Sea Piracy

The FMC is an independent government agency, responsible for the regulation of shipping in the foreign trades of the United States. The Commission is engaged in foreign commerce regulations, and many other facets of the maritime industry. Their website provides access to various Commission proceedings and decisions, as well as speeches and remarks.

The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations which is responsible for measures to improve the safety of international shipping and to prevent marine pollution from ships. It also is involved in legal matters, including liability and compensation issues and the facilitation of international maritime traffic. It adopts the budget for the next biennium together with technical resolutions and recommendations prepared by subsidiary bodies during the previous two years. The Council acts as governing body in between Assembly sessions, and prepares the budget and work program for the Assembly. The main technical work is carried out by the Maritime Safety, Marine Environment Protection, Legal, Technical Co-operation and Facilitation Committees and a number of sub-committees.

This Maritime Administration website provides a broad spectrum of maritime information including various programs and initiatives to ensure sufficient sealift capability and intermodal transportation infrastructure to support vital homeland and national security interests.

This is the official website for the U.S. Coast Guard, now combined with the Department of Homeland Security. Features include links to other government websites as well as various Coast Guard links.

"The Anti-Shipping Activity Messages (ASAM) include the locations and descriptive accounts of specific hostile acts against ships and mariners. The reports may be useful for recognition, prevention and avoidance of potential hostile activity." The ASAM Database can be searched using one or more of the following criteria: ASAM reference number(s), sub region, or occurrence date(s). Each record includes the date of occurrence, an ASAM reference number, the number identifying the geographical subregion, the latitude and longitude of the geographical location, the aggressor if known, the type of vessel victimized, the name of the vessel victimized and a detailed description of the occurance.

"Presidential Policy Directive 18 (PPD-18)1 established United States Government policy on Maritime Security and provided for the development of scalable, flexible frameworks on specific maritime issues to guide and clarify roles and responsibilities for strategic goals of the United States. This document: [1] Affirms the vital national interest in global maritime security and articulates United States Government policy for countering piracy, robbery at sea, and related maritime crime; [2] Provides the overarching guidance to develop objectives to enhance maritime security in other regions of the world as required based on evolving and emerging threats; and [3] Supersedes the Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan."

"The Worldwide Threats to Shipping Report, compiled and published weekly by the Office of Naval Intelligence, contains a summary of recent piracy acts and hostile actions against commercial shipping worldwide, organized by geographic region. The report also includes any recent developments in the efforts to prevent piracy and prosecute the aggressors."

"This Plan implements the National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005) and the Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea (June 2007) as applied to piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Strategy affirms the vital national interest of the United States in maritime security, and recognizes that nations have a common interest in achieving two complementary objectives: to facilitate the vibrant maritime commerce that underpins economic security, and to protect against ocean-related criminal and dangerous acts, including piracy. Our Policy provides that we shall '[c]ontinue to lead and support international efforts to repress piracy . . . and urge other states to take decisive action both individually and through international efforts.' Accordingly, this Plan seeks to involve all nations, international organizations, industry, and other entities that have an interest in maritime security to take steps to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa. This Plan's objective is to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa in the interest of the global economy, freedom of navigation, Somalia, and the regional states. Accordingly, this Plan focuses on immediate operational measures to prevent, disrupt, and punish acts of Somali pirate organizations. We intend this Plan to respond to the growing threat and to be mutually supportive of longer-term initiatives aimed at establishing governance, rule of law, security, and economic development in Somalia."

"The International Law Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, conducted a counter-piracy workshop on 7 and 8 April 2009. Comprising [of] fifty legal and policy experts from across the globe, the workshop captured a number of findings and vetted recommendations for continuing the effort against maritime piracy. The participants "took away" four major findings. First, it was apparent to them that piracy in the Horn of Africa has emerged from a complex political, economic, and cultural milieu. No single response will solve the problem. Second, regional capacity building and collective maritime action will be required to contend with the challenge of piracy so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. Proposals to stop piracy by "fixing" Somalia, however, beg the question of how to go about the task, as it is doubtful that the international community has the capability or will to transform Somalia quickly into a stable and viable state. Third, the participants were convinced that only the major maritime powers have the skill and resources to help the regional states expand coastal and littoral maritime-security capability rapidly. Security assistance to the regional states, including training and provision of patrol craft, can shift responsibility for counter-piracy to the states of the neighborhood. Eventually, these states should acquire and operate offshore patrol vessels, even corvettes. Shifting responsibility for maintaining rule of law at sea to the regional powers, the workshop felt, benefits everyone. Finally, the civil shipping industry should take a greater role in protecting merchant vessels, including integrating passive design measures that make it more difficult for pirates to board a ship. In some cases, this means that provision of private armed security may be appropriate. The workshop was designed to take a fresh look at the threat of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa, assess the tremendous progress in international law and diplomacy that has transpired to address the problem, and consider the way forward."

This Department of Transportation website provides a number of links to detailed information regarding maritime shipping concerns as they apply to the region around the Horn of Africa and piracy. "As an industry facilitator to meet security challenges, one of the roles of the Maritime Administration is to provide useful information to both the private and public sectors in the event of a transportation crisis. Piracy off the coast of Somalia escalated in 2008 causing a significant disruption to the Marine Transportation System (MTS), as well as endangering the life of merchant mariners. As part of the Maritime Administration action plan for addressing piracy off the Horn of Africa, pertinent information is consolidated on this site for easy access to current status and advice to counter-piracy and armed robbery. The information is intended to assist ship owners, operators, and other maritime industry representatives to be prepared to prevent seajackings."

"The Coast Guard announces the release of Maritime Security (MARSEC) Directive 104--6 (Rev 6). This Directive only applies to U.S.-flagged vessels subject to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) on international voyages through or in designated high risk waters, and provides additional counter-piracy guidance and mandatory measures for these vessels operating in these areas where acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships are prevalent. MARSEC Directive 104--6 (Rev 6) also includes an annex that provides specific direction for vessels operating around the Horn of Africa. Although MARSEC Directives are designated Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and are not subject to public release, a non-SSI version of this directive is available."

"Pirate attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, have brought continued U.S. and international attention to the long-standing problem of piracy in the region. The United States has been an active participant in piracy interdiction and prevention operations focusing on the Horn of Africa region. As part of anti-piracy operations, the U.S. military has detained individuals accused of acts of piracy against U.S.-flagged vessels. In some instances these individuals have been released, others have been transferred to Kenya for criminal prosecution in the Kenyan courts, and some have been brought to the United States for criminal prosecution in the federal courts. [...] The United States Navy, after thwarting two separate alleged acts of piracy, transferred suspected pirates to Norfolk, VA, for criminal trials in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of VA, on charges of piracy. One of the trials, United States v. Hasan, ended with the defendants found guilty on numerous charges, including piracy. The other case, United States v. Said, is on appeal based on a court ruling dismissing the charge of piracy. A common issue between the two cases, and yet the greatest distinction, is how the two trial courts interpreted the definition of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651. The Said court stated that the act of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, requires a robbery on the high seas. Thus, it appears that absent an actual robbery at sea, individuals may not be found guilty of the act of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651. [...] In Hasan, the trial court ruled that the act of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, is reflected by Article 110 of UNCLOS [Unites Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] and thus does not require an actual robbery at sea to be convicted of piracy. The divergent U.S. district court rulings may create uncertainty in how the offense of piracy is defined. Congress may provide guidance to the courts by clarifying the definition of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651. However, in the absence of legislative clarification, the courts may arrive at differing interpretations."

This Naval War College Newport Paper is "an academic and comparative examination of twelve selected case studies form maritime history and used to illuminate a range of concepts and uses of piracy suppression. The twelve case studies provide the basis for the conclusions, an approach that provides a more thorough understanding of the uses and limitations of naval antipiracy operations in the context of new maritime technologies and within a wider range of modern national policy goals than might otherwise be achievable. Above all, this collection provides a sound basis for comparative analysis of varying historical experiences that can stimulate new and original thinking about a basic but often overlooked naval duty."

This webpage is updated frequently and contains a bibliography described as "a comprehensive selection of resources on piracy off the coast of Somalia. Pulled together on one page for easy access are U.S. policy responses and recommendations, as well as websites and reports providing information on the international response, the scope and consequences of piracy, and suggestions for effective strategies to combat it." The resources "outline the response of the U.S. Government and the international community to piracy off the coast of Somalia, the scope and consequences of the problem, and identify some strategic options that are available to combat this growing menace." The bibliography is divided into the following sections: U.S. Response, International Organizations, Scope and Consequences, Combating Piracy, Additional Reading, and Background on Somalia.

"Pirate attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, have brought new U.S. and international attention to the long-standing problem of piracy in the region. According to the International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center 217 attacks occurred in the waters off the Horn of Africa during 2009, with 47 successful hijackings. The IMB recorded 111 attacks in those waters in 2008, almost double the number in 2007. Attacks have been concentrated in the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and the northern coast of Somalia and along Somalia's eastern coastline. However, in July 2009, the United Nations Secretary General warned that 'as a result of the military presence in the region, pirates have employed more daring operational tactics, operating further seawards, towards the Seychelles, and using more sophisticated weaponry.' […]. The Obama Administration has outlined its policy response and pledged to continue working through interagency and multilateral coordination and enforcement mechanisms established during the Bush Administration. Most experts believe that the reestablishment of government authority in Somalia is the only guarantee that piracy will not continue as a threat. The 111th Congress has explored a range of options to address both the threat posed by piracy as well as its underlying causes, and has sought to influence U.S. policy through oversight of U.S. military operations and diplomatic efforts and through defense and foreign assistance appropriations and authorizations."

From the opening statement of Elijah E. Cummings: "We have long argued that we need a U.S.-flagged merchant fleet to carry U.S.-government cargoes and to provide sealift capacity to support DOD needs in time of war and national emergency. For that reason, we have created the Maritime Security Program, which provides direct payments to U.S.-flagged ships to ensure that they are available when the government needs them. Given this, isn't it in our national interest to utilize the very limited U.S. military resources that would be necessary to protect our U.S.-flagged fleet rather than leaving them to implement their own defensive measures?" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: James Caponiti, Paul Doell, Ed Frothongham, Erik L. Johnsen, Brian Salerno, Philip J. Shapiro, Augustin Tellez, Bill Van Loo, and Arthur J. Volkle.

This is from the April 10, 2013 hearing, "Update of Efforts to Combat Piracy," before the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. From the opening statement of Duncan Hunter: "The Subcommittee is meeting this morning to review efforts by the United States and the international community to respond to piracy on the high seas and prevent future attacks. Since the Subcommittee's last hearing on this topic, there has been a dramatic reduction in the number of attacks off the Horn of Africa. I commend industry, labor, the federal government, and the international community for working together and taking strong actions to improve the safety and security of the crews, vessels, and cargoes transiting those strategically important waters. Unfortunately, although the situation has improved on the East Coast of Africa, it has deteriorated on the West Coast. Attacks on vessels and mariners in the Gulf of Guinea have risen nearly 20 percent from 2011 to 2012. Pirates are venturing further from shore and using more violent tactics. In just the last few weeks, pirates operating out of Nigeria hijacked more than five vessels, taking more than 20 mariners hostage, and killing one crewmember. The United States is not immune from the violence. Since 2008, pirates have attacked or attempted to attack 20 U.S.-flagged vessels. Pirates took three Americans hostage, including two working on a U.S.-flagged offshore supply vessel in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2011, pirates ruthlessly murdered a retired couple from Southern California and their two friends from Washington State as they sailed through the Indian Ocean." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Duncan Hunter, Joseph A. Servidio, Joseph Kuzmick, David Matsuda, Thomas Kelly, and Neil Smith.

"In 2009, the Naval Oceanographic Office was tasked with developing a product that uses forecasted meteorological conditions and historical pirate incidents to predict locations conducive to pirate activity in the Somali Basin Region and the Gulf of Aden. This resulted in the development of the Piracy Performance Surface (PPS) model, whose outputs are briefed daily to the Commander of the United States Naval Forces Central Command and Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain. The Next-generation PPS (PPSN) model uses simulation to provide as output, a forecast of relative pirate presence probability over time. Effective March 1, 2011, the name of PPSN has been changed to the Pirate Attack Risk Surface (PARS) model. This research includes interviews with counter-piracy forces that led to recommended changes in the PPSN model. In addition, using robust and realistic experimental designs, this research identifies the significant intelligence factors of the PPSN model. This gathered information is being used to refine these input variables to achieve maximum performance of the PPSN model. This research also unveiled input variables that are influential in the computing memory requirements and program runtime. This information is being used to focus efforts on setting these variables to realistic levels without sacrificing the model's efficiency and effectiveness. Finally, the results of this thesis allow for quick turnaround of updates to the PPSN model in response to gathered intelligence."

"This thesis examines the history and current trends of international maritime terrorism to show that terrorists may soon determine that small boat attacks may be the most cost-effective and successful terrorism strategy. This review determined that increasingly successful worldwide piracy attacks and the effective use of detection-evading drug vessels, may increase the risk of a terrorist attack in United States' waters. These reviews and lessons learned from other nations' successful responses to the maritime threat, in coordination with the goals outlined in the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, led to this author's recommendations that the local U.S. maritime community members must be better encouraged by Coast Guard members to become involved in observing and reporting suspicious activities, the Coast Guard and other local law enforcement agencies must investigate and prioritize those areas that might be used as a staging area for a small boat attack and increase their presence activities in those locations, the use of up-to-date technology must be a part of any small boat terrorist deterrence plan, and the U.S. must be prepared with a plan to respond to a successful small boat attack, including possible increased regulations and restrictions on the maritime community."

"Sea piracy has infested the seven seas throughout history. In modern times, the United States has paid little attention to piracy because the nation's isolated vastness has protected the shipping industry from maritime crime. But the events of 9/11 have changed the lens through which America views security. This thesis investigates modern day piracy and links between piracy and terrorism in order to determine implications for U.S. maritime security strategy. Specifically, the maritime environment in Southeast Asia and associated maritime security policies are researched because a sizable proportion of the world's sea piracy occurs in that region. U.S. maritime security policy is also evaluated."

From the thesis abstract: "The rise in piracy throughout the world in recent years has forced the international community to invest heavily in measures to counter the threat. However, these efforts have had little effect. Lately, the trends in Southeast Asia seem to have turned. In order to counter piracy efficiently, it is critical to fully understand the background and root causes for the phenomenon. Piracy is blamed by some on poverty, relative deprivation, and the lack of local institutions. This paper investigates piracy in the Caribbean, the Strait of Malacca, and Somalia, and finds that piracy is directly linked to the level of land-based governance. Poverty, relative deprivation, and a lack of local institutions are merely factors exploitable by organized pirate networks in territories with a low level of governance. By exploring levels of landbased governance in territories close to main shipping routes, possible emerging safe havens for pirates may be found."