"This report draws important lessons from the U.S. experience with corruption in Afghanistan since 2001. These lessons are relevant for ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, where the United States will remain engaged in coming years and continue to face the challenge of corruption. The United States may also participate in future efforts to rebuild other weak states emerging from protracted conflict. It is vital that anticorruption lessons from Afghanistan inform and improve these efforts. When U.S. military forces and civilians entered Afghanistan in 2001 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, they were immediately faced with the difficult task of trying to stabilize a country devastated by decades of war and poverty. Against that background, the U.S. government did not place a high priority on the threat of corruption in the first years of the reconstruction effort. By 2009, however, many senior U.S. officials saw systemic corruption as a strategic threat to the mission. Ambassador Ryan Crocker, who re-established U.S. Embassy Kabul soon after 9/11 and again led the embassy from 2011 to 2012, concluded in an interview for this report that 'the ultimate point of failure for our efforts … wasn't an insurgency. It was the weight of endemic corruption.' This report examines how the U.S. government--primarily the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, Treasury, and Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)--understood the risks of corruption in Afghanistan, how the U.S. response to corruption evolved, and the effectiveness of that response."
Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: https://www.sigar.mil/