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COVID-19-Related Impact on the Banking Industry: Conditions in the Second Quarter 2021 [October 13, 2021]
From the Document: "Bank regulation is designed to allow banks to withstand some amount of unexpected losses. Some observers have worried that the economic ramifications of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic could result in enough borrowers missing loan payments to cause distress for banks [hyperlink]. This Insight presents bank industry statistics through the second quarter 2021 and examines how the pandemic might be affecting the industry."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gnanarajah, Raj; Scott, Andrew P.
2021-10-13
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COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Accountability and Program Effectiveness of Federal Response, Report to Congressional Committees
From the Highlights: "As of September 23, 2021, the U.S. had about 43 million reported cases of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] and about 699,000 reported deaths, according to CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention]. The country also continues to experience economic repercussions from the pandemic. Six relief laws, including the CARES [Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security] Act, had been enacted as of August 31, 2021, to address the public health and economic threats posed by COVID-19. As of that same date (the most recent for which governmentwide data was available), the federal government had obligated a total of $3.9 trillion and expended $3.4 trillion of the $4.8 trillion in COVID-19 relief funds that had been appropriated by these six laws, as reported by federal agencies. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to report on its ongoing monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report examines the federal government's continued efforts to respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19 pandemic."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2021-10
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Pandemic Oversight [website]
From the Website: "[The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee is] here to help you understand how the federal government has responded to the pandemic. We show you data on where pandemic program funding money was spent. Our committee of 22 Inspectors General [hyperlink], along with our other law enforcement partners, uses the data you'll find on our website along with other data to detect and combat fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of any pandemic-related programs and funding."
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee Meeting: EUA Amendment Request for Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine for Use in Children 5 Through 11 Years of Age
From the Executive Summary: "On October 6, 2021, Pfizer submitted a request to FDA to amend its Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to expand use of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] Vaccine (BNT162b2) for prevention of COVID-19 caused by SARS-CoV-2 [severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2] in individuals 5 through 11 years of age (hereafter 5-11 years of age). The proposed dosing regimen is a 2-dose primary series, 10 µg mRNA/per dose, administered 3 weeks apart. This EUA request initially included safety data from 1,518 BNT162b2 recipients and 750 placebo (saline) recipients 5-11 years of age who are enrolled in the Phase 2/3 portion (Cohort 1) of an ongoing randomized, double-blinded, placebo-controlled clinical trial, C4591007. [...] This October 26, 2021 VRPBAC [sic] [Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee] meeting is being held to discuss whether, based on the totality of scientific evidence available, the benefits of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine when administered as a 2-dose series (10 µg each dose, 3 weeks apart) outweigh its risks for use in children 5-11 years of age."
United States. Food and Drug Administration
2021-10-26
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ERO COVID-19 Pandemic Response Requirements
From the Purpose and Scope: "The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic Response Requirements (PRR) sets forth expectations and assists ICE detention facility operators in sustaining detention operations while mitigating risk to the safety and wellbeing of detainees, staff, contractors, visitors, and stakeholders due to COVID-19. The ERO PRR builds upon previously issued guidance and sets forth specific mandatory requirements to be adopted by 'all' detention facilities, as well as recommended best practices, to ensure that detainees are appropriately housed and that available mitigation measures are implemented during this unprecedented public health crisis."
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
2021-10-19
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Building Back Resilient: Strengthening Communities Through the COVID-19 Recovery
From the Executive Summary: "'This report aims to understand how the coronavirus outbreak has impacted social cohesion and integration. It asks what the post-pandemic environment will look like when it comes to community resilience, and what is needed to ensure that the economic hit imposed by COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] does not exacerbate tensions in communities. Ultimately, it asks how we can 'build back better' when it comes to cohesion, so that the period of hardship which is likely to follow the coronavirus pandemic does not harm resilience.' The COVID-19 pandemic will lead to a period of real economic difficulty for the UK. It has effectively created a 'perfect storm' - exposing weak social infrastructure, accelerating certain types of automation and stretching local authorities, many of which were hit hard by austerity long before the coronavirus. This is not just an economic crisis but one that undermines the resilience of our communities, and puts many at risk of division and rising hate. Our research has consistently shown how, during economically tough periods, resentments and frustrations can brew, and people look for someone to blame. When people have little hope for their own chances in life, it is much harder for them to show openness and compassion for others. And it easier for opportunists to exploit real fears with hatred. The post-pandemic landscape therefore poses enormous challenges for community resilience. This is likely to play out across geographic divides. Our research has consistently found that communities with the greatest anxiety about immigration and multiculturalism are also the ones which have suffered through economic decline, have weak civic, social and economic infrastructure, and feel most distant from power."
Hope not Hate (Organisation); Paul Hamlyn Foundation
Carter, Rosie; Clarke, Chris
2021-11
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Association Between COVID-19 Relief Funds and Hospital Characteristics in the US
From the Abstract: "In response to financial stress created by the reduction in care during the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic, hospitals received financial assistance through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act program. To date, the allocation of CARES Act funding is not well understood. [...] This cross-sectional analysis of US-based hospitals and health systems assesses the hospital characteristics associated with CARES Act funding with linear regression models using linked hospital and health system-level information on CARES Act funding with hospital characteristics from Hospital Cost Report data. [...] The analysis included 952 hospital-level entities with an average payment of $33.6 million, most of which was received during the first payment round. Wide ranges existed in CARES Act funding, with 24% of matched hospitals receiving less than $5 million in funding and 8% receiving more than $50 million. Academic-affiliated hospitals, hospitals with higher pre-COVID-19 assets and hospitals with higher COVID-19 cases received higher levels of funding, while critical access hospitals received lower levels of financial assistance. A 10% increase in hospital assets, endowment size, and COVID-19 cases was associated with 1.4% (95% CI, 0.8% to 2.0%; P = .003), 0.2% (95% CI, 0.1% to 0.3%; P < .001), and 3.5% (95% CI, 2.8% to 4.2%; P < .001) increases in CARES Act funding, respectively. [...] In this cross-sectional study of US hospitals and health systems, findings suggest that High-Impact Distribution CARES Act funds may have disproportionately gone to hospitals that were in a stronger financial situation prior to the pandemic compared with those that were not, but funds also went disproportionately to those that eventually had the most cases."
Journal of the American Medical Association (Firm)
Qureshi, Nabeel Shariq; Whaley, Christopher; Briscombe, Brian . . .
2021-10-22
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Global Strategy for Shaping the Post-COVID-19 World
From the Executive Summary: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic is an acute public health and economic crisis that is further destabilizing an already weakened rules-based international system. With cooperation, determination, and resolve, however, the United States and its allies can recover from the crisis and revitalize an adapted rules-based system to bring about decades of future freedom, peace, and prosperity. [...] This strategy outlines the following overarching goals: [1] Mitigate the impact of COVID-19 and recover from the crisis as soon as possible in the health, economic, governance, and defense domains. [2] Seize the historic moment to lead a rejuvenation of an adapted rules-based global system that can endure for decades to come. The strategy focuses on four domains of action: health, economy, governance, and defense. Each domain contains a 'recovery' track, involving actions to limit the damage caused by the pandemic and facilitate a global rebound, and a 'rejuvenation' track, consisting of actions to adapt and reenergize a rules-based global system. Central to this strategy is close coordination among the United States and its allies and partners to leverage their combined economic, diplomatic, military, and scientific might."
Atlantic Council of the United States. Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Cimmino, Jeffrey; Katz, Rebecca; Kroenig, Matthew . . .
2020
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Taking Stock: Where Are Geopolitics Headed in the COVID-19 Era?
From the Executive Summary: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic is having dramatic effects on everyday life, global prosperity, and international security; its geopolitical implications could be even more profound. At the end of 2019, there was little to indicate that the global order would face an imminent, potentially transformative shock. Now, five months into 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has shattered global health security, devastated the world economy, and accelerated great-power rivalry. [...] This issue brief, the second in the Atlantic Council's series 'Shaping the Post-COVID-19 World Together,' will consider the current state of the pandemic and how it has strained the global rules-based order over the past few months. First, it will consider the origins of the novel coronavirus and how it spread around the world. Next, it will examine how COVID-19 has exacerbated or created pressure points in the global order, highlight uncertainties ahead, and provide recommendations to the United States and its partners for shaping the post-COVID-19 world."
Atlantic Council of the United States. Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security
Cimmino, Jeffrey; Kroenig, Matthew; Pavel, Barry
2020-06
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COVID-19 Pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Opportunity to Rethink Strategic Competition on the Continent
From the Document: "In this Perspective, we assess the effects and implications of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] on strategic competition in sub-Saharan Africa. We proceed in three main sections. First, we provide a brief overview of COVID-19 on the continent, highlighting the damage to public health, the political and economic ramifications, and what has worked thus far in slowing the pandemic. Second, we discuss Chinese and Russian influence, those nations' attempts to capitalize on the pandemic, and the extent to which COVID-19 has benefited them. Finally, in conclusion, we offer recommendations for how the United States can expand beyond a competition lens and help African countries respond to the pandemic in ways that are mutually beneficial to all parties--including, in some cases, China. Sub-Saharan Africa is of growing importance on the world stage. This trend will only accelerate in the coming years and decades, requiring broader and deeper--and more-strategic--U.S. engagement on the continent."
RAND Corporation
Shurkin, Michael Robert; Noyes, Alexander H. (Alexander Hale), 1982-; Adgie, Mary Kate
2021-07
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Obedience in Times of COVID-19 Pandemics: A Renewed Governmentality of Unease?
From the Abstract: "This article transects and articulates different disciplines and lines of thought in order to understand the redefinitions of the boundaries of political power in times of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019], and the practices which may outlive the potential normalization of the crisis when an efficient vaccine is discovered. We claim that the COVID-19 pandemic is an original form of governmentality by unease articulating three dimensions. First, the basic reaction of modern states when faced with uncertainty to apply national-territorial logics of controls. Second, bureaucracies consider the virus along the frame of a danger to security and organize public health emergencies according to the rules of the game of national security, creating tensions between internal security, public health and the economy because policy makers may be unsure about the priorities and may have privilege border controls. Third, resistance against the chosen national policies show that people are not led by a politics of fear and-or protection, but rather their own concerns about themselves with a peer-to-peer surveillance based on the denunciation of potentially contaminated persons as one key element of their compliance. Contact tracing technologies and strategies of border controls are key elements to analyze. We do so in different contexts: UK, European Union and Turkey."
Centre Pour La Communication Scientifique Directe. HAL archives-ouerte
Bigo, Didier; Guild, Elspeth; Kuşkonmaz, Elif Mendos
2021-10-19
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COVID-19 Vaccination Hesitancy Within the Critical Infrastructure Workforce
From the Document: "COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] vaccination hesitancy within the critical infrastructure workforce represents a risk to our National Critical Functions and critical infrastructure companies and operations. Employers of workers within the critical infrastructure sectors are essential to reducing vaccine hesitancy within their workforce by becoming messengers of accurate, reliable, and timely information. This CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] Insight provides an overview of COVID-19 vaccination hesitancy and steps that critical infrastructure owners and operators can take to reduce the risk and encourage vaccine acceptance across their critical sectors' workforce."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2021-03
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Building a More Resilient ICT Supply Chain: Lessons Learned During the COVID-19 Pandemic
From the Executive Summary: "The impacts of the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic on the Information Technology and Communication (ICT) sector's supply chains are still unfolding. To understand how IT [information technology] companies have been impacted, and to identify lessons learned about supply chain vulnerabilities and the potential ways to address them going forward, the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force, a partnership between the IT and Communications Sector Coordinating Councils and the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) formed a study group (collectively, 'the Study Group'). The goal of the Study Group was to uncover the impacts of COVID-19 on the ICT supply chains and make practical recommendations that can support policy and operational decisions to strengthen and build additional resilience into ICT supply chains in the future. These recommendations can support policy and operational decisions intended to strengthen supply chains going forward. The study also provides a high-level visual mapping of how goods and services flow through the generalized ICT supply chain, from the raw materials stage through to sale to the consumer."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020-11
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Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response [March 28, 2020]
From the Document: "As the Nation comes together to slow the spread of COVID-19, on March 16th the President issued updated Coronavirus Guidance for America that highlighted the importance of the critical infrastructure workforce. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) executes the Secretary of Homeland Security's authorities to secure critical infrastructure. Consistent with these authorities, CISA has developed, in collaboration with other federal agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector, an 'Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce' advisory list. This list is intended to help State, local, tribal and territorial officials as they work to protect their communities, while ensuring continuity of functions critical to public health and safety, as well as economic and national security. Decisions informed by this list should also take into consideration additional public health considerations based on the specific COVID-19 [coronavirus disease]-related concerns of particular jurisdictions."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Krebs, Christopher
2020-03-28
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Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response [March 19, 2020]
From the Document: "The attached list identifies workers who conduct a range of operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability, including staffing operations centers, maintaining and repairing critical infrastructure, operating call centers, working construction, and performing management functions, among others. The industries they support represent, but are not necessarily limited to, medical and healthcare, telecommunications, information technology systems, defense, food and agriculture, transportation and logistics, energy, water and wastewater, law enforcement, and public works. We recognize that State, local, tribal, and territorial governments are ultimately in charge of implementing and executing response activities in communities under their jurisdiction, while the Federal Government is in a supporting role. As State and local communities consider COVID-19 [coronavirus disease]-related restrictions, CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] is offering this list to assist prioritizing activities related to continuity of operations and incident response, including the appropriate movement of critical infrastructure workers within and between jurisdictions. Accordingly, this list is advisory in nature. It is not, nor should it be considered to be, a federal directive or standard in and of itself."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Krebs, Christopher
2020-03-19
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Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response [March 23, 2020]
From the Document: "The attached list identifies workers who conduct a range of operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability, including staffing operations centers, maintaining and repairing critical infrastructure, operating call centers, working construction, and performing management functions, among others. The industries they support represent, but are not necessarily limited to, medical and healthcare, telecommunications, information technology systems, defense, food and agriculture, transportation and logistics, energy, water and wastewater, law enforcement, and public works."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Krebs, Christopher
2020-03-23
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Advisory: APT29 Targets COVID-19 Vaccine Development
From the Introduction: "The United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE) assess that APT29 (also known as 'the Dukes' or 'Cozy Bear') is a cyber espionage group, almost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services. The United States' National Security Agency (NSA) agrees with this attribution and the details provided in this report. The United States' Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS CISA) endorses the technical detail and mitigation advice provided in this advisory. The group uses a variety of tools and techniques to predominantly target governmental, diplomatic, think-tank, healthcare and energy targets for intelligence gain. Throughout 2020, APT29 has targeted various organisations involved in COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] vaccine development in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, highly likely with the intention of stealing information and intellectual property relating to the development and testing of COVID-19 vaccines. APT29 is using custom malware known as 'WellMess' and 'WellMail' to target a number of organisations globally. This includes those organisations involved with COVID-19 vaccine development. WellMess and WellMail have not previously been publicly associated to APT29."
United Kingdom. National Cyber Security Centre; Communications Security Establishment (Canada); United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency . . .
2020-07-16
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Emergency Services Sector Continuity Planning Suite: Human Resources Worksheet
From the Introduction: "The following worksheet is derived from the 'Continuity Capability Evaluation for the Emergency Services Sector' (CCE) to assist Emergency Services Sector organizations in evaluating and filling gaps in their continuity capability. [...] Human resources are policies, plans, and procedures that address personnel needs during an emergency, such as guidance regarding pay, leave, work scheduling, benefits, telework, hiring, authorities, and flexibilities. Personnel are vital to the continuity capability of all organizations. Continuity coordinators at all organizations should be senior accountable officials responsible for working with the organization head to ensure the effectiveness and survivability of the organization's continuity capability. Continuity managers manage the day-to-day continuity programs. During an emergency, organizations will activate emergency response group (ERG) members to perform their assigned duties. The ERG is composed of individuals who are assigned responsibility to relocate to an alternate site, as required, to perform the organization's essential functions or other tasks related to continuity operations. Personnel stationed at the devolution site who are identified to conduct essential functions during activation of devolution plans are classified as the devolution emergency response group (DERG). Organizations should have means and processes in place for employees to contact their organization in a timely and routine manner during emergencies."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2018
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Advisory Memorandum on Ensuring Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers Ability to Work During the COVID-19 Response
From the Document: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) executes the Secretary of Homeland Security's authorities to secure critical infrastructure. Consistent with these authorities, CISA has developed, in collaboration with other federal agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector, an 'Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce' advisory list. This list is intended to help State, local, tribal, territorial officials and organizations endeavor to protect their workers and communities as they continue to reopen in a phased approach, coupled with the need to ensure continuity of functions critical to public health and safety, as well as economic and national security. Decisions informed by this list should also take into consideration worker safety, workplace settings, as well as additional public health considerations based on the specific COVID-19-related concerns of particular jurisdictions."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Wales, Brandon
2020-12-16
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Guidelines for 911 Centers: Pandemic Planning
From the Document: "Maintaining operational and resilient emergency communications is imperative during pandemic response for both public health and safety, as well as community well-being. A critical component of emergency communications are 911 centers--to include emergency communication centers (ECC), public safety answering points (PSAP), public safety communication centers (PSCC), emergency operations centers (EOC), and other public service command centers. A pandemic presents an immediate threat to the ability of these centers to operate effectively. The following guidance is intended to support public safety partners across all levels of government when engaging in the development of pandemic plans that promulgate policies, procedures, governance, resource planning, and contingency considerations."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020?
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Guidelines for 911 Centers: Pandemic Operating Procedures
From the Document: "Maintaining operational and resilient emergency communications is imperative during pandemic response for both public health and safety and community well-being. A critical component of emergency communications are 911 centers--to include emergency communication centers (ECC), public safety answering points (PSAP), public safety communication centers (PSCC), emergency operations centers (EOC), and other public safety command centers. A pandemic presents a real and immediate threat to the ability of these centers to operate effectively. In response, CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] has developed a series of guidance documents for all levels of government to use when addressing a pandemic and its potential impact to emergency communication centers. The following guidance is intended to support public safety partners across all levels of government when developing their policies and procedures to organize, train, and care for personnel while operating through a pandemic."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020?
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Guidelines for Executives: 911 Center Pandemic Recommendations
From the Document: "Maintaining operational and resilient emergency communications is imperative during pandemic response for both public health and safety, as well as community well-being. A critical component in delivering government services during any emergency, communications centers include public safety facilities at which 911 or other emergency communications lines are answered, calls are processed, and first responders are dispatched and managed."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020?
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Guidelines for 911 Centers: Cleaning and Disinfecting During a Pandemic
From the Document: "Maintaining operational and resilient 911 centers--to include emergency communication centers (ECC), public safety answering points (PSAP), public safety communication centers (PSCC), emergency operations centers (EOC), and other public safety command centers--is imperative during pandemic response for both public health and safety, as well as community well-being. A pandemic, such as coronavirus (COVID-19), presents a real and immediate threat to the ability of these critical centers to continue operations effectively. In response, CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] has developed a series of recommendations for all levels of government to use when addressing a pandemic and its potential impact on 911 centers."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020
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CISA Insights: 'Provide Medical Care' is in Critical Condition: Analysis and Stakeholder Decision Support to Minimize Further Harm
From the Document: "As the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic reaches another phase, with increased and protracted strains on the nation's critical infrastructure and related National Critical Functions such as 'Provide Medical Care,' CISA [U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] is undertaking a renewed push for cyber preparedness and resilience, as well as decision support for stakeholders within critical infrastructure sectors. Over time, we find these original insights increasingly valuable, and in service of timely decision support, we offer them to you in their original form. As British statistician George E. P. Box noted, 'All models are wrong, but some are useful.' We hope that these models and insights are useful to you and stimulate additional discussion and exploration for mutual benefit."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2021-09
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CBO Presentation: CBO's Budget and Economic Analysis During the Pandemic [November 3, 2021]
From the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) presentation to the Council for Affordable Health Coverage webpage: "Phillip Swagel, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, outlined the agency's budget and economic analysis during the 2020-2021 coronavirus pandemic and described some of the challenges involved in analyzing current economic policy. His remarks focused on CBO's analysis of health policy, the macroeconomic effects of the legislative response to the pandemic, and labor market issues arising from the response and recovery. He also discussed the long-term effects of the recovery on economic growth, jobs, wages, productivity, and climate change."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
Swagel, Phillip
2021-11-03
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Mémorandum De Recommandation Pour l'Identification Des Travailleurs Essentiels Des Infrastructures Critiques Dans Le Cadre De La Riposte Au COVID-19
"Alors que la nation entière se mobilise pour ralentir la propagation du COVID-19, le président a rendu publique le 16 mars une nouvelle version des Coronavirus Guidelines for America, des lignes directrices soulignant l'importance des travailleurs des infrastructures critiques. La Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) exerce les pouvoirs du secrétaire du département de la Sécurité intérieure des États-Unis (Homeland Security) pour protéger les infrastructures critiques. De ce fait, la CISA a dressé une liste de recommandation des « travailleurs essentiels des infrastructures critiques » en collaboration avec d'autres agences fédérales, avec des organismes publics étatiques et locaux, et avec le secteur privé. Cette liste est censée aider les responsables des États, des municipalités, des tribus et des territoires dans le cadre de leur travail de protection de leurs communautés tout en assurant la continuité des fonctions essentielles pour la santé et la sécurité publiques, ainsi que pour la sécurité économique et nationale. Les décisions prises à l'aide de cette liste doivent également tenir compte de facteurs supplémentaires liés à la santé publique et dépendant des enjeux du COVID-19 dans chaque collectivité concernée."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Krebs, Christopher C., 1977-
2020-05-19
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Memorándum de carácter consultivo sobre la identificación de trabajadores esenciales de infraestructura crítica durante la respuesta al COVID-19
"A medida que el país se une para frenar la propagación del COVID-19, el 16 de marzo el Presidente emitió una actualización de los Lineamientos para afrontar la pandemia de coronavirus en los Estados Unidos, que destacan la importancia de la fuerza laboral de infraestructura crítica. La Agencia de Ciberseguridad y Protección de Infraestructura (CISA) ejecuta las potestades del Secretario de Seguridad Nacional para asegurar la infraestructura crítica. En consonancia con esas potestades, CISA ha desarrollado -- en colaboración con otras agencias federales, gobiernos estatales y locales, y el sector privado -- una lista recomendada de 'Fuerza Laboral Esencial de Infraestructura Crítica'. Esta lista ha sido diseñada para ayudar a los funcionarios estatales, locales, tribales y territoriales a medida que trabajan en la elaboración de planes para proteger a sus comunidades y asegurar la continuidad de las funciones críticas para la salud y la seguridad públicas, al igual que para la economía y seguridad del país. Las decisiones que se tomen basadas en esta lista también deberían tomar en cuenta otras consideraciones de salud pública, según las preocupaciones específicas relacionadas con el COVID-19 de jurisdicciones particulares."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Krebs, Christopher C., 1977-
2020-05-19
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Critical Infrastructure Operations Centers and Control Rooms - A Guide for Pandemic Response
From the Document: "This Guide provides considerations and mitigation measures for operations centers and control rooms across the 16 critical infrastructure sectors required to operate in a pandemic environment. Operations centers and control rooms often operate 24/7, depend on unique equipment, and require specially trained staff who are difficult to replace. As a result, specialized equipment and long lead times required to train personnel mean there is a higher risk to sustaining reliable operations. Fortunately, operations centers and control rooms are generally isolated and physically secure, and may be more conducive to the sequestration of on-site staff if needed. This guide provides a set of special considerations for maintaining these critical operations."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020-04
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CISA Insights: Risk Management for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)
From the Document: "This product is for executives to help them think through physical, supply chain, and cybersecurity issues that may arise from the spread of Novel Coronavirus, or COVID-19. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), COVID-19 has been detected in locations around the world, including multiple areas throughout the U.S."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020-03-18
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CISA Insights: COVID-19 Disinformation Activity
From the Document: "'False and misleading information related to the coronavirus (COVID-19) are a significant challenge. This CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] Insight provides an overview of coronavirus disinformation and steps that can be taken to reduce the risk of sharing inaccurate information with your friends and family.'"
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020-05
