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San Diego Hazardous Material Commodity Flow Study
This study was conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9, in order to assist in chemical emergency planning and prevention efforts at the US/Mexico border. The cities of San Diego, California and Tijuana, Baja California are one of the six Sister City pairs on Region 9's border with Mexico under USEPA's Border XXI Program. The purpose of this study is to provide a commodity flow study of hazardous materials to aid local, state, and federal authorities to understand the volume and nature of hazardous material movements into, out of, and through the region, in particular San Diego County.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
2001-06
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Calexico: Hazardous Material Commodity Flow Study
This study was conducted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9, in order to assist in chemical emergency planning and prevention efforts at the US/Mexico border. The cities of Calexico, California, and Mexicali, Baja California, are one of the six Sister City pairs on Region 9's border with Mexico under USEPA's Border XXI Program. "Calexico: Hazardous Material commodity Flow Study," describes the identity and quantity of hazardous materials traveling through Calexico, and provides recommendations for reducing risks that these materials pose to the community. Furthermore, the study identifies the nature, quantities and routes of hazardous substances transported in or near Calexico, including exports to and imports from Mexico.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
2001-01
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United States-Mexico Joint Contingency Plan for Preparedness for and Response to Environmental Emergencies Caused by Releases, Spills, Fires, or Explosions of Hazardous Substances in the Inland Border Area
The United States-Mexico Joint Contingency Plan for Preparedness for and Response to Environmental Emergencies Caused by Releases, Spills, Fires, or Explosions of Hazardous Substances in the Inland Border Area (the Inland Plan) provides a mechanism for cooperation between the United States (U.S.) and Mexico in response to a polluting incident that may pose a significant threat to both parties or that affects one party to such an extent as to justify warning the other party or asking for assistance. Based on Article II of Annex II of the La Paz Agreement, the purpose of this Inland Plan is to protect human health and safety and the environment by providing for coordinated joint responses to polluting incidents affecting the inland border area of the U.S. and Mexico. The objectives of this Inland Plan are (1) to provide a bi-national coordination mechanism to assure appropriate and effective cooperative preparedness and response measures between the United States and Mexico for polluting incidents; and (2) to develop systems for notification of a polluting incident within the area covered by the Inland Plan.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1999-11-23
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U.S./Mexico Border Agreements, Laws, Regulations, Policies, and Procedures Related to Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness, and Response
This document is an outline description of U.S./Mexico border agreements, laws, regulations, policies, and procedures related to chemical accident prevention, preparedness, and response. The descriptions, in table form, provide the name of the regulation, the scope, the source and gives the reader instructions on where to locate the complete legal descriptions. Policy descriptions include international agreements, bi-national agreements, U.S. law and regulations, and border plans.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1998-07-09
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U.S. Policy Toward the European Security and Defense Policy
In December 2000 the European Union formalized a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with treaty amendments and concrete measures to establish supporting political and military structures. The United States favors a greater role for the European Union (EU) in European security provided that NATO's role in transatlantic security is not weakened and that European Union efforts result in increased and relevant military capabilities. Given the nascent nature of the ESDP, the time is now to carefully analyze the challenges and opportunities that exist for the United States to actively participate in shaping ESDP and NATO-EU relations. The United States seeks a relationship with the EU that strengthens transatlantic security and leads to an EU which is capable of being a future, viable partner for global security. How can the United States influence the process to ensure evolving EU defense structures are complementary and interoperable with NATO and capable of sharing defense responsibility with the United States in the future?
Army War College (U.S.)
Davis, Gordon B., Jr.
2002-04-09
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Strategic Implications for U.S. Policy in Iraq: What Now?
Currently, the underpinning of United States policy toward Iraq is based on a U.S. desire to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions enacted against Iraq's government, and more specifically against Saddam Hussein's regime, at the conclusion of the Gulf War. Since 1991, the U.S. government's strategy has been to contain Iraq through a combination of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military means. Despite these means, which include enforcing no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq, diplomatic pressure backed up by occasional missile strikes, and an economic embargo , Saddam Hussein remains recalcitrant and the U.S. continues to be concerned about Iraqi non-conventional weapons programs. Terrorist attacks against America at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 have given the Bush administration cause and public support to reevaluate U.S. policy toward Iraq. On one hand, it is possible that Saddam Hussein's regime is supporting, and possibly sponsoring, terrorism. On the other hand, there is a very real concern, especially throughout the moderate Muslim world, that expanding the fight against terrorism to include Iraq would undermine President Bush's fragile anti-terrorism coalition, possibly leading to a clash of civilizations. Therefore, the war on terrorism should be considered a catalyst for redefining U.S. national policy and strategy toward Iraq. This paper discusses the evolution of current U.S. policy toward Iraq, assesses key issues concerning the use of military force to meet national security objectives, and evaluates criteria likely to influence success or failure once the decision to use force has been made. The paper concludes that, as a result of the ongoing War on Terrorism, a number of strategic factors currently exist that support the use of military force to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime.
Army War College (U.S.)
Bender, William J.
2002-04-09
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Transformation of Counter Terrorism
The Transformation of Counter Terrorism is an examination of the changes occurring in counter terrorism using 11 September 2001 as a pivotal date. Before 11 September 2001, the United States dealt with counter terrorism primarily through law enforcement agencies and the civilian courts. After 11 September 2001, the United States declared war on terrorism and dealt with terrorists through the military and law enforcement agencies. United States civilian courts, international courts and military commissions are examined as various methods of determining guilt and the punishments upon terrorists.
Army War College (U.S.)
Golding, Peter
2002-04-09
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Transforming Military Overseas Presence to Deter and Prevent Asymmetric Warfare Against the United States
The end of the cold war has brought many changes to the geopolitical landscape of the world. Combined with covert operations, these technological advances have contributed to the world witnessing a rise in terrorism on a scale never before imagined; as demonstrated on 11 September 2001. This paper argues that the military presence overseas must transform, and integrate better with the interagency, to deter and defeat terrorist networks. The United States cannot allow failed nation states to become safe harbors for terrorist organizations of global reach. Nation states that provide nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or technology to terrorists are an even greater threat that must be deterred, or defeated if deterrence fails. A strong military presence overseas, along with an engaging foreign and economic policy, will enable the United States to effectively demonstrate its commitment to regional stability and defeating terrorist networks. Moreover, the U.S. will need a seamless intelligence network, stronger interagency collaboration, and greater international cooperation to prevent asymmetric attacks.
Army War College (U.S.)
Disney, Paul R., Jr.
2002-04-09
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U.S. Army Reserve Roles: Consequence Management in Support of Homeland Security
State and local governments rely on the federal government to develop national priorities, determine gaps in national preparedness, and provide technical assistance and specialized resources for state and local planning that addresses national priorities. Demand for trained state and local first responders is increasing proportionally as the terrorist threat increases. Following the September 11 attacks, state and local governments will devote massive resources to protect their citizens, respond to threats and hoaxes, and bolster preparedness. This study will examine ways that the U.S. Army Reserve can leverage its force structure and core competencies with local, state, and federal governments to support consequence management operations and enhance Homeland Security.
Army War College (U.S.)
Domingo, Edwin C.
2002-03-20
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Immigration and Naturalization Service's Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists
Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi were 2 of the 19 terrorists who hijacked and crashed 4 airplanes on September 11, 2001, resulting in the deaths of over 3,000 individuals, the complete destruction of the World Trade Center Towers in New York City, and extensive damage to the Pentagon. In the spring of 2000, both had entered the United States legally using visitor visas, and in September 2000 had requested that the INS change their status from that of "visitor" to that of "vocational student" so they could attend the flight training school. We found that the contractor handled these forms consistently with its handling of other I-20 forms and its interpretation of the requirements of its contract with the INS. The evidence suggests, however, that the contract was written so that the I-20 forms would be returned to the schools within 30 days, and we criticize the INS for failing to monitor adequately the requirements and performance of the contract. To date, the INS has not formulated any concrete plans for conducting or requiring verifications of the accuracy of the data that the schools enter into SEVIS. For example, the INS now requires adjudicators to check all I-539 change of status applications against certain lookout databases before rendering a final decision. Recommendations: At the end of the report, we make 24 systemic recommendations concerning various aspects of the INS's foreign student program that were implicated by our review of the INS's contacts with Atta and Alshehhi and our evaluation of the INS's tracking of foreign students.
United States. Department of Justice
2002-05-20
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Counterterrorism: Role of Interpol and the U.S. National Central Bureau, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives
In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the practices and procedures the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB) employ in their efforts to combat world terrorism and safeguard U.S. citizens' privacy. GAO found that USNCB: (1) generally adhered to a Privacy Act provision requiring publication of the existence of its information system in the Federal Register; (2) usually provided INTERPOL members and local law enforcement agencies with information dealing with terrorist activities; and (3) has a strict policy of not releasing U.S. citizens' addresses and social security numbers. GAO also found that: (1) INTERPOL members generally share information on suspected criminals and counterterrorist activities through their respective national central bureaus; (2) of the 19 INTERPOL members it reviewed, only 7 were satisfied with the quality, relevance, and timeliness of the assistance they received from USNCB; and (3) several of the countries it surveyed also receive their information from other U.S. sources, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
United States. General Accounting Office
1987-06-25
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Passports: Implications of Deleting the Birthplace in U.S. Passports, Report to the Congress
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reported on the implications of deleting the birthplace as a required item on U.S. passports in order to avoid possible harassment or violence from terrorists toward U.S. citizens. GAO found that: (1) deletion of the birthplace from passports could cause some inconvenience for U.S. travelers, since several countries indicated that they would not accept passports without birthplace information or would require birth certificates; (2) several law enforcement agencies oppose the deletion; (3) those agencies with border control responsibilities believe that their jobs would become more difficult if other countries also eliminated birthplace information from their passports; and (4) the Department of State could not identify any instance of terrorists singling out an American because of birthplace information on a passport.
United States. General Accounting Office
1987-08-27
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International Terrorism: Status of GAO's Review of the FBI's International Terrorism Program, Statement of Arnold P. Jones, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division
GAO discussed its review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) international terrorism program. GAO noted that its review of FBI investigations closed between January 1, 1982 and June 30, 1988, has progressed slowly because FBI has taken: (1) about 3 months to update a database of closed investigations so that GAO could select a sample for review; (2) about 6 months to complete GAO questionnaires; and (3) several months to review, edit, and provide GAO with the copies of selected case files. GAO found that FBI opened cases because the subjects were believed to be: (1) directly involved in terrorist acts; (2) members or leaders of terrorist groups; or (3) associated with terrorist groups. GAO estimated that: (1) about 99 percent of the investigations were not extensive; (2) 38 percent of the subjects were U.S. persons; (3) FBI recorded information on individuals in its databases in 47 percent of the cases; and (4) FBI monitored or observed First Amendment activities in 11 percent of the cases. GAO also found that FBI closed cases for a variety of reasons, with the most frequent reason being that it did not develop information that linked the subject with terrorist activities.
United States. General Accounting Office
1989-06-22
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DoD Directive 3025.1: Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)
This directive consolidates all policy and responsibilities previously known as "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities," applicable to disaster-related civil emergencies within the United States, its territories, and possessions, with those related to attacks on the United States, which previously were known as "Military Support to Civil Defense."
United States. Department of Defense
1993-01-15
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DoD Directive 3025.12: Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)
This directive updates policy and responsibilities governing planning and response by the DoD Components for military assistance to Federal, State, and local government (including government of U.S. territories) and their law enforcement agencies for civil disturbances and civil disturbance operations, including response to terrorist incidents, which hereafter are referred to cumulatively as "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances."
United States. Department of Defense
1994-02-12
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Chemical Warfare, Terrorism, and National Defense
The United States must improve its ability to defend its citizens and property against potential terrorist or "rogue state" attack with chemical weapons. As a military weapon, gas has been effective at causing casualties but has never been a "war winner." History shows that chemical weapons are most effective when used against an unprepared enemy that cannot retaliate in kind. The 1995 nerve agent attack in Tokyo was a "wake up call" for the United States to come to grips with the serious asymmetric threat from either rogue states or terrorists who could launch a devastating chemical attack on our homeland. This paper will trace the military history of chemical weapons and assess programs necessary to prevent, protect, and respond to a chemical WMD attack on the United States of America.
Army War College (U.S.)
Larsen, James P.
2001-04-10
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Containment Revisited: An Old Approach to Future Challenges
The end of the Cold War marked the termination of what is to date America's longest struggle for national security. But as the Cold War and its inherent fears of nuclear exchanges and World War III subsided, a new era of complex and intense national security concerns began. World order has changed but America's basic approach for securing its national interests may not have. The precepts of George Kennan's original containment strategy could prove to be the winning combination in the years ahead. The global nature of the new world order provides a grand setting for a revisit to Kennan's thoughts, giving America an unprecedented opportunity to secure itself and her allies without the "rapid and sustained build-up" of military might described in NSC 68. America's position as the world's lone superpower lends new credence to all of her instruments of national power, making classical containment the most viable option for a future national security strategy.
Army War College (U.S.)
Lindamood, Brian Avery
2002-02-15
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Equipping Reserve Early Consequence Management Response Forces with State-of-the-Art/off-the-Shelf Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Detection Equipment
The consequence management of a NBC Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack is a vital interest in our National Security Strategy. Mitigating the loss of human lives is the primary mission of Local, State and Federal emergency management agencies. Rapid detection and identification, of what Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical (NBC) agents are present at a disaster site, is the mission of reserve detection and reconnaissance teams. Equipping these teams with state-of-the-art/off-the-shelf detection technological advanced systems is critical. Emergency responders must know what NBC agent they are dealing with or they may become casualties themselves. The current procurement process does not guarantee these reserve teams will be equipped with the latest technological advancements allowing them to quickly detect and identify NBC agents. Similar active duty special operations detection and reconnaissance teams have a dedicated program manager and separate funding channels that allow them to take advantage of technological detection advances. Quick identification of what NBC agents are present, at a WMD site, is critical. A move towards the streamlined procurement process, currently in place for special operations forces, should be adopted for active and reserve force detection and reconnaissance teams.
Army War College (U.S.)
Ladd, Charles B.
2001-04-10
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Fiscal Year 2001 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program Application (Cities 69-105)
The Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs (OJP), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is providing funds for the purchase of specialized training equipment for fire, emergency medical, hazardous materials response services, and law enforcement agencies as part of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP). These funds represent the equipment component of a broader initiative designed to enhance the response capability of designated cities to respond to acts of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program was created under Title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-201, September 23, 1996), which authorized funding for the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a domestic preparedness training and equipment program. The law directed that the Secretary of Defense act as the interagency lead to develop this program. However, under Sec. 1412(a)(2) and 1415(d)(1) of the legislation, the President was given authority to designate the head of another agency to assume responsibility for carrying out the program on or after October 1, 1999. On April 6, 2000, the President designated the Attorney General to assume programmatic and funding responsibilities for several elements of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program as of October 1, 2000. Funding was subsequently appropriated for this purpose under the Fiscal Year 2001 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Public Law 106-553). As part of this transfer, direct equipment grant awards are being provided for the procurement of personal protection, detection, and decontamination training equipment. As noted, OJP, under the auspices of the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS), will administer these grants.
United States. Office of Justice Programs. Office for Domestic Preparedness
2001
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Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems
This annex represents input to the TOPS as a framework to eventually compare and rate different technologies. This "attributes" framework is still in development. Additional work will help refine many of the discussions and ratings of the specific barriers to proliferation, enhancing the utility of the
framework. In some cases, further work will allow a broader range of distinctions to be made in the degree of proliferation barriers posed by the features of a nuclear system. At the present stage of development, this framework cannot be used to quantitatively score or rank technologies. Also, in
lacking a system to estimate the weights of various attributes, this framework is limited to comparisons of the effectiveness of each attribute among civilian nuclear power systems and proliferation threat scenarios.
United States. Department of Energy
2000-10
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Practices for Securing Critical Information Assets
In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), which calls for a national effort to assure the security of the increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructure of the United States, especially the cyber-based infrastructure. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) was established to assist in the development of a national plan for protecting the country's critical infrastructure and to coordinate plan implementation efforts. Federal departments and agencies are beginning the process of identifying and securing those critical assets and related infrastructure components that they depend on to fulfill their responsibilities of ensuring national security, national economic security, and public health and safety.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
2000-01
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Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat According to the Current Unclassified Literature
In light of the potential severity and assessed increasing likelihood of confronting CBRN-armed terrorists, the Center for Counterproliferation Research was tasked with reviewing the open-source literature on the subject, with special emphasis on three types of information: Why a terrorist group might resort to the use of CBRN weapons, and the circumstances or conditions in which this could be most likely; What type of organizations, according to their characteristics and objectives, might be most likely to use CBRN weapons; and which of the CBRN weapon types, and, as possible, which particular agents, would most likely be used, and for what intended effect(s). In light of the abundance of available open-source literature on the subject of CBRN terrorism, the Center sought a representative sampling of recently published books and monographs, scholarly and professional journal articles, and studies and reports (available through the Internet or in hard-copy form) authored by think-tanks or other nongovernmental institutions. Intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, the review was constrained in three key ways: (1) only materials within the 1998-2002 time frame were considered; (2) no newspaper or weekly periodicals were reviewed; and (3) governmental reports and congressional testimony were not examined. Nonetheless, this review suggests the need for a broader examination of official government sources, testimony to Congress, additional Internet-based material, and a systematic review of the classified literature on the subject. Similarly, the classified and unclassified literature on the related subject of nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare threats and response may yield additional, potentially important insights.
National Defense University. Center for Counterproliferation Research
2002-05-31
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Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism: Report of the National Commission on Terrorism: Pursuant to Public Law 277, 105th Congress
The National Commission on Terrorism began its Congressionally mandated evaluation of America's laws, policies, and practices for preventing and punishing terrorism directed at American citizens. After a thorough review, the Commission concluded that, although American strategies and policies are basically on the right track, significant aspects of implementation are seriously deficient. Thus, this report does not attempt to describe all American counterterrorism activities, but instead concentrates on problem areas and recommended changes. We wish to note, however, that in the course of our assessment we gained renewed confidence in the abilities and dedication of the Americans who stand on the front lines in the fight against terrorism. The following findings are discussed in this report: International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to America; Countering the growing danger of the terrorist threat requires significantly stepping up U.S. efforts; Priority one is to prevent terrorist attacks; U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities must use the full scope of their authority to collect intelligence regarding terrorist plans and methods; U.S. policies must firmly target all states that support terrorists; Private sources of financial and logistical support for terrorists must be subjected to the full force and sweep of U.S. and international laws; A terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, even if it succeeds only partially, could profoundly affect the entire nation; The government must do more to prepare for such an event; The President and Congress should reform the system for reviewing and funding departmental counterterrorism programs to ensure that the activities and programs of various agencies are part of a comprehensive plan.
United States. National Commission on Terrorism
2002-08-02
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DoD and the Biological Weapons Domestic Response Plan: Does it Contribute?
The domestic response plan, or passive defense, regarding biological weapons involves deterrence by diminishing the prospects that an attack will attain the desired results and minimizing the consequences of an attack if it were to take place. The three layers of passive defense involve peacetime precautionary measures and preparation, crisis management, and consequence management. Currently, DOD plays a supporting role to other agencies with assets including, but not limited to, the US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Disease, US Army National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, and the US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. The planned role of DOD assets in this policy is resource intensive and in some cases has questionable added value in supporting a reaction to an attack. In establishing an effective and efficient response plan, while minimizing risk to the U.S., resources are better directed to enhancing the medical and public health capabilities in this arena prior to enhancing DOD assets. This paper evaluates the role the DOD plays in the Federal Response Plan in the event biological weapons are used against non-military targets within the United States. It defines the threat, outlines the current policy toward terrorism and biological agents, presents analysis of the passive defense component of homeland security strategy as it applies to biological warfare using a risk assessment framework, and makes policy recommendations regarding the role the DOD plays to posture for success in the near term extending to 2010.
Army War College (U.S.)
Allgood, Brian D.
2002-04-09
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Streamlining National Security Workshop: The Homeland Group (September 5-7, 2001)
This paper presents the preliminary findings and identifies some critical issues raised by The Homeland Group during the Workshop on Streamlining National Security 5 to 7 September 2001. Sixty subject matter experts gathered to discuss and explore concepts for restructuring certain areas within existing national security organizations.
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
Menk, Peter D.; Tussing, Bert B.
2001-10
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Consequence Management Symposium (August 21-23, 2001)
During a 21-23 August 2001 symposium a group of 80 subject matter experts examined the evolving policy and infrastructure surrounding Consequence Management. Participants concentrated on interagency and intergovernmental issues within this national challenge.
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
Reynolds, Jeffrey C.; Tussing, Bert B.
2001-09
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Conventional Deterrence in the First Quarter of the New Century - A Strategic Workshop (February 20-22, 2001)
The purpose of the Workshop was to answer broad questions of how U.S. national power should be postured to remain an effective deterrent force in support of U.S. national security objectives in the 21st Century. The participants considered the future challenges of an evolving geostrategic environment, U.S. national interests, alternative options and ways to employ the
elements of national power
(political-military-diplomatic-information-economic) and identified critical means (capabilities) needed for effective deterrence.
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
Menk, Peter D.
2001-02
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Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures: The Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
Our national defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life have long depended on the essential services that underpin our society. These critical infrastructures--energy, banking and finance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications--must be viewed in a new context in the Information Age. The rapid proliferation and integration of telecommunications
and computer systems have connected infrastructures to one another in a complex network of interdependence. This interlinkage has created a new dimension of vulnerability, which, when combined with an emerging constellation of threats, poses unprecedented national risk. For most of our history, broad oceans, peaceable neighbors and our military power provided all the infrastructure protection we needed. But just as the terrible long-range weapons of the
Nuclear Age made us think differently about security in the last half of the 20th Century, the electronic technology of the Information Age challenges us to invent new ways of protecting ourselves now. We must learn to negotiate a new geography, where borders are irrelevant and distances meaningless, where an enemy may be able to harm the vital systems we depend on without confronting our military power. National defense is no longer the exclusive preserve of government, and economic security is no longer just about business. The critical infrastructures are central to our national defense and our economic power, and we must lay the foundations for their future security on a new form of cooperation between government and the private sector.
United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
1997-10
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Responding to Terror: A Report of the U.S. Army War College Consequence Management Symposium
The Consequence Management Symposium was conducted by the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), at
the Collins Center, United States Army War College. It was co-sponsored by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The purpose of the conference was to contribute to the ongoing debate over domestic defense, and to identify opportunities and approaches to solutions in this area of vital national interest.
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
2002-05
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DoD Joint Service Chemical/Biological Defense Program Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book FY 2003 Budget Submission Procurement Defense-Wide
The DoD Chemical/Biological Defense (CBD) Program provides development and procurement of systems for U.S. forces to operate in all battlespaces contaminated with chemical and biological (CB) agents in support of U.S. counterproliferation policy. The
probability of U.S. forces encountering CB agents remains high. In FY 2003, the CBD Program expands to support homeland security and combating terrorism initiatives of the President and the Department by providing those systems necessary to effectively deter and respond to acts of CB terrorism. The CBD Program continues to implement congressional direction to improve joint CBD capabilities and reflects an integrated jointly developed modernization program. This year's program funds the passive defense counterproliferation initiatives, enhances military support to civilian authorities with consequence management capabilities, and initiates strong homeland security programs to enhance CB preparedness. The CBD Program invests in technologies to provide improved capabilities that have minimal adverse
impact on our warfighting potential. Joint and Service unique programs support the framework of the three tenets of CB defense: Contamination Avoidance (detection and identification) and NBC Battle Management (reconnaissance and warning of battlespace contamination to enable units to maneuver around the contamination), Force Protection (individual, collective, and medical support), and Decontamination. The FY 2003 budget adjusts CBD modernization efforts to meet the strategy as outlined in the September 2001 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review and includes resources for CB sensors, early-detection systems and an integrated joint warning and reporting network for CB attacks; biological warfare defense vaccines, medical countermeasures and surveillance systems; improvement of protective suits and masks; and modernized decontamination systems that minimize environmental impact
and are suitable for use on sensitive aircraft and electronic systems and for area decontamination of ports and airfields. In summary, the DoD CBDP
remains committed to establishing the correct balance between the near term requirement to field modernized equipment to the field, and the need to protect and replenish our long term investment in technology.
United States. Department of Defense
2002-02
