Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [July 19, 2006]   [open pdf - 60KB]

"Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs. Within NNSA, Congress established the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement NNSA's counterintelligence program. Although DOE's existing Office of Counterintelligence develops CI policy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA facilities. Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of a dual office structure in combating foreign espionage and have urged the adoption of an alternative structure. Several alternative organizational approaches have been discussed, including the following. One approach, which DOE has initiated, merges under the control of a new DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence DOE's Office of Intelligence, which assesses foreign nuclear weapons programs, and DOE's CI office. […]. Under a second approach, the DOE and NNSA CI programs could be consolidated under the control of the NNSA administrator. […]. Under a third approach, DOE could integrate its Office of Intelligence and CI office under a new DOE intelligence agency, but allow NNSA's CI office to remain as a separate entity. […]. A fourth approach would be to completely separate the DOE and NNSA counterintelligence programs. Proponents suggest that such an approach would clarify the chain of command. Opponents assert that separation could further undermine coordination and communication. A final approach would be to maintain the status quo. […]. This report will be updated as warranted."

Report Number:
CRS Report for Congress, RL33355
Public Domain
Retrieved From:
Federation of American Scientists: http://www.fas.org/
Media Type:
Help with citations