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Gathering Storm: The Threat of Global Terror and Asia/Pacific Security
Paul Wolfowitz: "Like most in this audience, I share the view that the Pacific is as important as any region in this world, perhaps the most important when we contemplate the challenges of the next half-century and the extraordinary dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region. Developing America's relationship with our Pacific partners is one of our highest security priorities. Twelve months ago, I might have called it our biggest challenge. But last September 11th, another enormous challenge intruded. We are now engaged in a relentless war on international terrorism. Yet it remains equally important to work on building a better and more secure future, and a large part of that future will be built right here in the Asia-Pacific region."
United States. Department of Defense
2002-06-01
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Contingency Operations Cost Breakdown Structure
For budget estimation, budget execution, and reporting purposes (and in some cases for billing purposes) the costs associated with contingency operations are limited to the incremental costs of the operation. Incremental costs are those additional costs the Department incurs as a direct result of the contingency operation; they are costs which otherwise would not have been incurred if the operation had not been supported. Pricing for incremental material and services shall be at the DoD rate (refer to Chapter 1, Volume 11A of the "DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) (DoD 7000.14-R)." The
following cost categories form the structure used for estimating and reporting costs of
contingency operations. All costs are limited to that increment above and beyond baseline training, operational, and personnel costs.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-03-28
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Beyond the ABM Treaty
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech that was printed in the Wall Street Journal. Deputy Wolfowitz was giving remarks concerning the ABM Treaty and. Deputy Wolfowitz said this: "Last year the president announced our intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty. Yesterday, that withdrawal formally took effect. As a result, we are now free to develop, test and deploy effective defenses against missile attacks from states like North Korea and Iran -- states that are aggressively seeking weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. As the president said in his State of the Union Address, we will not allow the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons. We need to defend against all avenues of attack with weapons of mass destruction. Missiles in the hands of states that support terrorism are a growing threat to the U.S. and our friends and allies. We've watched rogue states invest scarce resources to acquire increasingly capable missiles even while they starve their people. Until yesterday, because of the ABM treaty, we have not been able to develop appropriate defenses against this threat. We are at a turning point in defense and deterrence policy. We can now move forward with the robust development and testing program that the Department of Defense has designed to take advantage of new technologies and basing modes. Recent tests provide a foundation on which to proceed. Development and testing will continue, but we will also begin to deploy effective layered defenses against limited missile attack".
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-06-14
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Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security: January 1, 1996 - December 31, 1996
This report presents a summary of events. programs. and accomplishments in civil aviation scurity in 1996, including the effectiveness of screening in air transportation and foreign air carrier and airport security. Recent events, growth of the aviation industry, and the intelligence assessments that pointed to an increasing threat of terrorism within the United States raised concern about the standard everyday measures that formed the baseline of domestic aviation security. This concern, the tragedies of VluJet Fligth 592 and TWA Fligth 800, and major legislation drove a year of sweeping changes and growing partnerships and programs in civil aviation security.
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
1997
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Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security: January 1, 1997 - December 31, 1997
This report presents a summary of events, programs, and accomplishments in civil aviation security in 1997. The year continued the significant changes in direction and emphasis in civil aviation security in the United States that began in 1996 in the aftermath of the ValuJet Flight 592 and TWA Flight 800 tragedies. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended several measures to improve aviation safety and security and ensure that the U.S. aviation system remains the safest and most secure aviation system in the world. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made significant progress this year in implementing many of the White House Commission's recommendations and related legislation.
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
1998
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Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security: January 1, 1995 - December 31, 1995
The year 1995 was one of many terrorist attacks, but for civilian aviation it should be recorded as year of disasters averted. Of particular significance was the explosive device hidden on a Phillipine airliner flying from Manila to Osaka, via Cebu, on December 11, 1994. On detonation, this devie killed a Japanese student. This event turned out be the prelude for attempts to attack several American carrier flights in East Asia in January 1995. The FA adopted extensive security measures overseas to protect against this threat and additional measures were required at U.S. airports. The FAA also issued emergency security program amendments to 27 foreign air carriers operating to the United States from the Asia-Pacific region to address a specific threat in that region of the world.
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
1996
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Intro to the NERC/NICP Indications, Analysis & Warnings Program: IAW Program: Electric Power Sector
This presentation outlines the growing threat of a potential cyber attack on the electrical power industry in the United States. The government and industries lack the financial and human resources to deal with a proposed threat. The problem stems from easy access from unauthorized users into computer systems via an increase in worldwide connectivity. The Indications, Analysis & Warnings (IAW) Program, Electric Power Sector, responds to the increased risk of physical & cyber threats. The Electric Power participants are crucial to government and other critical industries such as water, banking and finance, telecommunications and transportation because these industries and government rely upon electricity. How the Program Works: (1) A company agrees to participate and distributes jobaids and forms so employees know how to recognize & report incidents; (2) When there is an "incident", you fill out a report, and send it to NIPC and NERC; (3) At the same time, NIPC is collecting data from numerous other organizations; (4) Industry experts review the data and look for trends and send out warnings if warranted.
National Infrastructure Protection Center (U.S.)
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Basics of Freight Rail Transportation in the United States
This report provides a preliminary assessment of the freight railroad system as a critical infrastructure of the United States, and describes the system's ability to continue to operate after accidents, natural disasters, actions caused by trespasses, and possible terrorist attacks.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
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Liability and Insurance: Infrastructure Assurance
Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P. (C&L) was engaged by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) to conduct a market study on infrastructure assurance in the oil and gas, electric and telecommunications industries. The purpose of this study was to identify and examine public policy issues associated with questions of responsibility for assuring reliable infrastructure services, both today and in the future. Its aim was also to identify how service providers deal with liability for service interruptions in the oil and gas, electric and telecommunications sectors. The study also assessed the impact of deregulation on infrastructure by terrorist or cyber attacks. Our analysis involved background research and interviews with senior executives in the three industries in question as well as related industries including law firms, insurance companies and financial institutions. Interview participants were selected that provide a wide range of perspectives and represent different types of service providers existing in the market, a variety of company sizes, different departments within organizations, as well as geographic diversity. The information and opinions presented in this report reflect the interview responses and perceptions within the industry.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
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Major Federal Legislation: A 'Legal Foundations' Study: Report 6 of 12: Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
"Some of the most sweeping Federal legislation relevant to efforts to protect the critical infrastructures was originally conceived, passed into law and implemented long before the proliferation of computer and computer networks, and before the emergence of serious threats to the infrastructures. While the long-standing divisions of authority created by such legislation and the mechanisms that flourished thereunder still appear to be fundamentally sound, some of this legislation may now require modernization so that it may continue to serve its originally intended purpose. Several pieces of legislation that appear relevant to infrastructure assurance objectives were written before the emergence of a recognizable cyber threat. It is not clear whether such authorities would apply, and should apply, to a cyber-related event. Until the dynamics of such a cyber event are better understood, including the necessary response vehicles, sweeping legislative changes would be premature. However, it is nonetheless possible to identify key issues and to make general recommendations to begin the process of incorporating the full range of infrastructure assurance issues within the legislative framework. It is also possible to identify the additional pieces of legislation relevant to achieving infrastructure assurance objectives and consider whether those acts should be amended or revised, or should act as models to guide the implementation of other specific infrastructure assurance objectives."
United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
1997
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Future Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism
Terrorism poses a growing threat to the United States, its interests, and its allies. The political, economic, and informational instruments of power play primary roles in addressing and eliminating the root causes behind terrorism attacks, but the military instrument will prevent some attacks and retaliate for others. Air and space power is one of the primary components of the military instrument in the battle against terrorism. This paper begins with an overview of US national and Department of Defense counterterrorist (CT) policies, performs a systems model analysis of a terrorist organization to better understand targeting of the same, reviews current air and space power CT capabilities, and concludes with recommendations for future ones. Air and space power contributes to current CT capabilities by providing global mobility for special operations forces, air superiority to protect those forces, and precision strike capability to target terrorist infrastructures. It also provides intelligence critical to deterring, preempting, and answering terrorist attacks, and provides psychological operations support to help erode terrorist will and popular support. Although there is no "silver bullet" to use against terrorists, future improvements in air and space power will enhance CT capability effectiveness and provide expanded options. This paper's research consisted of review of primary and secondary sources and interviews with terrorism and targeting experts.
Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College
McAlpine, Mark S.
1997-03
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Terrorism and CERT: Manual, Instructor Module
Module uses lecture to review the B-NICE agents. It covers indicators regarding their use. Participants are given actions that they can take if they are at or near an incident involving these agents including procedures for decontamination and sheltering in place. Participants apply the knowledge learned in this module by describing actions that they would take in a scenario presented to them at the beginning of the module and again at the end.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Terrorism and CERT: Manual, Student Module
This module uses lecture to review the B-NICE agents. It covers indicators regarding their use. Participants are given actions that they can take if they are at or near an incident involving these agents including procedures for decontamination and sheltering in place. Participants apply the knowledge learned in this module by describing actions that they would take in a scenario presented to them at the beginning of the module and again at the end.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Defense Forum Foundation
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech at the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington, DC on Friday, October 18, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz talk about Iraq during his speech at the Rayburn House. Deputy Wolfowitz said "Over the last 12 months, President Bush and his advisers have been weighing very carefully the risks of the various courses of action. While everything possible is being done to reduce those risks, no one is discounting them. The fundamental question is how to weigh the risks of action against the risks of inaction, and to weigh the risks of acting now against the risks of acting later, and doing so inevitably
requires making judgments about things that are fundamentally uncertain. The search for evidence is understandable; the search for facts on which to pass those judgments is absolutely necessary. But at the end of the day, we are trying to judge what will happen in the future along different courses that we might take".
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-10-18
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On Iraq
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave at speech at the Fletcher Conference in the Ronald Reagan Building on October 10, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz gave his speech on Iraq. Deputy Wolfowitz said "I want to talk to you today about an extremely important subject and a complicated subject which is the question, how do we weigh the risks of a possible use of force against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq? Let me underscore at the outset that word possible. The President has not made any decision to use force and, to the contrary, he is exercising strenuous efforts to try to find a peaceful resolution to
this serious threat that would allow us to avoid the use of force. But that possibility is in front of us. It's being debated. It was obviously debated vigorously when the Congress passed its important resolution last week. So I'd like to share some of my thinking with you. And since it is a complicated subject, and since some of you at least are from Fletcher and you're used to 50-minute segments, this may be a little long. Be patient".
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-10-16
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Association of Old Crows Annual Symposium and Convention
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Nashville, TN, Monday, October 28, 2002 to the Association of Old Crows. Deputy Wolfowitz said "The real issue we face, though, is how to weigh the risks of using force, should we have to do so, and that's what I'd like to talk about briefly this afternoon. Those risks are very real. As President Bush has demonstrated over and over again, he takes those risks extremely seriously, as does everyone in his administration. That's why the President has made it clear that he will do everything possible to achieve a peaceful disarmament of Iraq that resolves this issue that resolves this danger to our country and the world, if possible, without the use of force".
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-10-28
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Commercial Perspective on Information
This report responds to the following tasking from the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Provide an assessment of commercial information assurance, research and development funding, and determine where commercial technologies providers are currently investing and where they think investments should occur in the future. The results documented in the report will assist the Commission in developing its own set of recommendations for national IA research agenda, including recommendations for government funding, as part of the Commission's final report ot he President.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
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Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data
Making sure systems can work effectively together (interoperability) has been a key problem for the Department of Defense (DOD) yet integral to its goals for enhancing joint operations. Given the importance of being able to share intelligence data quickly, we were asked to assess DOD's initiative to develop a common ground-surface-based intelligence system and to particularly examine (1) whether DOD has adequately planned this initiative and (2) whether its process for testing and certifying the interoperability of new systems is working effectively. At times, these systems are not interoperable--either for technical reasons (such as incompatible data formats) and/or operational reasons. One multibillion-dollar initiative DOD has underway to address this problem is to pare down the number of ground-surface systems that process intelligence data and upgrade them to enhance their functionality and ensure that they can work with other DOD systems. The eventual goal is an overarching family of interconnected systems, known as the Distributed Common Ground-Surface System (DCGS). To date, planning for this initiative has been slow and incomplete. DOD is developing an architecture, or blueprint, for the new systems as well as an overarching test plan and an operational concept.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-31
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Academic Workshop on Public Confidence
The following contains transcripts of the Academic Workshop on Public Confidence proceedings.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
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'I Love You' Virus: Lessons Learned Report
"On 4 May 2000 the 'ILOVEYOU' Virus, also known as the "Love Bug", originated in the Philippines and wormed its way into government and business e-mail
systems around the globe from Australia and Hong Kong westward through Asia, Europe, and the U.S., including throughout HQ FORSCOM and its subordinate commands. The 'ILOVEYOU' Virus spread about 15 times faster than last year's Melissa computer virus. The program's rapid proliferation brought E-mail Systems worldwide to a grinding halt forcing technicians to take hundreds of systems offline. The virus was spread through an E-mail attachment designed to propagate the virus message automatically throughout an agency's Global Email Address Directory. Unsuspecting users who opened the attachment automatically caused the virus to start spreading throughout their agencies' e-mail system. This overloaded email servers and caused technicians to shut down servers to assess what was happening and attempt to fix the problem. The virus spread throughout Army networks before Army anti-virus software updates that could detect and remove it were available. FORSCOM DOIMs and activities responded quickly to contain the virus but in the process, email service was impacted. The impact of the virus as reported to the Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT) is: workstations infected - 2258, manhours lost - 12,010, estimated cost - $79.2K."
United States. Department of the Army
2000-05
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Human Capital: Building on the Current Momentum to Address High-Rish Issues, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before Congressional Subcommittees
"Federal employees represent the government's knowledge base, drive its capacity to perform, and define its character, and as such, are its greatest asset. The early years of the 21st century are proving to be a period of profound transition for our world, our country, and our government. In response, the federal government needs to engage in a comprehensive review, reassessment, reprioritization, and as appropriate, reengineering of what the government does, how it does business, and in some cases, who does the government's business. Leading public organizations here and abroad have found that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious change management initiative and effort to transform the cultures of government agencies. At the request of the subcommittees, GAO discussed the status of the federal government's efforts to address high-risk human capital weaknesses, possible short- and longer-term legislative solutions to those weaknesses, and other human capital actions that need to be taken to ensure that federal agencies are successfully transformed to meet current and emerging challenges."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-04-08
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Center for the Study of Popular Culture, Restoration Weekend Conference
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Palm Beach, FL on Friday, November 15, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz said "The war on terrorism is not something that's going to be over with one battle or one engagement, or in one country. As President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have said over and over again, we are in for a long war. If we do capture Osama bin Laden or kill him, the war will not be over. My boss reminded people right after September 11th that it's a mistake, in fact, to focus too much on one individual. And indeed, in some sense we should remind ourselves that the war on terrorism is not only about killing and capturing terrorists. As President Bush said in his State of the Union message, a
major part of our efforts is building a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terrorism, and
particularly in the Muslim world.
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-11-15
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Government Electronics and Information Technology Association
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Vienna, VA to the Government Electronics and Information Technology Association on Wednesday, October 30, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz discussed operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the technologies and strategies used in those operations.
United States. Department of Defense
2002-10-30
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FORTUNE Global Forum
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld gave a speech in Washington, DC on November 11, 2002. Secretary Rumsfeld said "In the global war against terrorism, President Bush has assembled the largest coalition in the history of mankind. Not bad for an administration that's frequently described by the press, and some in Europe, as unilateralist. The scope of this alliance is truly breathtaking in its breadth and its depth. Some 90 nations -- nearly half of the countries on the face of the earth -- are participating in the global war on terrorism. Never before have the interests of civilized nations more clearly overlapped. And never before have the nations of the world so effectively cooperated to defend them".
United States. Department of Defense
Rumsfeld, Donald, 1932-
2002-11-11
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Universal Joint Task List
"The Universal Joint Task List Version 4.2 (CJCSM 3500.04C) serves as a common language and common reference system for joint force commanders, combat support agencies, operational planners, combat developers, and trainers to communicate mission requirements. It is the basic language for development of a joint mission essential task list (JMETL) or agency mission essential task list (AMETL) that identifies required capabilities for mission success. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), when augmented with the Service task lists, is a comprehensive integrated menu of functional tasks, conditions, measures, and criteria supporting all levels of the Department of Defense in executing the National Military Strategy."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2002-07-01
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Civil Rights Issues Facing Arab Americans in Michigan
This report is a summary statement of the Michigan Advisory Committee's study on "Civil Rights Issues Facing the Arab American Community in Michigan" and includes conclusions and recommendations. Much of the report is based on information received by the Committee at a community forum held in Dearborn, Michigan, on September 27, 1999. The Michigan Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is composed of 14 members. It is bipartisan, including representation from both political parties as well as the different geographic regions of the state. The Michigan Advisory Committee is also independent of any national, state, or local administration or policy group.
United States Commission on Civil Rights
2001-05
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Joint Task Force Headquaters Master Training Guide
"In December 1993, the US Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (USCINCACOM) proposed to the Joint Staff that a Joint Task Force (JTF) training document be developed to link the Universal Joint Task List to joint doctrine/joint tactics, techniques and procedures (JTTP). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided funding for this project through the CINC Initiative Fund (CIF) and designated USACOM as the lead agent for its development. The intent is that this publication - named the Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (JTF HQ MTG) - will be the first of a series of joint training documents that support the training and operations of all Joint Task Forces. An explanation of this series of publications is provided in Chapter 1. The purpose of the JTF HQ MTG is to provide a descriptive, performance-oriented training guide to assist leaders in training their units. It also serves as a guide for the JTF Headquarters in actual operations. This publication is not intended to include information on all types of joint units - just the JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS. It should be viewed as a single source for information, in outline form, to guide training of the JTF HQ."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1997-04-15
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Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request: U.S. General Accounting Office: Testimony
This is the testimonial statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States. His statement contains information on the fiscal year 2001 budget performance and results, current challenges and future plans and requests for the 2003 fiscal year to support congress and the American public. Through GAO's effort, congress and government leaders saved $26.4 billion during FY 2001. This allowed for timely and rapid assistance to the events of September 11. Much of the document outlines the goals of the GAO in future years. Such goals include provision of timely, quality service to Congress and the federal government in addressing the financial security of the American people; respond to changing security threats and the challenges of global interdependence; and assist in transforming the government's role in conducting business to meet the needs of the 21st century. Topics covered include contributing to the military base closure and realignment process, cutting the cost of defense's acquisition infrastructure, improving department of defense antiterrorism efforts, strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and safety efforts, improving food safety, and creating a focal point for combating terrorism.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-05-08
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Toward a National Biodefense Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities: A Report of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
The National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research convened a multi-day conference in May 2002 to assess the status of and prospects for a national biodefense strategy. The conferences was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint Staff and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and drew widespread participation from each of these and other DoD offices and other Federal agencies and from nongovernmental and industry specialists. This monograph is grounded in, but further elaborates on, the presentations and discussion conducted in that forum. The United States requires a national biodefense strategy designed to shape effective policies, guide and maximize investment, and balance competing objectives. Developing such a strategy is a major challenge since the biological threat is complex and highly dynamic. Traditional policy tools for preventing the proliferation of these weapons are lacking. There are significant scientific and technological hurdles to overcome in order to provide effective means of detecting, identifying, treating, and defeating biological agents used as either a weapon of terror or organized warfare. Any national strategy must take explicit account of the biological threat faced by the United States and its allies. Included among the many important issues addressed are: the role of treaties and threat reduction activities; the prospects for deterrence and interdiction; the role of industry in biodefense; preparedness and medical infrastructure; military force protection and installation preparedness; technical and scientific challenges of detection; treatment and forensics; and military operations in a BW environment. The threat posed by biological weapons, while not new, is evolving and does present a series of political, military, technological and psychological national security challenges. While some military and civilian organizations have substantial capabilities in place to help counter the BW threat, others are relative newcomers and have only recently begun to consider their roles in the national biodefense effort. Certainly, the fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States triggered an outpouring of resources and captured the attention of the Bush administration as well as the nongovernmental policy community, the media, and the public on BW threats. This monograph assesses the nature of the biological weapons threat and analyzes its broader implications for national security. It articulates the imperative for developing a cogent, robust, and integrated national biodefense strategy and highlights an important set of issues facing the policy, operational, intelligence, and public health communities. Finally, it offers a series of recommendations to understand the changing BW threat and for further developing appropriate responses.
National Defense University. Center for Counterproliferation Research
2003-04
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Weapons of Mass Destruction: The U.S. Experience
The United States has renounced the use of chemical and biological weapons and has reduced both its conventional and nuclear forces substantially since the end of the Cold War, says Korb. However, as long as some nations continue to try to develop weapons of mass destruction, "the United States will need some form of nuclear deterrent," he says. Korb is Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration. With the end of the Cold War and the decline of defense spending, the U.S. economy grew rapidly during the 1990s. By the end of the decade, the U.S. GDP exceeded $8 trillion, unemployment was at 4.3 percent, and inflation was below 2 percent. Maintaining stability in the international system, while not cheap, will not place as much of a burden on the U.S. economy or the American people as the Cold War did. There will, of course, continue to be debates about how much is enough for defense. There are many, like former head of the Strategic Air Command, General Lee Butler, and former commander of the space command and commander of the air component of the Gulf War, General Charles Horner, who argue that the United States should eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. These Air Force generals feel that precision guided U.S. conventional weapons are now so powerful that they can deter use of weapons of mass destruction by themselves. Moreover, they argue that by eliminating nuclear weapons, the United States can seize the moral high ground in the nonproliferation debate. But, like the debates during the Cold War, these debates will not lead to the elimination of all U.S. nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, some nations have tried and will continue to try to develop weapons of mass destruction, and as long as they do, the United States will need some form of nuclear deterrent, particularly since it has given up its chemical and biological weapons.
United States. Department of State
Korb, Lawrence J., 1939-
1999-09