations). [...] This report discusses the five major U.S. trusted traveler programs: PreCheck, Global Entry, NEXUS (not an acronym), Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), and Free and Secure Trade (FAST). PreCheck is an expedited security screening process at U.S. airports. Global Entry allows for expedited clearance for preapproved, low-risk travelers when they enter the United States by air. NEXUS allows prescreened travelers expedited processing when entering the United States or Canada by air, land, or sea. SENTRI allows for expedited clearance for preapproved, low-risk travelers at certain land ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border. FAST is a commercial truck clearance program that provides expedited processing for known, low-risk shipments entering the United States from Canada and Mexico."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Kolker, Abigail F.

2021-05-05
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress [Updated May 6, 2021]

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Summary: "Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and, in recent years, have been given greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has about 70,000 Active Duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four service component commands, and eight sub-unified commands. [...] On November 18, 2020, Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller announced that he was implementing the reforms outlined in Section 922 of the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act by 'elevating Special Operations forces to a level on par with military departments as authorized and directed by Congress.' On May 5, 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reversed Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher C. Miller's 2020 decision and returned the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD [SOLIC]) to the control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD [P]). Potential issues for Congress include policy concerns relating to Secretary of Defense Austin's decision to reverse Acting Secretary of Defense Miller's 2020 policy decision and the status of DOD's review of DOD and USSOCOM support to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Feickert, Andrew

2021-05-06
MMWR Early Release: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, May 14, 2021: The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices' Interim Recommendation for Use of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine in Adolescents Aged 12-15 Years -- United States, May 2021

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Series is prepared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). [It] is the agency's primary vehicle for scientific publication of timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and useful public health information and recommendations. This early release issue of MMWR contains the following article: "The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices' Interim Recommendation for Use of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] Vaccine in Adolescents Aged 12-15 Years -- United States, May 2021." Notifiable Diseases and Mortality Tables from MMWR can be accessed at the following link [http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index2021.html].

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

2021-05-14
What is an Autodialer (Part II)? The Supreme Court (Mostly) Resolves a Robocall Enforcement Question [April 28, 2021]

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Document: "The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) makes it illegal to call any wireless phone number using an 'automatic telephone dialing system' (an autodialer) or an artificial or prerecorded voice. While the text of the TCPA defines [hyperlink] 'automatic telephone dialing system,' uncertainty has emerged over how this definition--written in 1991--applies to a technological landscape that is far different today from what existed at the time the TCPA became law. On April 1, 2021, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in 'Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid', [hyperlink] reversing the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the term 'automatic telephone dialing system' used in the TCPA. The TCPA defines an automatic telephone dialing system as 'equipment which has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.' [...] [The Supreme Court] held [hyperlink] that an automatic telephone dialing system is one that has the capacity to either store a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator or produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. This Legal Sidebar briefly discusses the Supreme Court's decision and considerations for Congress relating to the TCPA's autodialer definition."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Holmes, Eric N.

2021-04-28
Wildfire Statistics [Updated May 4, 2021]

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Document: "Wildfires are unplanned and unwanted fires, including lightning-caused fires, unauthorized human-caused fires, and escaped prescribed fire projects. States are responsible for responding to wildfires that begin on nonfederal (state, local, and private) lands, except for lands protected by federal agencies under cooperative agreements. The federal government is responsible for responding to wildfires that begin on federal lands. The Forest Service (FS)--within the U.S. Department of Agriculture--carries out wildfire management and response across the 193 million acres of the National Forest System (NFS). The Department of the Interior (DOI) manages wildfire response for more than 400 million acres of national parks, wildlife refuges and preserves, other public lands, and Indian reservations. Wildfire statistics help to illustrate past U.S. wildfire activity. Nationwide data compiled by the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) indicate that the number of annual wildfires is variable but has decreased slightly over the last 30 years and that the number of acres impacted annually, while also variable, generally has increased. Since 2000, an annual average of 70,600 wildfires burned an annual average of 7.0 million acres. This figure is more than double the average annual acreage burned in the 1990s (3.3 million acres), although a greater number of fires occurred annually in the 1990s (78,600 average)."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Hoover, Katie; Hanson, Laura A.

2021-05-04
Executive Order 14028: Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Policy: "The United States faces persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private sector, and ultimately the American people's security and privacy. The Federal Government must improve its efforts to identify, deter, protect against, detect, and respond to these actions and actors. The Federal Government must also carefully examine what occurred during any major cyber incident and apply lessons learned. But cybersecurity requires more than government action. Protecting our Nation from malicious cyber actors requires the Federal Government to partner with the private sector. The private sector must adapt to the continuously changing threat environment, ensure its products are built and operate securely, and partner with the Federal Government to foster a more secure cyberspace. In the end, the trust we place in our digital infrastructure should be proportional to how trustworthy and transparent that infrastructure is, and to the consequences we will incur if that trust is misplaced. Incremental improvements will not give us the security we need; instead, the Federal Government needs to make bold changes and significant investments in order to defend the vital institutions that underpin the American way of life."

United States. Office of the Federal Register

Biden, Joseph R., Jr.

2021-05-12
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 402, Countering Russian and Other Overseas Kleptocracy Act

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
This is the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Cost Estimate as ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 21, 2021. From the Bill Summary: "H.R. 402 would impose new penalties and allow the Department of State to use those collections to reduce corruption by public officials in foreign countries. It also would require the Department of State to establish an interagency task force to coordinate all federal efforts to help foreign countries reduce corruption. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 402 would increase revenues by $180 million over the 2021-2031 period and direct spending by $145 million over the same period. CBO further estimates that implementing the bill would cost a total of $5 million over the 2021-2026 period, subject to the availability of appropriated funds."

United States. Congressional Budget Office

2021-05-13
Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress [May 18, 2012]

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
"On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review of potential future security challenges, current defense strategy, and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisions a smaller, leaner Army that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and technologically advanced. This strategy will rebalance the Army's global posture and presence, emphasizing where potential problems are likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. [...] The Administration's proposals to drawdown and restructure the Army have a number of strategic implications. These implications include the capability to conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations, the ability to fight two simultaneous wars, shifting strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region, and how the Army will maintain presence in the Middle East. Other related concerns include reducing Army presence in Europe and the Army's role in the rest of the world. Until the Army provides detailed plans on how many units will be cut, how remaining units will be structured, and where they will be based, it is difficult to determine the impact on Army weapon systems under development and the overall budgetary implications of the Army's plan. Potential issues for Congress include the strategic risk posed by a smaller and restructured Army; the 'health' of the Army given the impending downsizing; where the force will be based; and the role of the National Guard and Reserves. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Feickert, Andrew

2012-05-18
Data Brokers and the Impact on Financial Data Privacy, Credit, Insurance, Employment, and Housing, Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, June 11, 2019

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
This is the June 11, 2019 hearing on "Data Brokers and the Impact on Financial Data Privacy, Credit, Insurance, Employment, and Housing," held before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. From the opening statement of Mike Crapo: "Private companies are collecting, processing, analyzing, and sharing massive data on individuals for all kinds of purposes. Even more troubling is that the vast majority of Americans do not even know what data is being collected, when it is being collected, how it is being collected, by whom, and for what purpose. In particular, data brokers and technology companies, including large social media platforms and search engines, play a central role in gathering vast amounts of personal information and often without interacting with individuals, specifically in the case of data brokers. [...] I look forward to hearing more about the structure and practices of the data broker industry and technology companies, such as large social media platforms; how the data broker industry has evolved within the development of new technologies, and their interaction with technology companies; what information these entities collect, how it is collected, and whom it is shared with and for what purposes; what gaps exist in Federal privacy law; and what changes to Federal law should be considered to give individuals real control over their data." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Alicia Puente Cackley, Pam Dixon, Jordan Abbott, Bob Liodice, Jim Nussle, and Brad Thaler.

United States. Government Publishing Office

2021
Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress [May 3, 2021]

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Summary: "The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment for many of the 33 countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and irregular; major factors driving migration include proximity and economic and security conditions. [...] Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean through both legislation and oversight. In March 2021, Congress passed into law the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. [public law] 117-2), which included $9.755 billion for foreign assistance to respond to COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] globally, and the House approved H.R. 6, which would provide a pathway to citizenship for those brought to the United States as children and those from countries with temporary protected status (currently including El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela). [...] To date, congressional hearings have focused on Venezuela, Haiti, the state of democracy in the region, and the root causes of Central American migration. Looking ahead, Congress will likely consider the Administration's FY2022 foreign aid budget request, which, according to the Administration's budget blueprint, will include assistance to address the root causes of migration from Central America."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Sullivan, Mark P.; Beittel, June S.; Meyer, Peter J. . . .

2021-05-03
Department of Defense's Role in Protecting Democratic Elections, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, February 13, 2018

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
This is the February 13, 2018 hearing on "Department of Defense's Role in Protecting Democratic Elections," held before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Cybersecurity of the Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of Mike Rounds: "The Cybersecurity Subcommittee meets this afternoon to receive testimony on the Department of Defense's (DOD) role in protecting the U.S. election process. [...] There is no dispute about what Russia did during the 2016 election cycle. There is clear evidence that Russia attempted to undermine our democratic process through the hacking of independent political entities, manipulation of social media, and use of propaganda venues such as Russia Today. Evidence to date indicates that no polls or State election systems were manipulated to change the outcome of the vote. However, there was evidence of Russian probing of certain election systems in 21 states. The Department of Defense has a critical role to play in challenging and influencing the mindset of our cyber adversaries and defending the homeland from attacks, attacks that could include cyber attacks by other nations against our election infrastructure. We look forward to the Department approaching these issues with a heightened sense of urgency." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Robert J. Butler, Heather A. Conley, Richard J. Harknett, and Michael L. Sulmeyer.

United States. Government Publishing Office

2021
Building Alliances for Equitable Resilience: Advancing Equitable Resilience Through Partnerships and Diverse Perspectives

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Insights and Reflections: "Throughout the month of October 2020, the Resilient Nation Partnership Network and NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] hosted a four-part series called 'Alliances for Equity,' addressing the various phases of advancing equitable resilience. Thirty-three speakers convened over four weeks to share their perspectives and personal and professional journeys. Nearly 2,200 viewers representing more than 500 organizations across diverse sectors and industries attended the virtual sessions. These conversations were a critical launching point for advancing dialogue and resulted in valuable discussion. A summary of key insights is [included in this document]."

United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Resilient Nation Partnership Network

2021-04
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin: April 2021

Show summary Open resource [html] (open full abstract)
This April 2021 edition of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin contains the following content: "Motivating and Retaining Today's Officers" by Joseph M. Traylor; "Body Disposal in Homicide" by Valeria Flores, Hyun Kim, Maeve Sielawa, Paulina Malinowska, Brian Ramanauskas, Duke Becker, Haley LeRoux, Louis B. Schlesinger, Leonard Opanashuk, and Sarah W. Craun; "Perspective: The Champion--A Positive Force Within the Community" by Jeffrey S. Miller; "Leadership Spotlight Institutional Knowledge--Recognizing, Valuing, and Preserving It"; and "Bulletin Notes".

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation

2021-04
Disinformation Dozen: The Sequel: How Big Tech is Failing to Act on Leading Anti-Vaxxers Despite Bipartisan Calls from Congress

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Introduction: "In March 2021, CCDH [Center for Countering Digital Hate] and Anti-Vax Watch identified the top 12 spreaders of anti-vaccine disinformation on social media in our report, The Disinformation Dozen [hyperlink]. The CEOs of Facebook, Twitter and Google responded by pledging to strengthen and better enforce their policies; crack down on vaccine disinformation on their platforms; and protect public health - but they have not kept their promises. Despite continued violations of community standards, the majority of the Disinformation Dozen remain online and active in their disinformation-spreading campaigns on at least one platform. [...] We know the most effective way to disrupt the dissemination of harmful misinformation is to stop providing services to the most egregious repeat offenders. Each day the Disinformation Dozen's accounts remain active is another day that their lies cost lives. It's time to finish the job."

Center for Countering Digital Hate

2021-04-28
FY2022 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Budget Request [May 5, 2021]

Show summary Open resource [pdf] (open full abstract)
From the Overview: "Each year, Congress typically considers 12 distinct appropriations measures to fund federal programs and activities. One of these is the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) bill, which supports a range of U.S. activities around the world. On April 9, 2021, the Biden Administration released a summary of its proposed FY2022 budget request [hyperlink] for discretionary programs. The request includes $63.50 billion for 'the State Department and other international programs,' which the Administration asserts would be a 12% increase from the FY2021- enacted level. It is unclear whether this figure reflects all components of SFOPS funding, or how it was calculated. The requested funding is about $7.3 billion (10%) below enacted FY2021 SFOPS [hyperlink] discretionary funding to date, including $10 billion in supplemental emergency funds enacted through the American Recue [sic] Plan Act (ARPA) to help combat Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) globally. The requested funding is about 34% higher than FY2021 base funding (excluding OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] and emergency funds and higher than any SFOPS total funding level enacted in the past decade, with the exception of FY2021, in current dollars. The April 9 budget summary provided only top-line funding levels and select program highlights. This Insight provides limited information and analysis based on the budget summary."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Gill, Cory R.; Lawson, Marian Leonardo; Morgenstern, Emily M.

2021-05-05

4309 4310 4311 4312 4313 4314 4315 4316 4317 4318 4319