Time Sensitive Targeting: Overcoming the Intelligence Gap in Interagency Operations [open pdf - 141KB]
"The Central Intelligence Agency's attack on a group of terrorists in Yemen epitomized the agency's short-notice capability to detect, track, and destroy a highly mobile and fleeting target of opportunity. The U.S. military and other federal agencies will not respond to terrorist threats overseas where the destruction of the adversary is allowed under the rules of armed combat. These highly mobile threats also may be found in the United States, where the rules of law apply and the target must be apprehended and prosecuted. The Department of Defense (DOD) perceives a time-sensitive target (TST) as an Iraqi mobile SCUD missile launcher, while other agencies view TSTs not as surface-to- air missiles (SAMs) but as humans engaged in a range of quickly moving hostile activities, such as terrorists fleeing in a vehicle. Human targets of interest may be terrorists, drug smugglers, or illegal aliens; they are highly mobile and exploit weaknesses in defense systems. When engaged in hostile or illegal activities, they may be subject to military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, or law enforcement actions, abroad or in the United States. The present process and capability to detect and identify SCUD-like TSTs lies within the capabilities of DOD and the intelligence community, and national and operational intelligence assets may provide the combatant commander with sufficient data with which to engage TSTs. However, when the source of targets is in or around the United States, and where the lead agency is not the military but a law enforcement agency, strategic and operational intelligence assets are rarely available or used; and if available, are rarely effective. This paper reveals gaps created by a lack of intelligence coordination and interagency cooperation when dealing with TSTs in an interagency environment within the United States."
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/