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Pandemic Influenza Planning and Preparation Best Practices Model
"The H5N1 influenza virus (commonly referred to as the Avian Flu) presents new challenges to the emergency response environment if it becomes a pandemic influenza in the United States. [...] These best practices are designed to promote the development of community specific guidelines and operational protocols to meet the challenge of a pandemic outbreak while not affecting normal daily response activities. The response community will be the front line providers of emergency medical care."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States Fire Administration
2006-12-06
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Pandemic Flu and Medical Biodefense Countermeasure Liability Limitation [December 05, 2006]
"Division C of P.L. 109-148 (2005), 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e, limits liability with respect to pandemic flu and other public health countermeasures. Specifically, upon a declaration by the Secretary of Health and Human Services of a public health emergency or the credible risk of such emergency, Division C would, with respect to a 'covered countermeasure,' eliminate liability, with one exception, for the United States, and for manufacturers, distributors, program planners, persons who prescribe, administer or dispense the countermeasure, and employees of any of the above. The exception is that a defendant who engaged in willful misconduct would be subject to liability under a new federal cause of action, though not under state tort law. Division C's limitation on liability is a more severe restriction on victims' ability to recover than exists in most federal tort reform statutes. However, victims could, in lieu of suing, accept payment under a new 'Covered Countermeasure Process Fund,' if Congress appropriates money for this fund."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cohen, Henry, 1949-
2006-12-05
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Pandemic Preparedness Manual
"This Pandemic Preparedness Manual has been prepared for the IFMA Foundation by Environmental and Occupational Risk Management (EORM), Inc. The Manual is designed to provide Facility Management (FM) professionals with a reference document to assist in planning for, controlling, and responding to the avian influenza and pandemic influenza threats. General guidance on establishing and maintaining a Business Continuity Program is also addressed in this Manual."
International Facility Management Association
2006-12
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Unanticipated Consequences of Pandemic Flu: Transportation Related Issues: A Preliminary Literature Review
From the Document: "Broadly speaking, plans for the containment and treatment of pandemic flu lead to a set of circumscribed outcomes, which include process outcomes (e.g., numbers of individuals vaccinated, numbers of health care workers vaccinated, numbers of intensive care beds opened up) as well as health outcomes (e.g., flu-related morbidity and mortality, transmission rates, and attack rates). Less well-known or researched are other health outcomes, such as excess morbidity and mortality from untreated or undertreated illness and injury distinct from influenza, and social outcomes related to such issues as increased crowding, health system congestion, increasing scarcity of resources (including monetary resources), major population shifts, and degradation of various workforces (health care, urban infrastructure such as police and sanitation, critical infrastructure, etc.) with their consequent effects."
National Center for Disaster Preparedness
Abramson, David M. (David Michael), 1958-; Fuller, Elizabeth J.; Wong, Melissa
2006-12-01
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Effectiveness of Urban Shelter-in-Place II: Residential Districts
"In the event of a short-term, large-scale toxic chemical release to the atmosphere, shelter-in-place (SIP) may be used as an emergency response to protect public health. We modeled hypothetical releases using realistic, empirical parameters to explore how key factors influence SIP effectiveness for single-family dwellings in a residential district. Four classes of factors were evaluated in this case-study: (a) time scales associated with release duration, SIP implementation delay, and SIP termination; (b) building air-exchange rates, including air infiltration and ventilation; (c) the degree of sorption of toxic chemicals to indoor surfaces; and (d) the shape of the dose-response relationship for acute adverse health effects. Houses with lower air leakage are more effective shelters, and thus variability in the air leakage of dwellings is associated with varying degrees of SIP protection in a community. Sorption on indoor surfaces improves SIP effectiveness by lowering the peak indoor concentrations and reducing the amount of contamination in the indoor air. Nonlinear dose-response relationships imply substantial reduction in adverse health effects from lowering the peak exposure concentration. However, if the scenario is unfavorable for sheltering (e.g. sheltering in leaky houses for protection against a nonsorbing chemical with a linear dose-response), the community must implement SIP without delay and exit from shelter when it first becomes safe to do so. Otherwise, the community can be subjected to even greater risk than if they did not take shelter indoors."
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Gadgil, Ashok; Price, Phillip N.; Nazaroff, W. W. . . .
2006-12
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SARS Commission Final Report (Pages 1-873): Spring of Fear
This report contains the first portion of the full official report which investigated the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Ontario, Canada (September 2003). It contains sections addressing the commission's mandate, the pandemic threat, and the story of the SARS outbreak.
Commission to Investigate the Introduction and Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Campbell Commission
2006-12
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SARS Commission Final Report, Pages 874-1204: Spring of Fear (Volume 3)
This document contains the second portion of the full official report which investigated the SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome] outbreak in Ontario, Canada in September 2003. The report contains sections addressing the victim's of SARS, a nurse's survey, and recommendations.
Commission to Investigate the Introduction and Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Campbell Commission
2006-12
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SARS Commission Executive Summary: Spring of Fear, Volume 1
"SARS was a tragedy. In the space of a few months, the deadly virus emerged from the jungles of central China, killed 44 in Ontario and struck down more than 3301 others with serious lung disease. It caused untold suffering to its victims and their families, forced thousands into quarantine, brought the health system in the Greater Toronto Area and other parts of the province to its knees and seriously impacted health systems in other parts of the country."
Canada. Health Canada
Campbell, Archie
2006-12
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Maryland Pandemic Influenza Plan (Version 6)
"This section of the Maryland Pandemic Influenza Plan outlines the goals and strategies that Maryland state government and other key stakeholders should take to mitigate the threat of an influenza pandemic. This Plan reflects the guidance of the United States Federal government and the recommendations of the World Health Organization. This guidance is subject to change as a result of the evolution of the threat of a pandemic and changes in the state of relevant response capabilities and technologies. Also, as the public health community continues to study the effectiveness of control measures in countries experiencing influenza infection in birds, animals, and humans, this data will enhance both our strategic and operational plans."
Maryland. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
2006-12
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Developing a Pandemic Flu Plan for Thurston County Fire District No. 9
"The problem was the potential impact of pandemic flu on department operations and steps that should be taken to prepare for pandemic flu had not been identified. Descriptive research was used to identify the impact on department operations and steps that should be taken to prepare for pandemic flu by answering the following questions: a) What is pandemic flu and why are we at risk? b) What impact would pandemic flu have on department operations? c) What steps should the department take to prepare for pandemic flu? Based on the findings, it was recommended the department conduct continuity of operations planning, implement a pandemic training program and update the department's Member Exposure Control Manual."
National Fire Academy
North, Steven R.
2006-12
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Report to Congress: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Spending [December 2006]
"This report is an update to the report to Congress on the first six months of activity that was provided on June 15, 2006. This report covers all activities from December 2005 to December 2006. The report covers both the December 2005 emergency supplemental (PL 109-148) and the June 2006 emergency supplemental (PL 109-234). In August 2005, animal outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 had been reported in twelve countries around the world with 112 total human cases confirmed in four of those countries. Just over a year later, in December 2006, the number of countries confirming animal outbreaks has jumped to 53, with 258 total human cases confirmed in ten of those countries. Once a pandemic begins, time will be a critical factor in our ability to accomplish the necessary production and delivery of vaccines and other medical countermeasures required to mitigate the pandemic. On November 1, 2005, the President requested a total of $7.1 billion in emergency funding for pandemic influenza preparedness activities, of which $6.7 billion was for implementation of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. This funding was requested in FY 2006 to fund a three-year preparedness effort to ensure that the Nation could effectively respond in the event of a pandemic. In December 2005, Congress appropriated $3.3 billion in emergency funding in a FY 2006 supplemental for HHS, for the first year of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, and in June 2006, Congress appropriated $2.3 billion for the second year of the HHS Plan in emergency funding in a second FY 2006 supplemental."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2006-12
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National Aviation Resource Manual for Quarantinable Diseases
"The purpose of this Manual is to be a national aviation resource outlining the response to and recovery from a quarantinable disease incident of major public health significance at a U.S. international airport. The target audience for the Manual is airlines, airports, federal response agencies and other first responders, local and state health departments, and other local and state government stakeholders that would be involved in the response to or recovery from the incident."
United States. Department of Transportation
2006-12
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Long-term Psychological and Occupational Effects of Providing Hospital Healthcare during SARS Outbreak
"Healthcare workers (HCWs) found the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) to be stressful, but the long-term impact is not known. From 13 to 26 months after the SARS outbreak, 769 HCWs at 9 Toronto hospitals that treated SARS patients and 4 Hamilton hospitals that did not treat SARS patients completed a survey of several adverse outcomes. Toronto HCWs reported significantly higher levels of burnout (p = 0.019), psychological distress, and posttraumatic stress. Toronto workers were more likely to have reduced patient contact and work hours and to report behavioral consequences of stress. Variance in adverse outcomes was explained by a protective effect of the perceived adequacy of training and support and by a provocative effect of maladaptive coping style and other individual factors. The results reinforce the value of effective staff support and training in preparation for future outbreaks."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Maunder, Robert G.; Lancee, William J.
2006-12
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SARS Commission: Spring of Fear, Executive Summary
This volume of the final report of the SARS epidemic in Ontario contains the introduction and thirteen essential questions asked in reviewing the procedures that were followed during the epidemic followed by recommendations. The questions are; Why does SARS matter today; How bad was SARS; What went right; What went wrong; Were precautions relaxed too soon; Who is there to blame; Was information withheld; Did politics intrude; Was SARS I preventable Was SARS II preventable; Were health workers adequately protected; Are we safer now; What must be done. Other volumes in this report include volumes 2-3, Final report, volume 4, SARS and Public Health in Ontario and volume 5, SARS and Public Health Legislation.
Publications Ontario
Campbell, Archie
2006-12
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Mental Health in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina
From the Document: "Hurricane Katrina is arguably the most significant natural disaster that has occurred in the United States, causing serious and long-lasting mental health effects. It is important to take the lessons learned from this tragedy and make sure that mental health is a priority in the planning, preparedness, and response policies for potential future disasters, including pandemic flu and terrorist activities. [...] This symposium is meant to contribute to the much broader discussion about the mental health ramifications of disasters, including terrorism. Our objective is to leave this symposium with specific things that we can do, in services and in policies, to improve our mental health planning, preparedness, and response to future significant disasters."
Emory University. Carter Center
Madrid, Paula
2006-11-08?
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Proceedings of the Workshop on Preparing for and Responding to Disasters in North America, San Antonio, Texas [November 7, 2006]
"Dr. Lance Robinson, Battelle Corporation, provides a succinct overview of the Workshop on Preparing for and Responding to Disasters in North America, which occurred in San Antonio, TX, November 6-7, 2006. The Proceedings describe the content and context of the workshop, which was co-hosted by the University of Texas, San Antonio, East Carolina University, and the Homeland Security and Defense Education Consortium of the U.S. Northern Command. Three panels, comprised of academics, military, public service and government personnel, tackled issues ranging from pandemic flu, to natural disasters, to terrorism. Panelists discussed the issues and offered suggestions on how governments, the military, and the private sectors in Canada, Mexico, and the United States can work together to tackle these homeland security challenges."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Robinson, Lance
2006-11-07
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Waco-McLennan County Public Health District Pandemic Influenza Exercise After Action Report [Waco, TX; November 2, 2006]
From the 'Executive Summary': "The purpose of this exercise was to foster understanding of concepts, identification of strengths and shortfalls, and education of partner organizations, to include the private sector, in pandemic response. It created an opportunity for participants to evaluate their current response concepts, plans, and capabilities for a community-wide response to a large-scale public health emergency driven by response to an infectious disease."
Waco-McLennan County Public Health District
2006-11-02
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Waco-Mclennan County Public Health District: Pandemic Influenza Exercise After Action Report
"The purpose of this exercise was to foster understanding of concepts, identification of strengths and shortfalls, and education of partner organizations, to include the private sector, in pandemic response. It created an opportunity for participants to evaluate their current response concepts, plans, and capabilities for a community-wide response to a large-scale public health emergency driven by response to an infectious disease."
Waco-McLennan County Public Health District
2006-11-02?
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SEMP Biot #410: Tamiflu Alert! 36 Million Americans Owned Tamiflu in October 2006
"Of America's 300 million residents, about 36 million (12%) owned a supply of Tamiflu (oseltamivir), or similar antiviral drug, according to an October 2006 survey conducted by Robert Blendon, et al, Harvard School of Public Health. Tamiflu, a prescription drug, can reduce the duration of viral replication and improve prospects for survival, provided it is administered within 48 hours following symptom onset, according to the World Health Organization. Tamiflu should be an essential plan of any plan to control pandemic flu, according to the WHO and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. This new information about the surprising prevalence of Tamiflu in American homes adds fuel to the ongoing debate as to whether the government or the private sector is better qualified to supply essential public services, such as provision of Tamiflu, for management of a potential or actual flu epidemic or pandemic."
Suburban Emergency Management Project (U.S.)
2006-11-01
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DMORT Standard Operating Procedures for National Transportation Safety Board Activations
From the Synopsis: "This document delineates the general procedures used for DMORT [Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team] operations when activated under an interagency agreement with the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board]. They are designed to provide medical examiners, coroners, and other medicolegal authorities with the information they need to understand how DMORT operates in support of the local medico-legal authority in transportation accidents involving fatalities. Medical examiners and coroners should be aware that expectations of family members of accident victims (and by extension the general public, politicians, and the media) concerning identification and morgue operations are high. Non-scientific identifications, such as witness viewing for identification purposes can lead to misidentification, are is not an acceptable practice. Funding alone should not pose an obstacle to accurate and timely identification. Since most transportation carriers (or their underwriters) bear the reasonable costs for victim identification, medical examiner and coroner offices are expected to rely upon acceptable forensic techniques (fingerprinting, dental, radiological, DNA, etc.) for positive identification."
United States. National Transportation Safety Board; Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams
2006-11
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Targeted Social Distancing Design for Pandemic Influenza
This article discusses the benefits of simulating social contact networks to better understand the spread of influenza within a specific community. This understanding will allow for the development of targeted social distancing strategies to mitigate a pandemic's effects.
Emerging Infectious Diseases
2006-11
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Preparing For Pandemic Flu: A Call to Action - An Interim Report by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Mega-Catastrophes of the Financial Services Roundtable
This report addresses what needs to be done urgently to prepare for a pandemic, or more specifically, the pandemic flu. The report looks at vaccine production , its limited production and method of development and concludes that the current method of vaccine production and distribution is inadequate in staving off a pandemic flu. It recommends a series of steps to change the current methodologies to be prepared for an inevitable outbreak of a deadly strain. Steps include; developing more timely vaccine technologies; license to maximum dissemination; develop a more aggressive annual flu shots; develop a more robust treatment program from those afflicted; develop and test preparedness plans and work globally to stem the migration of deadly strains
Financial Services Roundtable
Blue Ribbon Commission on Mega-Catastrophes
2006-11-01
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Oregon Public Health Pandemic Influenza Plan
"The 2006 Oregon Pandemic Influenza Plan builds on a planning effort that began in 2001. The detailed federal Health and Human Services plan released in November 2005 and the steady spread of a new type of severe influenza in birds (H5N1) prompted the expansion and revision of the Oregon plan. The Oregon Pandemic Influenza Plan is a 'Hazard-Specific Appendix' of the Health and Medical (ESF 8) Annex of the State of Oregon Emergency Plan; it contains information and concepts that are specific for pandemic influenza and is not intended as a stand-alone plan. […] The World Health Organization (WHO) developed a planning framework that describes 3 periods of pandemic threat: Interpandemic (no threat), Pandemic Alert (possible threat), and Pandemic (outbreak started). This plan follows the WHO scheme with the understanding that actual events may not be so easily characterized. The public health response will intensify as a pandemic appears more likely and with the proximity of a new strain of influenza to North America or the Northwest. If a pandemic occurs, the Oregon State Public Health Division (OSPHD) will be the lead state agency in Oregon and will operate under a National Incident Management System compliant Incident Command System, in collaboration with Oregon's 34 local health departments as well as American Indian tribal jurisdictions. Timely and consistent information for the public, hospitals, health care providers and other partners will be coordinated through a Joint Information Center (JIC). OSPHD and local health departments will support hospitals and health care providers in their efforts to provide essential routine care as well as the additional emergency care needed during a pandemic."
Oregon. Department of Human Services
2006-11-01
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Oregon Department of Human Services Public Health Pandemic Influenza Plan
"This plan is an appendix to the Oregon State Emergency Management Plan. It is organized into the following parts: The appendix explains the roles and strategies of OSPHD [Oregon State Public Health Division] in coordinating the public health response to a pandemic with the federal government, local health departments, the health care community, and other key partners; Attachments to this appendix describe specific OSPHD activities, such as communication, surveillance, and distribution of vaccine and antiviral drugs before, during and after a pandemic; Tabs in each attachment provide more detailed descriptions of these activities."
Oregon. Department of Human Services
2006-11-01
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Preparing Your Business, Pandemic Flu and Other Emergencies: A Scenario
This scenario below is framed around a moderate to severe influenza pandemic. It aims to provide businesses with a starting point to begin to prepare for pandemic influenza. This framework could also apply to other serious communicable disease outbreaks within a community, as it would likely affect the workforce in a similar manner. In addition, much would be equally applicable to a severe snow storm making transportation difficult, a flood, or other emergency.
West Virginia. Department of Health & Human Resources
2006-11-01
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University of North Carolina Pandemic Influenza Response Plan - Incident Level Responsibilities
This document summarizes responsibilities of emergency management personnel and school officials in an event of a pandemic.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
2006-11
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Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness Pandemic Influenza and Highly Infectious Respiratory Disease Standard Operating Guide
"This SOG describes the roles, responsibilities, and activities of the Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness while outlining activities to educate and prepare the general public and community partners. This SOG is intended to limit the mortality, morbidity and spread of a pandemic influenza virus or other highly infectious respiratory disease. This SOG supports the LMPHW's EOP and the Emergency Support Function 8 (Health and Medical Services) of the Louisville Jefferson County Emergency Operations Plan.
This SOG operates under the guidance of the Louisville Jefferson County Emergency Operations Plan and the Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness Emergency Operations Plan. The Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness's Pandemic Influenza and Highly Infectious Respiratory Disease Standard Operating Guide is a working document subject to change. All modifications, additions, and updates are subject to review. This version has been reviewed for content. Influenza viruses cause significant morbidity and mortality every year throughout the world. Approximately 30,000 people die annually in the United States alone due to influenza. The influenza virus changes a small amount every year via a phenomenon called antigenic drift, allowing the virus to evade community immunity and cause new disease in a population. Antigenic drift occasionally produces a new virus very different than the viruses of the preceding several years. These very different viruses cause influenza pandemics, characterized by sharp increases in the number of people who both become ill and die due to influenza."
Louisville Metro Department of Public Health and Wellness
2006-11
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Interim Pandemic Response Plan
The NRC's Pandemic Response Plan is intended to equip NRC managers and staff to maintain adequate protection of public health and safety, promotion of the common defense and security, and protection of the environment through the continuity of the agency's more important functions, identified as Pandemic Priority Functions (PPFs), in the event of a pandemic that could significantly increase absenteeism at NRC and in licensed activities. In conjunction with this Plan, each NRC Office and Region will develop Office-level procedures to
support continuation of these priority functions during a pandemic. Unlike the NRC Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan which provides for continuity of mission-essential agency functions for up to 30 days during and after natural or man-made emergencies that are expected to occur at times and places that are fairly well defined, this Plan provides for continuity of NRC operations in response to a pandemic which could present a more persistent and widespread assault that may grow and fade over a period of many months before finally
dying out.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2006-11-01
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Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan: Part I of II
"Part I of the HHS Implementation Plan identifies eight cross-cutting issues that encompass many of the themes noted in the HHS [Health and Human Services] Strategic Plan and Guidance for State and Local Partners. These themes include infection control, laboratory diagnostics, surveillance, health care planning, and workforce support. Each chapter outlines actions and specific steps the Department will undertake to fulfill the directives of the HSC [Homeland Security Council] and accomplish pandemic preparedness. The eight cross-cutting issue chapters are: 1) International Activities 2) Domestic Surveillance 3) Public Health Interventions 4) Federal Medical Response 5) Vaccines 6) Antiviral Drugs 7) Communications 8) State, Local, and Tribal Preparedness. The action steps in these eight chapters are organized by the three pillars identified in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: preparedness and communication; surveillance and detection; and response and containment. The implementation of the HHS action steps is contingent upon the availability of resources."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2006-11
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America Academy of Pediatrics Comments on Community Containment for Pandemic Flu
These comments by AAP president Jay Berkelhamer address the potential impact of pandemic flu community containment measures on the health and welfare of children.
American Academy of Pediatrics
2006-10-26?
