Mass Gatherings

"In August 2004, a meeting of a number of the foremost experts in the fields of bioethics, emergency medicine, emergency management, health administration, health law and policy, and public health was convened by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OASPHEP) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). These experts were joined by highly knowledgeable representatives from key Federal agencies and professional and other health organizations (see Appendix A for a complete list of participants). The purposes of this meeting were to: examine how current standards of care might need to be altered in response to a mass casualty event in order to save as many lives as possible; identify what planning, guidance, and tools are needed and what related issues need to be addressed to ensure an effective health and medical care response to a mass casualty event; and recommend specific action that will begin to address the needs of Federal, State, regional, community, and health systems planners on this critically important subject. This paper summarizes the deliberations and recommendations of the expert panel."

"Most American communities will never host a large-scale event, but the lessons learned from providing security at major events, such as the Olympics, can be scaled to other events. These lessons may also help guide homeland security preparedness, particularly in states, regions, and cities. This article distills the strategic insights of almost twenty-five years of national and international special event after-action reports and experience and offers five strategic principles that can be used as heuristics for future events: (1) start preparing from Day One, (2) understand the life cycle of a special event, (3) anticipate the threat spectrum, (4) write and live the security strategy, and (5) shape the security landscape. The strategic issues and suggestions made here are scalable to special events of practically any size, with applicability to homeland security as well. As one Utah public safety agency director is quoted, homeland security preparedness 'feels like we are preparing for the Olympics all over again, we just don't know when they are coming.'"

"Operation Partnership: Trends and Practices in Law Enforcement and Private Security Collaborations is intended to help law enforcement and private security organizations develop and operate effective partnerships to address issues of mutual concern. It provides guidelines and analysis which are supplemented with examples from partnerships throughout the nation of trends, innovative practices, obstacles, lessons learned, and results. These partnerships were formed or expanded to address a range of critical policing and private sector needs, including: terrorism preparedness and prevention, supporting neighborhood and downtown revitalization efforts, combating financial crimes, improving security at special events, improving security for the nation's critical infrastructure, and bringing community policing strategies to bear on crimes against businesses and the community."

"Thousands of pre-planned mass gatherings and special events occur each year across the country and abroad. […] Unfortunately, in today's environment, special events attended by large numbers of people may be considered as terrorist targets due to large concentrations of crowds, the symbolic nature of the event, high-profile attendees, and increased media attention. Beyond the terrorist implications, there is still the inherent vulnerability of mass gatherings. The effects of a natural disasters, accidents, or disease outbreaks become amplified when they occur in a mass gathering. Further, the nature of crowds, in and of themselves, can be dangerous. Lastly, high concentrations of people may overwhelm the personnel support capacity in a given area, compromising basic human services and exacerbating existing medical conditions or creating unhealthy environments. It is for these reasons that local, state, and federal authorities should manage the public health and medical issues presented by mass gatherings and prepare for contingency response operations. Treating these events as 'planned emergencies,' including using incident management systems for planning and operating, allows a rapid transition to emergency response should an incident occur. The resources in this Topic Collection include lessons learned, case studies, research, tools, and templates designed to help emergency medical staff create robust plans for mass critical care before an incident strikes their jurisdiction."

From the thesis abstract: "Although the United States made considerable advances in improving sport venue security following 9/11, many sporting events remain vulnerable to attack. The perceived lack of threat to smaller venues, budget limitations and technical constraints are restricting the level of patron and vehicle screening at Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) 4--5 events. This thesis assesses the risk of attack by analyzing 21st century developments in explosive trace detection and closed-circuit television technologies, as well as trends surrounding the terrorist target value of SEAR 4--5 events. The research shows that these events have become viable, valuable terrorist targets because of increasing attendance and rapidly expanding exposure via cable television, satellite broadcasts, and the Internet. It identifies shortcomings of national protection doctrine and outlines potential cost-effective policy options to better support SEAR 4--5 sporting event venue security. Establishing a national doctrine, organizational support and training standards, along with deploying select surveillance and detection technologies, will bring untold benefits to the national protection mission."

"A presidential transition is a unique time in America and holds the promise of opportunity, as well as a possible risk to the nation's security interests. The 2008- 2009 election marks the first presidential transition in the post-9/11 era, and is of concern to many national security observers. While changes in administration during U.S. involvement in national security related activities are not unique to the 2008- 2009 election, many observers suggest that the current security climate and recent acts of terrorism by individuals wishing to influence national elections and change foreign policies portend a time of increased risk to the current presidential transition period. [...] How the new President recognizes and responds to these challenges will depend heavily on the planning and learning that occurs prior to the inauguration. Actions can be taken by the outgoing President and President-elect that may ameliorate decisionmaking activities in the new administration. Whether an incident of national security significance occurs just before or soon after the presidential transition, the actions or inactions of the outgoing Administration may have a long-lasting effect on the new President's ability to effectively safeguard U.S. interests and may affect the legacy of the outgoing President. This report discusses historical national-security related presidential transition activities, provides a representative sampling of national security issues the next administration may encounter, and offers considerations and options relevant to each of the five phases of the presidential transition period. Each phase has distinct challenges and opportunities for the incoming administration, the outgoing administration, and Congress."

Chairman Bennie G. Thompson of the House Committee on Homeland Security, charged the Democratic Majority staff to examine and observe a number of different mass gathering events to identify areas where additional homeland security resources might help to ensure public health and safety at these events. "Ensuring the public health, safety, and security of the public at mass gatherings can be especially challenging. These areas are interrelated and do not fall within the exclusive domain of the private sector. On the contrary, mass gatherings require that the public and private sectors interact with and support one another in complex ways. […] Mass gatherings pose special challenges in terms of management and control, especially considering their value as targets for terrorism and other crimes. The terrorist goal of attacking cities in order to kill and injure the most people-and otherwise have the greatest impact for the least amount of effort-applies to mass gatherings as well. All large-scale mass gatherings need to be protected in the post-9/11 world. Mass gatherings can be categorized in a number of different ways. Mass gatherings occur over different periods of time. Some are one-day events, such as the Super Bowl. Others extend for longer, such as the Lollapolooza music festival. Still others are composed of a series of one-day events, such as National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 'March Madness.' In this paper, one-day events are referred to as 'shortterm mass gatherings.' This paper primarily focuses on mass gatherings lasting for longer than one-day and the attendees, participants, and support personnel who physically remain in the same constrained location-long-term mass gatherings."

The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states the following about the contents of this DHS Inspector General Report: "This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the United States Secret Service after-action review of concerns raised in the Washington Post on January 30, 2009, on inaugural security. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, interviews with members of the public, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents." More specifically, "our review focused on two issues: (1) the adequacy of security at the events described in the Washington Post article and (2) how well the Secret Service managed its after-action review of the concerns cited in the article. The article described ticket-sharing practices that the political hosts of inaugural events have discretion to allow, rather than deficiencies in physical screening measures that the Secret Service uses to provide security. The article also described other permitted activities, such as bringing a camera without live batteries through screening or posing for photographs near presidential vehicles. We evaluated the article's concerns that screened guests mingled with the public, but determined that Secret Service security measures were not readily identifiable to inaugural participants. We determined that the Secret Service after-action review was prompt and thorough, and designed to identify security planning and implementation weaknesses. We also concluded that the Secret Service risk assessments and security plans for the events described in the article were reasonable. Because the Secret Service after-action report identified and addressed areas for improvement, we recommend that Secret Service inform us of the implementation of these changes."

From the Introduction: "This report is NTAC's [National Threat Assessment Center] second analysis of mass attacks that were carried out in public spaces, and it builds upon 'Mass Attacks in Public Spaces - 2017' (MAPS2017). In MAPS-2017, NTAC found that attackers from that year were most frequently motivated by grievances related to their workplace or a domestic issue. All of the attackers had recently experienced at least one significant stressor, and most had experienced financial instability. Over three-quarters of the attackers had made threatening or concerning communications, and a similar number had elicited concern from others. Further, most had histories of criminal charges, mental health symptoms, and/or illicit substance use or abuse."

"Major events that are considered to be nationally significant may be designated by the President--or his representative, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-- as National Special Security Events (NSSE). Beginning in September 1998 through February 2008, there have been 28 events designated as NSSEs. Some of these events have included presidential inaugurations, presidential nominating conventions, major sports events, and major international meetings. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) is the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating, planning, exercising, and implementing security for NSSEs, and was designated as the lead agency in P.L. 106-544. This report provides information on USSS legislative authority for NSSEs, NSSE designation funding and training, and NSSE funding. This report will be updated when congressional or executive branch actions warrant."

"The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) was directed by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, to submit a report to Congress on 'best practices' developed by law enforcement to secure special events of national or regional importance, such as sporting events, concerts, and cultural exhibitions. The report, 'Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement,' was prepared after a nationwide study that included: (1)Consultations with representatives of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other agencies charged with providing high levels of security for major national events. (2) Interviews with private security experts regarding such events as National Football League and National Basketball Association games. (3) On-site observations of security planning and management for the Republican and Democratic National Conventions, Kentucky Derby, and other major events. (4) Extensive telephone interviews with more than 40 local law enforcement agencies concerning best practices for securing major events in their jurisdictions. (5) Reviews of relevant security plans, reports, articles, guidelines, and other documents produced by experts in event security planning and management."

Taken from the Introduction: "Although not the first, the June 2015 shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal [A.M.E.] Church in Charleston, South Carolina, that left nine parishioners dead was another dreadful reminder of the vulnerability houses of worship face in communities across the country. That unique vulnerability -- whether at a small or large venue -- stems from the balance faith-based institutions must strike between being welcoming to all comers, particularly those with immediate needs, while maintaining the sanctity and security of the worship center. Following the human devastation inflicted at Emanuel A.M.E., the United States Attorney's Office in Detroit reached out to its local faith community and sponsored a Faith-Based Security Summit for faith-based leadership. The event -- the inspiration of Barbara L. McQuade, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Michigan -- proved to be valuable resource to the community in a number of ways. It was not only an opportune time for the law-enforcement community to stand beside the faith-based community, but it also offered some practical guidance to strengthen houses of worship against the ever-increasing threats they confront. […] Given the increasing level of interest in the topic, the hope is that this resource guide draws upon these experiences and aids others in offering similar meetings in more communities."

From the opening statement of Bennie G. Thompson: "When Americans think of mass gathering events, the Super Bowl, the national conventions and the Pope's recent visit come to mind. How the Department of Homeland Security manages and coordinates these high-profile national security events is certainly worthy of discussion, but that is a discussion for another day. Today, we will turn our attention to the challenges of securing mass gatherings that are not considered national special security events, that do not have the Federal Government coming in to run security and are held in communities that do not have huge amounts of resources for security. Think of State fairs, collegiate sporting events and even large shopping complexes during the holiday season. Mass gatherings, whether they have national security event rating or not, could be particularly tempting targets for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with the goal of killing or injuring the most people, destroying the most infrastructure and having the greatest impact possible with the least amount of effort." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Bennie G. Thompson, Sheila Jackson Lee, Robert B. Stephan, Roger T. Rufe Jr., Thomas H. Blackwell, Scott McCartney, Douglas Reynolds.

This hearing testimony is from the June 23, 2014 hearing on "Mass Gathering Security: A Look at the Coordinated Approach to Super Bowl XLVIII in New Jersey and Other Large Scale Events" held before the House Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Susan W. Brooks: "As the world looks on as millions gather in Brazil to watch the World Cup, the Subcommittee is meeting today to examine the security considerations necessary for mass gatherings. On February 2, 2014, Super Bowl 48 took place less than ten miles from where we are sitting today. That event, which was attended by more than 80,000 and watched around the world by more than 100 million people, is just one of the many large sporting events and gatherings that take place around the country each year. […] In preparation for Super Bowl XLVIII, DHS took the lead in coordinating federal efforts to assist the New Jersey State Police in security operations at MetLife Stadium and the surrounding areas, directing over 13 federal offices and agencies in a massive interagency partnership. This partnership included the FBI, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), FDA, and DoD, among others, all of which were essential in providing safety and security for travel to and from the stadium and security during the event. I am pleased that we are joined by a number of key stakeholders in those planning efforts today. Each of our witnesses has played a vital role in ensuring the safety and security of the public when they attend mass gatherings. I look forward to hearing their perspectives on their successes and challenges in planning for the Super Bowl and Indy 500, including best practices that can be used by those preparing for future mass gatherings." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Andrew McLees, Edward Cetnar, Louis Koumoutsos, John G. Centanni, Dan Grossi, Daniel DeLorenzi, J. Douglas Boles, and Fred S. Roberts.

In the context of this report, NIPP stands for National Infrastructure Protection Plan. From the Executive Summary: "The Commercial Facilities (CF) Sector is made up of an extremely diverse range of sites and assets where large numbers of people congregate daily to conduct business, purchase retail products, and enjoy recreational events and accommodations. Given the national and international visibility and potential human and economic consequences associated with commercial facilities, it is important for the Federal Government and the CF Sector to work together to ensure the protection of our Nation's prominent business centers and gathering places. The majority of CF Sector facilities are privately owned, operate with minimal regulations, and house the business activities and commercial transactions that dominate the U.S. economy. The sector is divided into eight subsectors-Entertainment and Media, Gaming, Lodging, Outdoor Events, Public Assembly, Real Estate, Retail, and Sports Leagues-to facilitate coordination among facilities with similar functions, operations, and security issues. The Retail Subsector is further divided into two councils: the Shopping Center Subsector Council, which includes mall developers, and the Council of Retailers, which includes stores within malls and standalone retail establishments. While diverse, CF stakeholders, facing common existing and developing risks, must balance security priorities with their need for open access, public confidence, and economic vitality. Natural disasters, armed attacker and terrorist threats, pandemics, theft, supply chain, and geopolitical disruptions are persistent risks to the CF Sector. Risks associated with cyberattacks continue to grow, as CF Sector reliance on cyber systems, such as for online financial transactions and building management, rises. The use of social media has facilitated increasingly coordinated protest activities and has also allowed terrorist organizations to solicit support."

"As articulated in the United States Constitution, one of the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment is the right of persons and groups to assemble peacefully. Whether demonstrating, counterprotesting, or showing support for a cause, individuals and groups have the right to peacefully gather. Law enforcement, in turn, has the responsibility to ensure public safety while protecting the privacy and associated rights of individuals. To support agencies as they fulfill their public safety responsibilities, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) developed this paper to provide guidance and recommendations to state and local law enforcement officers in understanding their role in First Amendment-protected events. This paper is divided into three areas, designed to provide in-depth guidance for law enforcement."

"The Academy for Venue Safety & Security (AVSS) is a dynamic, two-year school built to train venue and event managers, security professionals, and other key personnel involved in every aspect of venue safety and security. The 2016 curriculum, developed and taught by a diverse team of experts, is designed to equip each and every attendee with the best practices, resources, and tools needed to face the evolving challenge of providing a safe venue for everyone."