From the thesis abstract: "The US Army division lost the capability to effectively shape the deep fight with the removal of division cavalry squadrons. The change made sense to provide cavalry squadrons to the modular brigade combat teams for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This move was a dangerous bargain: the sacrifice of a high-quality unit for the increase of similar units but of lesser quality. The lack in traditional capability was filled with a greater dependence on unmanned aerial surveillance systems. This added to the justification that cavalry squadrons no longer needed to fight for information. With the growing likelihood of large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary in a contested environment, the division needs the adequate capability to enable brigades to succeed in the close fight. Although the Army is developing solutions, this study proposes a unique alternative. By referencing US cavalry history and case studies of cavalry operations during the World Wars, this study proposes a change to the division which provides the commander with the operational capabilities that enable success in multi-domain battle within the full range of military operations. The result is that Division commanders have organic assets that are tactically and technically capable to accurately paint and effectively shape the deep fight."
Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library: http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/