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• Military Readiness: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, but Incentives May Need Revamping, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

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  "In the event of a national emergency, the Department of Defense (DOD) can use commercial aircraft drawn from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment its own airlift capabilities. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a fleet of aircraft owned by U.S. commercial air carriers but committed voluntarily to DOD for use during emergencies. This sparked concern about the fleet's ability to respond, if activated, and prompted the Subcommittee to ask GAO to determine whether the fleet could respond to an activation with the required number of aircraft and crews and in the required time frame. Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants can respond to an emergency or a war with the required number of aircraft and crews and within the required time frame. Currently, there are more aircraft committed to the fleet than are needed to fill the wartime requirements identified in the DOD Mobility Requirements Study 2005, which determined the requirements to fight and win two major theater wars. The incentives currently in place to encourage participation in the program, especially the incentive to participate in DOD's peacetime business, might be losing effectiveness and could become disincentives in the future. Some participants are not able to bid on peacetime cargo business because their fleets do not include B- 747s, the predominant aircraft DOD uses for peacetime cargo missions. Using smaller aircraft would provide more peacetime business to a greater share of program participants, thus enhancing current incentives."

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2002-12-30
• Federal Electrical Emergency Preparedness Is Inadequate

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  GAO reviewed the vulnerability of the nation's electric power systems to disruptions from acts of war, sabotage, and terrorism and analyzed the federal role in dealing with major, long-term electrical emergencies resulting from such acts. Federal leadership for electrical emergency planning and preparation is unorganized and ineffective. GAO found that: (1) the Department of Energy (DOE) has an inadequate program for dealing with major electrical disruptions; (2) DOE Emergency Electric Power Administration representatives are unsure of their status, roles, authority, and responsibility, and doubtful that the organization could operate during an emergency; (3) DOE does not have adequate plans to manage and mitigate electric power disruptions; (4) emergency plans to manage such disruptions and restore the power system are needed; and (5) problems exist in federal coordination with respect to electric emergency preparedness.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  1981-05-12
• FBI Internal Audit: Opportunities for Improvement, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) internal audit activities to determine the: (1) extent of the audits' focus on major FBI investigative programs; (2) steps FBI took to increase the qualifications, independence, and permanence of its inspection and audit staffs; and (3) potential weaknesses in audit quality and effectiveness. GAO found that, since 1979, FBI has: (1) improved its inspection and program evaluation activities by focusing on its 11 major investigative programs during division and field office inspection; (2) evaluated all major investigative programs at least once, except for the recently established FBI Drug Program; and (3) raised the educational and experience requirements for its program evaluation staff. GAO also found that, by filling audit management positions temporarily with special agents, FBI could impair the independence of the internal audits.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  1988-11-23
• Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for Combating Proliferation, Statement of Joseph A Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade

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  The attacks of September 11 and the recent anthrax cases have heightened long-standing concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the international community have undertaken several efforts over the years to secure these weapons and prevent their spread. Today, there is renewed need to maintain strong international controls over such weapons and related technologies, and to reevaluate the effectiveness of the controls. The United States has used the following four key policy instruments to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: (1) international treaties, (2) multilateral export control arrangements, (3) U.S. export controls, and (4) security assistance to other countries. Each instrument is important to preventing the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies to terrorists or rogue states, but each has limitations. International treaties restrict transfers of weapons of mass destruction technologies, but their effectiveness depends on whether treaties can be verified and enforced and whether all countries of concern are members. Multilateral export control arrangements are voluntary, nonbinding agreements under which countries that produce the technologies used to develop weapons of mass destruction agree to restrict the transfer of these technologies. U.S. export controls set the legal and regulatory conditions under which goods and technologies can be exported. Security assistance to other countries helps control or eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and otherwise stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2001-11-07
• Assessment of Various Aspects of This Nation's Nuclear Safeguards Programs

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  Protecting nuclear material from violent use against society has been an issue at the very heart of the nuclear energy debate from its beginning. A review was made to determine the effectiveness of the Department of Defense's (DOD) nuclear safeguards system and to compare that system to the systems used by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) who are also responsible for the security of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-grade materials against theft, diversion, or sabotage. In addition, the on-site security at a number of sites within the responsibility of each of these agencies was investigated by interviewing site officials and employees, touring the sites, and by testing various elements of the security system. DOD is responsible for the security of nuclear weapons and for the security of nuclear weapons-grade materials found in research reactor fuel and in fuel for naval propulsion reactors. In carrying out this responsibility, DOD has established minimum standard security requirements that are to be met by its nuclear facilities. At five weapon sites that were reviewed, it was discovered that while all of the sites met most of the minimum requirements, each one needed important improvements before all of the requirements would be met. With regard to DOD's research reactor and naval fuel storage facilities, the security appeared to be adequate. Some minor improvements could be made, but their importance to the overall security of the facility was not significant. Like DOD, NRC and DOE are also responsible for protecting the public against the hazards of theft, diversion, or sabotage of nuclear materials. While all three agencies are responsible for large amounts of nuclear materials, DOD and DOE also have custody of nuclear weapons themselves. Each agency designs its security system to what it believes to be the existing threat, and each has different estimates of what that threat is. These different threat levels have resulted in a situation where similar nuclear materials are receiving different levels of protection.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  1980-02-19
• DoD Directive 5230.16: Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance

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  This Directive reissues DoD Directive 5230.16, February 7, 1983 to update DoD policy, responsibilities, and procedures for the prompt release of information to the public in the interest of public safety, and to prevent public alarms in the event of accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components, radioactive material, nuclear weapon launch or transport vehicles (when a nuclear weapon is aboard), or nuclear reactors under DoD control. Updates DoD policy, responsibilities, and procedures during an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1993-12-20
• DoD Directive 5230.25: Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data From Public Disclosure

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  Under Title 10, United State Code, Section 140c, as added by Public Law 98-94, "Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984," Section 1217, September 24, 1983, this Directive establishes policy, prescribes procedures, and assigns responsibilities for the dissemination and withholding of technical data.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1984-10
• DoD Directive 5240.2: DoD Counterintelligence

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  This Directive: 1. Reissues DoD Directive 5240.2, June 6, 1983, and implements Section 1.11 of Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981 as it pertains to the assignment of CI responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, and Section 1.12 of Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981 as it pertains to the assignment of responsibilities to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), the Military Departments, and offices referenced in that section. 2. Integrates DoD CI capabilities and coordination procedures into a national CI structure under the direction of the National Security Council (NSC) under Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-24, "U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness," May 3, 1994. 3. Establishes and maintains a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated CI effort within the Department of Defense, pursuant tot he responsibilities and authorities assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)) in DoD Directive 5137.1, February 12, 1992. 4. Assigns responsibilities to the DoD Components for the direction, management, coordination, and control of CI activities conducted under the authority of Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981; DoD Directive 5137.1, February 12, 1992; Title 10, United States Code, "Armed Forces" and this Directive. 5. Establishes the Defense Counterintelligence Board (DCIB).

  United States. Department of Defense

  1997-05-22
• DoD Directive 5240.12: Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence Commercial Activities (ICAS)

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  This Directive: 1. Implements Sections 431 through 437 of Title 10 of the United States Code in furtherance of the accomplishment of DoD intelligence responsibilities authorized under Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981 and DoD Directive 5240.1, April 25, 1988. 2. Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for establishment and use of DoD ICAs necessary to provide security for authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department of Defense.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1992-12-02
• DoD Directive 5240.1: DoD Intelligence Activities

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  This Directive: 1. Reissues DoD Directive 5240.1, December 3, 1982; implements Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981; Executive Order 12334, December 4, 1981; Public Law No. 95-511; October 25, 1978; updates policies; and shall be the only authority used as guidance by DoD intelligence components to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning U.S. persons. 2. Continues in effect procedures previously approved by the U.S. Attorney General for use by DoD intelligence components under Presidential Directive NSC-9, March 30, 1977. 3. Authorizes the publication of DoD 524031-R, December 11, 1982, consistent with DoD 5025.1-M, October 16, 1980, and this Directive.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1988-04-25
• DoD Directive 5400.7: DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program

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  This Directive: 1. Reissues DoD Directive 5400.7 dated September 9, 1997, to update policies and responsibilities for the implementation of the DoD FOIA Program under section 552 of title 5, United States Code. 2. Continues to authorize, consistent with section 552 of title 5, United States Code, the publication of DoD 5400.7-R, the single DoD Regulation on the FOIA Program. 3. Continues to delegate authorities and responsibilities for the effective administration of the FOIA program

  United States. Department of Defense

  1997-09-29
• DoD Directive 5505.1: DoD Criminal Investigation Standards, Policies and Procedures

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  This Directive: 1. Reissues and updates reference (a). 2. Authorizes publication of DoD 5505.1-M, "DoD Criminal Investigation Policy and Procedures Manual," (reference (b)) consistent with DoD 5025.1-M (reference (c)), to provide expanded guidance on investigative policies and procedures under Public Law 95-452 (reference (d)) and DoD Directive 5106.1 (reference (e)).

  United States. Department of Defense

  2000-04-17
• Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be Improved, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  Congress responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with dramatic funding increases to combat terrorism. Even before these attacks, Congress was concerned about increased funding in this area, and based on findings from a 1997 GAO report, mandated that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) report annually on funding to combat terrorism. In this review, GAO was asked to analyze such funding trends, describe difficulties in coordinating combating terrorism budgets, assess data reported to Congress, and describe the executive branch's efforts to maximize the effective use of combating terrorism funds. This increase includes a 106-percent increase from the post-September 11 redefinition of combating terrorism to include homeland security activities such as aviation and transportation security, and a 170-percent increase due to funding increases. An OMB annual report summarizing funding for combating terrorism has had limited utility for decision makers because it was issued late in the congressional decision-making process and did not include data on obligations or on duplication in programs for combating terrorism.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2002-11-26
• Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

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  Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other criminals may exploit one of these programs--the Visa Waiver Program--to enter the United States. The program enables citizens of 28 participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. GAO was asked to review the Visa Waiver Program, including the process for assessing countries' eligibility to participate in the program. GAO was also asked to determine the implications--specifically those affecting national security, foreign relations, tourism, and State Department resources--of eliminating the program. To ensure that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program pose a low risk to U.S. national interests, the Departments of Justice and State verify each country's political and economic stability and the security of its passport issuance process.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2002-11-22
• Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened, Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives

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  The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R&D) Program is to conduct needs-driven research, development, testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States' ability to prevent and respond to nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. In fiscal years 1998 through 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program received an average of $218 million per year--a total of $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of that total was distributed for R&D at three NNSA national laboratories. Two of the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program lack a formal process to identify users' needs, and the tools used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In terms of users, NNSA's role is to develop technologies for, and transfer them to, users in the federal government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others. The program requires that projects' life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed information on project time frames, milestones, users of technologies, and deliverables. Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use the technology developed by NNSA's R&D program have found the technology useful, but some question whether the program is achieving the right mix of long-term and short-term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2002-08-23
• Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect Competition, Statement of JayEtta Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate

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  This testimony discusses the economic state of the airline industry. Many, but not all, major U.S. passenger airlines are experiencing their second consecutive year of record financial losses. In 2001, the U.S. commercial passenger airline industry reported losses in excess of $6 billion. For 2002, some Wall Street analysts recently projected that U.S. airline industry losses will approach $7 billion, and noted that the prospects for recovery during 2003 are diminishing. Carriers have taken many actions to lower their costs and restructure their operations. Since September 2001, carriers have furloughed 100,000 staff, renegotiated labor contracts, and streamlined their fleets by retiring older, costlier aircraft. Carriers have reduced capacity by operating fewer flights or smaller aircraft. In some cases, carriers eliminated all service to communities. As the aviation industry continues its attempts to recover, Congress will be confronted with a need for increased oversight of a number of public policy issues. First, airlines' reactions to financial pressures will affect the domestic industry's competitive landscape. Second, airlines' reductions in service will likely place additional pressure on federal programs supporting air service to small communities, where travel options are already limited. Finally, although domestic travel has been the focus of recent concern, there are numerous international developments--especially regarding the European Union (EU)--that may affect established international "open skies" agreements between the United States and EU member states.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2002-10-02
• Review of the Estimates for the Impact of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks on New York Tax Revenues

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  GAO reviewed the New York City Office of Management and Budget and the New York State Division of Budget estimates of tax revenue losses attributed to the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Both offices estimated that the attacks would reduce anticipated tax revenues to the city and state in both fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The budget offices' estimates of the tax revenue losses have limitations, such as including some of the economic slowdown that was under way at the time of the attacks. Nevertheless, the tax revenue loss estimates for the 2002 fiscal year--$1.6 billion for New York City and $1.6 billion for New York State--appear to reasonably approximate the impact of the attacks on tax revenues. Precisely measuring the effect on economic activity and related tax revenues is inherently difficult. Such measuring requires disentangling the effect of the attacks from the effects of other events. As of June 2002, the federal government had authorized funds of $10.4 billion to New York to partly compensate for the economic losses attributable to the attacks, including $6.4 billion for debris removal and temporary housing assistance. Nonetheless, the specific amount of funding obligated solely to New York City has not yet been compiled.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2002-07-26
• Coast Guard and Navy: It's Time for a 'National Fleet'

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  The U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy have been and will remain complementary. They are not competitors. However, the distinctiveness of their missions and functions, in practice their duties overlap. There is a zone of activity wherein the services share maritime geography and foci of concern. Because the Coast Guard operates shallow-draft warships, it can be misrepresented as the coastal or shallow-water navy of the United States. Similarly, because the Navy supports the Coast Guard when necessary and feasible, perception of naval enthusiasm for such support (and beyond) can feed ill-founded anxiety that the Coast Guard is in peril of imperial absorption by the much larger service. This article is propelled by the appreciation that even through the Coast Guard and the Navy are natural and necessary allies, trends exist today--both internal to each service and, even more, in their contexts of operation--that could strain their relationship.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Gray, Colin S.

  2001
• Has It Worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act

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  The overall report card is mixed. In the operational dimension of the Defense Department, which its original sponsors considered most pressing, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been very successful. The act's "business" reforms, however, have not worked. These concerns, which may have been secondary fifteen years ago, are urgent now.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Locher, James R., 1946-

  2001
• Socioeconomic Roots of Middle East Radicalism

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  The sources of Middle East extremism are profoundly complex and intertwined, composed of economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions. As important as the socioeconomic and political aspects of the present crisis are, however, the cultural difficulties are equally challenging, perhaps uniquely so. How can the United States reduce the appeal of the utopian fanatics? It should approach the problem with considerable humility. Take the economic crisis. A strong case can be made that the economies of the Middle East have failed because of institutional and political deficiencies. Outsiders can do very little to promote institutional change, as the United States learned to its dismay in Russia and elsewhere. The deep cultural crisis of contemporary Islam's confrontation with modernity can be resolved only by Muslims.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Richards, Alan

  2002
• National Interests: Grand Purposes or Catchphrases?

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  There are two basic schools of thought about how national interests should be defined: One school, the avatars of which might be realist statesmen like Otto von Bismarck in the nineteenth century and Richard Nixon in the twentieth, holds that national interests should be defined in terms of a state's tangible power and sphere of influence relative to those of other states. The single most important form of tangible power for this realist school is military (cannons and rifles in Bismarck's era, nuclear missiles and bombers in Nixon's); the statesman's ultimate challenge is to maintain a balance of military power that is favorable to his or her state. The other school holds that national interests should be defined more broadly to encompass intangible, but nevertheless highly prized, values like human rights, freedom from economic deprivation, and freedom from disease. In their vastly different ways, Woodrow Wilson and V. I. Lenin might be thought of as exemplars of this school. Both leaders employed the military power of their states to promote, respectively, the values of national self-determination and economic egalitarianism.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Miskel, James F., 1946-

  2002
• Military Action against Iraq Is Justified

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  A controversial issue in the news is whether under international law, it would be lawful for the United States, either alone or as a member of an international coalition, to use lethal force against Saddam Hussein personally or against Iraq. Under international law lethal force can never be used unless it is necessary and proportional. If nonviolent remedies are available that can protect a nation's rights, they must be pursued. Force cannot be used to resolve traditional political or economic grievances. It is permitted only when necessary to protect against the threat or use of unlawful force. Thus the key issue here is whether Iraq's current regime constitutes a threat to the peace against the United States or other countries. Furthermore, the purpose of the United Nations, as set forth in Article 1 of its charter, is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace." The Security Council has made it clear that Saddam Hussein is a major threat to international peace and security.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Turner, Robert F.

  2002
• DoD Directive 5200.1-R: Information Security Program

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  This Regulation is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program," December 13, 1996. It prescribes procedures for implementation of Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," April 20, 1995, within the Department of Defense.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1997-01
• Department of Defense Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Regulation

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  This Regulation is issued under the authority of DOD Directive 5210.42, "Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)" January 8,2001. It establishes requirements and procedures for the implementation of the PRP in order to select and maintain only the most reliable people to perform duties associated with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons require special consideration because of their policy implications and military importance, their destructive power, and the political consequences of an accident, loss of a weapon, or an unauthorized act. The safety, security, control, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons are of paramount importance to the security of the United States.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001-01
• Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Program

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  This Regulation is issued under the authority of DoD Instruction 4715.6, "Environmental Compliance," April 24, 1996. It prescribes procedures for implementing the Department of Defense Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Program as directed in the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security) memorandum, "Charter for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Program," August 21, 1997.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001-01
• DoD Nuclear Weapons Transportation Manual

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  This Manual is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 4540.5, Logistic Transportation of Nuclear Weapons," 4 February 1998. It provides guidance for the transport of nuclear weapons by the DoD Components, expands on the transportation polices and responsibilities established in DoD Directive 4540.5, and describes a range of transportation activities. It also addresses safety, security, and use control guidance for the transport of nuclear Weapons.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1998-02
• Hostile Intelligence Threat - U.S. Technology

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  This publication outlines the hostile intelligence threat to U.S. Industry and Western technology, including the operational capabilities of hostile intelligence services and their scientific and technological (S&T) targets. Current intelligence strategies used against the United States are described and sources of information providing countermeasures guidance are listed. Points of contact for security and counterintelligence assistance have also been included.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1988-11
• Physical Security Program

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  This Regulation is issued under the authority of DoD Directive 5200.8, "Security of DoD Installations and Resources" (April 25, 1991). It prescribes standards and policy relating to the physical protection of military installations and assets of the Department of Defense. It is understood that the review of existing physical security plans and operational concepts will take 1 year, with security upgrades extending through the fiscal year Defense plan in accordance with the methods in Chapter 2 of this Regulation.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1991-05
• Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today

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  Civil-military relationship is at the pinnacle of the government and in recent years, civilian control of the military has weakened in the United States and is threatened today. The issue is not the nightmare of a coup d'etat but rather the evidence that the American military has grown in influence to the point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies and decisions. The American national security policy and decision-making process has tilted far more toward the military than ever before in American history in peacetime. Military officers, as well as civilians, must restore the understandings, behaviors, and attitudes that once made civilian control of the military a conscious civic principle of American life. This article is an expansion and update of the Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History delivered in December 1999 at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Kohn, Richard H.

  2002
• '9/11' and After: A British View

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  The attack on the Pentagon in Washington may have been aimed specifically at the United States, but those on the World Trade Center in New York, a supranational institution housing a multinational population in the greatest polyglot city in the world, was directed against the nerve centre of an international community of which the United States is certainly the heart but that embraces the whole developed world. That was why the whole of that world in fact, the whole world, with the exception only of a few predictable rogue states--immediately declared its support to the United States in its hour of need. To call the struggle against terrorism "America's War," perhaps even a war at all, is to miss its full significance, argues one of the world's most distinguished military historians. It is a global confrontation between those who believe in the values of the Enlightenment and those who detest and fear them. In this confrontation armed force must inevitably play a part, but it can never be won by militaries alone--not even those of the United States.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Howard, Michael Eliot, 1922-

  2002