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South Asia
South Asia accounts for one-fifth of humanity but is, geographically and culturally, far from the United States--"on the backside of the world," as one senior official commented.
Perhaps because of distance and an American perception that South Asia's large population represents strategic weakness rather than strength, it has not been an important region for U.S. foreign policy.
The exact form of the next crisis cannot be predicted, but its consequences could be catastrophic if it were to spin out of control and result in a nuclear exchange.
Research conducted by the Naval War College indicates that nuclear war between India and Pakistan could result in casualties in the millions, a breakdown in governance in both countries, and the largest humanitarian crisis in history.
Pakistan's own dubious stability as a viable state, its growing Islamic militancy with a global reach, and an emerging competition between China and India that could take the form of an arms race, all further complicate the South Asian security scene and render it more tenuous.
These sobering realities highlight the need for the new administration to develop a strategy that will lead India and Pakistan to adopt transparent nuclear weapons postures that encourage regional stability and reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange, either by intention or by inadvertence.
The United States must also rebuild its relationship with Pakistan, engage the military in several areas critical to the United States, and halt the slide from friendship into outright animosity.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Holzman, John C.
2001
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East Asia and the Pacific
The United States has enduring economic, political, and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The region accounts for 25 percent of the global economy and nearly $600 billion in annual two-way trade with the United States. Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, over the past two decades, democracy has taken root in and spread across the region. Former authoritarian regimes in the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan have been transformed into vibrant democracies. For over a century, U.S. strategic interests have remained constant: access to the markets of the region, freedom of the seas, promotion of democracy and human rights, and precluding domination of the region by one power or group of powers. While major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. Hostilities that could involve the United States could arise at a moment's notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. This paper will focus on four key areas that require early attention by the Bush administration--the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Korean peninsula, China-Taiwan, and Indonesia--and suggest elements of a strategy for addressing policy challenges effectively.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Przystup, James J.; Montaperto, Ronald N.
2001
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Arms Control Policy
Decisions on the next phase of strategic force reductions and how to achieve them will have to await the resolution of larger issues related to the future of the U.S. strategic force posture and national missile defense.
Once the Bush administration completes its Nuclear Posture Review, however, it will need to decide whether to continue the Cold War-style strategic arms reduction process or explore alternatives for reducing nuclear threats to national security and transforming the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.
The traditional arms control process of negotiating legally binding treaties that both codify numerical parity and contain extensive verification measures has reached an impasse and outlived its utility.
To jump-start this process, the administration should give top priority to repealing legislation that prohibits the Nation from unilaterally reducing strategic forces until START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ) enters into force.
Unless the United States embraces a more flexible and innovative approach to strategic arms control, progress will be stymied in developing a nuclear weapons posture for the new security environment.
America and Russia are no longer enemies and the nuclear arms race between the two countries is, for all intents and purposes, over.
The likelihood that Russia could marshal the economic resources for clandestine production of new nuclear weapon systems on a militarily significant scale is extremely remote.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Sokolsky, Richard
2001
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Strategic Posture Review
In the past, U.S. decisionmakers have addressed strategic nuclear force and national missile defense issues in an incremental and uncoordinated manner.
The forthcoming Strategic Posture Review (SPR) needs to fundamentally reassess the purposes of nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and the requirements of deterrence and stability in the new security environment.
Such a framework should integrate new assessments of deterrence and stability over the next 10-20 years, in light of the much more diverse threats facing the United States.
SPR should include a reassessment of U.S. strategic force levels and targeting requirements; consideration of different hedges and reconstitution options against greater-than-expected threats, such as maintaining production capabilities or making unilateral strategic force reductions outside a formal treaty framework; and development of a broad calculus to assess the impact of national missile defense and other strategic developments on deterrence and stability.
Such aggression would be particularly troublesome if it involved use of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles to deter U.S. and Western military intervention in regional crises.
A strategy that puts higher priority on meeting future challenges from an adversarial Russia or a hostile China, and that maintains faith in traditional deterrence, is likely to continue relying most heavily on the threat of nuclear retaliation.
A strategy that is more concerned with building partnerships with Russia and China and relying on preventive defense, traditional deterrence, and conventional capabilities to defend U.S. interests against rogue state actions would be characterized by lower levels of offense and no or low defenses.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Bunn, M. Elaine; Sokolsky, Richard
2001
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In Touch with Industry: ICAF Industry Studies, Academic Year 1996: Aircraft
The U.S. aircraft industry is clearly a nationally important strategic
industry. Despite a global decline in the industry between 1991 and 1995,
most U.S. and international aircraft manufacturers predict a positive
future. However, to keep their current 60 percent market share, U.S.
companies will have to focus on several key areas in the future. The most
competitive global aircraft manufacturing companies are focusing
investment and management resources on modemizing and capitalizing on
the benefits related to the potential of the computer. And aggressive
marketing techniques, such as the use of full-scale cockpit and fuselage
mock-ups to demonstrate advanced designs and concepts, appear to be
very effective mechanisms for selling aircraft. Despite their current
dominance of the global market, we believe U.S. aircra~ manufacturers
will have to not only aggressively modernize their production and
engineering base but also become much more customer oriented to retain
their lead.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Abbott, Gerald
1996
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In Touch with Industry: ICAF Industry Studies, Academic Year 1996: Biotechnology
Biotechnology products and processes are revolutionizing the health care,
agricultural, industrial chemical, environmental, and other fields. This
young, risky, multidisciplinary industry holds endless promise for spin-off
products, manufacturing processes in other industries, and sustainability
for the future. Biotechnology is niche oriented, geared toward developing
high-technology, high-quality, and less expensive products for mankind.
Its potential military applications range from biological defenses to new
protective materials. The United States leads the world in biotechnology,
but the industry is at a critical point in its development cycle and needs
continued support for basic research. Just one new discovery can
completely change the structure of the industry.
As a result of the biotechnology industry's work, one day in the future a
child will receive an AIDS vaccine as a part of her normal pediatric
vaccination program, a farmer in Arizona will grow corn in the middle of
the desert, and in New Jersey an old industrial site will clean itself for
later reuse as a residential area. In the biotechnology industry, the future
is limited only by the human mind and financial risk.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Abbott, Gerald
1996
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In Touch with Industry: ICAF Industry Studies, Academic Year 1996: Construction
This report examines the changes in the construction industry--such as
design-build contract methodology and privatization of infrastructure--
caused by the information systems revolution, economic globalization, and
reduced government investments. It explores environmental issues and
changing trade patterns in construction machinery and materials caused
by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Lessons about terrorism
and construction learned from the World Trade Center bombing are also
highlighted.
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Abbott, Gerald
1996
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International Institute for Strategic Studies: Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Arundel House, London, England, December 2, 2002
Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Arundel House, London, England, December 2, 2002. Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz stated to the International Institute for Strategic Studies that "The goal in Iraq is disarmament; the elimination of Iraq's programs to build chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them. Disarming Saddam Hussein and fighting the war on terror are not merely related; the first is a crucial part of the second. The peaceful implementation of Resolution 1441 can only happen if there is a fundamental change in the attitude of the Iraqi regime. It is not and cannot be the responsibility of the inspectors to scour every square inch of Iraq. It cannot be their responsibility to search out and find every illegal weapon or system. That would be a task beyond their means. Nor is it their responsibility to disarm Iraq. That is the responsibility of the Iraqi regime itself. What inspectors can do is give us some confidence if the regime has, in fact, assumed that responsibility, if it has, in fact, declared every weapon of mass destruction and every development program that exists and has, in fact, destroyed those and dismantled those programs."
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-12-02
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IRAQ: What Does Disarmament Look Like?
Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, NY, Thursday, January 23, 2003. "The threat posed by the connection between terrorist networks and states that possess these weapons of mass terror presents us with the danger of a catastrophe that could be orders of magnitude worse than September 11th. Iraq's weapons of mass terror and the terror networks to which the Iraqi regime are linked are not two separate themes, not two separate threats. They are part of the same threat. Disarming Iraq and the War on Terror are not merely related. Disarming Iraq of its chemical and biological weapons and dismantling its nuclear weapons program is a crucial part of winning the War on Terror. Iraq has had 12 years now to disarm, as it agreed to do at the conclusion of the Gulf War. But, so far, it has treated disarmament like a game of hide and seek, or as Secretary of State Powell has termed it, "rope-a-dope in the desert." But this is not a game. It is deadly serious. We are dealing with a threat to the security of our nation and the world. At the same time, however, President Bush understands fully the risks and dangers of war and the President wants to do everything humanly possible to eliminate this threat by peaceful means. That is why the President called for the U.N. Security Council to pass what became Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations and, in so doing, to eliminate the danger that Iraq's weapons of mass terror could fall into the hands of terrorists."
United States. Department of Defense
2003-01-23
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Reserve Officers Association
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Reserve Officers Association 2003 Mid-Winter Conference and 18th Annual Military Exposition, Washington, DC, January 20, 2003. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that while a number of terrorist states are pursuing weapons of mass destruction, the threat posed by Iraq is unique. "No living dictator has shown the deadly combination of capability and intent, of aggression against his neighbors; pursuit of weapons of mass destruction; the use of weapons of mass destruction; oppression of his own people; support of terrorism; and the most threatening hostility to its neighbors and to the United States, than Saddam Hussein."
United States. Department of Defense
2003-01-20
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Transforming the Defense Establishment
Remarks by Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Bear Stearns & Company, Monday, January 27, 2003. This report goes over George W. Bush's remarks in a September 1999 candidacy speech. The topic discussed by Bush is the "revolution in the technology of war", and how our forces must be agile, lethal, readily available, and require a minimum of logistical support for the continued safety of our country and our allies.
United States. Department of Defense
2003-01-27
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Building the Bridge to a More Peaceful Future
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, The World Affairs Council and the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, CA, Friday, December 6, 2002. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz told the Council that it is not the responsibility of weapons inspectors in Iraq "to scour every square inch." That would be "beyond their means," as well as their responsibility, he said. "The bottom line is that Saddam Hussein and his regime must fundamentally change their attitude and finally implement a disarmament that they agreed to more than a decade ago. If the inspectors are forced to go back to the old cat-and-mouse game that the world saw so often before, then the effort to resolve this problem peacefully will have failed."
United States. Department of Defense
2002-12-06
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Protecting the Homeland: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defensive Information Operations: 2000 Summer Study, Volume II
The Vulnerabilities of the United States, inextricably intertwined with our civilian structure, when coupled with known and expected capabilities of potential adversaries raise serious questions about the readiness of the DoD to conduct Defensive Information Operations. To address these challenges, this task force focused on issues and opportunities in five major areas: Architecture for Information Assurance; Technology Challenges and Applications; Organization, Operations and Readiness; Policy Implications, and; Legal Implications. The report is provided in two volumes. Volume one presents the overall observations, finding and primary recommendations for each of the five focus areas, addressed at the decision maker level. Volume two provides a detailed report for each of the five focus areas, with more specific recommendations including courses of action, cost estimates, and anticipated level of effort, addressed at the implementation level. While there is no hierarchy implicit in these topics, recommendations pertaining to some will be easier and less costly. Others, like the architecture, will have the greatest impact, take the most time, and be the most expensive. Even so, it is only the successful integration of all of the recommendations that will provide the DoD with the Information Infrastructure need to achieve the goals the joint vision.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-03
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CDC Emergency Preparedness and Response: Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
This is a webpage maintained by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers. Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers are filoviruses such as Ebola, Marburg and arenaviruses (e.g. Lass, Machupo). Information contained on the website includes fact sheets and overviews, laboratory testing procedures, surveillance and investigation, and infection control. Several documents are available in portable document format (pdf).
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
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Acrolein (C3H4O) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include 2-propenal, 2-propen-1-one, prop-2-en-1-al, acraldehyde, acrylaldehyde, acrylic
aldehyde, allyl aldehyde, ethylene aldehyde, aqualine.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
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Joint Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) Special Projects
"Special projects are intended as a joint forum to explore, as a joint TENCAP community, the best ideas, new concepts, procedures, and equipment for requesting, tasking, processing, analyzing, integrating, exploiting, and disseminating information derived from National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and other joint and Service-unique ground, airborne, or overhead systems. Special projects assess how individual Service TENCAP-related tactics, techniques and procedures, concepts, and technologies may be integrated with existing theater and other Service's initiatives to improve knowledge-based decision making and
facilitate joint operations. These projects may examine current and future system capabilities as well as emerging technologies."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2002-07-22
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Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans
"This manual establishes guidelines for the review of operation plans submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Procedures for the review of format of operation plans are contained in references a through d. In order to review operation plans for compliance with regional taskings, planning assumptions, and force apportionment, use reference e. Reference f contains overarching principles that should be adhered to in conjunction with content issues surfaced by this manual. Responsibilities for the management of the review of operation plans are contained in reference g."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1998-09-15
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Learning from 9/11: Understanding the Collapse of the World Trade Center: Hearing before the Committee on Science, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, March 6, 2002
"On Wednesday, March 6, at noon the House Committee on Science will hold a hearing on the investigation into the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC). Witnesses from industry, academia, and government will testify on the catastrophic collapse of the WTC complex and subsequent efforts by federal agencies and independent researchers to understand how the building structures failed and why. By scrutinizing the steel and other debris, blueprints and other documents, and recorded images of the disaster, engineers, designers, and construction professionals may learn valuable lessons that could save thousands of lives in the event of future catastrophes, natural or otherwise."
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Science. (1995-2007)
2003-03-17
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Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) Situation Monitoring Manual
"This manual contains guidance and policy for the Commander's Situation Report (SITREP) and the Commander's Operational Report (OPREP-1, 2, 4, and 5), as well as reporting instruction for the OPREPs. The reports are used to provide timely information on critical situations and military operations. Critical or disastrous situations triggering national-level interest will be reported via OPREP-3 (PINNACLE) in accordance with the reference."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2001-05-01
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Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions
"This manual sets policy for a system of publications detailing standard reporting structures and for the use of United States Message Text Formats (USMTF) in DOD information systems...This manual provides: a description of the responsibilities of Joint Reporting Structure (JRS) participants and the procedures for maintaining, monitoring, and reviewing the JRS; the general instructions, guidelines, and standards to be used in the organization, writing, and promulgation of the subordinate publications of the JRS; [and] an executive summary for all reports in the structure, a report list with the appropriate CJCS 3150 series directives, and a discussion of management procedures regarding US Message Text Formats (USMTF)."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1999-06-30
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Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations
"This instruction defines responsibilities for planning and conducting military Consequence Management (CM) operations in response to incidents on foreign soil involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). DOD support to foreign CM operations focuses on providing specialized assistance in response to use of WMD against US military forces, installations, allies, regional friends, or vital interests."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1998-06-30
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Inventory of State and Local Law Enforcement Technology Needs to Combat Terrorism
Recent acts of terrorism within the United States, such as the bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, have focused attention on the ability of law enforcement to manage these incidents and investigate individuals and groups suspected of planning or executing terrorist acts. Of particular concern is the gap between technologies available to and used by law enforcement, especially State and local agencies, and the advanced technologies used by persons and groups planning terrorist acts. To improve the ability of law enforcement agencies to fight terrorism, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The Act charged the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) with the task of determining what technologies are needed by State and local law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism. To fulfill this task, NIJ sponsored a survey of State and local law enforcement officials and representatives of other groups that could be involved in preventing and managing terrorist attacks. The project was to be carried out in two phases: Phase one involved an inventory of the technology needs of State and local law enforcement, with respondents from all 50 States and the District of Columbia, while Phase two will involve analyses of those needs to determine whether existing or developing technology can fulfill them or whether new technologies are required. This Research in Brief presents findings from Phase I of the project, identifying the most frequently mentioned needs as well as issues related to fulfilling them.
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
1999-01
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Electromagnetic Spectrum Use in Joint Military Operations
"This instruction is in accordance with Enclosure B, reference a, issue policy and guidance for planning, coordinating, and controlling electromagnetic spectrum use in joint military operations. Its purpose is to develop and implement joint doctrinal concepts and associated operational procedures to achieve interoperability of IT and NSS capabilities employed by US military forces and, where required, with joint, combined, and coalition forces and other USG departments and agencies. References a through are provided for further reading."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2002-09-30
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Meeting the Aircraft Security Challenge: Report of the Secretary's Rapid Response Team on Aircraft Security
The threat to aviation safety has changed, and so must our response. The events of September 11 changed forever our concepts of appropriate aviation safety. The use of a hijacked aircraft as a weapon requires a new strategy to ensure that the crew always retains control of the aircraft. To combat the new threat and restore public confidence in commercial aviation, this report documents considerations of changes to aircraft design and operation. It addresses the security issues that arise at aircrafts in connection with travel on commercial airlines. A detailed discussion of specific action follows.
United States. Department of Transportation
2001-10-01
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Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR)
This instructions purpose is to provide policy and guidance for reporting, identifying, evaluating, and controlling electromagnetic interference to achieve a goal of electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) between joint Service and combatant command operations and space systems. This document also provides supplementary information (see DOD Directive C-3222.5 for further information) regarding the reporting and resolution of suspected hostile electronic attacks against DOD systems. Electronic Attacks are divided into three categories: Meaconing, Intrusion, and Jamming.
United States. Department of Defense
1999-12-01
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Nuclear Command and Control Command Assistance Visit (CAV) Program
"The Joint Staff will support National Military Command System (NMCS) staff receiving Staff Assessment Visits (SAVs) under reference with Command Assistance Visits (CAVs). This instruction documents this program. CAVs are designed to solve specific procedural issues related to NMCS staff nuclear operations or minimum core competencies."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1998-12-07
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Policy for Department of Defense Voice Networks
"This instruction establishes policy and prescribes responsibilities for use and operation of the DOD voice networks, specifically the DSN and the DRSN. This instruction applies to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Military Services, and Defense agencies. This instruction also identifies policy and responsibilities concerning non-DOD governmental, foreign government, and civilian organizational requests for DSN and DRSN support. Requests for waivers to this instruction will be forwarded by chain of command, including the CINCs, Service Chiefs, or Defense agencies, to the Joint Staff, stating the reason compliance is not possible."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2001-09-23
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Spectrum Deconflication Within the United States and Possessions
"This instruction implements policy to ensure use of Link-16 systems including the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) do not exceed pulse density limitations specified in National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and US Military Communications-Electronics Board (MCEB) guidance. This
instruction applies to all units operating JTIDS/MIDS in the proximity of the United States and its Possessions (US&P). This instruction provides the policy, definition, procedures, and organizational responsibilities to manage JTIDS/MIDS use through the control, monitoring, supervision, and management of pulse densities, referred to as pulse deconfliction."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2001-03-16
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Defense Information System Network and Connected Systems
This instruction establishes policy and delineates responsibilities for life-cycle management of the Defense Information System Network (DISN). It details policy for management and use of the DISN, DISN services, and connected systems. Specific policies governing the satellite component of the DISN are covered in CJCS MOP 37, 'Military Satellite Communications Systems.'...The DISC is DoD's consolidated worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications infrastructure that provides the end-to-end information transfer network for supporting military operations.
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1996-05-22
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Coordination of United States Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Positions in International Forums
"This instruction provides CJCS policy for the coordination of US positions dealing with command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems matters in international forums and describes procedures for US military participation in all international forums that deal with C4 issues. "CJCS policy supports: the development and implementation of procedures to ensure that US C4 positions in international forums are uniformly coordinated, in consonance with official US guidance on the C4 matter at hand, and are supported by all DOD components for which this instruction is directive. The concept, development, and coordination of guidance, normally in the form of a guidance package (GP), is the responsibility of the US delegate/representative for the particular international forum. The requirement that all guidance on C4 matters for international forums be coordinated with all interested CINCs, conflicts and variances be identified and resolved, and results of meetings be published and given timely dissemination to all DoD components as required."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2000-12-05
