Advanced search Help
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Domestic Preparedness Program: Testing of HAZMATCAD Detectors Against Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
This report characterizes the chemical warfare (CW) agent detection potential of the commercially available HAZMATCAD. Three HAZMATCAD instruments were tested against HD, GB, and GA vapors under various conditions. This report is intended to provide the emergency responders concerned with CW agent detection an overview of the detection capabilities of the HAZMATCAD. The test concept was as follows: determine the minimum detectable level (MDL), the lowest concentration where repeatable detection readings are achieved for each selected CW agent, (the current military Joint Services Operational Requirements (JSOR) for point sampling detectors served as a guide for detection sensitivity objectives); investigate the effects of humidity and temperature on instrument performance; observe the effects of potential interfering vapors upon instrument performance in the laboratory and in the field.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Longworth, Terri L.; Baranoski, John M.; Ong, Kwok Y.
2002-02
-
Domestic Preparedness Program: Testing of Detectors Against Chemical Warfare Agents - Summary Report (UC AP2C Portable Chemical Contamination Control Monitor Collective Unit)
This report characterizes the chemical warfare (CW) agent detection potential of the commercially available UC AP2C Portable Chemical Contamination Control Monitor Collective Unit. These detectors were tested against HD, GB, and GA vapor at various conditions. This report is intended to provide the emergency responders concerned with CW agent detection an overview of the detection capabilities of these detectors.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Longworth, Terri L.; Ong, Kwok Y.
2001-05
-
Domestic Preparedness Program: Testing of the CAM-Chemical Agent Monitor (Type L) Against Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
This report characterizes the chemical warfare (CW) agent detection potential of the commercially available CAM Chemical Agent Monitor (Type L). This instrument was tested against HD, GB and GA vapor at various conditions. This report is intended to provide the emergency responders concerned with CW agent detection an overview of the detection capabilities of these instruments.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Longworth, Terri L.; Ong, Kwok Y.
2001-08
-
Testing of Commercially Available Detectors Against Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
Five commercial detector types including photoionization, flame ionization, anc colorimetric detector tubes, were tested against HD, GB, and GA vapor at various conditions. These detectors were also challenged with potential interferent vapors. This summary report characterizes the chemical warfare (CW) agent detection potential of these detectors. It is intended to provide the emergency responders concerned with CW agent detection an overview of the detection capabilities of these detectors' characteristics based on results of the evaluation.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Longworth, Terri L.; Ong, Kwok Y.; Barnhouse, Jacob L. . . .
1999-02
-
Domestic Preparedness Program: Testing of APD2000 Chemical Warfare Agent Detector Against Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
This report characterizes the chemical warfare (CW) agent detection potential of the commercially available APD2000 Chemical Agent Detector. These detectors were tested against HD (Mustard), GB (Sarin), and GA (Tabun) vapor at various conditions. This report is intended to provide the emergency responders concerned with CW agent detection an overview of the detection capabilities of these detectors.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Longworth, Terri L.; Ong, Kwok Y.; Barnhouse, Jacob L.
2000-08
-
Domestic Preparedness Program: Testing of M90-D1-C Chemical Warfare Agent Detector Against Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
This report characterizes the chemical warfare (CW) agent detection potential of the commercially available M90-D1-C Chemical Agent Detector. These detectors were tested against HD, GB, and GA vapor at various conditions. This report is intended to provide the emergency responders concerned with CW agent detection an overview of the detection capabilities of these detectors.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Longworth, Terri L.; Ong, Kwok Y.; Barnhouse, Jacob L.
2000-12
-
Changing Face of the Department of of Defense's Chemical Biological Defense Chemical Biological Defense Program
A Presentation made at the World Wide Chemical Conference XIX by the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense about the past, present and future of the DoD's Biological Defense program.
United States. Department of Defense
Johnson-Winegar, Anna
2002-10-19
-
Transforming Chemical and Biological Defense Acquisition
A presentation from the World Wide Chemical Conference XIX by the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Agency about the current and future capabilities chemical and biological acquisition process.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Reeves, Stephen, V.
2002-09
-
New Normalcy... and the Way Ahead: Understanding the Coast Guard's Maritime Homeland Security and National Defense Missions
A presentation from the World Wide Chemical Conference XIX by representatives from the U.S. Coast Guard outlining the organizations new role in maritime homeland security as a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
United States. Coast Guard
O'Dell, Mike
2002-09
-
Test Results of Level B Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Summary Report
Six Level B protective suits were tested for GB and HD permeation swatch testing using modified procedures of TOP 8-2-501. Agent break-through times were calculated for each suit. Aerosol agent simulant tests of suit systems were conducted to measure overall protection factors of the suit.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
1999-04
-
Domestic Preparedness: Sarin Vapor: Challenge and Corn Oil Protection Factor (PF) Testing of Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Systems and Cartridges
Under the Domestic Preparedness (DP) Expert Assistance Personal Protective
Equipment (PPE) Evaluation Program, the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC) was tasked to perform testing of Commercial Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Systems and Cartridges. Three tests were performed: (1) Chemical agent
breakthrough testing of PAPR cartridges (specifically the organophosphorus nerve agent GB, known as Sarin), (2) Combined Sarin-challenge testing of cartridges and facepiece facial seals using a manikin headform equipped with simulated-breathing pumps, and (3)
Corn oil Protection Factor (PF) testing of PAPR Systems using human subjects. The PF testing examines the face seal only, the breakthrough testing with Sarin examines the
cartridge adsorption efficiency only, and the combined test examines both under high concentration challenge conditions. The chemical agent testing was done by Chemical
Evaluation Laboratory, Surety Team, Engineering Directorate. The PF testing was done by the Mask Fit Test Facility, Non-Surety Team, Engineering Directorate. The first objective of the task was to determine the protection potential of the PAPRs against the organophosphorus nerve agent, Sarin (GB). GB is the standard nerve
agent used in military testing. It is the most volatile of the nerve agents and hence more suitable for vapor testing. There are presently no standardized qualification procedures
developed for these types of applications. Therefore, a draft version of procedures
developed by the U.S. Army Chemical Agent Safety and Health Policy Action Committee (CASHPAC), and methods and requirements established by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) were used as guides in developing the test
procedures used for the DP applications. The test procedures are described in subsequent sections of this report. The second objective was to perform Protection Factor (PF) testing of the PAPR systems being challenged by a corn oil aerosol. This is a standard Army procedure used
by all military services.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Pappas, Alex G.; Campbell, Lee E.
1999-02
-
Sarin Vapor Challenge and Corn Oil Protection Factor (PF) Testing of Commercial Air-Purifying Negative Pressure Respirators
Results of performance testing of commercial air-purifying negative pressure respirators (NPR) are described. Three series of tests were performed: (1) breakthrough time determinations of cartridges/canisters against Sarin (GB), (2) GB vapor breakthrough determination of entire NPR systems using manikin headform and simulated breathing, and (3) corn-oil protection factor determinations of NPR systems using human subjects. Results indicate that cartridges provide adequate resistance to GB breakthrough against high-concentration challenges, but that corn oil aerosol and high-concentration GB vapor penetration into the breathing zone of the NPR occurs at unacceptable levels.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Pappas, Alex G.; Campbell, Lee E.; Lins, Ray
2002-12
-
Sarin Vapor Challenge and Corn Oil Protection Factor (PF) Testing of 3M BE10 Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) with AP3 Cartridge
Results of performance testing of the 3M Model BE10 powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) are described.
Three series of tests were performed: (1) breakthrough time determinations of PAPR Cartridge Model AP3 against Sarin (GB) (2) GB vapor penetration determination of entire PAPR systems using manikin headform and simulated breathing, and (3) corn-oil protection factor determinations of PAPR systems using human subjects. Results indicate that cartridges provide adequate resistance to GB penetration against high concentration challenges, but that corn oil aerosol and high concentration
GB vapor penetration into the breathing zone of the PAPR occurs at high levels, possibly through the hood-type head enclosure and/or the exhalation valve.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Pappas, Alex G.; Campbell, Lee E.; Lins, Ray
2001-06
-
Test Results of Air-Permeable Charcoal Impregnated Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Executive Summary
Swatches from five commercially available air-permeable charcoal impregnated protective suits were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the convective permeation test procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From these data, a physiologically-derived breakthrough time was calculated for each suit for the purposes of comparison. In addition, intact suits were challenged with corn-oil aerosol to simulate a biological or chemical aerosol. Protection factors were determined for each suit.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.; Pappas, Alex G.
2002-09
-
Tests of Level B Suit: Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Executive Summary
Six Level B protective suits were tested for GB and HD permeation swatch testing using modified procedures of TOP 8-2-501. Agent break-through times were calculated for each suit. Aerosol agent simulant tests of suit systems were conducted to measure overall protection factors of the suit.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
1999-04
-
Test Results of Phase 2 Level B Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Executive Summary
Swatches from seven commercially available Level B protective suits were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each suit for the purposes of comparison. In addition, intact suits were challenged with corn-oil aerosol to simulate a biological or chemical aerosol. Protection factors were determined for each suit.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-02
-
Domestic Preparedness Program: Test for Mustard (HD) Liquid Challenge of Hoses for Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
This report contains information on the testing of hoses for Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) against permeation by liquid mustard (HD). Under the Domestic Preparedness (DP) Expert Assistance Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) Evaluation Program, the Chemical Biological Center (CB) was tasked to perform testing of hoses for Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
against permeation by liquid mustard (HD). HD is a military chemical agent whose action is vesicant (blistering). It is used as a standard permeation test challenge
because it permeates most protective materials more rapidly than any other chemical agent, thus shortening the test time to detection of permeation. The DP Program includes response to incidents of military chemical agent, thus shortening the test time
to detection of permeation. The DP Program includes response to incidents of military chemical agents dispersed in a civilian setting, therefore the requirement for testing
responders' personal protective gear against these agents. If the components of the PPE resist HD permeation for a specified time, it is certain that the components will
resist permeation by any other chemical agent for the same time. The actual permeation testing was assigned to the Chemical Evaluation Laboratory, Surety Team,
Engineering Directorate, which has many years experience in testing military breathing hoses against HD, using a standard method. The requirement for test results was
given to the laboratory as one hour resistance to HD permeation. The purpose of the test was to collect data on the performance of the hoses against HD challenges.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Campbell, Lee E.; Sneeringer, Paul V.
1999-01
-
Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM)
The MARSSIM provides information on planning, conducting, evaluating, and documenting building surface and surface soil final status radiological surveys for demonstrating compliance with dose or risk-based regulations or standards. The MARSSIM is a multi-agency consensus document that was developed collaboratively by four Federal agencies having authority and
control over radioactive materials: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE),
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The MARSSIM's objective is to describe a consistent approach for planning, performing, and
assessing building surface and surface soil final status surveys to meet established dose or risk-based
release criteria, while at the same time encouraging an effective use of resources. The Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) provides a nationally consistent consensus approach to conducting radiation surveys and investigations at potentially contaminated sites. This approach should be both scientifically rigorous and flexible enough to be applied to a diversity of site cleanup conditions. MARSSIM's title includes the term "survey" because it provides information on planning and conducting surveys, and includes
the term "site investigation" because the process outlined in the manual allows one to begin by investigating any site (i.e., by gathering data or information) that may involve radioactive contamination.
United States. Department of Defense; United States. Environmental Protection Agency; United States. Department of Energy . . .
2000-08
-
Sharing the Knowledge: Government Sector Partnerships to Enhance Information Security
The U.S. military has become increasingly dependent upon the nation's information and communications infrastructures. Concurrently, threats to and vulnerabilities in these infrastructures are expanding, in large part due to structural factors not likely to disappear in the future. To prevail against the increasing threat, the military--and, more broadly, the government--needs to adopt a risk reduction and management program. A crucial element of this risk management program is information sharing with the private sector. However, substantial barriers threaten to block information exchanges between the government and private sector. These barriers include concerns over release of sensitive material under Freedom of Information Act requests, antitrust actions, protection of business confidential and other private material, possible liability due to shared information, disclosure of classified information, and burdens entailed with cooperating with law enforcement agencies. There is good cause to believe that the government and private sector can overcome these barriers, guided by lessons learned from numerous successful government-private sector information-sharing mechanisms. This analysis concludes with actions the government should undertake to develop an information-sharing mechanism with the private sector. Key among them are actively engaging the private sector from the onset, determining information requirements, and fostering a partnership based on trust.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Rinaldi, Steven M.
2000-05
-
Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications for U.S. Security Interests
This paper analyzes the history of Indo-Russian military and nuclear cooperation. The "special" Moscow-New Delhi relationship during the Cold War, it concludes, was based upon Indian needs, American ambivalence, and Soviet opportunism. In the post-Cold War era this relationship has persisted due to continued American ambivalence, short-term Indian military needs, and Russian economic needs. This bond, therefore, may be fractured by an eventual improvement in Indian military self-reliance or a deepening in Indo-American military cooperation. India's strategic culture, rooted in Indian history, geography and political culture, has created an Indian strategic mindset impervious to American nonproliferation efforts. The paper finds, moreover, that there are no short-term "silver bullets" to cure the current Indo-American rift, which flows from causes in addition to India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998. While short-term measures can be taken to improve the bilateral relationship, the historical rift that has emerged between the two states cannot be easily mended. The United States, therefore, must strive to ensure that Indian nuclear expansion is conducted in a controlled, safe and limited manner.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Conley, Jerome M.
2000-02
-
Interpreting Shadows: Arms Control and Defense Planning in a Rapidly Changing Multi-Polar World
The focus of arms control is changing. It now deals with issues affecting all nations and not just the super powers. The policy options available to counter proliferation span responsibilities in different American agencies. A cohesive arms control effort will require greater interagency cooperation, because it will involve both inherently political and military issues. In reviewing current policy options some key findings emerge. First, the United States needs to develop closer relationships with countries that will have an impact on key regions. Key considerations in building these relationships are that the country has a similar government, an open economy, a professional military, and adequate infrastructure to support joint military exercises. Second, deterrence is still required, but nuclear deterrence by the United States is no longer credible and can be counterproductive to non-proliferation. The result is that conventional deterrence as the primary method of deterrence needs to be developed and demonstrated. Additionally, because of their quick deployment and long-range precision-strike capabilities, the role of the Air Force will probably increase in scenarios with regional powers possessing weapons of mass destruction. Third, economic sanctions are ineffective and hurt the population and not the leaders they are targeted against. There may be situations where multilateral sanctions would be appropriate; however, the United States should discontinue implementing unilateral economic sanctions. Fourth, export controls have been used to limit proliferation and support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, more can be done to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons through unilateral and multilateral export controls. Fifth, military assistance, when provided, needs to focus more on infrastructure development and deal less with weapon system sales. Building a nation's infrastructure has the dual purpose of aiding their economy and facilitating joint military exercises. Finally, confidence-building measures need to be pursued with more than lip service, because for confidence-building measures to succeed takes as much work as other options discussed.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
King, David R.
1999-06
-
Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience
The primary focus of the paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful development and subsequent rollback of South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the important milestones in the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability. It also relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa's nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests. The conclusions drawn from this effort are the South African nuclear program was an extreme response to its own "identity crisis." Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long-term end of a closer affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation--and receive guarantees of its security--rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western support to counter a feared "total onslaught" by Communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved economic and political integration with the West. Several recommendations are offered for critical review of the above issues to include the need for greater international dialogue and constructive engagement with threshold nations such as India and Pakistan. Nonproliferation regimes can be used to promote mutual verification, transparency, and the resolution of mutual security concerns. More than anything, policymakers must be prepared to assist threshold nuclear states in resolving their core regional security concerns if they wish to encourage states to pursue nuclear rollback.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Horton, Roy E.
1999-08
-
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture, Report to Congressional Requesters
Never has a results-oriented focus been more critical than today, when the security of America's citizens depends on the outcomes of many federal programs. In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) that created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and made it responsible for transportation security. ATSA requires TSA to implement specific practices that are intended to make it a results oriented organization. GAO makes specific recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation and the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security to continue and augment TSA's progress in implementing ATSA's results-oriented practices. The adjacent table shows selected recommended next steps for TSA. We provided drafts of this report to officials from the Department of Transportation (DOT), including TSA, for their review and comment. TSA's Director of Strategic Management and Analysis provided oral comments on behalf of DOT and TSA generally agreeing with the contents, findings, and recommendations of the draft report.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-01-17
-
Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction
The purpose of Counterforce: Locating and Destroying Weapons of Mass Destruction is to integrate the key insights of previous Air Force vision statements with the findings of the 1998 Long-Range Air Power Panel and address one of the most demanding practical issues that will impact America's next first battle. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) changes the context and conduct of future warfare. For starters, America's military strategy, operations concepts, and doctrine for the early 21st century should be based on the very real possibility that the armed forces will be pitted against adversaries armed with biological and chemical weapons and the ballistic and cruise missiles needed to deliver them accurately across great distances. The single most distinguishing feature of counterforce operations against WMD, as compared with existing missions of battlefield area interdiction, offensive counterair, and deep interdiction, lies in the targets themselves: chemical and biological weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles. These targets may already be earmarked for attack under an existing mission area but counterforce operations against WMD should be considered a specialized subset of these other missions and whose neutralization or destruction is of immense importance to the success of the overall campaign. Many of the WMD targets should be destroyed early in a conflict to prevent their use against friendly populations and forces. Locating these targets can be difficult, including, for example, the specific site of WMD facilities within the confines of a larger fixed target. Some targets may be relocatable; they may be vulnerable to attack for a short period of time (hours) at the outset of conflict. Mobile targets, such as missile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), present an especially difficult bombing task due to an enemy's use of ruses, decoys, rapid shoot-and-scoot operations, and other tactics. Another consideration is the depth of the target from political borders. Generally speaking, the deeper the target location, the more onerous is the counterforce strike operation. Finally, linking sensors-to-shooters can help significantly in striking the WMD target within the enemy's decision-making cycle.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Chandler, Robert W.
1998-09
-
Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations: New Answers and New Issues in the Arena of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy and Posture Entering the Twenty-First Century
"This publication represents the INSS vision. It emphasizes both the product of research, the papers produced, and the process of national security education and expertise development. Each of the authors presented here is a 'military-academic,' more traditionally a 'soldier-scholar,' and most are associated with the faculties of either the United States Air Force Academy or of its parent United States Military Academy. The results of their research are distributed by INSS to reach an audience that includes the military policy community. But of equal importance, these same results find their way into the classroom, educating the next generation of military leaders. The messages of these researchers and their enthusiasm for their subjects also reach the military faculties, particularly the junior faculty that many of these authors mentor in both career and academic pursuits. In short, these papers and authors combine the product and the process goals of INSS, thus magnifying the significance of their research efforts. Therefore, INSS presents the following four papers on post-Cold War deterrence and strategic defense, nuclear strategy, and regional considerations both for their content (product) and in furtherance of education and inquiry (process) in this critical arena of high-end national security policy."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Smith, James M.
2001-02
-
Searching for National Security in an NBC World: Four Papers on Changing Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats and US Government Policy in the Post-Cold War International Security Environment
"The four papers that follow are not a set, but a sampling of research being undertaken about the future role of nuclear weapons. No one of them is complete in addressing one or more of the questions--in fact these papers were written to address related but separate research questions. Either together or alone, neither are they necessarily definitive on each selected topic, but instead they represent developmental efforts by researchers still growing expertise in these fields. And both in spite of and because of researcher evolution and learning, they take on the added importance of being written by military and military-related civilians associated with the three Department of Defense service academies--faculty and staff members at institutions devoted to the undergraduate education and career preparation of future generations of practitioners of United States national security at all stages of the military spectrum."
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Smith, James M.
2000-07
-
Test Results of Level A Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Summary Report
In 1996, Congress passed Public Law 104-201, directing the Department of Defense (DoD) to assist other federal, state and local agencies in enhancing preparedness for terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction. DoD responded by forming the Domestic Preparedness Program that same year. One of the objectives of the Domestic Preparedness Program is to enhance emergency and hazardous material response to Nuclear, Biological and chemical (NBC) terrorism incidents. As part of an effective response, people who are responding to an incident will use personal protective equipment to protect them from exposure to chemical agents or biological agents. The specific personal protective equipment that will be used depends upon the situation that they encounter and what they have on hand. In some cases, Level A protective suits are required to enter a contaminated area. Level A suits are totally encapsulated suits that protect the wearer from liquid, vapor and gaseous chemical and particulates. Air is supplied by self-contained breathing apparatuses or supplied air lines. Appendix A has a list of the Level A suits that are testing in this program.
Edgewood Research, Development, & Engineering Center (U.S.)
Belmonte, Richard B.
1998-06
-
Test Results of Phase 2 Level A Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Summary Report
Swatches from six commercially-available Level A protective suites were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each suit for the purposes of comparison. In addition, intact suits were challenged with corn-oil aerosol to stimulate biological and chemical aerosols. Protection factors were determined for each suit.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.; Pappas, Alex G.
2001-02
-
Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Gloves to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
Swatches from eleven commercially available chemical protective gloves were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each glove/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-02
-
Swatch Test Results of Phase 2 Commercial Chemical Protective Gloves to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report
Swatches for four commercially available chemical protective gloves were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time and the results for all swatches were used to determine an average cumulative mass for each glove. From these data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each glove/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.
U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command
Procell, Suzanne A.; Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-01
