Integrated IAEA Safeguards Concepts for Nuclear Critical Facilities   [open pdf - 2MB]

"A study was undertaken to investigate concepts for international safeguards at critical facilities which would minimize impact on normal operations. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The assumed goal of the study was to develop an independent capability for detecting the protracted or abrupt diversion of fuel containing 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately 1 week of the diversion. It is concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system for critical facilities can be achieved. Such a system would involve methods of monitoring movement of materials and people and would maintain a running inventory that is tested periodically by independent inventory sampling. This monitoring would detect inventory and procedural discrepancies as well as unauthorized removal of nuclear materials. A special inventory may be taken following a monitoring alarm to confirm a suspected diversion. Comparison of various safeguards options led to the selection, for further development, of a system which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and periodic routine inventory verification. The safeguards system concepts were developed for a reference critical facility having a split-table horizontal matrix; however, a system designed for an actual facility would necessarily incorporate facility-specific features. Development of special equipment for such systems must include preliminary operational tests and evaluations of these concepts in an operating facility to determine their effectiveness and acceptability."

Report Number:
ALO-0789-T5; Albuquerque Operations Office-0789-T5
Public Domain
Retrieved From:
U.S. Office of Scientific and Technical Information: http://www.osti.gov/
Media Type:
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