Maritime Domain

The FMC is an independent government agency, responsible for the regulation of shipping in the foreign trades of the United States. The Commission is engaged in foreign commerce regulations, and many other facets of the maritime industry. Their website provides access to various Commission proceedings and decisions, as well as speeches and remarks.

The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations which is responsible for measures to improve the safety of international shipping and to prevent marine pollution from ships. It also is involved in legal matters, including liability and compensation issues and the facilitation of international maritime traffic. It adopts the budget for the next biennium together with technical resolutions and recommendations prepared by subsidiary bodies during the previous two years. The Council acts as governing body in between Assembly sessions, and prepares the budget and work program for the Assembly. The main technical work is carried out by the Maritime Safety, Marine Environment Protection, Legal, Technical Co-operation and Facilitation Committees and a number of sub-committees.

This Maritime Administration website provides a broad spectrum of maritime information including various programs and initiatives to ensure sufficient sealift capability and intermodal transportation infrastructure to support vital homeland and national security interests.

From the Summary: "Congress has shown growing interest in and support for geoengineering techniques as a means to remove carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere. 'Geoengineering' is a field of study that involves large-scale technological interventions to manipulate the processes that affect Earth's climate, generally with the aim of countering climate change. Geoengineering techniques that stimulate or amplify natural processes that remove CO2 from the atmosphere (e.g., afforestation, ocean fertilization) may be of particular interest to Congress, due to the relatively low cost of research, development, and deployment of these techniques compared with geoengineering techniques that rely on novel or industrial-scale technologies. For example, CO2 is transferred into the deep ocean via the physical process of overturning circulation and the biological process known as the 'biological pump.' Ocean iron fertilization (OIF), an ocean-based geoengineering technique, aims to increase the rate of atmospheric CO2 transfer to the deep ocean by stimulating the biological pump through the addition of iron (a key nutrient) to the surface of the ocean. Modeling studies indicate that OIF has the potential to remove CO2 from the atmosphere for hundreds to thousands of years."

From the Document: "Congress currently faces decisions about how best to restore the readiness of a fleet of government-owned ships kept on standby to support Department of Defense (DOD) surge sealift requirements. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF)--a subset of the statutorily required National Defense Reserve Fleet--comprises 46 vessels managed by the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration (MARAD). RRF vessels are located strategically at ports throughout the United States. MARAD contracts with several private-sector companies to keep these ships maintained and ready to sail within five days' notice. These companies typically employ a skeleton crew of about 10 per ship who both live onboard and perform regular maintenance. MARAD contractors must also assemble the additional crew that would be needed for operating the ship if activated to support DOD. According to contract activity entered into the Federal Procurement Data System for FY2018 and FY2019, three of MARAD's leading RRF contractors are also major container ship carriers in the U.S. domestic trade. MARAD's other four leading contractors are primarily ship management companies."

From the Introduction: "This report presents background information and issues for Congress concerning the Navy's force structure and shipbuilding plans. The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans, and the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's force-level goal, its proposed FY2023 shipbuilding program, and its longer-term shipbuilding plans. Decisions that Congress makes on this issue can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base."

From the Introduction: "This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress for three types of large unmanned vehicles (UVs) that the Navy wants to develop and procure in FY2023 and beyond: [1] Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs); [2] Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs); and [3] Extra-large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs). The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to shift the Navy to a more distributed fleet architecture, meaning a mix of ships that spreads the Navy's capabilities over an increased number of platforms and avoids concentrating a large portion of the fleet's overall capability into a relatively small number of high-value ships (i.e., a mix of ships that avoids 'putting too many eggs into one basket'). The Navy's proposed FY2023 budget requests $549.3 million in research and development funding for these large UVs and LUSV/MUSV-enabling technologies, and $60.7 million in additional funding for core technologies for XLUUV and other Navy UUVs."

From the Document: "The Biden Administration has boosted the profile of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, aka 'the Quad,' as a centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at strengthening the United States' position in and commitment to the region. The four-country coalition, comprised of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, claims a common platform of protecting freedom of navigation and promoting democratic values in the region. The first leader-level summit, held virtually in March 2021, produced the first-ever joint leaders' statement. A September 2021 Quad Leaders' Summit produced an expanded statement outlining four broad areas of cooperation: vaccine production and distribution; climate change mitigation efforts and clean energy development; the promotion of transparency and high-standard governance in the field of critical and emerging technologies; and the development of a regional infrastructure partnership. Working groups in these areas are pushing forward with efforts to flesh out these priorities."

From the Document: "Since summer 2020, U.S. overseas containerized trade has risen to record levels as the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic led households to spend less on services such as vacation trips and restaurant meals and more on imported goods. The demand surge has resulted in transport delays, higher freight rates, and increased tension between shippers and ocean carriers over ancillary fees and the availability of containers. These controversies have drawn attention to the role of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), a federal agency with jurisdiction over ports and ocean shipping. [...] Two FMC commissioners recently reminded liner carriers about their 'common carrier obligation,' under which they may not 'unreasonably refuse to deal or negotiate' (46 U.S.C. [United States Code] §41104(a)(10)). This reminder followed complaints by exporters of low-value agricultural goods that ocean carriers are not supplying them with enough empty containers to ship their goods. The exporters are seeking FMC's assistance in obtaining firmer commitments from carriers regarding container supply. Because the United States imports more containerized goods than it exports, the ocean rates for exports are much lower than for imports. In the number of days it takes for a U.S. exporter to load a container and for the purchaser of the goods in Asia to unload the container, a carrier could return the container empty to Asia and have the container start earning the much higher Asia-to-United States freight revenue. This may be a consideration when container supply becomes tight."

From the Introduction: "This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding U.S.-China strategic competition in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS). In an [sic] renewed great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition. China's actions in the SCS in recent years have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China's maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China's near-seas region--meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea--could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. The issue for Congress is whether the Administration's strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere."

From the Document: "Formally established in 1979, the Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program consists of complementary diplomatic and operational efforts to safeguard lawful commerce and the global mobility of U.S. forces. The Department of State (DOS) protests excessive maritime claims, advocating for adherence to international law, while the Department of Defense (DoD) exercises the United States' maritime rights and freedoms by conducting operational challenges against excessive maritime claims. In combination, these efforts help preserve for all States the legal balance of interests established in customary international law as reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. [...] DoD's operational challenges are also known as 'FON assertions,' 'FON operations,' and 'FONOPs.' The regular and routine execution of these operations supports the longstanding U.S. national interest in freedom of the seas worldwide. [...] This report illustrates that U.S. FONOPs challenge a wide variety of excessive maritime claims made by allies, partners, and competitors. They are not focused on any particular excessive claimant, and they are not executed in response to current events. Rather, their purpose is to reinforce international law peacefully and in a principled, unbiased manner. A number of like-minded U.S. allies and partners continue to voice strong public support for the Law of the Sea Convention as the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out. Moreover, many nations continue to comment favorably on the United States' peaceful vigilance of excessive maritime claims. The United States invites these and other nations to conduct their own freedom of navigation operations and to publicly--and peacefully--contest excessive maritime claims."

From the Foreword: "I am pleased to present the following report, 'Maritime Law Enforcement Assessment,' which has been prepared by the U.S. Coast Guard. Senate Report 116-125 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2020 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-93) directs the Coast Guard to provide an assessment of the Coast Guard's ability to conduct maritime law enforcement activities on the high seas in support of international partners. Pursuant to congressional requirements, this report is being provided to the following Members of Congress: [1] The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard Chairwoman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security; [2] The Honorable Chuck Fleischmann Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security; [3] The Honorable Shelley Moore Capito Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security; [and] [4] The Honorable Jon Tester Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security."

"Modern maritime systems are highly complex digital systems to ensure the safety and efficient operation of the shipping traffic so vital to the global economy. The vulnerabilities associated with reliance on digital systems in the maritime environment must be continuously examined. System protections must be ever ready to monitor vulnerabilities and secure maritime traffic systems. The U.S. Coast Guard must ensure the integrity of the entrances to our 'digital ports' and work to develop practical cyber security solutions to protect the nation's maritime infrastructure."

This PowerPoint presentation outlines U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security initiatives in the Sector Seattle organization. Areas of responsibility, marine terrorism response challenges, and the Maritime Terrorism Response Initiative are all discussed.

From the Highlights: "The Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the principal federal service responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports and waterways. It is composed of approximately 55,200 personnel. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the service has been charged with additional security-related mission responsibilities. It has also faced increasing responsibilities related to natural disasters and commercial maritime activity. This statement addresses (1) the Coast Guard's efforts to determine its workforce needs and (2) selected personnel issues. It is based on seven products GAO [Government Accountability Office] issued from November 2019 through June 2022. It also includes updates from January 2022 to July 2022 on actions the Coast Guard has taken to address recommendations from these reports. To perform this prior work, GAO analyzed relevant Coast Guard documentation and data and interviewed officials. For a full list of the reports, see Related GAO Products. [...] GAO made numerous recommendations to the Coast Guard in prior reports, including to improve its workforce assessment process. DHS concurred with all recommendations. The Coast Guard has taken steps to address some of these recommendations, and GAO continues to monitor its progress in implementing them."

From the Document: "Arctic sea ice has diminished, lengthening the navigation season and increasing opportunities for maritime shipping. However, the U.S. Arctic lacks maritime infrastructure--such as a deep-draft port and comprehensive nautical charting--to support increased traffic. The lack of infrastructure exacerbates risks inherent to shipping in the Arctic such as vast distances and dangerous weather. This report examines (1) how U.S. Arctic shipping trends have changed since 2009 and factors that have shaped shipping in the region, and (2) the extent to which U.S. agencies' efforts to address Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps have aligned with leading management practices. GAO [Government Accountability Office] collected U.S. Coast Guard traffic data from 2009 through 2019 and interviewed 20 stakeholders selected to represent a range of views. GAO also analyzed Arctic strategies, interviewed selected agencies involved with maritime infrastructure, and compared efforts to leading management practices."

From the Highlights: "The nation's coastal, Great Lakes, and inland ports have long been recognized as critical to the national and local economies. Ports can contribute not only by moving freight but also, for example, through activities related to tourism, transportation, or real estate. Nationwide port studies have typically focused on the impact of freight, and less attention has been paid to these non-freight activities. House Report 116-452 included a provision for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to examine ports' non-freight activities. This GAO report describes (1) what is known about the nature of and funding for non-freight activities at public ports, and (2) the extent to which federal discretionary grant programs have provided funds to public ports for non-freight and freight projects, and stakeholders' views on this federal assistance. To address the two objectives above, GAO conducted a non-generalizable survey of 80 ports and interviewed officials at 15 ports and 14 port industry stakeholders. GAO selected ports for variety based on their level of non-freight activity, freight traffic, and location, and whether they have applied for DOT [Department of Transportation] funding. GAO also interviewed officials within DOT; the Departments of Commerce (Commerce), Defense, and Homeland Security; and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In addition, GAO (1) reviewed port documentation, such as economic impact studies and (2) analyzed DOT, Commerce, and EPA grant award data from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2020."

From the Highlights: "In March 2021, the Navy published a framework that called for developing and fielding uncrewed surface and undersea vehicles to complement its existing fleet as a key to future Navy capabilities. The Navy intends to prototype these systems to gain knowledge and address technical issues before acquiring systems in significant numbers. A House Report included a provision for GAO [Government Accountability Office] to review the Navy's efforts to develop and produce uncrewed surface and undersea vehicles. GAO's report assesses the Navy's planned investments for these uncrewed maritime systems and its management and prototyping approaches. GAO reviewed documentation for four ongoing medium and large uncrewed maritime system prototype efforts and the associated information technology efforts that enable these systems."

From the Document: "AMSCs [Area Maritime Security Committees] were mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 to provide a link for contingency planning, development, review, and updates to the Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSPs), and to enhance communication between port stakeholders and all levels of government. Local AMSC annual reports are an important tool used to compile and share information pertaining on issues such as committee organization, training, challenges, accomplishments, best practices, and recommendations. These efforts ensure the Coast Guard and the maritime communities maintain alignment with national preparedness goals, strategies, reporting requirements. They ultimately serve to improve AMSC effectiveness nationwide. AMSCs continue to be a vital partner in securing the MTS [Marine Transportation System]. [...] This Annual Report highlights the many achievements of the AMSCs across the country and serves as a reminder of all the outstanding work performed in 2020 to secure the MTS in the face of unprecedented challenges."

From the Abstract: "Deterrence theory evolved during the Cold War nuclear weapons arms race environment in a nation-state context. Modern counterproliferation efforts focus on different kinds of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and sub-national adversaries. This article will discuss the evolution of deterrence theory, provide a brief overview of specific counterproliferation efforts, and apply principles of deterrence theory to these counterproliferation efforts. The main takeaway for deterrence scholars and counterproliferation practitioners is that more thought is needed to determine whether deterrence theory is an appropriate theoretical bedrock for modern maritime counterproliferation strategy against sub-national adversaries."

From the Bottom Line Up Front: "This report describes the progress of the Marine Corps on my watch in preparing for the sweeping changes needed to meet the principal challenges facing the institution: effectively playing our role as the nation's naval expeditionary force-in-readiness, while simultaneously modernizing the force in accordance with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) - and doing both within the fiscal resources we are provided. A certain degree of institutional change is inevitable when confronting modernization on this scale, and that type of change is hard. As such, I want to be clear up front: our force design effort is a work in progress. Thanks to the dedication and effort of a great many Marines, Sailors, and civilians over the last six months, we have come to a clearer understanding of some force design changes we can confidently make today, while identifying other areas that require additional analysis. This reports explains, at length and in some detail, my argument for change, our force design methodology and organization, my personal assessment of the work to date, and the steps we are taking to move the force design effort into the next phase."

From the Document: "Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a collective term that embraces all activities associated with gaining deeper insight and understanding into the global maritime domain. Most MDA programs have the following three aims at their core: 1) early threat detection and resolution; 2) provision of decision support for a broad spectrum of threats; and 3) monitoring adherence to international laws to ensure freedom of navigation and the efficient flow of commerce. Achieving these aims necessitates a high degree of situational awareness that is only possible through collaboration with allies and partner nations, international agencies, IO/NGOs, [International Organizations/ Non-Governmental Organizations] and the private sector in the sharing of information, the coordination of activities, and the development of expertise."

This is the April 24, 2018 hearing titled "Maritime Transportation: Opportunities and Challenges," held before the Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety and Security of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. From the opening statement of Deb Fischer: "Thank you all for being here today for this Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security Subcommittee hearing titled 'Maritime Transportation: Opportunities and Challenges.' Maritime transportation and the Merchant Marine are essential to the United States for both commercial and defense purposes. The United States Bureau of Transportation statistics found that in 2016, the value of exports and imports shipped by water was worth nearly $1.5 trillion. As the world becomes more connected through trade, even a triple landlocked state like Nebraska relies on maritime transportation and the Merchant Marine to get our products to their final destination." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Michael A. Khouri, Mark H. Buzby, James Helis, and Craig H. Middlebrook.

This is the November 16, 2021 hearing on "On the Frontlines in Turbulent Times: Workforce Perspectives on the State of Transportation Security," held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security. From the Opening Statement of Watson Coleman: "The safety of front-line workers and passengers is paramount, particularly as we continue to battle a pandemic that has turned many of our usual travel customs and norms on their head. While this is not the first year that our country will celebrate the holidays with COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] in our midst, it is heartening that almost 60 percent of the population is fully vaccinated against this virus. While we still have a ways to go, strong protection from the worst effects of the virus means more families can safely reunite during this special time of the year. Last Monday was the deadline for Federal employees, including Transportation Security Officers, to receive their last shot of a two-dose vaccine regimen, or a single dose in the case of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine, to meet the November 22 deadline to be fully vaccinated, per President Biden's recent Executive Order. In addition, many major airlines have required their employees to receive their shots ahead of the January 4 deadline for Federal contractors. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how vaccination efforts are progressing among their memberships and the partnerships between employees and employers that these efforts have borne." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Everett B. Kelley, Sara Nelson, John Samuelsen, and John A. Casaretti.

This is the April 15, 2021 hearing on "Practical Steps Toward a Carbon-Free Maritime Industry: Updates on Fuels, Ports, and Technology," held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. From the opening statement of Salud O. Carbajal: "Today we will examine the progress towards eliminating carbon emissions in the maritime industry, and how Congress can support these efforts. This work is crucial to mitigating the effects of climate change. Without decisive action in the maritime industry and elsewhere, we are going to experience severe impacts on our way of life from sea level rise, flooding, and more frequent extreme weather events." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John W. Butler, Kristin Decas, Morgan M. Fanberg, B. Lee Kindberg, and Dan Rutherford.

This is the October 8, 2015 hearing on "Protecting Maritime Facilities in the 21st Century: Are Our Nation's Ports at Risk for a Cyber Attack?" held before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Candice S. Miller: "The United States Coast Guard is the Government agency responsible for the physical security of our Nation's port infrastructure. Working through the Area Maritime Security Committees, the Coast Guard partners with port authorities and operators to update access controls, fence-off sensitive areas of the ports, and increase surveillance when appropriate. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States Congress has appropriated $2.4 billion dollars in port security grant funds to harden port facilities against the potential for a terror attack. As a Nation, we have done a fairly good job updating the physical security at ports, but I am concerned that the U.S. Government has fallen behind when it comes to the cybersecurity of the port. Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard was granted responsibility for the protection of communication systems, including information that flows through the Marine Transportation System. Port facilities and ship operators, like many industries in America, increasingly rely on automation to streamline operations. While those innovations reduce the time it takes to stock our shelves, and lower the cost of doing business, they also carry risk. Terror groups, nation-states, criminal organizations, hackers and even disgruntled employees could breach these systems-with potentially catastrophic results to the Nation's economy." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Paul F. Thomas, Gregory C. Wilshusen, Randy D. Parsons, and Jonathan Sawicki.

This is the November 16, 2021 hearing on "Rebuilding Coast Guard Infrastructure to Sustain and Enhance Mission Capability," held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. From the opening statement of Salud O. Carbajal: "With infrastructure a national focus, today's hearing will highlight the need to invest in Coast Guard infrastructure, including $429 million in the recently enacted Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and $650 million more for shoreside infrastructure in the Build Back Better Act, which is currently under consideration." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Paul F. Thomas and Heather MacLeod.

This is the July 21, 2021 hearing on the "Review of Fiscal Year 2022 Budget for the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Programs," held before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. From the opening statement of Salud O. Carbajal: "Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing on the review of the fiscal year 2022 budget request for the Coast Guard and maritime transportation programs. Today, we will hear directly from the Commandant and the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard, the Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, and the Acting Administrator of the Maritime Administration [MARAD] on the President's budget request and agency priorities. [...] On marine transportation, I look forward to MARAD's plan to revitalize every facet of the U.S. maritime industry, from our ports to the continually declining U.S.-flag fleet and the associated American merchant mariners. I would like to hear more about how the Port Infrastructure Development Program can help address and prepare for climate change. [...] I am disappointed that the administration's national maritime strategy remains incomplete. While mandated by legislation in 2014, MARAD has yet to develop an implementation plan or report on regulations that impact the competitiveness of the industry." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Karl L. Schultz, Daniel B. Maffei, Jason M. Vanderhaden, and Lucinda Lessley.

From the Introduction: "The United States is a maritime nation. Our security and prosperity depend on the seas. Since the end of World War II, the United States has built, led, and advanced a rules-based international system through shared commitments with our allies and partners. Forward deployed forces of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard--collectively known as the Naval Service--have guaranteed the security of this system. Free and open access to the world's oceans has fostered an extraordinary era of wealth and peace for many nations. That system is now at risk. 'Advantage at Sea' is a Tri-Service Maritime Strategy that focuses on China and Russia, the two most significant threats to this era of global peace and prosperity. We prioritize competition with China due to its growing economic and military strength, increasing aggressiveness, and demonstrated intent to dominate its regional waters and remake the international order in its favor. Until China chooses to act as a responsible stakeholder rather than brandish its power to further its authoritarian interests, it represents the most comprehensive threat to the United States, our allies, and all nations supporting a free and open system."

"In accordance with Section 1259 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 'Buck' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Public Law 113-291, this report outlines the Department of Defense's strategy with regard to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. Recognizing the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and its maritime domain for the security of the United States, the Department is focused on safeguarding freedom of the seas, deterring conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards. As it does around the world, the Department will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, in support of these goals and in order to preserve the peace and security the Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed for the past 70 years. [...] The United States has enduring economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. And because the region - stretching from the Indian Ocean, through the South and East China Seas, and out to the Pacific Ocean - is primarily water, we place a premium on maintaining maritime peace and security. To that end, the Department of Defense has three maritime objectives in the Asia-Pacific region: to safeguard the freedom of the seas; deter conflict and coercion; and promote adherence to international law and standards."

From the Forward: "This maritime strategy describes how we will design, organize, and employ the Sea Services in support of our national, defense, and homeland security strategies. It also sets maritime priorities in an era of constrained resources, while emphasizing warfighting capabilities and forward naval presence to advance national interests today and guide preparations for tomorrow's challenges. Forward naval presence is essential to strengthening alliances and partnerships, providing the secure environment necessary for an open economic system based on the free flow of goods, protecting U.S. natural resources, promoting stability, deterring conflict, and responding to aggression. As global maritime commerce expands, populations increase, competition for energy and natural resources grows, and advanced military technologies proliferate across the oceans and through the littoral, so too will challenges arise for anyone operating in those regions. The American people will continue to rely on the Sea Services to respond to fast-changing and complex world events that threaten the security of the United States and our allies and partners. Our Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen stand ready to meet these challenges with the same determination and responsiveness they have demonstrated for more than two centuries."

From the Executive Summary: "'Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)' is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States. The 'Maritime Domain' is all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, and other conveyances. This Plan provides the context to understand the importance of MDA to maritime security and why it is imperative to enhance MDA. It will empower the U.S. Government to understand the characteristics of the current maritime domain, identify the strategic approach we seek to employ, clarify our strategic and foundational priorities, and develop an implementation plan to improve MDA that enables decision-makers to perform their responsibilities consistent with Presidential Policy Directive 18 (PPD-18) and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS). This Plan promotes sustaining favorable conditions for global maritime security and prosperity. This is accomplished through the effective understanding of the maritime domain and by improving our ability to appropriately share maritime information, including intelligence, law enforcement information, and all-source data from the public and private sectors. The concept of maritime intelligence integration serves as a foundational and, therefore, necessary priority for the effective understanding of the maritime domain."

"In April 2013, the National Ocean Council (NOC) published the National Ocean Policy (NOP) Implementation Plan. The Implementation Plan aligned the efforts of the Federal government under five major themes: Ocean Economy, Safety and Security, Coastal and Ocean Resilience, Local Choices, and Science and Information. Since then, Federal agencies have made tremendous progress in carrying out actions described in the Implementation Plan. In March 2015, the NOC released the 'Report on the Implementation of the National Ocean Policy,' providing the status of all 214 actions described in the Implementation Plan. The Implementation Plan provides a solid foundation for enhanced agency collaboration and effectiveness, and resulted in meaningful, beneficial results. The many accomplishments realized through the original Implementation Plan set the stage for a targeted approach to future NOP implementation. As many of the actions in the current Implementation Plan are completed, progress on the NOP will continue under Annual Work Plans to focus on pressing issues in a defined timeframe. A longer-term, higher-level implementation guide (Guide) based on the original Implementation Plan themes will provide the overarching context and vision for crafting the Annual Work Plans and implementing the NOP in future years."

"I am pleased to transmit this document, 'Science for an Ocean Nation: An Update of the Ocean Research Priorities Plan', which presents national research priorities in key areas of interaction between society and the ocean. Our Nation's first ocean research priorities plan, 'Charting the Course for Ocean Sciences in the United States', was developed during 2005-06 and published in January 2007. Although it remains useful for many purposes, a number of issues not thoroughly addressed in that report have since risen in importance, including ocean acidification and rapidly changing conditions in the Arctic Ocean. Further, in July 2010 President Obama signed Executive Order 13547 establishing America's first National Ocean Policy, which calls for science-based decision-making as the Nation works to manage our ocean resources. For these and other reasons, the interagency National Science and Technology Council has crafted this update. Structured around six societal themes, this report recommends research priorities designed to advance our understanding of critical ocean processes and phenomena that are relevant to human health, economic well-being, environmental sustainability, adaptation to climate and other environmental change, and national and homeland security. The report also provides updates on research progress in a number of these areas."

From the Introduction: "The National Defense Strategy (NDS) defines 'the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security as the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition' posed by Russia and China. It emphasizes that, 'America's military has no preordained right to victory on the battlefield.' 'The developing abilities of near-peer competitors drive the need for increased Naval capability distributed over a wider area'. [...] 'Autonomous systems provide additional warfighting capability and capacity to augment our traditional combatant force, allowing the option to take on greater operational risk while maintaining a tactical and strategic advantage'. The Navy and Marine Corps are already operating unmanned systems, and going forward will seek to achieve a seamlessly integrated manned-unmanned force across all domains. The question is not 'if' the Naval force will prioritize and leverage unmanned platforms and systems, but how quickly and efficiently, in resource-constrained environments."

"Each year since 1995, the Maritime Administration has published the Compilation of Maritime Laws as an essential reference for its Agency leadership and staff. The Compilation is also widely used by the Members of Congress, their staffs and committees, attorneys practicing in the area of Federal Maritime Law and interested members of the general public. The Maritime Administration believes that it is essential that this publication be made available to ensure access to the current state of significant Maritime Laws including current statutory amendments. This publication has been changed considerably from earlier editions to reflect the codification of Title 46 Appendix, United States Code, in Public Law 109-304. An Index giving the old and new citations for various provisions of law has been included at the very end to help the reader find new section numbers. This convenient volume is current through the first session of the 110th Congress. It also contains Public Law 110-181, approved January 28, 2008 (122 STAT. 3). While this Compilation is a helpful research tool, citation to the law should be made by reference to the United States Code or other official reporters."

"This directive: a. Reissues DoD Directive 2005.02E (Reference (a)) to establish policy and assign responsibilities for MDA [Maritime Domain Awareness], by which DoD: (1) Contributes to the effective understanding of the global maritime domain and its impact on the security, safety, economy, and environment of the United States. (2) Distributes maritime information, including intelligence, in support of DoD missions globally. (3) Integrates MDA with awareness in the land, air, cyber, and space domains to provide commanders, decision makers, and responders with near-real-time integrated domain awareness. b. Designates the Secretary of the Navy as the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for MDA, in accordance with DoD Directive 5101.1 (Reference (a)). c. Designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) as the OSD Principal Staff Assistant to oversee the activities of the DoD EA for MDA in accordance with Reference (a)."

"It is DoD policy that: [a.] MDA [Maritime Domain Awareness] efforts within DoD will align with and build upon interagency efforts to strengthen and enhance the maritime information sharing environment and to maximize intelligence integration, such as the National MDA Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security (Reference (c)). [b.] MDA, as one component of DoD's all-domain awareness, will be implemented within the context of national and DoD information and data-sharing guidance, in accordance with Reference (b) and Executive Order 13388, DoD Information Sharing Strategy, the DoD Information Strategy Implementation Plan, the DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy, DoD Instruction 8500.01, and DoD Instruction 8320.02 (References (d) through (i)), and consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Reference (j))."

"This publication provides doctrine for the command and control of joint maritime operations across the range of military operations. It also describes the maritime domain; addresses considerations for establishing a joint force maritime component commander and attendant command relationships; provides principles and guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of joint maritime operations; and presents considerations for specific maritime operations. […] This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for United States (US) military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective."

"This directive establishes U.S. policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to enhance U.S. national security and homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests. It directs the coordination of United States Government maritime security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, State, local, and private sector entities. This directive also establishes a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee to coordinate inter-agency maritime security policy efforts."

From the thesis abstract: "The purpose of this thesis was to explore the modern threats to the maritime homeland security environment and the effectiveness of Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs) in preventing and responding to transportation security incidents. AMSCs are deliberately designed to encompass senior representatives of numerous stakeholders in the maritime homeland security enterprise, such as law enforcement, fire, industry, and labor. There were two research questions used in this project: What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the effectiveness of AMSCs, and how can AMSCs improve their interagency collaboration to enhance the homeland security enterprise? Two rounds of Delphi surveys were conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of AMSCs. These were issued to 24 people from five Captain of the Port Zones across the West Coast of the United States. The survey answers were then evaluated against open-source reports produced by AMSCs. Between these research sources, AMSCs were shown to be positive collaboration and information-sharing mechanisms, but geography creates barriers to participation and effectiveness. In order to improve, AMSCs must increase funding, change policy to fund the travel and training of AMSC members, recruit and provide engaging training for new personnel, and establish metrics of performance. On the national level, all AMSCs should target and monitor common threats to better secure the maritime transportation system."

From the thesis Abstract: "As increased border security measures are adopted along the United States' southern land border, researchers believe that an increase in illicit maritime traffic can be expected. As the primary maritime security agency, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is suffering from a lack of interdiction assets and resources and admits it is already only capable of responding to one-third of all known maritime smuggling events. Based on current data regarding drug interdictions within the maritime domain and the expectation that smuggling events will increase, can the number of successful interdictions be increased through greater interoperability and cooperation between the U.S. Navy (USN) and USCG? This thesis discusses the mission of both the USN and USCG and analyzes the role that Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) plays in coordinating counter-narcotics efforts. The research for this thesis suggests that JIATF South is successfully coordinating responsibilities among all involved agencies to maintain complete awareness of maritime drug smuggling, but that it now lacks the necessary assets to improve on the number of successful interdictions each year. The USN is aiming to surpass the previous goal of a 355-ship fleet by developing unmanned surface vehicles, which could prove to be the asset JIATF South needs."

From the thesis Abstract: "Strategically, it will always be preferable for the United States to fight 'out there' where the conflict isfar away from the homeland. But, as the Russian and Chinese navies continue to develop longer-range capabilities and other threats toward the U.S. homeland grow, it is crucial to examine how well the surface Navy is prepared to defend the homeland. Given both the emerging threats from peer competitors, such as Russia and China, and the surface Navy's prioritization of forces abroad, this thesis asks whether the surface Navy is adequately prepared to defend against such future threats to the American homeland. Through a qualitative analysis of relevant literature, this thesis concludes that the American homeland will be targeted by peer competitors during a future crisis or conflict. Based on credible threats to the homeland, the Navy will have to balance appropriately on prioritizing and allocating forces abroad and at home. The Navy will have to break away from the traditional maritime strategy of primarily only fighting abroad, and it will need to provide assistance to enhance a layered defense approach to effectively defend the homeland in the future. Thus, this thesis recommends establishing a national combined maritime and aerospace defense command to ensure that air, land, and sea forces are prioritized and allocated appropriately for the defense of the American homeland during crisis or conflict in the future."

"America's maritime ports provide vital services to the nation's economy and national security functioning as the critical nodes in a transportation network facilitating imports and exports and connecting distribution routes throughout the entire country. Many maritime ports also provide facilities for military operations for all branches of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. The homeland security enterprise is primarily focused on counterterrorism. A changing climate brings significant threats across a wide spectrum of vectors. Maritime ports and their supporting infrastructure are at risk of inundation from sea-level rise as a consequence of global climate change. The homeland security enterprise continues to focus on the low probability/high consequence threat of domestic maritime terrorism while a high probability/high consequence event looms just over the horizon. This paper examines the risks, vulnerabilities, costs and consequences posed by the catastrophic threat of sea-level rise--nature's weapon of mass destruction, reviews the dynamics behind recent and current resource allocation, and proposes recommendations for future policy deliberations."

From the thesis abstract: "Small submersible vessels have been used for years by nation states, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations to achieve operational objectives. These entities have sought to capitalize on the overriding tactical advantage of submersible technology which is stealth. For example, drug trafficking organizations in Central and South America have been routinely using self-propelled semi-submersible vessels to clandestinely transport large quantities of illicit drugs to North America. Small submersible vessels can also be nefariously used in the maritime domain to transport persons or weapons or they could be used as waterborne improvised explosive devices. Terrorists and criminals are complex adaptive adversaries and are driven to innovate when confronted with threats to their operational effectiveness. Innovation and adaption are driving these foes to leverage disruptive technology towards the development or acquisition of fully-submersible vessels. Furthermore, there is a growing population of privately owned submersibles within the U.S. that policymakers have little visibility of. Homeland security policymakers lack adequate situational awareness regarding the vulnerabilities, threats, and consequences to the maritime transportation system from the malicious use of submersibles. The core challenge for the maritime homeland security enterprise with regards to submersibles is developing effective strategies to mitigate their potential risk."

From the thesis Abstract: "This thesis answers the question: What are the core domestic maritime transportation system waterway vulnerabilities for the Carrier Strike Group power projection capabilities of the United States? There is a multitude of threats that the United States Navy faces in today's world, such as terrorism, great power competition, and contention for freedom of the seas. Some of these originate in the homeland, such as threats to U.S. waterways that are home to surface naval vessels. Vulnerabilities to these waterways in the form of natural disasters, accidents, adversarial attacks, and management issues can potentially disrupt normal maritime operations and the power projection capabilities of the U.S. Navy. Within the continental United States, surface fleet naval bases are located within open civilian waterways, complete with interdependent infrastructure including international trade terminals, bridges, tunnels, and transportation nodes. When operating within the United States maritime transportation system infrastructure, the U.S. Navy operations are vulnerable. This thesis describes and analyzes three regions where carriers are homeported in the United States and assesses the maritime transportation system through risk assessment, reliability engineering, worst-case planning, and surprise adaptation. The assessments are then compared and contrasted to provide recommendations for improving domestic vulnerabilities to aircraft carrier power projection."