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• LLIS Practice Note: Los Angeles, California's Operation Archangel

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  "The City of Los Angeles launched Operation Archangel to identify and protect critical assets in 2004. Archangel supports the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) by building security partnerships, managing risk, and maximizing efficient use of resources. Operation Archangel utilizes the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS), a data collection and reporting tool, to track and report CI/KR [critical infrastructure and key resources] protection data."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
• LLIS Practice Note: Hazardous Materials: The State of Ohio's First Responder Personal Protective Equipment Kits

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  "The State of Ohio Security Task Force (SOSTF) implemented a hazardous materials (HazMat) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) awareness training program in 2003 for the state's first responders. As SOSTF developed that program, it realized that many Ohio responders did not have access to PPE for use in the event of a chemical or biological incident. To address this deficiency, SOSTF formed a working group to develop a low cost, self-contained PPE kit that could be carried by Ohio responders operating in the field."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
• FY2006 Homeland Security Grants Program Guidance and Application Kit

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  "Several significant changes in the HSGP [Homeland Security Grant Program] and its focus are being made for FY 2006. First, this marks the first grant cycle in which the Interim National Preparedness Goal is in place to outline National Priorities and focus expenditures on building capabilities. This common planning framework and the tools that support it allow the Nation to define target levels of performance and measure progress made toward achieving them. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is adopting in FY 2006 a risk- and need-based approach to allocating funding for certain programs within HSGP. The aim is to allocate and apply these resources to generate the highest return on investment and, as a result, strengthen national preparedness in the most effective and efficient manner. In addition to integrating these new policy developments, the FY 2006 HSGP guidance: Highlights the Interim National Preparedness Goal and its applicability to the FY 2006 HSGP; Highlights the Target Capabilities List and its applicability to the FY 2006 HSGP; Presents overall FY 2006 HSGP policy and program requirements, including overall FY 2006 HSGP allowable costs; Guides grantees in the application and award process for the FY 2006 HSGP; Provides detail on the specific requirements associated with FY 2006 SHSP [ State Homeland Security Program], UASI [Urban Areas Security Initiative], LETPP [Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program], MMRS [Metropolitan Medical Response System], and CCP [Citizen Corps Program]."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Strengthen, Prepare, Respond: The Interagency Board FY 2016 Annual Report

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  "The IAB's [InterAgency Board] mission is to strengthen the Nation's ability to prepare for and to respond safely and effectively to emergencies, disasters, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) incidents. Today, this mission is more complex than in the early days of the IAB. Attacks on police, civil unrest, wildfires, and widespread addiction were not as prominent then as they are now. These incidents have significant impacts on our communities and tax public safety resources. Incidents today routinely cross disciplinary lines and have raised citizens' expectations of local, state, and federal response capabilities. Public safety responses to local incidents now include emergency management, public health, and state and federal partners in addition to police, fire, and emergency medical services. Assets such as the National Guard Civil Support Teams, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are increasingly integrated into local planning meetings. Additionally, our Nation's Fusion Centers are routinely involved in intelligence sharing with local partners. Interagency cooperation across all tiers of response is vital as we all work in a common mission space."

  InterAgency Board
• Interagency Board: 2004 Annual Report and 2005 Standardized Equipment List

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  This is an annual report of the Interagency Board (IAB). IAB for Equipment Standardization and Inter Operability Working Group is designed to establish and coordinate local, state, and federal standardization, interoperability, and responder safety to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover from any incident by identifying requirements for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosives (CBRNE) incident response equipment.

  InterAgency Board
• Large-Scale Building Collapse: Prioritizing Damage and Safety Assessments at the Command Level

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  "Following a large-scale building collapse, command-level responders should resist becoming involved in individual rescue efforts. Instead, commanders should focus on assessing the overall damage and safety situation."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
• Large-Scale Building Collapse: Initial Building Damage Assessments from a Variety of Vantage Points

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  "The collapse of a large building because of an explosion will produce smoke that may obscure certain views of the collapsed structure. Incident command (IC) may need to request damage reports from a variety of vantage points in order to acquire a clearer picture of collapsed structure."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
• Hurricane Katrina Response Lessons Learned

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  This document covers issues with the response to Hurricane Katrina and gives recommendations.

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Large-Scale Building Collapse: Low-Impact Methods and Devices for Searching Voids

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  "Following a large-scale building collapse, search and rescue teams will need to search voids for survivors and victims' bodies. Many of these voids may not be accessible without the removal of heavy debris, a process that can threaten the stability of the collapsed structure. When possible, search and rescue teams should use low impact means for searching voids, including pole cameras, listening devices, heat-sensing cameras, and/or canine teams."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
• Large-Scale Building Explosions: Extinguishing Car Fires

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  "A large-scale building explosion may ignite cars located in nearby parking lots and on adjacent streets. The thick, black smoke from car fires can significantly hamper visibility at the incident site. Incident command (IC) should immediately designate fire department units to extinguish all car fires. This measure will help improve visibility and aid damage assessments."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
• Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure

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  "This Handbook is published under the authority of DoD Instruction 7045.7, 'Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS),' May 23, 1984 (reference (a)). It contains the DoD program structure and the definition of each Major Force Program (MFP) and Program Element (PE) approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Also included are other related codes for the specific resources assigned to each PE and an explanation of their use. This edition covers changes through FYDP Structure Coordination Document 2004-00, dated March 5, 2004. All previous editions of DoD 7045.7-H are hereby superseded. This Handbook applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified or Specified Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, Field Activities, and other Defensewide activities (hereafter referred to collectively as the 'DoD Components'). This Handbook is effective immediately and is mandatory for use by all the DoD Components. Heads of the DoD Components may issue supplementary instructions only when necessary to provide for unique requirements within their Components."

  United States. Department of Defense
• Public Communications: Vital Link to Maintaining the Public's Trust During Crisis

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  This report is part of chapter five of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "Pick up a daily newspaper; turn to any national news broadcast; type in the web address for your favorite Internet search engine. What you find from these sources is a smorgasbord of crises du jour. Several recent examples: A website claims that seven National Football League gridiron stadiums will be attacked with radiological dirty bombs. NFL stadiums in New York, Miami, Atlanta, Seattle, Houston, Oakland and Cleveland. Fortunately, only a hoax, the FBI states. What was initially thought to be another 9/11 attack over New York City turned out to be a tragic aircraft accident taking the life of New York Yankee pitcher, Cory Lidle, who crashed into a 50- story apartment building on Manhattan's Upper East Side. Within moments of the Space Shuttle Discovery, STS-121, taking off the pad in Florida, on July fourth North Korea was making their own holiday fireworks launching seven missiles, one a long- range type. For several frightening moments their final impact points were unknown. Was the United States a target? Daily, at local, state and federal levels, there are situations that cause the public affairs (PA) community to rapidly decide to engage or to not engage in public communications. The instant information age in which we work and live with Internet access nearly everywhere from homes to offices, from airports and coffee shops to mobile devices now hanging from ears of driver--is jammed with components that bring news and information rapidly to our citizens. The potential downside for the PA practitioner is there is little time to execute crisis strategic communication plans and be responsive to an onslaught of public inquiry. In the future, the speed and flow of information will continue to increase requiring organizations to use all the tools of a 21st century society when addressing, affecting and assessing public opinion."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Perini, Michael B.
• Hurricane Katrina: Communications & Infrastructure Impacts

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  This report is part of chapter five of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "In some respects, Hurricane Katrina was the equivalent of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on the Gulf Coast. The hurricane caused catastrophic damage over an area roughly the size of Great Britain. However, while it is tempting to view a storm such as Katrina as a once-in- a-lifetime event, doing so would be an exercise in wishful thinking. Although Katrina was a very large hurricane, it was not 'The Storm of the Century,' or even 'The Big One' which forecasters have warned about for many years. The best estimates are that at landfall, Katrina was at Category 3 strength (winds of 11-130 miles per hour [MPH]). Sustained wind strength at landfall was about 125 MPH. By contrast, 1969's Hurricane Camille was a Category 5 storm with winds greater than 155 MPH. Much of the extensive damage caused by Katrina was due to storm surge, especially along the Gulf Coast, and by levee breaches and resulting flooding in the New Orleans area, rather than by the wind and rain from the storm itself. In other words, it should be clear that Katrina-sized incidents are neither unprecedented nor unlikely to recur. We will see more, and we may well see worse, either from storms, earthquakes, or other natural or man-made causes. The fact that a replay of Katrina-sized events are all but certain makes it all the more urgent that we draw appropriate lessons from the 2005 experience."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Miller, Robert I.
• Role of Information and Communication in Disaster Response: An Overview

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  This report is part of chapter five of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "Only recently has emphasis (at least in words if not deeds) on the information element of power surfaced as a key contributor to strategic success. In fact the United States is just getting around to coming up with an acceptable term to describe the way the nation wields information as power: Strategic Communication. The government is still arguing about the pure definition of this term, but, in order to establish a baseline, consider the definition from the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review. Strategic Communication is defined as: Focused United States Government (USG) processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power. In its simplest form, strategic communication in disasters and catastrophes serves several purposes: first, prior to the event, it can serve to manage the expectations of the public regarding the capabilities and potential assistance provided at all levels of government; second it provides public information prior to and during the event to facilitate the safety and security of U.S. citizens; and finally, it can, if proactively and effectively used in conjunction with visible ongoing relief efforts, serve to increase the credibility of government and serve as a calming influence to the citizenry. Strategic communication during domestic disasters also serves a foreign policy role. Effective USG strategic communication can portray the United States as a capable, efficient and effective responder to the needs of its people and so send a message to emerging democracies regarding the role of government toward the needs of its citizens. On the other hand, poor USG strategic communication can contribute to the opposite perception world-wide."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Murphy, Dennis M.
• Transformation of the Reserve Component

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  Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "The 'Transformation of the Reserve Component,' the title of our panel, is interesting but should not necessarily be examined in a vacuum, as the transformation of the reserve component cannot be generally separated from the transformation of the Department of Defense (DoD). When President Bush was first elected, he articulated his goal for DoD transformation. Since that time, efforts have continued to reach that goal, even in the midst of on-going combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some have questioned whether these efforts--transformation and combat operations--should be conducted simultaneously, but I would argue that it is the only approach we can take in today's world. I have heard Ms. Mackenzie Eaglen, a Senior Policy National Security Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, suggest the Army National Guard employ a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in their efforts to reorganize, modernize and equip in lieu of heavy brigades or heavy battalions. Those of us who currently serve or who have served in the Army know that the size and shape of the forces used in combat operations, war, are made up of the forces you currently have. Although Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was criticized when he stated, 'you go to war with the army you have, not the army you want,' he was speaking the truth. In hindsight, it's easy to say 'shoulda, coulda, woulda,' in how we approached, conducted and continue to conduct our operations abroad, but we are where we are. Being from the 'we are where we are' school of management, I believe we cannot go back, but must instead move on from where we are now. The DoD has adopted and now lives by the 'total force concept,' which means having the right forces for the right capabilities for the right operations at any given time. What many may not understand is that the National Guard and the Reserve Components which include the Army and the Air Force National Guard, as well as the Service Title 10 Reserve Components are, in fact, fully integrated into that total force concept. Therefore, the Reserve Component is part of those right forces and are employed for their right capabilities to be used for the right operations at any given time."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Verga, Peter
• Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security: Goldwater-Nichols and Network-Centric Warfare

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  This report is part of chapter two of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "Since the attacks of 9/11, the United States has sought to strengthen its ability to prevent terrorist attacks and respond to high-consequence events affecting the U.S. homeland. Washington's tactic of choice to improve counterterrorism and homeland security has been to reorganize the federal government. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 to rationalize assets and centralize activities related to borders, domestic asset protection, preparedness and response, information integration and dissemination, and science and technology. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created to better coordinate the fragmented intelligence community Washington's decision to turn to far-reaching reorganization in response to new national security challenges has significant historical precedent. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help the United States meet the security challenges it faced after World War II. It took another decade, however, to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), deterrence and various other critical institutions and concepts to fight the Cold War effectively. For every step in the right direction, there were missteps, trial and error. It took another 39 years before Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to foster 'jointness' among the military services, something that Dwight Eisenhower had lobbied for both as a general and as President. U.S. efforts to address homeland security and counterterrorism represent the most significant federal reorganization since 1947. But the 'big bang' creation of both the DHS and DNI are not sufficient. Reorganization is only a step in refashioning government and society to meet the challenges of global terrorism and homeland security."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Prieto, Daniel B.
• Equipping the Army National Guard for the 21st Century

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  This report is part of chapter three of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "The Army National Guard does not have an equipment modernization program of its own that is specifically designed to meet its unique needs and capabilities. While not ideal, the lack of a modernization program was acceptable when the National Guard was primarily an adjunct force to active units, for use typically in the later stages of conflict. Over the past five years, however, the Army National Guard has contributed nearly half of all Army troops on the ground in Iraq and has assumed an increased role in homeland defense missions. Somewhat surprisingly, the Army National Guard currently faces a severe shortage of available equipment within the United States. The equipment that is available is typically older, more difficult and expensive to maintain, and not easily deployable or useful in all types of domestic missions. The lack of equipment is negatively affecting readiness. The Army National Guard needs its own modernization program to buy the equipment that meets both the low-end and high-end mission needs unique to the Guard. The common sense solution to, and only affordable option available for, this equipment modernization program is the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat Team model."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Eaglen, Mackenzie M.
• Goldwater-Nichols Act for Homeland Security

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  This report is part of chapter two of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "All cabinet-level departments need to join together in a Goldwater- Nichols type reform to look at man-made and natural threats and government responses in an integrated manner. By creating better communication and synergistic efforts our government will be better equipped to handle, in a cost effective manner, the outcome of a terrorist act or natural disaster. This course of action will drive a holistic approach for the development of capabilities that will be flexible and resilient while providing a proactive capability to prevent some of the threats facing us today and in the future. The attempted rescue of U.S. hostages held captive by Iranians in 1980 was categorized as unsuccessful, not just for its failed effort, but also because of a plethora of interoperability issues. For example, Marine Corps pilots were operating unfamiliar Navy helicopters, covertly inserting Army Special Forces to waiting Air Force refueling platforms, and while its joint concept appeared fluid, the operation was nevertheless chaotic. Interoperability issues would also plague the U.S. efforts in Grenada three years later. 'Who,' asked Colonel O. E. Jensen, 'hasn't heard about the soldier who called from a phone booth on Grenada back to the States to get a message passed to U.S. Navy ships lying in sight offshore? Who doesn't know that the ATO [Air Tasking Order] in the Gulf War had to be printed, copied, and carried to the Navy by hand because communication systems were incompatible? Such incompatibility could cost lives in the next war."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Edwards, Michael, 1957-
• Goldwater-Nichols for the Executive Branch: Achieving Unity of Effort

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  This report is part of chapter two of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "The United States military's successful return to dominance following the Vietnam War was marred by a series of setbacks during the 1980s that revealed a need for further improvement in the way the various branches of the military fought together in battle. One of the most compelling examples is Operation Desert One, the failed attempt in 1980 to rescue the Americans held hostage in Iran. Of the many problems that plagued the aborted attempt to rescue the American embassy hostages, a core lesson was the need for the armed services to better train and exercise their ability to conduct joint, complex operations. Three years later, when the U.S. military invaded the island of Grenada, several mishaps again demonstrated that while the Services each possessed impressive individual capabilities and strengths, they still did not operate together well as a team. Inter-Service rivalries led to friction among leaders, and incompatible communications systems and operational doctrine hampered cohesion among the many units involved. To address these problems, Congress passed the landmark Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. A chief objective of the legislation was to force the disparate Services to forge themselves into a true joint force able to operate with their collective and unified might, seamlessly weaving together their capabilities for a common purpose."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Bagnal, Joel
• DoD - Not the Department of Disaster

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  This report is part of chapter one of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "The notion that the Department of Defense (DoD) should serve as the lead federal agency for major disasters and catastrophic events is not new. In 1992, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, discussions took place regarding this issue, and more recently, the topic resurfaced after Hurricane Katrina devastated areas of Louisiana and Mississippi in 2005. DoD is certainly capable of serving as the lead federal agency for catastrophic events and major disasters; but examining this issue from an operational rather than an academic point of view leads to the conclusion that a more useful and appropriate role for the department would be to enable and support other federal agencies--equally, or even better suited to lead the federal response efforts. In the event of a catastrophe, the DoD has three combatant commands which would be more than capable of anchoring the lead in a response to catastrophe: the United States Northern Command, the Pacific Command, and (perhaps less intuitively) the United States Southern Command. The experience and competence of the commands' leadership--coupled with the department's ability to conduct a wide variety of missions such as civil affairs, civil administration, reconstruction and restoration--lead many people to automatically default to the position that the DoD should serve as the lead agency in the event of a major disaster or catastrophe. The inherent capacities the department carries in the realms of communication, transportation, and a wide range of logistics capabilities only serve to reinforce this notion. Unfortunately, while this position is convenient from an operational point of view, this is not necessarily the best alternative."

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Tussing, Bert B.; Chavez, Richard
• Constitutional Charter of the Guard

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  "The Army National Guard's charter is the Constitution of the United States. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution contains a series of "militia clauses," vesting distinct authority and responsibilities in the federal government and the state governments. These clauses and follow-on legislation have sculpted the Guard as you see it today. Here are summaries that will help you understand how the Guard came to be what it is today."

  United States. National Guard Bureau
• Classification of Death and Injury Resulting from Terrorism

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  The National Center for Health Statistics has developed a set of new codes within the framework of the ICD and the ICD-9-CM that will allow the identification of deaths from terrorism reported on death certificates through the National Vital Statistics System as well as for injuries and illnesses from terrorism reported on medical records used for statistical purposes and for reimbursement. Presented herein is the process that produced the codes and a set of guidelines related to the codes.

  National Center for Health Statistics (U.S.)
• Information Warfare and International Law

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  The authors of this monograph, members of the Project on Information Technology and International Security at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control, have surfaced and explored some profound issues that will shape the legal context within which information warfare may be waged and national information power exerted in the coming years. They note that despite the newness of both the technology of Information Warfare (IW) and the evolving concepts for its employment, legal constraints will almost certainly apply to IW. Also noting that concepts of sovereignty based on physical territoriality do not function well in cyberspace, the authors observe that there is no authoritative legal or international agreement as to whether an IW "attack" equals an "attack" or "use of force" in the traditional sense. With this as a context, the authors offer several legal approaches the United States could employ to protect the national information infrastructure or clarify options useful for offense, defense, or retaliation. They are under no illusions that they have answered all of the questions relating to information warfare and international law, but rather can take great satisfaction in having cogently and thoroughly explored key legal questions and issues that information warriors, jurists, and policy makers will wrestle with in the future. In doing so, they have made a significant and lasting contribution to national and international security, stability, and peace.

  National Defense University

  Soo Hoo, Kevin J.; Goodman, Seymour E.; Greenberg, Lawrence T.
• Theory of Information Warfare: Preparing for 2020

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  This article postulates a theory of information warfare within the larger context of warfare and proposes ways to wage information warfare at the strategic and operational levels. The tools to wage information warfare are at hand, and because information weapons are such powerful weapons, both combatants and noncombatants need to be protected against them. The vulnerability to information warfare is universal. The decisions to pursue the development of information weapons or to prosecute information warfare are governmental decisions. These decisions need to be made consciously and deliberately and with an understanding of the moral and ethical risks of information warfare. After assessing all the risks and deciding to create information weapons or engage in information warfare, the decision makers should first have an understanding of these weapons and a weapon employment theory before such warfare starts rather than after the weapons are deployed or have already been employed. The United States should expect that its information systems are vulnerable to attack. It should further expect that attacks, when they come, may come in advance of any formal declaration of hostile intent by an adversary state. When they come, the attacks will be prosecuted against both knowledge systems and belief systems, aimed at influencing leadership choices. The knowledge and beliefs of leaders will be attacked both directly and indirectly. Noncombatants, those upon whom leaders depend for support and action, will be targets. This is what we have to look forward to in 2020 or sooner.

  Air University (U.S.). Press

  Szafranski, Richard
• Information Warfare, 1995

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  Much of what is discussed in this essay on information warfare is unofficial speculation. There is no official, open-source US government definition of information warfare. The Department of Defense calls its current thinking and approach to information warfare "command and control warfare" (C2W). There is little agreement among the services about either information warfare or C2W; and among civilian defense analysts looking at the issues of information warfare, there is even less agreement. Why, then, should we be thinking about this new and strange idea? The chief reason, of course, is that while we don't know just what we've got here, all the services agree that information warfare is something important. Was Desert Storm the first war of third-wave information warfare or the last war of mechanized second-wave industrial warfare? Nobody is sure, but a lot of people, including potential rivals, are trying to figure it out. This article attempts to make some sense of this new idea called information warfare. It looks at four sets of ideas: (1) A definition of information warfare; (2) How we should start thinking about developing a strategy of information warfare; (3) Why current Air Force doctrine may be the best framework for developing a doctrine of information warfare; and (4) A very brief comment on the danger of failing to develop information warfare.

  Air University (U.S.). Press

  Stein, George J.
• Theater Missile Defense: Reflections for the Future

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  The two distinctive Theater Missile Defense (TMD) lessons that emerged from the Gulf War were (1) that missiles will play a significant role in future wars, and (2) that locating, targeting, and destroying mobile missile transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) is both time and resource intensive. Yet before the United States Air Force develops new TMD doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, it would serve us well to first reflect on the past. Major topics of the article include Background information, Crossbow Campaign, The Great SCUD Chase, and Future Considerations. Author concludes that if the Air Force is to remain the leader in air and space power, it must require its members to become better students of history. While not yielding specific doctrinal templates, history does provide fertile ground for developing judgement. If Air Force leadership and doctrine are to remain reliable and relevant to the future, our understanding of history must prove equally as sound.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  Kipphut, Mark
• Weaponization of Space: It Doesn't Happen in a Vacuum

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  This article details the history of the weaponization of space, beginning with a description of 1950s United States space policy as outlined by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Subsequent major sections of the article discuss Early Steps toward Weaponization, Overt Advocacy, Arms Control Counterargument, Chicken Little, and Back to the Future. The conclusion delineates lessons learned from the Air Force's space weaponization, and ultimately states that the nonweaponization of space may be eeven more in the national interest than in Eisenhower's day.

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  Belote, Howard D.
• Impact of the National Guard Counterdrug Program in America. Where Do We Go from Here?

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  The illegal drug scene is spreading and changing, but how to deal with drug abuse is a much disputed subject. How you look at the drug scene depends on where you are, who you are and what you know about the scenario for tomorrow. Although the abuse of some drugs is decreasing, serious drug problems are found everywhere, in cities and rural communities, in all age groups, and among people of all races and economic status. For several years the National Guard has played a key role in the Counterdrug efforts to stop the flow and spread of illicit drug into and within the United States. The purpose of this study is to examine the National Guard Counterdrug programs in America and its efforts in neutralizing the use and spread of illegal drugs.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Geary, Reginald B.
• Chapter 4: Economic Strategy in the War on Terrorism

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  President Bush has expressed a new U.S. resolve to win the war on terrorism. "We will not tire. We will not falter. We will not fail." In addition to winning the war on terrorism, President Bush is determined to return the nation towards the path of economic recovery. This document traces the immediate actions that were taken by national leaders in an attempt to head off financial disaster in light of the 9-11 attacks and the subsequent call for a war against terrorism.

  United States. Pacific Command

  Rosenberger, Leif; Chun, Clay
• Federal Employee's Emergency Guide, 2003

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  "More than ever, the work of Federal employees is critical to the well-being and security of our Nation. However, Federal employees face unprecedented uncertainty. Individuals who are unwilling to impact the world through constructive efforts have instead stated their intention to harm freedom-loving civilians. While terrorists are determined in their hatred, they cannot match the strength, ingenuity, or systems of our democratic Government. Just as they typically rely on rudimentary methods to attack unprotected and unsuspecting individuals, we must increase our vigilance to deal effectively with man-made or natural threats. The intent of this guide is to provide a general document that educates Federal employees on the repercussions of various attack scenarios (or unintentional accidents) and to identify the steps that employees can take before and during an attack to mitigate the repercussions of an event. While the scope of this guide is to provide general information, resources (with website addresses) have been included which offer more comprehensive information on preparing for emergency events."

  United States. Office of Personnel Management