ABSTRACT

Commander's Emergency Response Program: A Flawed Metric   [open pdf - 287KB]

From the thesis abstract: "Throughout its military history, the United States has demonstrated poor institutional memory resulting in a tendency to reinvent the wheel. The development of counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam, for instance, yielded valuable knowledge about combating an irregular enemy. Regardless, the subsequent foray into a counterinsurgent environment during Operation Iraqi Freedom proved problematic as the U.S. scrambled to adapt to yet another asymmetric threat. Operationally, the selection of performance metrics by the U.S. in complex and adaptive battlefields has mirrored this argument. Throughout the entirety of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. spent over $60 billion on reconstruction and stability of which the Commander's Emergency Response Program cost the U.S. taxpayer over $4 billion. Reminiscent of the poor selection of performance measures in Vietnam, the metrics used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Commander's Emergency Response Program proved insufficient and resulted in the waste of time, money and resources."

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Date:
2012-09-25
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Copyright:
Public Domain
Retrieved From:
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/
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pdf
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application/pdf
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