"As the US Army transitions from a force no longer sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations to an agile and versatile organization prepared to operate in a wide spectrum of complex environments against a regular, irregular, or hybrid adversary how the force chooses to employ violence in future operations will be crucial to achieving its operational and strategic goals. By examining the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan it becomes clear that the precise application of violence provides space and opportunity for the non-lethal aspects of a balanced irregular warfare campaign to take hold. Well-managed violence and balanced strategies often meant progress, while mismanagement and imbalance often resulted in lost ground. Because of political sensitivities many conventional units abstained from operations like raids and kinetic strikes and relied on special operations forces to conduct targeting. While the force made tremendous strides in the last decade a capability gap developed between special operations and conventional force targeting that needs to be filled. By educating, training, and minimal organizational changes conventional forces can better fuse intelligence and operations, manage ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance], and create a clearer understanding of the environment not just for targeting but for all operations against an irregular or hybrid threat."
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/