Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Structure, Funding, and Other Issues [February 28, 2017] [open pdf - 811KB]
"Conventional wisdom regarding regulators is that the structure and design of the organization matters for policy outcomes. Financial regulators conduct rulemaking and enforcement to implement law and supervise financial institutions. These agencies have been given certain characteristics that enhance their day-to-day independence from the President and Congress, which may make policymaking more technical and less 'political' or 'partisan,' for better or worse. Independence may also make regulators less accountable to elected officials and can reduce congressional influence, at least in the short term. Although independent agencies share many characteristics, there are notable differences. Some federal financial regulators are relatively more independent in some areas but relatively less so in others. Major structural characteristics of federal financial regulators that influence independence include: agency head […], party affiliation […], term in office […], grounds for removal […], executive oversight […], congressional oversight […], and funding […]. From time to time, Congress has considered legislation that would alter the structure and design of some of the federal financial regulators, including changes to their leadership and funding structure, the Congressional Review Act, and cost-benefit analysis requirements."
CRS Report for Congress, R43391
Federation of American Scientists: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/index.html