Biological Laboratory and Transportation Security and the Biological Weapons Convention [open pdf - 67KB]
The U.S. is among those States Parties that lack a biological laboratory and transportation security (BLTS) standard to guide those who are responsible for protecting high-consequence microbial agents and toxins. No clear consensus exists within the USG on the nature of the bioterrorist threat or the pathogens that would be most or least likely targeted for theft or diversion. As a result, the limited physical security measures in place at many U.S. biological research facilities, as well as within the system that transports pathogens around the country on a daily basis, are ad hoc, widely variable, and not designed to mitigate the current bioterrorist risk. These facilities will need to look beyond traditional concepts of facility security that generally rely on perimeter fences and armed personnel - often described as "guns, gates, and guards." This document identifies the fundamental aspects of high-contaminant research that demonstrate why biological laboratory and transportation security should be differentiated from traditional aspects of high security. There is now a need for BLTS standards analogous to those that already exist for biosafety.
SAND No. 2002-1067P
Cooperative Monitoring Center: http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/