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Information Warfare Threat Demands More Attention on All SidesNeither the administration, nor the Congress, nor the public at large is devoting enough serious attention to the growing threat of information warfare, says Senator Jon Kyl. Potential adversaries are honing their ability to attack the critical infrastructure that increasingly runs the nation's communications, transportation, and financial systems -- and its vital defense establishment as well, he warns. Kyl, an Arizona Republican, serves as chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee. He also is a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Kyl was interviewed by Contributing Editor Ralph Dannheisser. Topics discussed include vulnerability of digital systems to attack, national security and public safety concerns, possible damage if the information grid is broken into, and legislative attention on this issue. According to Kyl, a large number of countries have information warfare programs under way, some of which are aimed at the United States. In his opinion the United States is, by far, the most vulnerable country because of the degree of our reliance upon technology.United States. Department of StateDannheisser, Ralph1998-11
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Information Assurance and the New Security EpochThe United States has faced five security epochs, with each change involving transitions from a certain past to an uncertain future. The first epoch was from the Revolutionary War to the mid-1820s, with the United States at the fringe of an international security environment still dominated by Europe. The most recent epoch -- the Cold War -- was dominated by a bipolar world. The United States led the international community in creating institutions to rebuild the shattered economies of Europe and to deal with the collapse of the old Europe-dominated empires in the Third World. At the same time, the United States was leading the free world states to contain communism until the Soviet Union collapsed. Now we are in transition to a new epoch, seemingly characterized by the revival of old dangers -- nationalism and ethnicity. We now live with the unsettling fear of "loose nukes" and chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists. The next security epoch also will present the challenge of cyber security. The explosive growth in the use of information technologies (IT) has had a profound effect on all sectors of the American economy and government. IT has fueled amazing economic growth, dramatically improved communications, and allowed American businesses to compete more effectively than ever. The United States -- and the world -- truly rely on information technology in ways unimaginable even just a few years ago. Information assurance, encryption, and network security pose some of the most daunting challenges the Department of Defense has ever faced. To take advantage of the IT revolution, we must ensure access to and protection of the very assets on which we depend. We are taking giant strides to make this happen, but much more remains to be done. These challenging days require that we turn to the expertise of information professionals both in DOD and in the broader government and private sectors to protect systems vital to all of us. We must ensure that our nation's journey into the new security epoch is as successful as the last.United States. Department of StateHamre, John J.1998-11
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Adapting the CFE Treaty to New Realities and ChallengesSince its inception, "CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) has become both a process and a venue for continuous dialogue on the security concerns of its participants and, whenever possible, cooperative solutions," says Dunkerley, Special Envoy for CFE. "This dynamic within CFE -- between reinforcing stability and addressing change -- will remain one of its greatest strengths." Since early 1997, negotiations have been under way in Vienna to update the CFE Treaty to take account of dramatic changes throughout Europe since the treaty was originally signed in 1990. These negotiations, taking place among the 30 States Parties within the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG), are intended to preserve the treaty's critical benefits, even while establishing a new structure of limitations providing increased stability and transparency. At the same time, individual States Parties have set out projected levels for their future national and territorial ceilings under an adapted CFE Treaty. For many of them, this would involve reductions in their permitted levels in two or more categories of Treaty-Limited Equipment. (In light of the drastic change in circumstances from the 1980s to the present, for example, the United States proposes to cut by more than 50 percent the number of tanks it has been permitted to have in Europe under the treaty. This does not imply a major change to the United States' actual military presence, but rather recognition that original CFE-permitted levels need to adjust to a new security environment.) But much still needs to be done. There are tough decisions ahead for all parties. Translating the work done thus far, and the underlying political agreements, into legal treaty text is a major task. Important details are still open -- especially if we are to secure the necessary transparency this future CFE regime will require. No less critical are the continued efforts of the United States and its allies to ensure the full and timely implementation of all existing CFE obligations under the current treaty and its associated documents. Implementation is the foundation on which successful adaptation can go forward.United States. Department of StateDunkerley, Craig Gordon1999-09
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Small Arms Use and Proliferation: Strategies for a Global DilemmaSmall arms proliferation is a symptom of increased intrastate conflicts and is "a problem that is not amenable to simple or quick solution and will be with us for the long term," says Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. "The United States and the international community must therefore address the root causes of intrastate conflict and, at the same time, try to stem the supply of these weapons and contain the devastation that they cause." While most arms control efforts focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and heavy conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons designed for military use are responsible for most of the killing and injuries, especially of civilians, in the increasing number of intrastate conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. These weapons include assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and individually portable mortars and missiles. The focus of U.S. policy is to achieve agreement by next year on a Protocol on Illicit Firearms and Ammunition Trafficking to the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention. This protocol is modeled on the InterAmerican Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, and Other Related Materials initiated by the OAS. Seven OAS member states have ratified the convention (Mexico, Belize, Bahamas, Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru, and Ecuador), and all but four OAS members have signed it. In June 1998 the President transmitted the convention to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. In a larger sense, small arms proliferation is one of many symptoms of increased intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. The proliferation and use of these weapons in such conflicts is a problem that is not amenable to simple or quick solution, and it will be with us for the long term. The United States and the international community must therefore address the root causes of intrastate conflict and, at the same time, try to stem the supply of these weapons and contain the devastation that they cause. This will require us to begin to integrate small arms concerns into the fabric of our diplomatic relations, as we now do with democracy and human rights. Without sustained, creative attention to both aspects of the problem of intrastate conflict, many of the other problems that we strive to mitigate will become worse.United States. Department of StateNewsom, Eric David1999-09
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Landmine-Safe World by 2010: Not an Idle DreamThe United States is engaged in a concerted effort to eliminate the threat that landmines pose to civilians worldwide by the end of the next decade, say Steinberg and Zimmerman. They believe the United States can achieve this goal by "working with governments, international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private citizens around the world." Steinberg, former U.S. Ambassador to Angola, is the Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining. Zimmerman is a Harold W. Rosenthal Fellow working in the President's Office of Global Humanitarian Demining; she is now completing her graduate studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Our government is firmly committed to ending the humanitarian crisis caused by landmines. The goal of President Clinton's "Demining 2010 Initiative" is to eliminate the threat of landmines to civilians around the world by the end of the next decade. We are taking key steps toward this goal. Our government is financing programs in about 28 heavily mined countries to eradicate their worst minefields by providing equipment, financial support, and training for deminers. In sum, we have spent $250 million on these and similar programs over the past five years, and are expanding our efforts to more than $100 million in 1999. Together with our humanitarian demining efforts, the steps outlined in this article are a serious, pragmatic approach toward landmines. Working with governments, international agencies, NGOs, and private citizens, we can achieve the goal of eliminating the threat of landmines to civilians around the world by the year 2010. The children of the new millennium deserve nothing less than to walk the earth without fear.United States. Department of StateSteinberg, Donald K.; Zimmerman, Laurie B.1999-09
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Year 2000 ProblemThe world currently faces one of the great challenges of the Information Age. As we head toward a new millennium, many computer systems, as well as the computer chips embedded in everything from personal computers to household appliances and sophisticated manufacturing equipment, are set to shift backwards in time. The problem is that many older computer systems and microprocessors, as computer chips are known, use only the last two digits of a year to keep track of the date. So, when the year 2000 arrives, those chips may recognize 00 as the year 1900, not 2000. The resulting malfunctions could cause serious disruptions of power grids, water treatment plants, financial networks, telecommunications systems, and air traffic control systems worldwide. In an increasingly wired world with a global economy, computer networks are only as strong as their weakest link. While each nation is likely to experience its own particular system problems, in a very real sense we are all in this together. Year 2000-related disruptions are likely to begin before the new millennium as outmoded systems attempt to calculate or schedule future events. Precisely what will happen is difficult to predict at this point. There are a number of Internet Web sites in the United States where some experts that one would not normally think of as alarmists have predicted widespread system failures that will result in power outages, traffic problems, economic recession, and possibly, in some regions, food shortages. While the author tends to be more optimistic than these doomsayers, he is concerned particularly about countries where inactivity and lack of awareness could lead to fulfillment of some worst-case scenarios. The point is that by taking action now we can minimize the disruptions and, hopefully, effect a seamless transition to the year 2000.United States. Department of StateKoskinen, John Andrew, 1939-1998-11
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Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning: State and Local Guide (101): Chapter 6, Attachment G: TerrorismThis new guidance, Attachment G, is a supplement to Chapter 6 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)State and Local Guide 101 Guide. This supplement aids state and local emergency planners develop and maintain a plan for responding to and recovering from terrorist-initiated incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The guide discusses hazards, situations and assumptions, operations, organization and assignment of responsibilities, and administration and logistics. The purpose of Attachment G is to aid State and local emergency planners in developing and maintaining a Terrorist Incident Appendix (TIA) to an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) for incidents involving terrorist-initiated weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1 The planning guidance in this Attachment was prepared with the assistance of the Departments of Defense, Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Veterans Affairs; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the National Emergency Management Association; and the International Association of Emergency Managers. State and local governments have primary responsibility in planning for and managing the consequences of a terrorist incident using available resources in the critical hours before Federal assistance can arrive. The information presented in this Attachment should help planners develop a TIA that integrates the Federal, State, and local responses. The TIA resulting from this guidance should supplement existing State and local EOPs. A suggested format for a TIA is shown in Tab A. The TIA should identify and discuss the nature of the WMD hazard(s), the hazard agents, potential targets, and release areas, as described in this document. The entire document "State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning" may be found at: http://www.fema.gov/rrr/gaheop.shtmUnited States. Federal Emergency Management Agency2001-04
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Research and Development for Combating Terrorism: Technical Support Working GroupThis report describes the organization and activities of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which conducts an interagency research and development program for combating terrorism. The working group balances technology and capability development efforts among the four pillars of combating terrorism: intelligence support, counter-terrorism, anti-terrorism, and consequence management. Today, TSWG still performs that counterterrorism technology development function as a stand-alone interagency working group. TSWG operates under the policy oversight of the Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the management and technical oversight of the Department of Defense (DoD) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)). Participation is open to federal departments and agencies. While the TSWG's core funds are derived principally from the DoD's Combating Terrorism Technology Support (CTTS) Program, and the DOS, other departments and agencies contribute additional funds. Other departments and agencies also provide personnel to act as project managers and technical advisors. The TSWG has successfully transitioned capabilities to the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Justice, State, and Treasury (Secret Service, Customs, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms); the Intelligence Community; the Transportation Security Administration; the Public Health Service; and other departments and agencies. TSWG membership includes representatives from over eighty organizations across the Federal Government. These departments and agencies work together by participating in one or more subgroups. A comprehensive listing of member organizations by subgroup is provided in the appendix. The nine subgroups are: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; Explosives Detection; Improvised Device Defeat; Infrastructure Protection; Investigative Support and Forensics; Personnel Protection; Physical Security; Surveillance, Collection and Operations Support; and Tactical Operations Support.United States. Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office. Technical Support Working Group2002
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Small Arms and Asymmetric Threats"The US response to an asymmetric threat must be an improvement over what has historically been the case. It is arguable that at least three small arms developmental strategies should be adopted. These strategies would permit flexible small arms applications and make the force adaptable in combat at distances from arms-length to roughly 300 meters. First, small arms must overmatch the threat's lethality in close quarters battle while minimizing collateral damage. Second, small arms must continue to overmatch the threat in conventional battle. Third, small arms must be effective against nonparadigmatic shadow threats such as terrorists, drug cartel operatives and transnational criminals. Should US small arms overmatch the threat at long range, the threat will likely seek combat in an urban or heavily wooded area to negate that advantage. The threat could also attempt to erode confidence in weapon systems with the goal of compromising faith in those who manufacture them, the government who supplies them, those who use them and the purpose for which they are employed. Today's pursuit of offensive and defensive technologies--and the under- or over-reliance on them by either the threat or the United States--may well determine whether the US military can successfully deter or defeat future threats. The article also presents likely technological trends that might produce significant improvements in threat small arms from now until the year 2020."U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeSmall, Stephen C.2000-11
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Validation Assessment of Thunder 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceA validation assessment of THUNDER 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) module is accomplished using formulation and experimental validation techniques. A comparison of ISR purposes and processes according to military doctrine is made with the purposes and processes of ISR implemented within THUNDER 6.5. This comparison provides an overview of the process, an understanding of the level of aggregation within THUNDER, insight into possible problem areas in THUNDER, and a basis for improving THUNDER ISR processes. Sensitivity analysis of the ISR parameters as they relate to the Quality, Quantity, and Timeliness of ISR is also presented to provide insight into the responsiveness of THUNDER to changes in ISR capability for selected battle outcomes. Linear Regression and a Face-Centered Central Composite Design were used to generate a response surface. Ninety-percent confidence intervals were used to determine differences in mean response among the full factorial design points.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Nelson, Francine N.1998-03
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Value of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: How Much Could the DOD Spend on Incentives?This study evaluated the value of the CRAF program to the DOD and explored the amount that could be spent to remove potential obstacles to participation with aviation insurance and lost market share. In comparing the value of the CRAF and the cost of current incentives, it was determined that up to $1.4 million could be spent on additional incentives, annually. For multiple aircraft losses and liability claims, the Air Force would need to tap into the Defense Business Operating Fund. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis was conducted and found that for low valued aircraft, such as the DC8, the cost due to loss would exceed the cost of commercial insurance at relatively low incident rates. Thus, it may be appropriate for the DOD to absorb the cost of commercial war-risk insurance for certain missions, thereby eliminating the expense resulting from a large claim. The cost due to lost market share was measured by the minimum cost required to re-enter a city pair market. At highly desirable airports, this cost is approximately $51,200 per month. However, this research found no conclusive evidence that would warrant additional monetary incentives to reduce the risk of lost market share.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Donovan, Pamela S.1996-09
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Value Focused Approach to Determining the Top Ten Hazards in Army AviationThe United States Army Safety Center is challenged with identifying the top ten most severe hazards in Army Aviation. This research utilizes value-focused thinking and multiattribute preference theory concepts to produce a decision analysis model designed to aid decision-makers in their analysis process. The severity model is based on the Army's Risk Management doctrinal manual and has been tailored specifically for aviation related accidents and hazards. The model determines the severity and risk ranking for 65 categories of accidents and 24 existing hazards. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine the effects of variations in the weights of the top-level criteria for accident and hazard severity. Recommendations are presented for ways to use the information contained in this report to assist in developing risk reduction controls focused on force protection. The model provides the decision-makers with a decision analysis methodology that is consistent with Army doctrine and the values of the current chain of command at the Army Safety Center. Furthermore the model can be adjusted for different leadership levels or situations.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Nelson, Francine N.1998-03
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Learning from the Arms Control ExperienceArms control and disarmament policy became an integral part of America's national defense strategy during the Cold War. The implementation of that policy brought with it into the security arena a number of environmental issues. In some instances, addressing environmental concerns was a major goal of our arms control agenda, as in the treaty banning environmental modification as a method of warfare (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1996). In other cases, environmental problems presented challenges to the achievement of other goals, as in the obstacles created by clean air standards to the rapid elimination of ballistic missiles required by new treaties. The environmental consequences of conflict were also a matter of debate within the arms control community: for example, the fear that a "nuclear winter" could follow a global war, the controversy over use of defoliants in counter-insurgency operations, and the uncertainty about regional consequences of Saddam Hussein's burning of the Kuwaiti oil fields during the Gulf War. Environmental degradation was increasingly seen also as a cause of conflict or a hindrance to peace. Concerns that environmental threats might undermine negotiations led to considerable parallelism in the Multilateral Middle East Peace Process as the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group found itself following closely developments in the working groups dealing with water, refugees, and economics. As we consider suggestions that our notions of international security be broadened or enhanced to include a greater centrality for environmental issues, insights can be gained from recent arms control experience. In part, that experience places before us case studies of the national security establishment coming to grips with environmental questions. Perhaps of even greater value is the recognition that the arms control policy process, with themes, institutions, and individuals mirroring and even overlapping those involved in the environmental policy process, has debated many of the same issues now central to the question of what is "environmental security." Thus, one can gain some insight into the role environmental issues play in national security by looking at the arms control experience. In the process, thinking about what is meant by "environmental security" may be clarified.United States. Department of EnergyLehman, II, Ronald F.1998-07-14
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Terrorism and Counterterrorism Remains a Global IssueAmong the issues directly affecting people everywhere, terrorism remains a high priority item on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not bring forth the "End of History" or a new dawn of world peace and harmony. Instead, this change brought into sharper focus serious global problems and threats. These threats include ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, untenable population growth, international crime, and terrorism. Perhaps none of these issues has caused Americans more anxiety than terrorism. First, terrorism provokes deep fear and insecurity--more than other forms of violence. Terrorism is also used as low--cost strategic warfare, sometimes by rogue states using surrogates, and sometimes by groups motivated by ideology, religion, or ethnicity to overthrow governments and change the course of history. Technology has also added to the terrorist threat. Terrorists use computers, cellular phones, and encryption software to evade detection, and they have sophisticated means for forging passports and documents. Even more dangerous is the specter that terrorists will turn to materials of mass destruction -- chemical, biological, or nuclear -- to multiply casualties far beyond traditional levels. The sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 by Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic Japanese sect, showed that the threat of chemical terrorism is now a reality. Finally, terrorism today is far more devastating than in the past because of the mass media. No story plays better, or longer, than a terrorist attack. What about the current trend in terrorism? Who are today's terrorists? And what is the U.S. government doing to combat them and put them on the defensive, where they belong? The trend has both good new and bad news. The actual number of international terrorist incidents has declined in recent years, from a high of 665 in 1987 to an average between three and four hundred in recent years due to various reasons and influences, outlined further in this article. There are also negative trends, such as groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The United States is taking a firm stand against terrorism, and our policy is to seek out relentlessly and punish terrorists wherever they may be, using the combined assets of law enforcement, diplomacy, and intelligence. We are increasing cooperation with other nations, and we have a strong program of research and development in counterterrorism technology, especially in explosives detection. We can be proud of the successes we've achieved, using these policies and tools. But we can't be complacent, since terrorism is a dynamic, moving target.United States Information AgencyWilcox, Philip C.1997-02
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America: Not Immune to AttacksThe United States is not immune to terrorist attacks, although relatively few have occurred within its borders. The United States and its citizens remain a prime target of international terrorism. This article contains excerpts of a September Following are excepts of a September 1996 report on "Terrorism -- Background and Issues for Congress" prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. While United States policy is a prime target for international terrorism -- in 1994, 24% of all terrorist incidents worldwide were committed against U.S. citizens or property -- the vast majority of those acts take place on foreign soil. The U.S. public perception of terrorism as primarily an international issue, however, may be changing with the advent of the bombing of the Trade Center in New York and the federal building in Oklahoma City. Much U.S. policy against terrorism was shaped in reaction to the murders of Israeli athletes in the 1972 Munich Olympics. Past administrations have employed a range of options to combat international terrorism, including the use of military force. Most experts agree that the most effective way to fight terrorism is to gather as much intelligence as possible and to disrupt terrorist plans and organizations before they act and, also, to organize multinational cooperation against terrorists and countries that support them. In responding to the risk of terrorist activity here and abroad, sensitivity to constitutional protections is necessary. For example, during investigations of allegations of possible terrorist activity, the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment, the protection of the freedoms of speech and association in the First Amendment, the protection of the right to bear arms in the Second Amendment, and due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may be implicated. The constitutional framework sets the outside limits within which any official investigations must operate.United States Information Agency1997-02
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Review of Nonimmigrant Visa Issuance Policy and ProceduresThis document contains findings on the ability of Consular officers to adequately process NIV (Non-immigrant visas) with respect to national security. It also discusses the Viper program to provide names of potential terrorists to CLASS (Consular Lookout and Support System). The events of September 11, 2001, notably changed our perspective on the admission of aliens to the United States. In retrospect, the previous emphasis on immigration left the Unites States vulnerable to the threat of aliens intent not on remaining in the country as immigrants, but in harming American citizens and institutions. The NIV issuance process as it existed before September 11 was inadequate to meet that threat. Since then, steps have been taken to address this problem, though existing policies and resources remain inadequate. This report addresses several elements of this issue including policy, staffing, secure workspace, and training. A classified annex addresses findings concerning the Visas Viper Program established in 1993 to identify potential terrorists and make their names available in the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). The post-September 11 era should have witnessed immediate and dramatic changes in CA's direction of the visa process. This has not happened. A fundamental readjustment by Department leadership regarding visa issuance and denial has not taken place. The Department still does not fully appreciate the consular function as part of a coordinated national effort to manage border security and implement the INA, both to prevent the travel of those who might present risks to the Unites States and its citizens and also to facilitate legitimate travel. CA continues to experience shortcomings that include: lack of uniformity in visa processing from post to post; and lack of a planning staff to develop and advance options for consular input into border security initiatives and directions. If the visa process is to be made more secure, it must be considered as a part of a larger process beginning with the visa process and continuing through the admission of aliens to the United States and tracking them while they remain in this country.United States. Department of State. Office of the Inspector General2002-12
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Environmental Protection: Federal Planning Requirements for Transportation and Air Quality Protection could Potentially be More Efficient and Better Linked"To protect the public from harmful emissions, transportation planners in areas with poor air must show that their plans will not make it worse. Every time they update their transportation improvement program (TIP) and their 20-year plan--every 2 and 3 years respectively--federal laws and regulations require that they ensure the emissions from their plans will not exceed the mobile source emissions budget. This is known as 'demonstrating conformity.' Areas that fail to do so generally cannot spend federal funds on new projects until they resolve the problem. The Committee asked GAO to determine (1) how many areas have failed, why, and what corrective actions they took, and (2) what issues transportation planners had with the conformity process and what solutions are possible. To help improve the conformity process, GAO recommends that the relevant federal agencies (1) consider extending the 3-year time frame between required transportation plan updates and asking the Congress to amend the Clean Air Act to change the conformity rules to match, and (2) assess the advantages and disadvantages of statutorily requiring that the emissions budgets in air quality plans be regularly updated with new travel data and emissions models. DOT and EPA generally agreed with these recommendations."United States. General Accounting Office2003-04
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Analysis of Disaster Planning in Business and Industry"Business and industry of all sizes are susceptible to damage or destruction from natural disasters and man-made catastrophes. Newspapers describe daily the loss of life, suffering, and costly damages caused by tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, chemical spills, and so on. Media coverage of these events has brought significant pressure upon federal, state, and local authorities to plan for disasters, and respond quickly and decisively. This is particularly true in regard to relieving human suffering, as was the case with the August 1992 Hurricane Andrew disaster and subsequent massive response effort in Florida. But what about U.S. business and industry? Are they prepared for disasters? Should they plan? What is business resumption planning? What can they do to be ready? Is insurance enough? What are the risks, the costs, and what should government do to assist? I will address these questions in this paper. Further, I will make recommendations in regard to U.S. policies, and suggest changes for business and industry to adopt in regard to disaster planning."Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)Hoffmann, Donald B.1993
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Melting the Organizational Boundaries in Border Security: An Initiative for the 1990s"The World Trade Center is bombed. Between two and four million illegal aliens are currently in the U.S. A ship laden with Chinese indentured servants runs aground in New York City. What is the common link? Do we have a border security system or not? Can we improve border security in a way that is consistent with the longstanding humanitarian traditions of this nation? This paper examines the history of border security and the contemporary situation. It reviews various 'fixes' to that system which have been proposed during the past fifteen years. Drawing upon the lessons learned from the case of Sheikh Omar Abdurrahrnan (the 'Blind Sheikh' of World Trade Center fame), the paper develops a proposal for 'reinventing' U.S. border security by establishing a Border Security Agency (BSA). This agency, which would report to the Attorney General, would absorb all immigration and customs responsibilities currently held by the Department of State, the Customs Service of the Treasury and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. The paper argues that establishing a BSA would help ensure a seamless and effective border security system which would operate from the embassy or consulate in which a visa is issued through port-of-entry processing in the United States."Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)Moss, Frank E.1994
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United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 1998This document explains the Special Operations Forces' (SOF's) posture statement for 1998. The contents include the following: special operations, the relevance of Special Operations Forces, current operations, SOF around the world, U.S. Southern Command and Special Operations Command South, U.S. Atlantic Command and Special Operations Command Atlantic, U.S. European Command and Special Operations Command Europe, U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command Central, U.S. Pacific Command and Special Operations Command Pacific, and Special Operations Command Korea, Emerging Threats and SOF Funding, SOF Organization, SOF Programs and Systems appendices, and a glossary. Special operations forces have been a part of the U.S. military history since the colonial era. In every conflict since the Revolutionary War, the United States has employed special operations tactics and strategies to exploit an enemy's vulnerabilities. These operations have always been carried out by specially trained people with a remarkable inventory of skills. SOF principal missions: counter-proliferation, combating terrorism, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, psychological operations, civil affairs, unconventional warfare, and information operations. Characteristics of special operation forces exemplify the following: mature professional with leadership abilities, specialized skills, equipment, and tactics, regional focus, language skills, political and cultural sensitivity, and small, flexible, joint-force structure.United States. Department of Defense2002-06-16
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Homeland Defense Specific RecommendationsThis document provides specific recommendations by the National Defense Panel (NDP) regarding the following areas: Homeland Defense, Regional Security, Projecting Military Power, Space Operations, Information Operations, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Near-Term Implications, Strategic Forces, Reserve Components, A Broad National Security Approach, Institutionalizing Change, Transforming the Unified Command Plan, Transforming the Industrial Base, and Transforming Infrastructure. The NDP recommendations in the area of Homeland Defense, for example, include the following: develop integrated active and passive defense measures against the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), develop and retain the option to deploy a missile defense system capable of defeating limited attacks, incorporate all levels of government into managing the consequences of a WMD-type attack, prepare reserve components to support consequence management activities, support the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, and use Department of Defense assets to advise, and assist law enforcement in combating terrorist activities.United States. National Defense Panel
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Major Multilateral Terrorism ConventionsThere are nine major multilateral conventions related to states' responsibilities for combating terrorism. The United States is a party to all of these. They are all listed in this fact sheet, along with email and web addresses for additional information.United States Information Agency1997-02
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Denial and Jeopardy: Deterring Iranian Use of NBC WeaponsThis study is part of a larger effort at the NDU Center for Counterproliferation Research to identify regional strategies that contribute to enhanced deterrence of employment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery. This particular assessment of Iran and the challenges of deterring its use of NBC weapons was the annex to a broader evaluation of regional deterrence, which includes Iran and North Korea as case studies. Both the broader deterrence paper and the North Korean case study will be published separately. While much unclassified literature is available on both deterrence theory and Iran, the present study was facilitated by the fairly narrow scope of the questions being asked about Iran: what makes Iran easier or harder to deter, and what can the United States do to enhance our ability to deter Iran's use of NBC weapons? The Islamic Republic of Iran presents a particular challenge to the Western analyst: Iranian leaders do not see the world from the Western view and have demonstrated a willingness to undertake actions at times seemingly contrary to their national interests and at a cost other states would find unacceptable. This does not make them irrational or necessarily undeterrable. The factors that influence their cost/benefit calculations, however, may be very different than those that have guided Western concepts of deterrence over the past 50 years. Thus it was important throughout the research to make every effort to avoid imposing Western perspectives and values on the evidence. Conclusions based on superimposed but inaccurate perspectives are often wrong and, in light of the need to deter Iranian NBC use, could be dangerously wrong in the not-distant future.National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic StudiesDesutter, Paula A., 1958-1995
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Aspects of Financial Transactions Indicative of Terrorist FundingThis Bulletin is provided to alert financial institutions to financial transactions and methods that could indicate fundraising associated with various criminal activities including terrorism. This Bulletin provides synopses of FinCEN's investigative support describing financial transactions that may be associated with criminal fundraising activities. This information was derived from Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and other Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) information filed by depository institutions. Each case example is followed by a set of indicators of fundraising activity that were extracted from the case. SAR narratives were used extensively in the development of these indicators. The information provided in this Bulletin is intended to assist financial institutions in identifying transactions that may be linked to potential terrorist financial activity. The indicators of such activity outlined in this Bulletin are intended to augment existing systems and procedures used by financial institutions to identify suspicious or unusual activity that may be of interest to law enforcement. This Bulletin includes information reported by financial institutions on financial transactions and methods that could indicate fund raising associated with various criminal activities including terrorism. Additional information on other related activities will be issued in advisories, bulletins, or other means as it is developed. For additional information, comments, or questions concerning this Bulletin, call FinCEN's Office of Strategic Analysis at (703) 905-3525 or send an email to osa@fincen.treas.gov.Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (U.S.)2002-01
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Guidelines for Port Security Committees, and Port Security Plans Required for U.S. PortsThe purpose of this Circular is to provide guidance to field commanders on how to develop Port Security Committees (PSC's) and Port Security Plan (PSP's). The specific goal of this guidance is the formal creation of PSC's and PSP's for U.S. ports. A secondary purpose is to provide Commanding Officers of Coast Guard Activities, Marine Safety Offices and Captains of the Port (COTP) with a document that addresses port security issues to be shared with the port and maritime community. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for the Maritime Homeland Security mission. In this capacity, the Captains of the Port, as the Coast Guard's lead entity in the port is responsible, through the Port Security Committee for developing a Port Security Plan. The PSP defines the government's (local, state and federal) obligation and the other port stakeholder's contributions to the Maritime Homeland Security mission. The PSP is designed to capture the information necessary to coordinate and communicate security procedures at each Maritime Security (MARSEC) level. The plan's goal is to enhance awareness for the detection of terrorist threats, to deter attacks, and reduce vulnerabilities through coordinated security procedures and communication. The PSP will complement facility and vessel security plans. Because the PSP's purpose is prevention, it must also integrate with (and may cause revisions to) existing plans for response (e.g. Area Contingency Plans (ACP), 9700/9800 series Operational Plans (OPLANs)) and consequence management (e.g. Federal Response Plan (FRP) when incident response and consequence management are necessary.United States. Coast Guard2002-09-30
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Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly"Historically, great powers have fought small wars and counterinsurgencies badly. They do not lose them so much as they fail to win them. Cassidy considers historical instances of this phenomenon and concludes that asymmetry in strategy, technology, or national will creates an Achilles heel for great powers. History offers many examples of big-power failures in the context of asymmetric conflict: the Romans in the Teutoburg Forest, the British in the American Revolution, the French in the Peninsular War, the French in Indochina and Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and the Americans in Somalia. This list is not entirely homogeneous, and it is important to clarify that the American Revolution, the Peninsular War, and the Vietnam war are examples of great powers failing to win against strategies that combined asymmetric approaches with symmetric approaches. However, two qualifications are necessary when generalizing great powers' failures in small wars. First, big powers do not necessarily lose small wars; they simply fail to win them. In fact, they often win many tactical victories on the battlefield. However, in the absence of a threat to survival, the big powers' failure to quickly and decisively attain their strategic aim causes them to lose domestic support. Second, weaker opponents must be strategically circumspect enough to avoid confronting the great powers symmetrically in conventional wars."U.S. Army Combined Arms CenterCassidy, Robert M., Ph.D.2002-09
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Hawaii's Homeland Security"The attacks of 11 September 2001 did not fit the popular paradigm of terrorist attack. No one expected U.S. Armed Forces to fight their next war on U.S. soil. The author describes steps U.S. Army, Pacific in conjunction with federal, state, and local governments and agencies are taking to deter or respond to terrorism in the Hawaiian Islands. JRAC-HI worked with state civil defense to develop a civilian version of the military's force-protection condition rating system for use in civilian communities. Within 30 days of 11 September, Hawaii established a color-coded system that the Office of Homeland Security used as the model to develop the national Security Alert System. What is being done in Hawaii is a microcosm of what Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge is facing on a national scale."U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeWhelden, Craig B.2002-05
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Paradoxical and Unintended Effects of the War on DrugsIn his article, "Paradoxical Effects in Political Systems," John Beahrs postulates that political systems are inundated with effects which run counter to policy intent or expectations. Furthermore, he contends that when a specific social ill is defined as unacceptable and specific corrective action is taken, then, instead of the intended or expected effects the following occur: 1) the underlying problem worsens; 2) related new problems arise; or 3) the same problem surfaces in a different form or at another level. Most authorities agree that there is no quick fix or adequately reliable valid single solution to the drug dilemma. This paper examines the paradoxical or unintended effects of United States policies to control illegal drugs and how they complicate U.S. efforts in reaching a resolution to the drug dilemma and proposes solutions to minimize these effects.Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)Fishburne, Lillian E.1993
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Political Strategy for Antisatellite WeaponryThis paper analyzes and develops a political strategy for United States (US) antisatellite (ASAT) weapon programs. Currently, the US has no fielded capability to negate enemy satellites. The Russians have demonstrated and fielded a capability, but it has numerous operational constraints which keep it from being a strategically threatening weapon. Domestic support for ASAT weapons is weak at best. A revised political strategy for ASAT weapons is required to deal with the new US political conditions and world order. Specifically, this paper: provides background on the geography of space and a definition of ASATs and their uses; examines the national requirements for ASAT weaponry; discusses relevant ASAT policy issues; assesses the domestic political situation for ASATs; and presents options for the future of US ASAT programs.Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)Rohlman, William H.1993
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Openness: A Viable Strategy for U.S. Intelligence?Robert M. Gates, Director of Central Intelligence, in recognition of the dramatic changes going on in the world and the need for course corrections announced a new strategy for American intelligence in February 1992. A significant aspect of this strategy was the announcement of greater openness for the CIA. Better accountability to the American people, both directly and through the Congress, was the intended purpose. The author agrees that it is difficult to argue with Mr. Gates' position that the intelligence community must make changes. In this research report, the author explains the initiatives undertaken to achieve openness; evaluates how well these initiatives are likely to achieve the intended outcome; examines the likely benefits of openness, evaluate openness as a strategy; and suggests other actions that may be taken by the intelligence community to achieve accountability.Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)Moore, Bill R.1993