Fusion Centers

From the opening statement of Jane Harman: "This committee has said this many times that it won't be a bureaucrat in Washington who will thwart the next terror attack. It will be a cop on the beat, familiar with the rhythms and nuances of her neighborhood, who will notice something suspicious and be best positioned to do something about it. Fusion centers are uniquely local for this reason. One size cannot fit all, because communities and their populations are diverse, and so are their geographies. So it is fusion centers, in my view, who are the tool, hopefully, to empower that cop to know what to look for and what to do. But steps need to be taken to get this effort right. [...] This subcommittee held two hearings in the last Congress to address efforts underway to provide fusion centers with the mission focus, structure, and privacy and civil liberties resources they need to protect our homeland, while preserving our Constitution, which, obviously, is necessary to protect all of us. Today's hearing is intended to continue the examination of the challenges that fusion centers face, and to dispel some of the myths that still exist." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Jane Harman, Michael T. McCaul, Leroy D. Baca, Robert Riegle, Russell M. Porter, John E. Bateman, Bruce Fein, Ned Norris, and David D. Gersten.

"This 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report (2015 Final Report) provides the results of the 2015 Assessment for the period from August 1, 2014 to September 30, 2015. It summarizes the FCPP findings on the ii / 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report capabilities and performance of the National Network and recaps its progress since 2011, setting the stage for transition to a performance-focused assessment."

"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducts the annual fusion center assessment to provide a comprehensive picture of the performance of the National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network), help measure the effectiveness of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant funding, and guide partners to invest in mission areas with the greatest potential benefit to the entire homeland. The assessment primarily evaluates fusion centers' achievement of selected performance measures. It also strives to ensure functional consistency across the National Network, regardless of fusion center size, scope, geography, or mission. [...] This year's 2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report (2016 Final Report) reflects this change through a focus on performance measures developed by a DHS-led working group of fusion center directors. The key findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this 2016 Final Report center on: the need for a shared understanding of critical fusion center functions; the importance of aligning staffing, training, and collaboration with key fusion center focus areas; the need for training, transition procedures, and onboarding materials to enhance skills and maintain continuity for new and existing staff; the restrictions that state and local laws and policies impose on many fusion centers in sharing analytical products on the Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence Community of Interest (HSIN-Intel) and elsewhere; and the opportunity to convert increased fusion center colocation and law enforcement focus into outcomes that more fully address partner needs."

From the introduction: "At the beginning of the 115th Congress, Chairman Michael McCaul directed the Majority staff to conduct a review of federal coordination with, and support to, the National Network of Fusion Centers. Building upon prior work completed by the Committee [...] Committee staff conducted a review of the progress made across all levels of government to enhance the flow of counterterrorism information to and from fusion centers. The Committee visited ten fusion centers, and had additional meetings with five others, to hear directly from analysts and operators. [...] Though a comprehensive review of the Committee's analysis and findings is detailed below, Committee staff have noted that since the release of the Committee's 2013 report, significant progress has been made in the overall maturity of the National Network of Fusion Centers. Many fusion centers have expanded capabilities to address all crimes and threats, recognizing that early indicators of terrorism often include criminal activity. The Committee witnessed greater intra-network collaboration, including the exchange of best practices, collaboration on strategic products, and provision of support to other centers during major incidents. Additionally, fusion centers are embracing a multidisciplinary approach to outreach programs to better integrate fire, emergency medical services, and the private sector. [...] The Committee also noted several areas that warrant further attention and enhancement. [...] The Committee also identified several new challenges that, if not addressed, could impact the ability of fusion centers to assess threats and share information."

"An innovative design for sharing information and intelligence is found in the form of network fusion, which encourages collaboration across multiple disciplines by leveraging technology to connect the unconnected at classified and unclassified levels. As terrorists move to new methods of attack, law enforcement and first responders must use comprehensive and timely information and intelligence to both anticipate potential threats and to ensure a high measure of adaptability in responses. This article defines network fusion along with other architectures for homeland security connectivity; explores the current information and intelligence sharing challenges; examines how network fusion can enhance fusion centers as well as assist emergency responders; and makes several recommendations for implementing network fusion. Network fusion provides an opportunity to bring many unique perspectives together for smarter, faster and cheaper intelligence sharing."

From the U.S. Department of Homeland Security website: "The Performance Measures Definitions Guide (PMDG) is the product of a collaborative effort led by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) State and Local Program Office (SLPO) in cooperation with federal, state, and local fusion center stakeholders. These partners collectively developed an initial set of five performance measures that were implemented as part of the 2012 Fusion Center Assessment (2012 Assessment) and have since collaborated to develop a comprehensive suite of 45 performance measures designed to capture data on National Network impacts across a range of mission areas, including enhancing threat awareness and decision making, supporting law enforcement operations, and supporting incident response efforts. The attached PMDG, version 1.0, defines these measures and explains the data collection methodology for each. This version of the PMDG covers the entire suite of 45 National Network performance measures, 34 of which were implemented as part of the 2013 Assessment. These 34 measures will remain in place, without change, for the 2014 Assessment cycle. The PMDG is intended to be a living document. SLPO will lead a periodic review process involving the entire fusion center stakeholder community to ensure that measure definitions and data collection approaches remain up-to-date, accurate, and meaningful. This review process will allow all partners to provide input and feedback on current measure language and to propose new measures or revised language as needed. The review process will align with the annual assessment process to ensure that updates to the measures are accounted for in data collection approaches, including the annual assessment process."

From the thesis abstract: "This research utilized a semi-structured survey instrument delivered to subject matter experts within the national network of fusion centers and employed a constant comparison method to analyze the survey results. This 'smart practice' exploration informed through an appreciative inquiry lens found considerable variation in how fusion centers plan for, gather requirements, select and acquire federated search tools to bridge disparate databases. These findings confirmed the initial hypothesis that fusion centers have received very little guidance on how to bridge disconnected databases to enhance the analytical process. This research should contribute to the literature by offering a greater understanding of the challenges faced by fusion centers, when considering integrating federated search tools; by evaluating the importance of the planning, requirements gathering, selection and acquisition processes for integrating federated search tools; by acknowledging the challenges faced by some fusion centers during these integration processes; and identifying possible solutions to mitigate those challenges. As a result, the research will be useful to individual fusion centers and more broadly, the National Fusion Center Association, which provides leadership to the national network of fusion centers by sharing lessons learned, smart practices, and other policy guidance."

"A growing number of states have created multiple fusion centers, including California. In addition to having a state fusion center, California has four regional centers statewide. Each center is separately governed, but intended to work together as a unified, statewide system. Given their recognized autonomy, the relationship between California's fusion centers is voluntary and 'horizontal' versus 'hierarchical,' with no single entity in charge. Consequently, the attainment and sustainment of a robust and synchronized partnership between California's fusion centers is dependent upon each center's commitment to collaborate. Current research has focused largely on building collaboration within fusion centers, as opposed to between fusion centers. This research seeks to identify the appropriate role and mission of California's state fusion center as it relates to strengthening stakeholder relationships, collaboration, and sustainability, through the analysis of data captured from California's regional centers, sheriffs and police chiefs, and examining the roles and methods of other state fusion centers in states with multiple centers. From this research, this thesis recommends a series of collaborative initiatives intended to help strengthen intra-state fusion center collaboration, more properly align state and regional fusion center efforts, and enhance sustainability through maintained relevancy and added value to stakeholders and customers."

From the thesis abstract: "This thesis examines the broader federalism implications of fusion centers. From a constitutional perspective, these bodies matter because they stand squarely at the crossroads of federal, state, law enforcement, and intelligence concerns. Although collating state law enforcement information existed prior to 9/11, the growing linkage with a 'national' homeland security mission spawns an entirely new set of issues. The lines separating the levels and responsibilities of government, once clear and distinct, have now become ambiguous and confusing, thereby enabling states to reassert their power vis-à-vis the federal government. The decentralized nature of the overall homeland security apparatus and the growing complexity of the assigned tasks enables fusion centers, and thus the states themselves to rise in stature. Because each state is free to tailor its own security framework, fusion centers enjoy the kind of flexibility urgently needed in today's domestic security environment. This thesis addresses the recent advances in federalism by exploring two pillars of fusion center characteristics. The first section can be construed to be the 'hardware' piece; that is, the missions and structures under which they operate. The second section investigates the 'software' side, or the databases and networks containing the information and intelligence."

From the thesis abstract: "The attacks of September 11, 2001, were a wakeup call for the United States. In the aftermath, the U.S. government created the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate the efforts of securing the nation's porous borders. One of the many tools developed to secure the nation was the development of a network of state and local fusion centers throughout the country. This thesis examines the effectiveness of fusion centers as a network of information collaboration to counter illegal activity by involving rural residents and local law enforcement as force multipliers in sparsely populated border states. This study incorporates case studies from the states of North Dakota and Washington, as both are northern tier states whose geographical diversities and challenges are representative of problems facing any northern border state. The results of this study suggest that fusion centers, while still in their infancy, are an effective tool to enhance information flow and provide leadership the ability to centralize efforts to leverage resources to counter both natural and manmade events."

From the thesis abstract: "Incidents of mass or targeted violence seem to occur without warning and lead us to conclude that nothing may be done to prevent them. These incidents may take the forms of mass shootings, stabbings, vehicular attacks, and other methods designed to kill or injure many people. Opportunities to detect and interdict potential attackers may exist. The literature identifies a host of warning behaviors that may be useful in detecting and disrupting acts of violence. This thesis examines the opportunities available to the nation's 78 fusion centers to help prevent mass or targeted violence by learning to conduct behavioral threat assessments and management activities. Analysis of four police agencies that conduct behavioral threat assessments is conducted. Also, the National Network of Fusion Centers is explored to determine whether behavioral threat assessment and management may be a good tool to incorporate into current violence prevention efforts. It was found that fusion centers already perform basic behavioral analysis through the vetting of suspicious activity reports as part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative. Preventive efforts may be more successful should principles of behavioral threat assessment and management be incorporated into fusion center operations."

"In the final report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) found that the attacks were successful in part because information was not shared and analysis not pooled among the different agencies across all levels of government. Since that time, there have been significant strides to improve cooperation and close the intelligence gaps among the different intelligence and law enforcement services. Effective terrorism prevention, however, requires information and intelligence fusion as a cooperative process at all levels of government so that the flow of intelligence can be managed to support the identification of emerging threats to our homeland. This thesis explains the value of a state/regional fusion center by examining three successful fusion centers in Arizona, Georgia, and Los Angeles. Recommendations from each agency on lessons learned as well as independent research have been provided to help state and local agencies develop their own fusion centers."

The mission of the National Fusion Center Association is "[t]o represent the interests of state and major urban area fusion centers, as well as associated interests of states, tribal nations, and units of local government, in order to promote the development and sustainment of fusion centers to enhance public safety; encourage effective, efficient, ethical, lawful, and professional intelligence and information sharing; and prevent and reduce the harmful effects of crime and terrorism on victims, individuals, and communities."