From the thesis abstract: "Army warfighting doctrine clearly delineates the definition, scope, and components of protection for application on the battlefield; however, the Army's Operations Other Than War (OOTW) doctrine does not provide similar clarity for the concept in OOTW missions. Protection, as defined by FM 100-5, Operations, conserves the commander's combat power, but none of the OOTW manuals give the same definition of protection. In examining Army doctrine, this monograph highlights the significant differences which appear in the key OOTW doctrinal manuals: FM 100-20 (Draft), Operations Other Than War, FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, and FM 100-23-2, Multiservice Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Humanitarian Operations. Comparing these manuals to FM 100-5 shows the disparities which exist in the doctrine. In operations other than war, the commander's requirement to protect his force has received little attention in doctrine. The history of the United States Multinational Force in Lebanon, September 1982 to February 1984, reveals several essential concepts necessary to protect the force in OOTW. Examining the bombing of the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) building in Beirut, Lebanon on the 23d of October, 1983 provides evidence to further modify existing -Army doctrine. The commander must weigh competing requirements to secure his force while simultaneously exercising restraint in the use of weapons. Regardless of the mission, a commander must take precautions to protect his force. Especially during active hostilities, the need for security outweighs concerns about perception."
Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/