"Biological weapons attacks could be mounted either inside or outside the United States and the effects of an initial attack could spread widely - whether because a contagious agent was used, because travelers exposed in one location may fall ill elsewhere, or because those in other locations will be concerned about being the next target. Disease outbreaks, whether natural or deliberate, respect no geographic or political borders. Preventing and controlling biological weapons threats is extremely challenging. Advances in biotechnology and the life sciences present the prospect of new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators that would require new detection methods, preventive measures, and treatments. These trends increase the risk for surprise. Anticipating such threats through intelligence efforts is made more difficult by the dual-use nature of biological technologies and infrastructure, meaning that the same science and technology base necessary for legitimate scientific, economic, and health applications can also be used for harm. Furthermore, adversaries may use denial and deception to conceal their illicit activities or at least not publicly reveal an attack has taken place until casualties are apparent. [...] The BDRD [Biological Defense Research and Development Subcommittee] conducted a comprehensive evaluation of U.S. biological defense capabilities to identify future priorities and actions to support them, culminating in a two-day session in October 2015 in which identified needs were evaluated and prioritized, with the most important ones presented in this report."
The White House of President Barack Obama: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov