Nuclear Weapons

"The past 2 decades have seen an increase in nuclear dangers. Arsenals have been operationalized in India and Pakistan, and China seems to be augmenting its own. North Korea has crossed the nuclear threshold, and Iran seems to be on the way to do so itself. Four hitherto undisclosed--and illegal--nuclear programs were discovered: Iraq in 1991, Iran in 2002, Libya in 2003, and Syria in 2007. Pakistani and North Korean nuclear expertise and technology transfers were also uncovered. Al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups showed an interest in gaining access to nuclear weapons and materials, and some attacked nuclear-related facilities in Pakistan. The security and control of nuclear weapons is thus more important than ever, as witnessed by the political success of two Nuclear Security Summits in Washington (2010) and Seoul (2012). Despite disagreement over budget priorities, the topic enjoys a rare level of bipartisanship in the United States. Much has been written about nuclear accidents and nuclear crises, but much less about the impact of political crises in nuclear-capable states. The goal that Henry Sokolski and I set in undertaking this project was to shed light on the following issue: How do nuclear-capable states behave in times of major political crises?"

"A ban on all nuclear tests is the oldest item on the nuclear arms control agenda. Three treaties that entered into force between 1963 and 1990 limit, but do not ban, such tests. In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear explosions. In 1997, President Clinton sent the CTBT to the Senate, which rejected it in October 1999. In a speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama said, 'My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.' However, while the Administration has indicated it wants to begin a CTBT 'education' campaign with a goal of securing Senate advice and consent to ratification, it has not pressed for a vote on the treaty and there were no hearings on it in the 111th, 112th, or 113th Congresses. There will be at least one hearing in the 114th Congress--a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the CTBT planned for September 7, 2016. […] This report will be updated occasionally. This update reflects the FY2017 budget request and developments through August 2016. CRS Report RL34394, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, presents pros and cons in detail. CRS Report R40612, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated 'Safeguards' and Net Assessments, by Jonathan E. Medalia, discusses safeguards--unilateral steps to maintain U.S. nuclear security consistent with nuclear testing treaties--and their relationship to the CTBT."

"All three countries discussed in this report have short-range ballistic missiles. Iran and North Korea also have medium-range ballistic missiles; North Korea has intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons on three occasions; Iran and Syria's nuclear programs have raised suspicions that those countries are pursuing nuclear weapons. However, Iran has, according to the IC [Intelligence Community], halted its nuclear weapons program, and Syria does not appear to have an active nuclear weapons program. Congress has held numerous hearings regarding these countries' nuclear and missile programs. It has also passed legislation providing for sanctions on countries whose entities assist Iran, North Korea, and Syria to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. For example, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, P.L. [Public Law] 106-178) imposes penalties on countries whose companies' exports assist the efforts of Iran, North Korea, and Syria to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems. Congress has also established reporting requirements concerning these countries' missile and nuclear programs. Congress may wish to consider requiring additional reporting from the executive branch on WMD proliferation because the number of unclassified reports to Congress on WMD-related issues has decreased considerably in recent years. This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress."

"The role of Congress in the arms control process depends on the mechanism used to reduce forces. If the United States and Russia sign a formal treaty, then the Senate must signal its advice and consent with a vote of two-thirds of its Members. The House and Senate would each need to pass legislation approving an Executive Agreement. But the President can reduce U.S. nuclear weapons in parallel with Russia, without seeking congressional approval, if the reductions are taken unilaterally, or as the result of a nonbinding political agreement. Each of the mechanisms for reducing nuclear forces can possess different characteristics for the arms control process. These include balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidence in compliance, and timeliness. Provisions in formal treaties can mandate balance and equality between the two sides' forces. They can also provide both sides with the ability to predict the size and structure of the other's current and future forces. Unilateral measures allow each side to maintain flexibility in deciding the size and structure of its nuclear forces. In addition, the monitoring and verification provisions included in bilateral treaties can provide each side with detailed information about the numbers and capabilities of the other's nuclear forces, while also helping each side confirm that the other has complied with the limits and restrictions in the treaty. With unilateral reductions, the two sides could still agree to share information, or they could withhold information so that they would not have to share sensitive data about their forces."

"Since 1945, seven nations--China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States--have developed and currently deploy nuclear weapons. North Korea tested a low-yield nuclear explosive device in October 2006, announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test in May 2009, and announced a third test on February 12, 2013. Israel is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons, although it maintains a policy of ambiguity on this matter. This report describes the organizations controlling research and development (R&D) on nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear explosive devices, as distinct from the bombers and missiles that carry them) in these nations, and presents a brief history of the organizations controlling nuclear weapons R&D in the United States. It discusses whether these organizations are civilian or military, though in many nations the lines between civilian and military are blurred. This information may be of use to Members of Congress and their staff interested in nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, and arms control matters."

From the statement of Daniel Akaka: "Today the Subcommittee will examine interagency efforts to prevent nuclear and radiological materials from falling into the wrong hands. Since 1999, I have chaired 10 related hearings on this subject and requested 10 Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigations, and they have been good in meeting those requests. The terrorist threat remains serious and the consequences of a nuclear or radiological terrorist attack would be catastrophic. In 2010, President Obama stated that nuclear terrorism is the single biggest threat to U.S. security, short-term, medium-term, and longterm. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported more than 2,000 unauthorized incidents, such as illegal trade or movement of nuclear or radioactive material, from 1993 through 2011." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel Akaka, Thomas M. Countryman, Anne Harrington, Kenneth Handelman, Gene Aloise, Kenneth N. Luongo, and Page O. Stoutland.

This testimony compilation is from the February 14, 2013 hearing, "National Nuclear Security Administration Weapons Activities," before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, and Related Agencies. From the opening statement of Rodney P. Frelinghuysen: "We are opening this hearing season examining Nuclear Weapons programs run by the Department of Energy, a fitting start given the critical importance of these activities. […] It should be apparent by now how important Weapons Activities is to this subcommittee. The reliability, safety and security of our nuclear deterrent is, to my mind, the single most critical responsibility of this subcommittee and the Department. In fact, this is the only account under our jurisdiction which gets a funding anomaly under the CR [Continuing Resolution]. And these anomalies don't appear out of thin-air. Increases to the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] budget are only available because we cut national security funding elsewhere. This is truly a zero-sum game, and the pot is getting smaller over time." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Rodney P. Frelinghuysen, Neile Miller, Don Cook, and James Dawkins.

This is the July 31, 2013 hearing on "Oversight of DOE's Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste," held before the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy. From the opening statement of Fred Upton: "First, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is the law on this subject. As Chairman Shimkus stated, that means Yucca Mountain. In shutting down the repository program, the administration did not elaborate on a technical or safety concern, merely that it was 'unworkable.' This was followed by the former Nuclear Regulatory Commission chairman unilaterally ceasing the staff's review of the license application one month -- one month before a key safety evaluation report was to be publicly released with the agency's conclusions about the safety of Yucca Mountain. Electricity consumers pay for the disposal of civilian spent nuclear fuel and taxpayers pay for disposal of nuclear waste from the atomic energy defense program. Michigan consumers alone have paid nearly $600 million dollars into the fund. $15 billion was invested in the repository program and got us within one month of knowing whether we have a scientifically safe and sound location. After spending $15 billion, the public should have a right to know what the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] concluded. Instead, DOE's [Department of Energy] strategy unfortunately abandons that investment, expecting consumers and taxpayers to foot the bill for another $5.6 billion for the first ten years to start over from square one." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ernest J. Moniz.

This is the July 26, 2012 hearing on "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS Have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Detection Strategy?," held before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies. From the opening statement of Daniel E. Lungren: "Nuclear and radiological terrorism is my greatest fear. It would represent an unprecedented catastrophic event, causing enormous death, destruction, as well as long-term economic disruption. So it is critical that we continue our vigilance and oversight efforts in order to address this continuing threat. Our subcommittee hearing today will examine the current nuclear detection strategy of the Department of Homeland Security and assess whether that strategy is both effective and efficient in countering this threat. It was exactly 1 year ago today, in this very hearing room, that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office informed me that it was cancelling its costly Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitoring Program, known as ''A--S--P''. After much promise, testing, and evaluation, the Department cancelled ASP without identifying a new technology replacement. Three months ago, the Department provided its proposed path forward with its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) ''Implementation Plan''. This was a major accomplishment of DNDO by facilitating the interagency cooperation that is essential to the development of such a comprehensive architecture. The plan provides for the first time, a 5-year look-ahead of the needed capabilities for countering our nuclear and radiological threats. While the GNDA plan contains excellent procedures and policies to coordinate our Nation's nuclear defense efforts, it fails to identify the Department's priorities for acquiring its next generation of detection equipment." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Yvette D. Clarke, Bennie G. Thompson, Huban A. Gowadia, David C. Maurer, and Vayl S. Oxford.

"Of the roughly two dozen countries that have pursued or obtained nuclear weapons during the last fifty years, almost all of them depended importantly on foreign supplies. As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, illicit nuclear trade is likely to be conducted by several nations seeking nuclear weapons or wanting to maintain existing nuclear weapons arsenals or capabilities. Additional states in regions of proliferation concern may utilize smuggling methods to acquire advanced, ostensibly civilian, nuclear technology including uranium enrichment and plutonium production and separation capabilities. And despite many recent, particularly United States-led, successes, stopping this trade will remain difficult. Absent mitigating actions, several existing or expected trends are projected to make it easier for smugglers to succeed in acquiring nuclear and nuclear-related goods and technology. Future illicit trade can be stopped through measures taken today as long as the political will is there to foresee and address future threats. A range of countermeasures aimed at mitigating or eliminating these future threats must be employed today to stop them from emerging in the next five to ten years. Preventing the future world of illicit trade is imperative to U.S. and international security and to the creation of a world safer from the spread and use of nuclear weapons." Note: This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.

"On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that have negotiated with Iran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany--collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA) that attempts to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes, in exchange for a broad suspension of U.S., European Union (EU), and United Nations sanctions. The text of the JCPOA appears to reflect largely what was agreed in an April 2, 2015, framework for a comprehensive agreement. Some issues that were left open in the framework accord were clarified and specified in the JCPOA. The agreement, if it enters into force following review by the U.S. Congress and Iran's political system, will replace a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) interim nuclear accord agreed to in November 2013 and in operation since January 2014. The Administration and the other P5+1 governments assert that the JCPOA represents the most effective of several alternatives to ensure that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon--one of which could conceivably be military action against Iran's nuclear facilities. The Administration also argues that all U.S. options to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon remain available even after the JCPOA expires. The Administration further asserts that the JCPOA contains provisions for U.N. sanctions to be reimposed if Iran is found not in compliance with its requirements, although the Administration and many experts acknowledge it is difficult to predict the degree to which international governments might reimpose their sanctions in the event U.N. sanctions are reimposed."

"The Secretary of Defense, on behalf of the President, is submitting this report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States in accordance with Section 491 of 10 U.S.C. Section 491 states: By not later than 60 days before the date on which the President implements a nuclear employment strategy of the United States that differs from the nuclear employment strategy of the United States then in force, the President shall submit to Congress a report setting forth the following: (1) A description of the modifications to the nuclear employment strategy, plans, and options of the United States made by the strategy so issued. (2) An assessment of effects of such modification for the nuclear posture of the United States. (3) The implication of such changes on the flexibility and resilience of the strategic forces of the United States and the ability of such forces to support the goals ofthe United States with respect to nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and defense. ( 4) The extent to which such modifications include an increased reliance on conventional or non-nuclear strike capabilities or missile defenses of the United States. With the President's issuance of new nuclear weapons employment guidance, this report is being provided in advance of implementation and, thus, fulfills the requirements of Section 491. Implementation of this new employment strategy will consist of updating Department of Defense (DoD) military guidance and plans over the next year."

"Negotiated by the Reagan Administration nearly 30 years ago, the current U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) is set to expire on December 30, 2015. President Obama submitted a new 30-year U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement for congressional review on April 21, 2015. Among other provisions, the agreement would allow for uranium enrichment up to a level less than 20% U-235 and Chinese reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material at safeguarded facilities. The required congressional review period ended on July 31. Such agreements are often called '123 agreements' because they are required by Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (P.L. 95-242). They are a prerequisite for any significant nuclear cooperation with another country, such as exports of nuclear power plants and components and the transfer of nuclear material. Since the original agreement was concluded before China was a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), some changes to the text were required. The recently submitted renewal agreement complies with the relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and therefore was subject to a review period totaling 90 days of continuous session. If no resolution of disapproval is passed into law before that deadline, then the agreement may enter into force. No resolution of disapproval was passed."

The NPT is a collection of eleven articles designed to prevent new countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, to promote disarmament, and to establish a system for safeguards and verification.

"The American Nuclear Society is a not-for-profit, international, scientific and educational organization. It was established by a group of individuals who recognized the need to unify the professional activities within the diverse fields of nuclear science and technology. December 11, 1954, marks the Society's historic beginning at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. ANS has since developed a multifarious membership composed of approximately 11,000 engineers, scientists, administrators, and educators representing 1,600 plus corporations, educational institutions, and government agencies. It is governed by four officers and a board of directors elected by the membership."

"The IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] is the world's center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world's 'Atoms for Peace' organization in 1957 within the United Nations family. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies."

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is an independent agency established by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to regulate civilian use of nuclear materials. The NRC's primary mission is to protect the public health and safety, and the environment from the effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities. It also regulates these nuclear materials and facilities to promote the common defense and security.