Critical Releases in Homeland Security: August 27, 2008

The National Infrastructure Advisory Council's primary goal with this document "was to address the assigned tasks and develop policy recommendations for the President and DHS in an effort to improve the security posture of our Nation's critical infrastructures. The NIAC also sought to leverage its findings to increase understanding of the insider threat and help CIKR operators mitigate insider threats. Insider threats exist for all organizations. Essentially, this threat lies in the potential that a trusted employee may betray their obligations and allegiances to their employer and conduct sabotage or espionage against them. Insider betrayals include a broad range of actions, from secretive acts of theft or subtle forms of sabotage to more aggressive and overt forms of vengeance, sabotage, and even workplace violence. The threat posed by insiders is one most owner-operators neither understand nor appreciate, and it is a term that is commonly used to refer to IT network use violations. This often leads to further confusion about the nature and seriousness of the threat. This misunderstanding or underestimation relates, in part, to the stigma that an act of insider betrayal carries with it-a stigma that can cause customers, partners, and shareholders to lose trust in an organization. This loss of trust can translate into lost business, revenue, and value. As a result, CIKR owner and operators often handle these types of events discretely and away from public view. This common practice has impeded the understanding of the threat and the efforts to address it, exacerbating the existing risk."

"This is the final report on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7 (WTC7), conducted under the National Construction Safety Team Act. This report describes how the fires that followed the impact of debris from the collapse of WTC1 (the north tower) led to the collapse of WTC7; an evaluation of the building evacuation and emergency response procedures; what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the building; and areas in current building and fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision. Extensive details are found in the companion report, NIST NCSTAR 1-9 and NIST NCSTAR 1-9A. Also in this report is a summary of how NIST reached its conclusions. NIST complemented in-house expertise with private sector technical experts; accumulated copious documents, photographs, and videos of the disaster; conducted first-person interviews of building occupants and emergency responders; analyzed the evacuation and emergency response operations in and around WTC 7; performed computer simulations of the behavior of WTC7 on September 11, 2001; and combined the knowledge gained into a probable collapse sequence. This report concludes with a list of 13 recommendations for action in the areas of increased structural integrity, enhanced fire endurance of structures, new methods for fire resistant design of structures, enhanced active fire protection, improved emergency response, improved procedures and practices, and education and training."

"This report presents the recommendations of the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) Water Sector Decontamination Working Group. This Working Group was convened by the Water Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) and Government Coordinating Council (GCC) to develop a strategy and plan that supports priorities for water sector decontamination and recovery for the purpose of water security. The Working Group was composed of seven SCC representatives and seven GCC representatives. Five subject matter experts and eight representatives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also supported the Working Group in their discussions, but were not involved in decision making. […] The issues, recommendations, and proposed decontamination strategic plan resulting from the CIPAC Water Sector Decontamination Working Group, and documented in this report, are intended for consideration by the members of the SCC and GCC. The recommendations on decontamination and treatment methods and technologies, in particular, are also intended for consideration by research organizations to further the state of the science in decontamination. It is the Working Group's intention that these recommendations be used as a guide to help focus the efforts of the water sector in addressing decontamination needs. It is important to note that asset and financial resource needs necessary to implement the proposed decontamination strategic plan recommendations were not taken into consideration by this Working Group. Also, when implementing the recommendations, the coordinating agencies may identify additional supporting organizations not identified by the Working Group."