Wassenaar: Cybersecurity and Export Controls, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, January 12, 2016 [open pdf - 5MB]
This is the January 12, 2016 hearing on "Wassenaar: Cybersecurity and Export Controls," held before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of John Ratcliffe: "To the issue at hand, we know that private industry in America is excellent at responding to consumer demands. Many companies, including some of those here today, pride themselves on guaranteeing the security of their customers' personal information. Others represented here exist solely to help in securing that information. They also secure vital sectors of society such as critical infrastructure and the financial sector. Their success hinges, in part, on their ability to guarantee their own security. Today, I hope to hear from our witnesses on how the Wassenaar Arrangement in its implementation would affect these objectives. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established 20 years ago to apply to conventional arms and dual-use goods and technology. Changes made in 2013 sought to extend export controls to cybersecurity intrusion and surveillance software and technology. These changes were motivated by a desire to prevent authoritative regimes from repressing their people. This intent is noble. If the administration's implementation effort resulted in unified dissent from the technology and cybersecurity industries, from academics and researchers, the energy and financial sectors also voiced deep concerns. And they were echoed by civil society groups who said that the proposal could make communicating about security vulnerabilities almost impossible in certain cases. The Federal Government engages in countless ways with the American people and our international partners. When proposing actions, the government should, at a minimum, not do harm to its own people. I'm interested to hear from our government witnesses how they believe this arrangement will successfully deter the accumulation of digital weapons, which aren't constructed in factories, which don't need physical space for storage, and which don't depend on traceable means of transport." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Vann H. Van Diepen, Kevin J. Wolf, Phyllis Schneck, Cheri Flynn McGuire, Iain Mulholland, Cristin Flynn Goodwin, Dean C. Garfield, and Ann K. Ganzer.
Serial No. 114-102 & 114-49; Serial Number 114-102 & 114-49
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