"This report examines five historical case studies to provide valuable insights for developing U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine for urban areas. The report begins with an introduction to the nature of urban insurgency and then evaluates each case. The cases (Palestine [1944-19471, Algeria [1954-1957], Cyprus [1955-1958], Venezuela [1960- 19631, and Uruguay (1968-1972]) are diverse in many areas including causes, intensity, insurgent and counterinsurgent strategies and tactics, the role of cities in the overall terrorist campaign, and outcome. After discussion of the case as a whole, emphasis shifts to military forces. The role of military forces in a government's total counterinsurgency effort is examined as are the details about military execution of this role. Political, legal, and strategic factors, organization and command and control, tactics, and equipment are discussed in detail. The report develops findings and conclusions and addresses their implications for U.S. military forces in future urban counterinsurgency operations."
Technical Memorandum 14-89
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/