Critical Releases in Homeland Security: December 12th, 2007

"The relative stability of the bipolar Cold War era has given way to a more volatile international environment in which adversaries employ unconventional, and often violent, tactics including terrorism, insurgency, propaganda, subversion, sabotage, and criminal money-making activities. This Interim Guide focuses specifically on insurgency and the strategies and tactics to combat it, collectively known as counterinsurgency (COIN). Information, including intelligence; economic development, incentives, and sanctions; security and public services; and social and political resolution are all necessary components of COIN, and none is sufficient in isolation from the others; moreover, each of these four spheres depends on the others. This document is intended to provide a broad understanding of the characteristics of COIN, and to serve as a basis for interagency discussion of policy, programs, and the development of national capabilities relevant to COIN. Insurgency is a protracted political-military campaign conducted by an organized movement seeking to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially control the resources and/or population of a country through the use of force and alternative political organizations. Insurgents exploit societal trends, grievances, and needs; insurgency is 'armed politics,' and while military action may be an important component of COIN, political resolution is indispensable to success. Conflict dynamics that contribute to insurgencies include societal incentives for violence; state incapacity to contain or effectively respond to violence; and regional or broader international conditions that inspire, or fail to discourage, violence."

"The United States has been actively engaged in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) since September 2001. However, after 5 years of national effort that has included the loss of over 3,000 service members in combat operations, many question whether the U.S. strategy is working, and whether the United States understands how to combat an enemy motivated by a radical revolutionary religious ideology. The author reviews the pertinent cultural history and background of Islam and then posits three root causes of this conflict: the lack of wealth-sharing in Islamic countries, resentment of Western exploitation of Islamic countries, and a U.S. credibility gap within the Islamic community. Following this discussion of root causes, this analysis compares the Ends, Ways and Means of the U.S. Strategy for Combating Terrorism with that of terrorist organizations such as al-Qai'da. The author concludes that the United States is not achieving its long-term strategic objectives in the GWOT. He then recommends that U.S. strategy focus on the root causes of Islamic hostility. Accordingly, the United States should combat radical Islam from within the Islamic community by consistently supporting the efforts of moderate Islamic nations to build democratic institutions that are acceptable in Islamic terms."

"This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assesses the status of Iran's nuclear program, and the program's outlook over the next 10 years. This time frame is more appropriate for estimating capabilities than intentions and foreign reactions, which are more difficult to estimate over a decade. In presenting the Intelligence Community's assessment of Iranian nuclear intentions and capabilities, the NIE thoroughly reviews all available information on these questions, examines the range of reasonable scenarios consistent with this information, and describes the key factors we judge would drive or impede nuclear progress in Iran. This NIE is an extensive reexamination of the issues in the May 2005 assessment. This Estimate does assume that the strategic goals and basic structure of Iran's senior leadership and government will remain similar to those that have endured since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. We acknowledge the potential for these to change during the time frame of the Estimate, but are unable to confidently predict such changes or their implications. This Estimate does not assess how Iran may conduct future negotiations with the West on the nuclear issue."