"Beyond the infection control questions which local government agencies need to coordinate with their public health colleagues (and go beyond the scope of this paper), in preparing for pandemic influenza and business continuity, there are two non-health pandemic planning assumptions local government must consider: 1) simultaneous or near simultaneous outbreaks will limit the ability of any jurisdiction to provide mutual aid; and 2) the potential disruption of community critical infrastructure (e.g., transportation, commerce, utilities, and public safety). Local governments must also face the reality that many business continuity plans anticipate disruptions that are restricted to a certain place and time frame (e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes [corrected], snow storms). Pandemic influenza requires different continuity plans since it won't be restricted to a certain place and time frame. Pandemic flu will be widely dispersed geographically and potentially arrive in waves that last several months at a time, with the potentially high employee absentee rates whatever the season. And unlike other disasters which typically involve damage to physical infrastructure, a pandemic does not damage a business's physical infrastructure. Rather, a pandemic affects an organization's most valuable asset, its employees and volunteers, its human infrastructure."
2006 Public Entity Risk Institute
Internet Archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20061005225701/http://www.riskinstitute.org/NR/rdonlyres/7572DA59-1667-4C78-800E-F4905E93AC74/0/Continuity.pdf
Preparing for a Local Crisis within a Global Pandemic. Online Symposium. June 2006