ABSTRACT

Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq   [open pdf - 18MB]

In June 2003, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence began a formal review of U.S. intelligence into the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his violations of human rights including the actual use of weapons of mass destruction against his own people, as a part of the Committee's continuing oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States." The first overall conclusion was that "most of the major key judgments in the Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence. This report examines: the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his repression of his own people; the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community; whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policymakers in the executive branch and Congress; whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee's review.

Publisher:
Date:
2004-07-07
Copyright:
Public Domain
Retrieved From:
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, http://intelligence.senate.gov/
Format:
pdf
Media Type:
application/pdf
URL:
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