From the thesis abstract: "This monograph discusses the nature of tactical intelligence prediction in military operations. Such prediction is extremely complex and involves a broad range of factors from traditional military ones such as terrain and doctrine to more non-traditional ones of human behavior and perceptual mechanisms. While the traditional factors are important, the non-traditional ones are no less so and often hinder accurate prediction. The monograph first examines the U.S. Army's doctrinal requirement for tactical intelligence prediction, both past and present. Next, it discusses and clarifies the relationships of the concepts of 'capabilities,' 'enemy intent,' and 'prediction.' Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is then examined as a vehicle for intelligence prediction. The monograph then moves on to describe the behavioral aspects of prediction in terms of individual and organizational factors which inhibit objective analysis. Historical examples are provided. Finally, an expanded version of IPB is offered as an analytical model offering a more comprehensive and objective approach to tactical intelligence prediction. The monograph conclusion is that U.S. Army doctrine does require tactical intelligence to be predictive in nature, that IPB is inadequate as the current predictive method, and that the suggested analytical model will improve our ability to predict enemy courses of action."
Combined Arms Research Library: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/CARL/