Space Policy & National Security

This is the February 18, 2015, hearing on "China's Space and Counterspace Programs," held before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Three panels covered the topics: (1) China's Civilian/Dual-Use and Military Space Programs; (2) Inputs to China's Space Program; and (3) Implications for the United States. Statements, letters and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Kevin Pollpeter, Joan Johnson-Freese, Dean Cheng, Alanna Krolikowski, Tate Nurkin, Mark Stokes, Richard Fisher, Roger Handberg, and Phillip Saunders.

"This Directive reissues DoD [Department of Defense] Directive (DoDD) 3100.10 (Reference (a)) to update established DoD space policy and assigned DoD responsibilities for space-related activities in accordance with the National Space Policy, Presidential Policy Directive-4 (Reference (b)) and the National Security Space Strategy (Reference (c)). It addresses comprehensively the challenges posed in an increasingly congested, contested, and competitive space domain."

"I view this [Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, Regional Forum, or ARF] Workshop as an opportunity to discuss how ARF participants can benefit from space and how we can work together to ensure the long-term sustainability and security of the space environment in the face of pressing dangers such as the growth of space debris. As more and more Asian-Pacific nations develop space capabilities, cooperation among Asian-Pacific governments will be essential to preserving the space environment for us all." Sections in these remarks include the following: "The Urgent Challenge of Orbital Debris," "The Contribution of Transparency and Confidence-building Measures," and "Concrete TCBMs in Action." TCBM is Transparency and Confidence-building Measure.

This is the February 4, 2014 hearing on "Necessary Updates to the Commercial Space Launch Act" held before the Subcommittee on Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives. From the charter: "The industry has grown over the years since the passage of the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-575) thirty years ago, and this law has been amended several times since then. The Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) provides authority to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to license launches and indemnify launch providers from third-party claims should an accident occur. The law also provides a framework for the FAA's regulatory authority. This hearing will examine the various changes in the industry and what, if any, accompanying changes to the Commercial Space Launch Act may be needed going forward." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: George Nield, Alicia Cackley, and Henry Hertzfeld.

"The President authorized a new national space policy on August 31, 2006 that establishes overarching national policy that governs the conduct of U.S. space activities. This policy supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49/NSTC-8, National Space Policy, dated September 14, 1996. [...] Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities."

"The People's Republic of China (PRC) has made significant advances in its space program and is emerging as a space power. Senior leaders have established space as a national priority and are allocating significant resources toward enhancing the PRC's space-related technology base. With preservation of its monopoly on power as an overriding goal, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bolsters its legitimacy through achievements in space. Policymakers view space power as one aspect of a broad international competition in comprehensive national strength and science and technology (S&T). Investments in space also serve as a stimulant for economic growth. The manned program in particular enhances CCP prestige and draws international attention to the country's expanding technology base. Without a clearly defined civilian space program, such as that managed by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the PRC (hereafter also referred to as 'China') integrates civil and military uses of space. China's space ambitions are in part peaceful in nature. Yet technologies can also be used with ill-intent. The PLA is rapidly improving its space and counterspace capabilities in order to advance CCP interests and defend against perceived challenges to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because Taiwan's democratic system of government -- an alternative to mainland China's authoritarian model -- presents an existential challenge to the CCP, the PLA relies on military coercion to compel concessions on sovereignty. Although other interests divert attention and resources, Taiwan remains the principle illustrative scenario guiding the PLA's military ambitions in space. Taiwan is a core interest of the United States. As such, the United States should maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."

"Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-4), 'National Space Policy of the United States of America', (Reference a) reiterates that United States national security is critically dependent upon space capabilities and this dependence will grow. Space activities are also closely linked to the operation of the United States Government's (USG) critical infrastructures and have increasingly been leveraged to satisfy national security requirements. Therefore, increased assurance and resilience are needed for the mission-essential functions of national security space systems, including their supporting infrastructure, to help protect against disruption, degradation, and destruction, whether from environmental, mechanical, electronic, or hostile means. […] The primary objective of this policy is to help ensure the success of national security missions that use space systems, by fully integrating information assurance into the planning, development, design, launch, sustained operation, and deactivation of those space systems used to collect, generate, process, store, display, or transmit national security information, as well as any supporting or related national security systems. Fully addressing information assurance is especially important for the space platform portion of space systems, since any vulnerability in them normally cannot be eliminated once launched."

"After decades of activities in space, Earth's orbit is littered with man-made objects that no longer serve a useful purpose. This includes roughly 22,000 objects larger than the size of a softball and hundreds of thousands of smaller fragments. This population of space debris potentially threatens U.S. national security interests in space, both governmental (military, intelligence, and civil) and commercial. Congress has broadly supported the full-range of these national security interests and has a vested concern in ensuring a strong and continued U.S. presence in space.After decades of activities in space, Earth's orbit is littered with man-made objects that no longer serve a useful purpose. This includes roughly 22,000 objects larger than the size of a softball and hundreds of thousands of smaller fragments. This population of space debris potentially threatens U.S. national security interests in space, both governmental (military, intelligence, and civil) and commercial. Congress has broadly supported the full-range of these national security interests and has a vested concern in ensuring a strong and continued U.S. presence in space. [...] Congress has an opportunity to explore these issues through hearings, for instance with major stakeholders in the U.S. national security and civil space communities, and the commercial sector. Efforts to find international agreement on mitigation may involve congressional prerogatives on advice and consent, and any program to pursue remediation will likely entail appropriations support from Congress."

From the thesis abstract: "During the last two decades, technological advancements to the size and performance of electronics have fostered the development of increasingly sophisticated and smaller satellites. Small satellites, or smallsats as they are commonly referred to, have recorded data on terrestrial and space environments, served as important test beds and risk reducers for emerging space technologies, and provided important hands-on educational opportunities for industry and academia. The decreased cost and improved performance of smallsats have opened up a wide range of space missions at a fraction of the cost of larger satellite systems that would have been unfathomable two short decades ago. The proliferation of smallsat technology opens up a world of new scientific possibilities and unique security challenges as well for all space-faring nations through the potential use of smallsats as anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. This thesis examines the historical development of ASAT systems for the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China and discusses how they have influenced each nations space policy. Finally, this thesis will address current efforts to mitigate space weapons, review the implications of smallsat technology development on current space policy, and suggest courses of action to mitigate this emerging space security dilemma."

From the thesis abstract: "Without a doubt the United States uniquely relies on space capabilities to integrate and project all instruments of its national power. With this reliance come tremendous risks and vulnerabilities that must be mitigated to sustain American pursuit of a world order based upon 'freedom, justice, and human dignity.' As the 44th President of the United States entered office in January 2009, the stakes for space security in the 21st century may be of lesser consequence in comparison to issues such as the nation's flagging economy and the on-going Global War on Terrorism. Nonetheless, failure to resolutely address space security could pose severe repercussions for American power projection in the coming decades. The purpose of this research paper is to frame the anticipated space policy debates for the next Administration."

From the thesis abstract: "Actions taken or not taken by law enforcement agencies, in 'Ungoverned Spaces' reduce US ability to forestall hostile actions on US soil. The current organizational limitations of US civil authorities' poses a problem to accomplishing the goals of our National Security Strategy to 'Prevent attacks on the Homeland' and 'Enhancing security at Home.' To that end, this thesis examines areas of the United States that function as 'Ungoverned Spaces' and possible strategies to maximize Interagency and interoperable government control through joint operations between civil authorities and Department of Defense forces. Finally, the author analyzed the gaps in the ability of law enforcement to project civil authority and the historical short falls of civil law enforcement in past events. The recommendations suggest; the creation of a full time paramilitary police force trained, and maintained in sufficient size and strength to police our nations ungoverned spaces, established as a full time National Guard unit. Satisfying the author's recommendations on the use of the National Guard as a paramilitary police force, he examines historical and current legal precedent for the legal deployment of National Guard troops under Title 32 as a law enforcement entity."

From the thesis abstract: "This thesis examines a series of problems that the United States has encountered in its space systems acquisition process, and how these problems have impacted national security. This thesis has also examines several space system projects, and analyzes the various elements contributing to increased project cost and major project delays. Based on this assessment, it is concluded that although the space acquisition process has gone through a number of significant changes over the past 50 years, it is questionable that lessons learned from past acquisition experiences coupled with implemented space acquisition process changes has led to significant progress. Several recommendations are made to improve the acquisition process."

"In January 2007, China successfully tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, launching a kinetic kill vehicle staged atop a ballistic missile to destroy an aging weather satellite orbiting 537 miles above earth. Though not the first such test US space agencies had detected nor necessarily the most aggressive, as Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael Moseley explained to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the January test confirmed China "can attrit and literally kill satellites." Few would counter the assertion space systems have become critical to the efficacy of the instruments of national power, but to what extent do capabilities such as those demonstrated by China's ASAT testing threaten the successful conduct of the nation's diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities? This paper specifically seeks to determine whether a potential adversary's ability to conduct counterspace operations makes space power a critical vulnerability of the US military. Iraq's 2003 counterspace operations provide proof positive the unchallenged space superiority the US military has enjoyed since Desert Storm can no longer be taken for granted. The United States disproportionate dependence on highly vulnerable space systems provides its enemies a recognizable opportunity to degrade the effectiveness of American forces that they are increasingly willing and capable of exploiting. By incorporating threat-based considerations into operational plans, war games, and exercises, theater commanders can better prepare their forces for the operational implications of "war in space.""

"The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) is the United Nations office responsible for promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. UNOOSA serves as the secretariat for the General Assembly's only committee dealing exclusively with international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space: the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). UNOOSA is also responsible for implementing the Secretary-General's responsibilities under international space law and maintaining the United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Through the United Nations Programme on Space Applications, UNOOSA conducts international workshops, training courses and pilot projects on topics that include remote sensing, satellite navigation, satellite meteorology, tele-education and basic space sciences for the benefit of developing nations. It also maintains a 24-hour hotline as the United Nations focal point for satellite imagery requests during disasters and manages the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER). UNOOSA is the current secretariat of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG). UNOOSA also prepares and distributes reports, studies and publications on various fields of space science and technology applications and international space law. Documents and reports are available in all official languages of the United Nations through this website. UNOOSA is located at the United Nations Office at Vienna, Austria."

This testimony compilation is from the September 27, 2016 hearing, "National Security Space: 21st Century Challenges, 20th Century Organization," before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services. From the testimony of James O. Ellis, Jr.: "The Subcommittee, in its letter of invitation, asked that the witnesses address several specific issues related to the challenges we face in the national security space domain. Those included the organization, management, leadership structure, acquisition process, operational authorities and other associated elements of the space posture of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). In preparing my response, I drew on my own experience and explored previous studies of the issue, some decades old, as well as a recent summary GAO [Government Accountability Office] report to Congress on the subject." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: James O. Ellis Jr., Martin C. Faga, and John J. Hamre.