Domestic (U.S.) Terrorism

"Violent extremism--generally defined as ideologically, religious, or politically-motivated acts of violence--has been perpetrated in the United States by white supremacists, anti-government groups, and radical Islamist entities, among others. In 2011, the U.S. government developed a national strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. In 2016, an interagency CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ was created to coordinate CVE efforts. GAO was asked to review domestic federal CVE efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States have implemented the 2011 SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has assessed progress. GAO assessed the status of activities in the 2011 SIP; interviewed officials from agencies leading CVE efforts and a non-generalizable group of community-based entities selected from cities with CVE frameworks; and compared Task Force activities to selected best practices for multi- agency efforts. [...] GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ concurred with both recommendations and DHS described the CVE Task Force's planned actions for implementation."

From the Preface: "In November 2015, Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (the Department), directed the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), to establish a subcommittee (Subcommittee) that is focused on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). The Subcommittee was stood up to act as an incubator of ideas for the new Office for Community Partnerships (DHS/OCP), and has worked to leverage outside expertise and new thinking to support and enhance as well as assist in reframing and re-envisioning, where necessary the Department's CVE efforts. [...] This report focuses on the spread of violent extremist ideology and the recruitment of American youth to extremist groups, and how the Department can be a platform and and engine to leverage partnerships in the technology, health, education, communications, cultural, philanthropic, financial, and non-government sectors to counter such recruitment. While recognizing previous efforts - from those of the Spring 2010 Countering Violent Extremism Working Group to the more-recent Foreign Fighter Task Force - this report seeks to focus on discrete areas, separate and distinct than those undertaken in other efforts. "

"Violent extremism presents a critical threat to the United States. Individuals who commit acts of violent extremism are inspired by diverse political, religious, and philosophical beliefs, and are not limited to any single population or region. No matter the motivation, attacks by violent extremists have devastating effects on our communities. The United States unequivocally condemns ideologically-motivated violence. Although counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts to disrupt plots are a continuing priority, the evolving threat environment requires more proactive, community-based prevention and intervention. The United States must work to counter violent extremism by dissuading individuals from radicalizing to violence in the first place. This means supporting and building trust with diverse communities across the country. Research shows that parents, neighbors, colleagues, peers, teachers, and community leaders are best positioned to address the underlying causes of violent extremism, recognize when an individual becomes ideologically-motivated to commit violence, and intervene before an individual or a group commits an act of violent extremism. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is dedicated to countering violent extremism and plays a leading role in the Federal Government's efforts. To accomplish this, DHS equips CVE [countering violent extremism] community partners with the necessary information, grants, tools, training, and other support to help them identify and counter radicalization to violence. Through these efforts, the Department ensures that families and communities are empowered and well-informed to resist violent extremism."

"The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists-people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements-have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist 'threats'. These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion. The boundary between constitutionally protected legitimate protest and domestic terrorist activity has received public attention. This boundary is highlighted by a number of criminal cases involving supporters of animal rights-one area in which specific legislation related to domestic terrorism has been crafted. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374) expands the federal government's legal authority to combat animal rights extremists who engage in criminal activity. Signed into law in November 2006, it amended the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-346)."

"The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists--people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements--have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under terrorism statutes. This latter point is not meant to imply that domestic terrorists should be taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially list domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist 'threats.' These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and anti-abortion beliefs."

"The strategy that follows outlines how the Federal Government will support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism. This strategy commits the Federal Government to improving support to communities, including sharing more information about the threat of radicalization; strengthening cooperation with local law enforcement, who work with these communities every day; and helping communities to better understand and protect themselves against violent extremist propaganda, especially online. Most of all, this strategy reaffirms the fundamental American principles that guide our efforts."

This is a document from the September 14, 2016 hearing, "Radicalization in the U.S. and the Rise of Terrorism," held before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. From the statement of Chairman Mark Meadows, "Today's hearing will examine ways in which we can give our law enforcement agencies and communities the tools that they need to prevent this lone wolf radicalization before it starts. [...] This hearing will also be able to examine the strategies that both law enforcement and the administration can undertake to address the growing threat of radicalized Americans returning to the U.S. as foreign fighters. This threat from the foreign fighters cannot be overstated." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Matt A. Mayer, David Inserra, and Richard Cohen.

This is the July 15, 2015 hearing on "The Rise of Radicalization: Is the U.S. Government Failing to Counter International and Domestic Terrorism?" held before the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement Michael T. McCaul: "Our Nation is grappling with a new wave of terror from the suburbs of Massachusetts to the streets of South Carolina. We have apprehended a string of assailants who, while living among us, plotted to cause mass harm in the name of their hateful ideology. Just days ago, U.S. authorities disrupted an ISIS-linked plot to attack an American university with assault rifles and improvised explosive devices. The suspect planned to execute students and broadcast it live on the internet. Last month our Nation reacted with horror as another extremist launched an attack on Black worshippers at a Charleston church. Whether inspired by Islamic terror or white supremacy these assailants share one trait in common: They want to attack the innocent, intimidate our population, and coerce us in order to achieve their ideological and insidious goals. Both international and domestic terrorism and extremist groups are seeking to radicalize our citizens, and they have begun to master social media as a recruitment tool, placing people on a path of violence at an alarming speed. But we cannot bow down in the face of terror, and we must refuse to live at the mercy of fanatics. That is why we are here today: To confront the dangers we face, identify gaps in our defenses, and counter the viral spread of violent extremism." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Farah Pandith, Seamus Hughes, and J. Richard Cohen.

This is the July 27, 2017 hearing on "Combating Homegrown Terrorism" held before the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. From the opening statement of Ron DeSantis: "In the words of DHS Secretary John Kelly, the United States is experiencing a, quote, 'unprecedented spike in homegrown terrorism.' Currently, the FBI has open terrorism investigations in all 50 States. As of June 2017, the U.S. Government has charged 128 individuals with offenses related to the Islamic State over the last three years. Radical Islamic extremism is the primary driver of this problem and deserves the government's immediate attention. In recent years, the Federal Government has sought to combat this problem under the guise of a program called Countering Violent Extremism, or CVE. Three cities were used to conduct pilot programs: Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis. Minneapolis is a particularly troublesome area, as it is a major center of Islamic terrorist activity. The region is home to the largest concentration of Somali refugees and has been the epicenter for domestic radicalization. [...] Today, the subcommittee seeks to understand what this administration's policy is for countering violent extremism. According to DHS, this policy is currently under review, and DHS has declined to share any details about this process, including when this review is supposed to be complete and which organizations are participating. For Congress' immediate purposes, we must determine what is driving DHS's agenda: the assumptions of the Obama era about countering this threat or the President's pledge to put political correctness aside and defeat the Islamic State at home and abroad." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Kerry Sleeper, George Selim, Raheel Raza, Adnan Kifayat, and Seamus Hughes.

"In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-identify with the far-right of American politics. These incidents cause many to wonder whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing trend, part of increasing societal violence, or attributable to some other condition. To date, however, there has been limited systematic documentation and analysis of incidents of American domestic violence. This study provides a conceptual foundation for understanding different far-right groups and then presents the empirical analysis of violent incidents to identify those perpetrating attacks and their associated trends."

"Despite published warnings from the Department of Homeland Security, the current social, economic, and political environment is not likely to lead to a violent confrontation between right-wing extremist groups and government authorities. This thesis applies the theory of collective behavior and examines--in the context of the current health care reform debate--existing conditions and dynamics and their influence on the domestic far right. Although several determinants of collective behavior (i.e., structural conduciveness, structural strain, and ideology) produce a climate within which right-wing extremism can emerge and flourish, the lack of an influential far-right leader and the effective operation of existing social controls hinder the mobilization of the domestic far right. To counter right-wing extremism, the U.S. government should avoid dismissing outright the grievances of the far right. Instead, the government should direct its efforts to reduce the social structures that create an environment in which right-wing extremism can emerge and flourish and to encourage and ensure the effective operation of social controls. Endeavors along these lines are similar to international efforts countering radical Islamic extremism. Further studies are needed to explore how counter-radicalization approaches against Islamic extremists can be tailored to comply with domestic law and be applied to domestic right-wing extremists."

From the thesis abstract: "Americans readily identify Muslim extremism as a viable threat to America. However, they ignore or remain unaware of Christian extremism in the same context, despite the similarities in ideology that advocate violence against Americans. For example, the motivation behind Eric Rudolph's bombing of the Olympics in Atlanta in 1996 was to 'embarrass and punish the U.S. government' for its pro-abortion stance. This monograph explores what, if any, domestic terror threat Christian extremism poses and follows the Constructivist approach: how ideas define structure, how this structure defines interests, and how actors take action as a result. Initially focusing on the history and core beliefs of the Christian Identity movement and radical fringes of Dominion and Reconstruction theology, this monograph identifies two major underlying themes in Christian extremism. The first is racism through the use of religion as an accelerant to promote violence. The second is religiously motivated terrorism to support what is perceived as God's will and law. In addition, this monograph analyzes federal law enforcement action against Christian extremism through a series of case studies that took place in Mountainhome, Arkansas, Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas. The analysis of the catastrophic consequences from Ruby Ridge and Waco with the Oklahoma City bombing follows. Concluding this monograph are the lessons learned, comparison of federal law enforcement's action in each case study, and analyzing the tactics and leadership involved. Whereas the FBI's tactics and leadership exercised proved highly successful in Arkansas, they were disastrous in Idaho and Texas. Finally, this monograph provides a domestic terror threat assessment with recommended actions in what is not only a law enforcement issue, but a war of ideology between tolerance and understanding versus hate and bigotry."

From the thesis abstract: "After the September 11 attacks, it was expected that terrorists would continue their innovations in tactics to eventually use high-tech weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Such a WMD attack has not occurred. During the past decade, however, law enforcement and military authorities in the United States and in other countries have faced a number of terrorist attacks carried out using more conventional paramilitary methods with devastating results. This thesis examines the paramilitary terrorist attacks that occurred in Beslan in 2004 and in Mumbai in 2008 in an attempt to understand the threat and to establish the criteria for an effective U.S. response to paramilitary terrorism. It is important to understand that a drastic difference exists between requirements for response to paramilitary terrorism and the more common active shooter protocols. This thesis examines the capabilities and limitations of law enforcement, the National Guard, and the active component (AC) of the military to recommend a response that could be uniformly achieved across the United States. It was determined that the AC of the military is the only capable response force. It requires additional planning, coordination, and cross-training with regional civilian counterparts for an effective response to a paramilitary attack to be established."

From the thesis abstract: "The domestic terrorist threat in the United States is active and complex, with ongoing threats from violent left- and right-wing extremist groups, and radicalization and recruitment efforts by international terrorist groups. In response, domestic intelligence agencies, at all levels of government, have instituted reforms and improvements since 9/11, but there are still gaps in information-sharing and community engagement. For example, a review of the Boston Marathon bombings uncovered that important risk-based information was not shared with local law enforcement. Concerning domestic terrorism, the United States may, once again, be failing to 'connect the dots.' This thesis synthesizes existing studies, reports, and expert testimony concerning domestic terrorism and the roles of domestic intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the public, and proposes the development and implementation of a formal, national counterterrorism (CT) doctrine. The CT doctrine, in conjunction with a counter-radicalization strategy, should focus on bottom-up intelligence/information-sharing, training to strengthen and focus intelligence collection efforts, and culturally sensitive and engaging messaging on social media and the Internet to counter extremist propaganda."

From the thesis abstract: "A major goal of the homeland security enterprise is to prevent terrorism in the United States. Federal, state, and local agencies have responded to this challenge with a number of initiatives that have prevented another large-scale network attack since 9/11. Yet terrorism perpetrated by a lone individual, not in direct communication with a larger terrorist network, continues to occur on a regular basis in the United States. Rather than considering lone-actor terrorism a subset of networked terrorism, this thesis considers lone-actor terrorism as a subset of other grievance-fueled violence such as mass murders and workplace violence. Comparing the motivations of the perpetrators using a case study method, this thesis considers the complexities of addressing the key trait of motivation that separates lone-actor terrorism from other forms of lone violence. As a result of this analysis, five key observations--leading to five policy implications--are postulated to provide clarity to the issue of lone-actor terrorism in pursuance of improving prevention methods."

From the thesis abstract: "Since 1866, the Ku Klux Klan [KKK] has been able to muster three distinctive and sustained campaigns of terrorism, commonly referred to as the three 'waves' of Klan violence. The first occurred between 1866 and 1871, the second between 1915 and 1928, and the third from roughly 1954 to the mid-1960s. Subsequent to the third wave, the Klan unsuccessfully attempted another resurgence in the mid-1970s/early 1980s but was snuffed out before a campaign could be triggered. By studying the three most successful Klan campaigns of the past (granting that each varied in scope, intensity and outcome) alongside the failed campaign attempt of the 1970--1980s, this dissertation will investigate which commonly cited factors and conditions were, in fact, associated with the rise of the KKK's campaigns of terrorism. Ultimately, the dissertation finds that four factors--the presence of a safe haven, organizational structure, leadership, and recruitment techniques--are necessary and jointly sufficient to explain Klan campaign emergence. By combining these factors in a manner which better reflects their interplay, a model offering greater explanatory value emerges. The first significant set of correlates is the presence or absence of safe havens and their relation to the organizational structure chosen by Klan leadership. The second set of correlates is the ability of the Klan to downplay its core ideology and effectively frame a recruitment message which resonates with a pre-existing dominant social narrative--a narrative usually based on mythologized history or an unfalsifiable belief system. As will be explained in concluding chapters, the probabilistic model that emerges when these factors combine proves more effective in explaining and predicting campaigns of Klan terrorism than simply listing these factors as if they are not consciously combined for effect."

"Countering the radical Islamist narrative remains a high-profile priority of the United States in its ongoing efforts to counter domestic violent extremism. Since mid-2014, government officials have condemned the United States as unable to muster a satisfactory 'counter-narrative,' and emphasize the potentially devastating consequences of failure. Experts inside and outside the government describe the Islamic State as masters of the internet capable of reaching into the United States and turning its people into hate-filled, violently inspired terrorists at will. The idea that the United States must aggressively work to counter these messages domestically remains a given; but should it? The focus of this thesis is to examine current U.S. efforts in counter-messaging to determine why the United States believes it is failing, and what, if any, evidence supports the idea that a counter-narrative or counter-messaging should be part of domestic countering violent extremism (CVE) programs. Review of official documents found little basis to assess U.S. programs, as no meaningful published strategy, objectives, or performance data exist for current efforts. Moreover, the foundational assumptions underlying current programs suggest malalignment between what U.S. officials desire a counter-messaging effort to accomplish and what is realistically achievable. Based on these findings, it is recommended that domestic CVE programs eliminate counter-messaging from their portfolio."

From the thesis abstract: "The FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] has identified the Sovereign Citizen Movement (SCM) as a significant threat to the domestic security of the United States. The movement's adherents are capable of significant acts of violence and creating civil unrest. They also embrace harassing tactics such as filing lawsuits, false liens, and restraining orders as a method to harass government and financial institutions. This is known as paper terrorism. The modern SCM has its roots in the Posse Comitatus movement and in racialist philosophies such as the Christian Identity Movement. It was primarily a movement embraced by right-wing Caucasians. Over time, the SCM has morphed from a primarily racialist platform to a more inclusive anti-government platform. The current SCM model is decentralized and largely leaderless, and its narrative is often driven by circumstances. Using social identity theory as a framework, what conclusions can be drawn regarding this change, and how can the government prepare for the emerging ideation of SCM? If not handled appropriately, government reactions to economic and social crisis could validate the SCM narrative. Government entities must embrace training, transparency, and ethical decision making in an effort to nullify the SCM narrative."

This is a collection of Hate Crime Statistics documents from the FBI. From the text: "On April 23, 1990, Congress passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act, which required the Attorney General to collect data 'about crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.' The Attorney General delegated the responsibilities of developing the procedures for implementing, collecting, and managing hate crime data to the Director of the FBI, who in turn, assigned the tasks to the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. Under the direction of the Attorney General and with the cooperation and assistance of many local and state law enforcement agencies, the UCR Program created a hate crime data collection to comply with the congressional mandate. The UCR Program's first publication on the subject was Hate Crime Statistics, 1990: A Resource Book, which was a compilation of hate crime data reported by 11 states that had collected the information under state authority in 1990 and were willing to offer their data as a prototype. The UCR Program continued to work with agencies familiar with investigating hate crimes and collecting related information so that it could develop and implement a more uniform method of data collection on a nationwide scale. Hate Crime Statistics, 1992, presented the first published data reported by law enforcement agencies across the country that participated in the UCR Hate Crime Statistics Program."

This is the website of the Southern Poverty Law Center, which runs a Militia Task Force. The SPLC has provided the FBI with intelligence on right-wing extremists, and it has also successfully brought suits against right-wing groups in a variety of states.