September 11, 2001 Attacks

This is the September 9, 2019 hearing on "18 Years Later: The State of Homeland Security After 9/11," held before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. From the opening statement of Ron Johnson: "The title of this hearing '18 Years Later, The State of Homeland Security After 9/11,' describes our goal: to look back and assess what has transpired since that awful day. What actions were taken? What has and what has not been effective? And maybe most important, what has changed?" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Alice M. Greenwald, Michael Chertoff, Janet A. Napolitano, and Jeh C. Johnson.

This is the October 7 and November 2, 2021 hearing on "20 Years After 9/11: Examining Emergency Communications," held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery of the Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Val Butler Demings: "Last month, our Nation marked 20 years since the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil. The Committee on Homeland Security joined many of our colleagues from New York and New Jersey to visit the National September 11 Memorial and Museum, and held a roundtable with first responders. We have also conducted several hearings on the evolution of the Department of Homeland Security and heard from our intelligence community regarding the current and emerging threats to our homeland. Today, the Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Subcommittee will examine the progress made in emergency communications since September 11, 2001, and discuss the challenges that may still persist today." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Christopher Rodriguez, Mel Maier, Chris Lombard, H.D. ''Gator'' DeLoach, III, Antwane Johnson, Billy Bob Brown Jr., and Edward Parkinson.

This is the September 27, 2016 hearing on "Fifteen Years After 9/11: Threats to the Homeland," held before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. From the testimony of Chairman Jeh C. Johnson: "One, I have talked, repeatedly, about how we see the global terrorist threat evolving and the threat to our homeland evolving, from terrorist-directed attacks to a global threat environment that now includes terrorist-inspired attacks of the type we have seen most recently, in our homeland, where an actor is self-radicalized, without receiving direct orders from a terrorist organization, and has, as Senator Carper noted, very often spent most of his life here. He can be a U.S. citizen and he can have been born here, but he is inspired by things that he sees on the Internet, social media, and the like. This makes for a more complicated and challenging homeland security and public safety environment. I think I speak for all three of us when I say that the prospect of the next terrorist-inspired attack, on our homeland, is the thing that keeps us up at night the most often." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: James B. Comey, Jeh C. Johnson, and Nicholas J. Rasmussen.

While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, the Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the September 11attacks, particularly when considered for its collective significance.

This document concerns the President's declaration of a national emergency in response to the unusual and extraordinary threat posed to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States by grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, at the Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania. It also addresses the issuance of an Executive Order to help deal with this threat by giving the United States more powerful tools to reach the means by which terrorists and terrorist networks finance themselves and to encourage greater cooperation by foreign financial institutions and other entities that may have access to foreign property belonging to terrorists or terrorist organizations.

This document includes senate proceedings and statements from a number of U.S. Representatives honoring the fallen heroes of September 11, 2001.

From the opening statement of Bob Graham: "As we enter the public hearing phase of the inquiry, our purpose is to inform the American people of our findings and to continue exploring what reforms will be necessary to reduce the chances of another terrorist attack on our homeland. As we said in the preamble to the scope of inquiry statement that the committee adopted in April, our review is designed to reduce the risk of future terrorist attacks, to honor the memories of the victims of the September 11 terrorist attacks by conducting a thorough search for facts to answer the many questions that their families, and many Americans, have raised, and to lay the basis for assessing the accountability of institutions and officials of the government. [...] One, the evolution of the terrorist threat to the United States, and our government's awareness of and response to that threat. It is important that we gain an understanding of how terrorist organizations, particularly Usama bin Ladin and Al-Qa'ida, move from being a relatively insignificant threat to American interests just a decade ago to their status today as America's number one threat. Second, what the Intelligence Community and the active consumers of the government's intelligence knew, or should have known, prior to September 11 about the scope and nature of possible attacks on U.S. interests by international terrorists. By examining how and when the government recognized this evolving threat and how it responded to that threat, we will gain insights into the ways that we need to respond to terrorism." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Kristen Breitweiser, Orrin Hatch, Eleanor Hill, Jon Kyl, Stephen Push, Pat Roberts, Bob Graham, Richard L. Armitage, Samuel R. Berger, Anthony Lake, Brent Scowcroft, Paul D. Wolfowitz, Richard Beer, Christopher Kojm, Michael E. Rolince, Carl Levin, Leonie Brinkema, Cofer Black, Dale Wason, and Robert S. Mueller III.

From the opening statement of Bob Graham: "This is the sixth open hearing by our committees as we consider our joint inquiry into the Intelligence Community's performance regarding the September 11 tragedies. During the course of our investigation, we have considered questions about the sharing of information among the major parts of our intelligence community, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], NSA [National Security Agency] and the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], as well as between law enforcement and the intelligence components, particularly of the FBI. Today we will focus on several other aspects of information sharing. One is the sharing of information between the principal elements of the Intelligence Community and a range of Federal agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which are important users of intelligence information and which also may generate intelligence information of use to others. A second issue is the sharing of intelligence information between the Federal Government and State or local governments as well as parts of the private sector." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Louis Andre, James Gilmore III, Joseph Greene, Eleanor Hill, Claudio Manno, Edward T. Norris, Francis X. Taylor, Spencer Abraham, David M. Walker, Lowell E. Jacoby, Robert C. Norris, Jr., Lee H. Hamilton, Frederick Hitz, William E. Odom, William Webster, George Tenet, Kie Fallis, Louis Freeh, Paul R. Pillar, Warren Rudham, Mary Jo White, Bruce Hoffman, Michael V. Hayden, Robert Mueller, James R. Clapper, Bob Graham, Lowell E. Jacoby, and Carl Levin.

This is the declassified version of the Final Report of the Joint Inquiry that was approved and filed with the House of Representatives and the Senate on December 20, 2002. With the exception of portions that were released to the public previously (e.g., the additional views of Members, the GAO Anthrax Report, etc.), this version has been declassified by the Intelligence Community prior to its public release. There are four parts to the report. Part one contains the findings and conclusions of the joint inquiry. Part two contains the narrative with details of the planning of the September 11th attacks, the hijackers of the Pentagon flight (Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Salim al-Hazmi) and related terrorist incidents involving the same individuals, intercepted communications amongst the Pentagon hijackers, al-Hazmi's and al-Mihdhar's contact with an FBI Informant, associates of the terrorists involved in the 9-11 attacks including Omar al-Bayoumi and Osama Bassnan, the increased threat of terrorism, and U.S. counter-terrorism policy prior to 9-11. Part three details the execution of the September 11th attacks in regards to counter-terrorism resources, foreign liaison's, covert action and military operations against Usama Bin Ladin, disruption of terrorist funding, Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (considered the mastermind of 9-11), investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui prior to 9-11, Phoenix Electronic Communication (EC), and views outside of the intelligence community in addition to information sharing, technology gaps, technical collection of terrorist communications, and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection. Part four contains a discussion and narrative regarding certain sensitive national security matters in addition to a glossary, additional views of members, and appendices.

"Expressing the sense of the Senate and House of Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001. Whereas on September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked and destroyed four civilian aircraft, crashing two of them into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and a third into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C.; Whereas thousands of innocent Americans were killed and injured as a result of these attacks, including the passengers and crew of the four aircraft, workers in the World Trade Center and in the Pentagon, rescue workers, and bystanders; Whereas these attacks destroyed both towers of the World Trade Center, as well as adjacent buildings, and seriously damaged the Pentagon; and Whereas these attacks were by far the deadliest terrorist attacks ever launched against the United States, and, by targeting symbols of American strength and success, clearly were intended to intimidate our Nation and weaken its resolve".

This is the September 22, 2021 hearing on "Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: 20 Years After 9/11," held before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Bennie G. Thompson: "This month Americans observed the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We will never forget the heroic first responders who ran into the Twin Towers to save others, the brave flight 93 passengers who fought back against the hijackers, or the service members killed at their posts in the Pentagon. We remember all of those who lost their life or their loved ones on 9/11 and those who have suffered Ground Zero-related health effects in the days since. This committee was created in the aftermath of the attacks. [...] Today the committee is meeting to examine world-wide threats to the homeland 20 years after 9/11." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Christopher A. Wray, and Christine Abizaid.

"Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets, with a centralized leadership structure, made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization's plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief Executive Officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. Some would argue that the Al Qaeda of that period no longer exists. Out of necessity, due to pressures from the security community, in the ensuing years it has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. [...] The Al Qaeda network today also comprises semi-autonomous or self radicalized actors, who often have only peripheral or ephemeral ties to either the core cadre in Pakistan or affiliated groups elsewhere. According to U.S. officials Al Qaeda cells and associates are located in over 70 countries. [...]. Understanding the origins of Al Qaeda, its goals, current activities, and prospective future pursuits is key to developing sound U.S. strategies, policies, and programs. [...]. The focus of this report is on the history of Al Qaeda, actions and capabilities of the organization and non-aligned entities, and an analysis of select regional Al Qaeda affiliates. This report may be updated as events warrant."

From the Summary: "Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates have conducted sophisticated public relations and media campaigns since the mid-1990s. Terrorism analysts believe that these campaigns have been designed to elicit psychological reactions and communicate complex political messages to a global audience as well as to specific subpopulations in the Islamic world, the United States, Europe, and Asia. Some officials and analysts believe that Al Qaeda's messages contain signals that inform and instruct operatives to prepare for and carry out new attacks. Bin Laden and other leading Al Qaeda figures have referred to their public statements as important primary sources for parties seeking to understand Al Qaeda's ideology and political demands. Global counterterrorism operations since 2001 appear to have limited Bin Laden's ability to provide command and control leadership to Al Qaeda operatives and affiliated groups. Other Al Qaeda leaders and affiliates continue to release statements that encourage and provide guidance for terrorist operations. Iraq has become a focal point for jihadist rhetoric, underscoring Al Qaeda leaders' interest in Iraq and support for the ongoing insurgency. Statements released by Osama Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri since late 2004 have rekindled public debate in Europe and the United States surrounding Al Qaeda's ideology, motives, and future plans for attacks. Statements released following the July 2005 Al Qaeda-linked suicide bombing attacks on the London transit system have characterized those attacks and Al Qaeda's ongoing terrorist campaign as a response to British and American military operations in Iraq."

"After more than a decade of combating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States now faces an increasingly diverse threat from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa and from emerging groups that have adopted aspects of Al Qaeda's ideology but operate relatively or completely autonomously from the group's senior leadership. U.S. counterterrorism debates have focused on 'formal' Al Qaeda affiliates, and policymakers increasingly are considering options for addressing the range of threats posed by the wider spectrum of groups inspired by--or similar in goals and aspirations to--Al Qaeda. An additional challenge is the fluid nature of the threat, given the apparent fragmentation of Al Qaeda, and Ayman al Zawahiri's struggle to assert leadership of the group in light of challengers such as Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Finally, concerns regarding these issues might shape ongoing reevaluations of the federal statutes that underpin current U.S. counterterrorism policy, including the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40). In addition to the AUMF, Congress has addressed the emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates through a number of channels, including oversight of executive branch counterterrorism policies and practices; authorization and appropriations of U.S. funds for counterterrorism operations; and assistance for partner nations engaged in such operations."

"In response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, the Congress passed legislation, S.J.Res. 23, on September 14, 2001, authorizing the President to 'use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons....' The President signed this legislation into law on September 18, 2001 (P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). This report provides a legislative history of this statute, the 'Authorization for Use of Military Force' (AUMF), which, as Congress stated in its text, constitutes the legislative authorization for the use of U.S. military force contemplated by the War Powers Resolution. It also is the statute which the President and his attorneys have subsequently cited as an authority for him to engage in electronic surveillance against possible terrorists without obtaining authorization of the special Court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, as amended. This report will only be updated if events warrant."

"Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Armed Forces, under guidance from the Department of Defense (DOD), have conducted the following military operations: [1] Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and other small Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations like the Philippines and Djibouti that began immediately after the 9/11 attacks and continue; [2] Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) that began in the fall of 2002 with the buildup of troops for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and continued with counter-insurgency and stability operations until 2010; [3] Operation New Dawn (OND), a successor to OIF that began on September 1, 2010, when U.S. troops adopted an advisory and assistance role and concluded in December 2011 when all U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq (though some 13,000 combat-ready troops remain in Kuwait); [4] Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security for U.S. military bases and other homeland security that was launched in response to the attacks and continues at a modest level; and [5] Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), authorized by the President on August 7, 2014, beginning with DOD air strikes in Iraq and Syria to 'degrade and ultimately defeat' the Islamic State (IS) without deploying U.S. ground troops. On May 27, 2014, President Obama's announced that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan would decrease from 33,000 to 9,800 by January 1, 2015; would halve again by January 1, 2016, to about 4,900; and be limited to an embassy presence of about 1,000 thereafter.1 Some unspecified number of the 60,000 U.S. troops currently providing in-theater support would remain in the region as an 'enduring presence' after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan."

"This report provides historical background on the enactment of declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force and analyzes their legal effects under international and domestic law. It also sets forth their texts in two appendices. The report includes an extensive listing and summary of statutes that are triggered by a declaration of war, a declaration of national emergency, and/or the existence of a state of war. The report concludes with a summary of the congressional procedures applicable to the enactment of a declaration of war or authorization for the use of force and to measures under the War Powers Resolution. The report will be updated as circumstances warrant."

From the introduction: "Numerous legal and practical obstacles, such as the infeasibility of locating al Qaeda operatives, stand in the way of victims seeking to establish liability in U.S. courts against, and recover damages from, the terrorists who planned and carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks. Victims, however, have sued numerous individuals and groups with only indirect ties to the attackers, including defendants who allegedly provided monetary support to al Qaeda prior to September 11, 2001. 'In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001', is a consolidated case that includes, among other claims, claims against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, several Saudi princes, a Saudi banker, and a Saudi charity. Plaintiffs argued that these Saudi defendants played a 'critical role' in the September 11 attacks by giving money to Muslim groups, which in turn funded al Qaeda. In August 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed dismissals of the claims against the Saudi defendants. However, part of the reasoning for the dismissals was later overturned, and the plaintiffs may now get a second chance to bring their suit against the Saudi government and government-owned charity. This report explains the legal bases for the initial dismissals and provides an update to the status of the case."

From the Summary: "The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent discussions of religious extremism have called attention to Islamic puritanical movements known as Wahhabism and Salafiyya. Al Qaeda leaders and their ideological supporters have advocated a violent message that some suggest is an extremist interpretation of this line of puritanical Islam. Other observers have accused Saudi Arabia, the center of Wahhabism, of having disseminated a religion that promotes hatred and violence, targeting the United States and its allies. Saudi officials strenuously deny these allegations. This report provides a background on Wahhabism and its relationship to active terrorist groups; it also summarizes recent charges against Wahhabism and responses, including the findings of the final report of the 9/11 Commission and relevant legislation in the 110th Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. Related CRS [Congressional Research Service] products include CRS Report RL33533, CRS Report RL32499, CRS Report RS21432, CRS Report RS21529, CRS Report RS21654, and CRS Report RL31718."

"This memorandum sets out information and analysis concerning presidential references in official notifications and records to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note), enacted in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, to justify and undertake military and other action. It contains very brief discussions of the relevant provisions of the 2001 AUMF, and the uses of U.S. armed forces connected with 2001 AUMF authority, as well as excerpted language and other information from the notifications."

From the Document: "In 2001, P.L. [Public Law]107-89 designated September 11 as Patriot Day to honor the individuals who lost their lives as a result of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. The law asks the President to issue an annual Proclamation for Patriot Day that directs the U.S. flag be flown at half-staff and a moment of silence be observed. The terrorist attacks, which claimed nearly 3,000 lives, involved four civilian airplanes hijacked by 19 members of the Al Qaeda terrorist network. The first two airplanes were crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The third plane struck the Pentagon. The fourth crashed in southwestern Pennsylvania (near Shanksville) after passengers tried to take control of the aircraft. Patriot Day is not a federal holiday. In 2009, P.L. 111-13 also designated September 11 as the 'National Day of Service and Remembrance.' This fact sheet is designed to assist congressional offices with work related to Patriot Day observances. It contains links to CRS [Congressional Research Service] products, sample speeches and remarks from the Congressional Record, presidential proclamations, and selected historical resources."

"Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda-related entities have increased in number and become more diffuse; with these changes there has been an evolution in how the United States defines the terrorist threat. How the threat has evolved could influence consideration of new authorities and policies in the 114th Congress."

"The death and destruction associated with the hijacking of four commercial airliners constitute federal crimes that outlaw air piracy, murder, and kidnapping. Relevant statutes carry the death penalty and apply to any accomplices or coconspirators here or abroad. [...] On September 11, 2001, four commercial airliners were hijacked. Two crashed into the World Trade Center towers; one into the Pentagon; and a fourth in Pennsylvania. Casualties number in the thousands. [...] The existence of multiple murder victims; the risk of death of others; the heinous nature of a murder; and the fact a murder occurred during the commission of air piracy, destruction of federal buildings or those whose activities affect interstate commerce, kidnapping, or destruction of commercial aircraft, are all aggravating factors which a jury may consider in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed on those guilty of federal capital offenses."

"This memorandum is in response to a request for information about attacks by Al Qaeda both before and after the September 11, 2001 attack on the US. The request asks for the number of attacks attributed to Al Qaeda in the two-and-a-half years before September 11, 2001, and in the two and a half years afterwards, as well as the total number of attacks by Al Qaeda before September 11, 2001. While an analysis of the number of attacks worldwide committed by Al Qaeda might seem a simple, straightforward exercise, it is not, for the reasons mentioned below. We have endeavored to provide an assessment of the evidence available and will describe our findings in the body of the memorandum."

The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Series is prepared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). [It] is the agency's primary vehicle for scientific publication of timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and useful public health information and recommendations. This issue of MMWR contains the following: "Prevalence of Excess Sodium Intake in the United States -- NHANES, 2009-2012"; "Diagnosis of Tuberculosis in Three Zoo Elephants and a Human Contact -- Oregon, 2013"; "Vital Signs: Exposure to Electronic Cigarette Advertising Among Middle School and High School Students -- United States, 2014"; "Announcement: National Birth Defects Prevention Month and Folic Acid Awareness Week -- January 2016"; and "QuickStats: Percentage of Youths Aged 10-17 Years Who Did Not Receive a Well-Child Checkup in the Past 12 Months, by Metropolitan Status of Residence -- National Health Interview Survey, United States, 2008-2014." Notifiable Diseases and Mortality Tables from this issue can be accessed at the following link [http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index2015.html]

"The terrorist attacks caused enormous destruction in New York City. The losses included the direct costs of the destruction to lives and property, as well as cleanup, and the indirect costs of lost income brought about by business closings and related spending reductions. It is expected that some of the losses will be covered by payments from private insurance, emergency federal relief funds, and charitable contributions. Other losses, however, may never be recovered because some individuals and businesses may not have been insured or may not qualify for federal relief or charity."

Like every other organization and individual in the United States, the FBI has struggled to comprehend the events of September 11, 2001. Apart from investigating the crime scenes in New York City (the World Trade Center); Somerset County, Pennsylvania; and Arlington County, Virginia (the Pentagon); following leads, and addressing a myriad of concerns resulting from these attacks, the FBI through its Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program has struggled with how to report the data to the public. The FBI recognizes that the UCR Program must evolve to be able to capture the crimes of this modern era. As it currently exists, the UCR Program is limited in its ability to report the offenses committed at the World Trade Center, in the airways above Pennsylvania, and at the Pentagon. Recognizing the limitations of the Program, yet also recognizing that many agencies and researchers will have a specific, nontraditional application for the statistical data associated with these offenses, the FBI has compiled this special report.

This document contains testimony of various eyewitnesses to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.

This report summarizes the events leading up to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States as authorized by President Bush and the U.S. Congress.

"As no other event in U.S. history, not even Pearl Harbor, the deadly assaults on New York and Washington that took the lives of almost 3,000 people on 11 September 2001 shattered the nation's sense of security. The utter destruction of the Twin Towers in New York and the severe damage done to the Pentagon by Middle East terrorists signaled a changed world in the making, one that poses a constant threat of attack that the United States must guard against and defeat if its people are to live in freedom and safety. The nation responded first with stunned surprise and overwhelming grief, then with outrage and stern refusal to be intimidated. What happened at the Pentagon that day and for days afterwards is a compelling story of trauma and tragedy as well as courage and caring and an instructive case study in coping with such appalling contingencies. Any history of this event must relate the resolve and fortitude exhibited by the military and civilians most immediately affected as well as the indispensable help that came from thousands of responders in the aftermath. In the first terrifying minutes after the plane crashed into the building the swift actions of survivors and rescuers helped save the lives of many who would otherwise have perished. The prompt response and subsequent performance of federal, state, and especially local agencies, in particular their coordination and cooperation with each other and with Pentagon authorities, provided invaluable lessons for dealing with other large-scale emergencies in the future."

This is an unclassified report from the 9/11 Review Commission titled, "The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century." Chapters include: "Baseline: The FBI Today"; "The Sum of Five Cases"; "Anticipating New Threats and Missions"; "Collaboration and Information Sharing"; and "New Information Related to the 9/11 Attacks." The report gives recommendations and key findings.

"Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned cool and clear, with sunny skies all along the eastern seaboard. For Air Force aviators like Lt. Col. Timothy 'Duff' Duffy of the 102d Fighter Wing at Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts, the day held the promise of perfect flying weather, at a time when the U.S. civil aviation system was enjoying a period of relative peace, despite concerns about a growing terrorist threat. More than ten years had passed since the last hijacking or bombing of a U.S. air carrier. That morning, however, the country came under a shocking, coordinated aerial assault by nineteen al Qaeda hijackers at the direction of the network's leader and cofounder, Islamist extremist Osama bin Laden (1957/1958--2011). The attack plan carried out by the suicide operatives had been years in the making. It was intended to cause mass, indiscriminate casualties and to destroy or damage the nation's financial, military, and political centers, four high-value U.S. targets selected by bin Laden, independent operator Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and al Qaeda operations chief Mohammed Atef. Analysts in the United States immediately recognized the historic nature of the strikes, launched without warning against targets in New York City and Washington, D.C., and compared them to another deadly surprise aerial attack against the United States almost sixty years earlier. The December 7, 1941, assault by Japanese forces on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor had been the most devastating attack against U.S. territory by a foreign adversary until the morning of September 11, 2001."

"You have asked this Office to undertake a thorough reexamination of the STELLAR WIND program as it is currently operated to confirm that the actions that the President has directed the Department of Defense to undertake through the National Security Agency (NSA) are lawful. STELLAR WIND is a highly classified and strictly compartmented program of electronic surveillance within the United States that President Bush directed the Department of Defense to undertake on October 4, 2001 in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Specifically, the program is designed to counter the threat of further terrorist attacks on the territorial United States by detecting communications that will disclose terrorist operatives, terrorist plans, or other information that can enable the disruption of such attacks, particularly the identification of al Queda operatives within the United States. The President's initial directive to the Secretary of Defense authorized the STELLAR WIND program for 30 days. Since then, the President has periodically (roughly every 30 to 45 days) reauthorized the program."

From the Webpage: "The morning of September 11, 2001 remains one of the most pivotal points in American history--and for the FBI. The ensuing investigation was the largest in the history of the Bureau. The attacks led to far-reaching changes in the organization as it elevated terrorism to the gravest threat against the U.S. The attacks took the lives of nearly 3,000 people, and the crash sites represented the largest crime scene in FBI history. At the peak of the case, more than half of all FBI agents were at work to identify the hijackers and their sponsors and, along with other agencies, to head off any possible future attacks. Over the last 20 years, the Bureau evolved from an agency focused primarily on criminal offenses into an intelligence-based national security and law enforcement organization. Preventing terrorism continues to be the FBI's top priority; the Bureau has established more than 200 Joint Terrorism Task Forces with partner law enforcement agencies across the country."

From the Abstract: "This article argues that the coronavirus pandemic represents a global intelligence failure on the part of the traditional intelligence community as well as the national and international medical intelligence and surveillance systems designed to detect and prevent outbreaks just such as this one. Comparing these failures with intelligence failures of the past such as the 9/11 attacks can help us understand how we got to where we are today--and even more important, how we might prevent future disasters by avoiding these failures next time. Today's crisis is very different from previous intelligence failures, but in both the 9/11 attacks and the coronavirus pandemic, the United States was threatened by an enemy that was present in our country well before it was recognized. This article outlines steps that must be taken to ensure that when the next crisis arises, warnings can be sounded, and they will be heeded."

The 9/11 Commission, an independent, bipartisan commission created in late 2002, was chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The Commission was directed to investigate facts relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, diplomacy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets to terrorist organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional oversight and resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the Commission. They reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries. This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in their mandate, and the following is their findings.

"This is the final report on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers, conducted under the National Construction Safety Team Act. This report describes how the aircraft impacts and subsequent fires led to the collapse of the towers after terrorists flew jet fuel laden commercial airliners into the buildings; whether the fatalities were low or high, including an evaluation of the building evacuation and emergency response procedures; what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the towers; and areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision. [...] Also in this report is a description of how NIST reached its conclusions. [...] The report concludes with a list of 30 recommendations for action in the areas of increased structural integrity, enhanced fire endurance of structures, new methods for fire resistant design of structures, enhanced active fire protection, improved building evacuation, improved emergency response, improved procedures and practices, and education and training."

"This is the final report on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC 7), conducted under the National Construction Safety Team Act. This report describes how the fires that followed the impact of debris from the collapse of WTC 1 (the north tower) led to the collapse of WTC7; an evaluation of the building evacuation and emergency response procedures; what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the building; and areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision. Extensive details are found in the companion reports, NIST NCSTAR 1-9 and NIST NCSTAR 1-9A. Also in the report is a summary of how NIST reached its conclusion. NIST complemented in-house expertise with private sector technical experts; accumulated copious documents, photographs, and videos of the disaster; conducted first-person interviews of building occupants and emergency responders; analyzed the evacuation and emergency response operations in and around WTC 7; performed computer simulations of the behavior of WTC 7 on September 11, 2001; and combined the knowledge gained into a probable collapse sequence. The report concludes with a list of 13 recommendations for action in the areas of increased structural integrity, enhanced fire endurance of structures, new methods for fire resistant design of structures, enhanced active fire protection, improved emergency response, improved procedures and practices, and education and training. One of these is new; the other 12 are reiterated from the investigation into the collapse f the WTC towers. Each of the 13 is relevant to WTC 7."

"The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requested that the CIA'S Office of Inspector General (OIG) review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and undertake whatever additional investigations were necessary to determine whether any Agency employees were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided before the attacks of September 11,2001 (9/11), or should be held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. The Accountability Review Team assembled by the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and functioning of the Agency's many components involved with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do so. As a result, this account does not document the many successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels (including many whose actions are discussed in this report) in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11. Similarly, because this report was designed to address accountability issues, it does not include recommendations relating to the systemic problems that were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior Agency managers. In its regular program of audits, investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review the counterterrorism programs and operations of the Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that might be improved."

"This report is organized into six chapters. Chapter One contains this introduction. Chapter Two provides general background on the: issues discussed in this report. For example, it contains descriptions of key terminology, the FBI's organizational structure, the so-called 'wall' that separated intelligence and criminal investigations in the FBI and the DOJ, the process for obtaining a FISA warrant, and other legal background issues related to how the FBI investigated terrorism and intelligence cases before September 11, 2001. Because the background chapter contains basic terminology and Chapter Three evaluates the FBI's handling of the Phoenix EC. As an initial matter, we provide background on how 'leads' were assigned in the FBI before September 11, 2001, and we summarize the contents of the Phoenix EC. We then describe in detail how the Phoenix EC was handled within the FBI before September 11. In Chapter Five, we examine the FBI's handling of intelligence information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar. We found that, beginning in late 1999 and continuing through September 11, 2001, the FBI had at least five opportunities to learn of intelligence information about Mihdhar and Hazmi which could have led it to focus on them before the September 11 attacks. In this chapter, we describe each of these five opportunities in detail. In chapter six, we set forth our recommendation for systemic improvement in the FBI and we summarize our conclusions."

From the findings section within the document: "While in the United States, some of the September 11 hijackers were in contact with, and received support or assistance from, individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government. There is information, primarily from FBI sources, that at least two of those individuals were alleged by some to be Saudi intelligence officers. The joint Inquiry's review confirmed that the Intelligence Community also has information, much of which has yet to be independently verified, indicating that individuals associated with the Saudi Government in the United States may have other ties to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. The FBI and CIA have informed the Joint Inquiry that, since the September 11 attacks, they are treating the Saudi issue seriously, but both still have only a limited understanding of the Saudi Government's ties to terrorist elements. In their testimony, neither CIA not FBI witnesses were able to identify definitively the extent of Saudi support for terrorist activity globally or within the United States and the extent to which such support, if it exists, is knowing or inadvertent in nature. The FBI's Washington Fields Office created a squad devoted to […]. Only recently, and at least in part due to the Joint Inquiry's focus on the issue, did the FBI and CIA establish a working group to address the Saudi issue. In the view of the Joint Inquiry, this gap in U.S. intelligence coverage is unacceptable, given the magnitude and immediacy of the potential risk to U.S. national security. The Intelligence Community needs to address this area of concern as aggressively and as quickly as possible."

Executive Order 13223 provides additional authority to the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation to respond to the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States. The Executive Order makes it possible to order any unit, and any member of the Ready Reserve not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months, is invoked and made available, according to its terms, to the Secretary concerned, subject in the case of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to the direction of the Secretary of Defense.

"Pursuant to section 201 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1621), I hereby report that I have exercised my authority to declare a national emergency by reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States. A copy of my proclamation is attached. Further, I have authorized, pursuant to section 12302 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service within the Department of the Navy, to order to active duty units and individual members not assigned to units of the Ready Reserve to perform such missions the Secretary of Defense may determine necessary. The deployment of United States forces to conduct operational missions in connection with the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks necessitates this action." A copy of the Executive Order implementing this action is attached.

"I am deeply saddened and outraged by the loss of life and suffering caused by the attacks at the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. I convey my deepest sympathy and heartfelt sorrow to our fellow Americans and their families who have been affected by these senseless acts of violence. Many parts of the Federal Government have been mobilized to respond to this tragedy. As part of this effort, I ask the heads of executive departments and agencies having Federal civilian employees in the affected areas to excuse from duty, without charge to leave or loss of pay, any such employee who is prevented from reporting to work or faced with a personal emergency because of the terrorist attacks and who can be spared from his or her usual responsibilities. This policy should also be applied to any employee who is needed for emergency law enforcement, relief, or recovery efforts authorized by Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction. I have directed the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Department of Labor to establish teams of specialists to assist with Federal benefits and workers' compensation claims of those employees who were injured or killed in the attacks. Finally, I have directed OPM to establish an emergency leave transfer program to assist employees affected by this major disaster."

"Joint Resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States."

This webpage is for the 9/11 Commission Records. "The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, was an independent, bipartisan commission created by Congress. The Commission's mandate was to provide a 'full and complete accounting' of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and to provide recommendations as to how to prevent such attacks in the future. The Commission, extant from 2003 - 2004, held hearings, conducted interviews, and produced a report. When the 9/11 Commission closed on August 21, 2004, it transferred legal custody of its records to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The Commission encouraged the release of its records to the fullest extent possible in January 2009. Because the Commission was part of the legislative branch its records are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Approximately 35% of the Commission's archived textual records are now publicly available. Due to the collection's volume and the large percentage of national security classified files, NARA staff was unable to process the entire collection by January 2009. Review and processing focused on the portion of the collection that contains unique documents created by the Commission and those that reveal the most about the scope of the investigation and the internal workings of the Commission and its staff."

"This resource page allows you to browse our collection of nearly 600 articles, reports, books, dissertations relating to the World Trade Center attack of 9/11/2001 and its aftermath."

From the Webpage Description: "DHS and its many partners across the federal government, public and private sectors, and communities across the country and around the world have worked since 9/11 to build a new homeland security enterprise. Below we've laid out some of the concrete measures that have been put in place since 9/11."

"As the title of this exhibition suggests, Witness and Response: September 11 Acquisitions at the Library of Congress features the collections that the Library has amassed and is still receiving about the tragic events of one year ago. It is an exhibition that reveals much about the Library of Congress as an institution, its astounding collections, and its equally remarkable staff. At its core, this exhibition is the story of how the 9/11 materials in this national institution arrived here and today reflect what America has experienced while providing assurance that the record will be here in the future for America's citizens and others to recall and scholars to study. Within hours of the attacks in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, offices within the Library mobilized to record and gather for posterity first-hand accounts and images. Other offices of the Library here and abroad collected the written and recorded reports of 9/11, acquiring in the process a wide-range of responses. Over the past year and in almost every section of the Library of Congress, staff have sought and received an abundance of original material including prints, photographs, drawings, poems, eye-witness accounts and personal reactions, headlines, books, magazines, songs, maps, videotapes, and films. The Library even acquired physical remnants from two of the attack sites. The collection of 9/11 material is in the tens of thousands and continues to grow steadily."

"The World Trade Center Health Program (WTC Health Program) was established by the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 . The program provides services for responders, workers, and volunteers who helped with rescue, recovery, and cleanup at the World Trade Center and related sites in New York City. It also provides services for survivors who were in the New York City disaster area, lived, worked, or were in school in the area. Enrollment for responders to the Pentagon and the Shanksville, PA [Pennsylvania] crash site is expected to open in late 2012, after eligibility guidelines and program benefits are defined. There is also a national program offering medical monitoring and treatment for responders who live outside the New York City metropolitan area."