States' Obligations Under Additional Protocols to IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements [October 23, 2017] [open pdf - 425KB]
"Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) treaty, which entered into force in 1970, requires nonnuclear-weapon states-parties to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), which are of indefinite duration, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These agreements are based on a model described in Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153), which states that such agreements 'should provide for the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied' to all nuclear material of potential proliferation concern 'in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' The scope of a CSA agreement is not limited to nuclear material declared by a state, but includes all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within that country. This was a change from the pre-NPT version of IAEA safeguards, described in Information Circular 66 (INFCIRC/66), which depended on verifying declared material at specific facilities. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the IAEA's ability to inspect and monitor nuclear facilities, as well as obtain information, in a particular country pursuant to a CSA is limited to facilities and activities that have been declared by the government. After a CSA enters into force, the government is required to provide the IAEA with lists of all nuclear material in the country and nuclear facilities, along with associated design information. The agency subsequently verifies the correctness and completeness of those declarations using various verification methods."
CRS Memorandum, October 23, 2017
Federation of American Scientists: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/index.html